STUDIES IN PALI AND BUDDHISM

A Memorial Volume in Honor of Bhikkhu Jagdish Kashyap



BHIKKHU JAGDISH KASHYAP

STUDIES IN PALI AND BUDDHISM

A Memorial Volume in Honor of Bhikkhu Jagdish Kashyap

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

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Preface

Bhikkhu Jagdish Kashyap passed away on the 28th January, 1976 at Rajgir. I received the sad news later by a telegram. Soon after, in consultation with his pupils and friends, I decided to bring out a volume of homage to his memory. An editorial committee was formed and letters inviting contributions for the volume were sent out. The response was overwhelming but I had to put a deadline and disappoint late-comers. The result is this volume of 37 articles on a wide range of topics in Pali and Buddhist Studies written by scholars from various parts of the world. The editorial committee and I take this opportunity to put on record our thanks to all the contributors for their support to, and participation in, the project. I thank Rev. N. Khemapali and T. Bhuripalo for kindly supplying the photograph of Bhikkhu Kashyap for this volume.

I am particulary thankful to Miss I.B. Horner and Professors H. Nakamura, H. Bechert, P.S. Jaini, Alex Waymen, C.S. Upasak and N.H. Samtani who kindly accepted my invitation to be a member of the editorial committee and thus became a great source of strength to me in the production of this volume.

I thank Dr. Leonard Zwilling and Mr. Roger Jackson for their assistance in editing and proof-reading. Finally I must thank the Publishers and their staff for publishing the volume efficiently.

A.K. NARAIN

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15 August, 1978.

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Bhikkhu Jagdish Kashyap

(*A Biography*)

A.K. NARAIN

Bhikkhu Jagdish Kashyap was born as Jagdish Narain in 1908 at Ranchi in the state of Bihar in India. But his ancestral home was in the village of Rounia in the district of Gaya. Rounia village is not far from the Barabar Hills in one direction and Rajgir and Nalanda in another. Jagdish Narain came from an old respectable middle class Hindu Ambastha Kayastha family, which has in possession a genealogical table going back to the 13th century A. D. when Thakur Haldhar Das, a Kanungo, migrated somewhere from near Delhi to Bihar. The name of Jagdish Narain's father was Shyam Narain and he was a Siristedar in the Judge's Court at Ranchi. His paternal grand father, Bhikhari Lal was a Mokhtar and an employee of the Amawan Raj and was much respected in the village for his honesty and integrity because he refused to make a false statement in favour of one of the estate contestants inspite of the offer of an "elephant load" of money. Jagdish Narain's maternal grandfather was Ram Prasad, a Siristedar at Ranchi and a much respected leader in the Kayastha community there. Since Shyam Narain was married to the only child of Ram Prasad, he was pursuaded to work in Ranchi which became the second home of the former's family. The eldest son of Shyam Narain was Aditya Narain who was a successful lawyer in Ranchi and rose to eminence in his profession as Government pleader, but died prematurely at the age of 47 in 1943. Aditya Narain was an active social worker and took keen interest in the Indian national movement. He exercised great influence on the charater and career of Jagdish Narain. The second son of Shyam Narain, Shiva Narain, is still a practising lawyer at Darbhanga; he has also been a Government Advocate for some time and has been associated with the social and municipal activities of the town. He is one of the son-in-laws of Dharni Dhar, a very close associate of Mahatma Gandhi in the first Satyagraha of Champaran in Bihar. The

house in which Jagdish Narain was born was partially donated to the Indian National Congress, after the death of Aditya Narain in view of latter's close association with the local activities of the Congress in Ranchi, at the instance of Rajendra Prasad, the first President of India, and of K. B. Sahay, an important provincial leader and at one time the Chief Minister of Bihar.

Jagdish Narain had his early school education at Ranchi. He passed his Matriculation examination from Ranchi Zila School in 1925. Like all his brothers he was above average in his studies, but unlike them he was at once little rustic and simple in his habits, a bit unconventional and radical in outlook. He did not wear western dress, but wore Khadi Dhoti and Kurta and would often go to school without shoes. Some of the elderly gentlemen in the family therefore thought of him as an eccentric. But he was full of respect for elders in the family, though he was sometimes obstinate. He was a good sportsman and he played soccer, field hockey and cricket well. These were interests which he kept alive even in his college days. He enjoyed wrestling and did gymnastics too. In addition to his school teachers he had also a private tutor Jagdeep Narain who taught him at home. Occasionally he received guidance in Sanskrit from a neighbour friend of the family Nand Kumar Lal, who was a Pleader, and in English and Mathematics from one of his uncles Bansi Prasad, a Deputy Magistrate. While in school he became a victim of cholera epidemic twice but his life was saved by timely medical help. Later he suffered a severe attack of typhoid and as a result he got meningities. All physicians failed. Finally his neighbour Nand Kumar Lal, who was not a medical doctor, told the family, that he had read in one of the Sanskrit books on Ayurveda that this ailment could be treated by placing a cap of an Ash Gourd (*Bhatua*) on a shaven head. As a last recourse this was tried and it did cure him of the maddeningly acute pain in the head and saved him from a possible brain damage. But on account of this attack, he continued to suffer from mild headache for long and he lost his speech for sometime. Finally, partly due to homeopathic treatment and partly gaining strength by natural process in due course of time he recovered his speech though he lost his fluency.

Jagdish Narain was sent to Patna for higher studies. He did his Intermediate Arts there from New College in 1927, and Bachelor of Arts from Patna College in 1929. From Patna he went to Varanasi and did his Master of Arts in Philosophy from Banaras Hindu University in 1931. In the following year he did a second M.A. privately in Sanskrit from the same University.

In Patna College, and in Banaras Hindu University, Jagdish Narain was not only doing well in his studies, but, was also pursuing his other goals which were related to social reform and the nationalist movement. He had already begun wearing Khadi as a teenager but he now enjoyed spinning Charkha and wearing Kurtas made out of his own hand-spun Khadi. He lived very simply and liked austerity. He took active part in the political demonstration against Simon Commission when it visited Patna, and got a reprimand from his college authorities. In fact, this was one of the reasons why he moved from Patna to Banaras Hindu University which was a nationalist institution well known for its role in political leadership. As a student in Varanasi he participated fully in social, cultural and political activities of the country and came in the mainstream of the relevant movements. He took interest in the Satyagraha movement of 1931 but he did not involve himself too actively partly because he was more involved

with tasks of social reform, and partly because he could not afford to drop out from college.

Already from school days he had come under the influence of one of his maternal grandfathers, Ayodhya Prasad, an Arya Samaj leader and preacher who had represented the Arya Samaj in USA. He had become such an ardent Arya Samaji even at High School that, as he told me, he wrote the word *Om* on my tongue and whispered this great word in my ears when I was born. It was on account of Ayodhya Prasad's influence and guidance that he continued to be an active Arya Samaj worker and also acquired the art of public speaking. His academic training in Philosophy and Sanskrit helped him to take deeper interest in the Arya Samaj not only as an instrument of social change but also as a religious movement and a way of life. So, he joined one of the Gurukulas run by the Arya Samaj. He worked as the Principal of Sanskrit Vidyapith, the Gurukula at Baidyanathdham in Bihar during the year 1931-33. In this manner he got formally and intimately associated with the Arya Samaj.

As soon as he had passed his B. A. examination people had started coming to his parents with offers of marriage. But he decided to lead a celibate life and refused to be pursuaded by his parents for marriage. When pressed by them he argued with them that, since they already had two of their sons married and they had now grandchildren and since the continuity of the family thus had already been taken care of, there was no need for him to marry. Moreover, if he did not marry he would be able to dedicate his life to the service of the country and society. He wanted to be ideally suitable for the Gurukula work.

But the Gurukula years of Jagdish Narain proved to be a turning point in his life. On the one hand this was the period of his most intimate relationship with the Arya Samaj and its cause, but on the other hand, this was also the period of his increasing interest in Buddhism. As the Principal of a Gurukula, he was a strict disciplinarian and tried his best to guide the life pattern and duties of the inmates in keeping with the ideals of the Arya Samaj and Vedic culture. He treated the inmates as one family (*kula*) and he participated in all activities of the young and the old for he was indeed a very energetic person and of strong physique. He had also taken my mother, wife of his eldest brother, there, who was seriouslly ill with tuberculosis, with him at the Gurukula and nursed her with great care and affection for he respected her like his mother. Gradually he became disenchanted with the organization of the Gurukula and became very much concerned with the great gap between the precepts and the practice of the Arya Samaj , paritcularly as it related to the functioning of the caste system. He found that in Arya Samaj there were Brahman Pandits, Vaiśya Pandits, and Śudra Pandits, and the members of the Arya Samaj were not able to free themselves from their caste background in their social relationships. On this issue he was so much disillusioned that, as he told me later, out of exasperation once he wanted to turn even to Islam. He had also briefly participated in the reconversion program of the aboriginal tribes of Chotanagpur and Santhal Parganna to the Vedic Hinduism of the Arya Samaj and discovered in the process how Christianity provided only a light veneer of outward culture over a hard core of the original and traditional customs and beliefs.

After completing his M. A. studies Jagdish Narain wanted to do doctoral work in Buddhist Philosophy. Dr. Bhagwan Das, a respected citizen and philosopher of Kashi, as well as Ayodhya Prasad, his Arya Samaji Guru, encouraged him but also

told him that in order to do so he must study Pali Tripiṭaka in original. While preparing for his M. A. examination in Sanskrit, Jagdish Narain had got his first introduction to Pali. At the Gurukula he continued his study of Pali. He was attracted by the very first verse of Dhammapada. It did not take him long to make up his mind to go to Sri Lanka for further study. He wrote an emotional letter in Sanskrit to the Vidyalankara Parivena in Sri Lanka introducing himself as a young 'seeker of truth' from Magadha and expressing his desire to go there and study Pali in order to revive a lost tradition in India. Since he did not receive reply for a long time he gave up hope. But one day he received a letter from Germany written in Hindi. He was very excited to have it for this was the first letter he had got from a foreign country. This was from Rahula Sankrityayana advising him to see him during the latter's next visit to India. Jagdish Narain met with him in Patna at the residence of K. P. Jayaswal, an eminent Indologist. Rahula Sankrityayana had brought there a vast collection of Tibetan manuscripts and crates were being opened one after another. Jagdish Narain stayed there for a few days and he was much impressed by the very sight of these manuscripts. Rahula and Jagdish, joined by K. P. Jayaswal, at times, discussed Buddha, Buddhism and Buddhist countries. One day Rahula Sankrityayana drew Jagdish Narain's attention to Buddha's teaching to the Kālāmas in which the Buddha had asked not to accept what he said because he said it, but only after being convinced about it; and this made an impact on his mind. In his M.A. Philosophy course he had selected logic for his special papers and statements as above by the Buddha as well as the theory of *Paticca Samuppāda* appealed him very much. His interest in Buddhism increased beyond mere academic and he developed great respect for the Buddha. The Patna meeting thus further strengthened his inclination toward Buddhism and his desire to go to Sri Lanka. Rahula Sankrityayana and Anand Kausalyayana had already become Bhikkhus and had joined the Vidyalankara Parivena. Through their good offices, Jagdish Narain was able to invite a teacher of Pali, Bhikkhu B. Seevali from Sri Lanka, and learnt more about Pali and Buddhism from him.

But when he told his parents of his plans to go to Sri Lanka, they were not prepared for this. They said with much feeling that they had reconciled themselves to his idea of not marrying for the sake of social work but they did not know how to accept the idea of his leaving the country. Finally, they had to give in at his repeated request and at the instance of his eldest brother. Jagdish Narain's mother was a strong woman and no important decision could be taken in the family without her knowledge and permission but my mother had already quietly pursuaded her for it. Anyway, this was a great day in the life of Jagdish Narain. He left for Sri Lanka in November 1933. As he told me, all through his plans he received much support and encouragement from his liberal eldest brother Aditya Narain and his sister-in-law Kishori Devi, who even wanted their eldest daughter Tara, still in High School, to study Pali and Sanskrit. At the suggestion of Jagdish Narain therefore Bhikkhu Seevali continued to stay for sometime more as family guest at Ranchi for this purpose. Not only my sister learnt some Pali in Sinhalese characters from him but I also picked up few words of Sinhalese and wrote letters to my uncle in Sri Lanka in mixed Hindi and Sinhalese, but in Sinhalese characters, for fun. The family in this manner got exposed to Buddhism as well as to a Buddhist monk's life. Jagdish Narain had joined the Vidyalankara

Parivena in Sri Lanka and taught there Sanskrit and learned more Pali. There he wrote an essay in Sanskrit on "Buddhism and the essentials of Philosophy". One day came the letter from Jagdish Narain to his parents asking their permission to become a monk. Most of the family members had by this time known which direction things were moving but it all depended on the permission of his mother. She was naturally very reluctant at first but she was a courageous woman and this time not only gave her permission but also blessed him. In 1934 he was thus ordained into the Sangha by the Ven. L. Dhammananda Nayaka Mahathero of the Vidyalankara Parivena. And thus Jagdish Narain became Bhikkhu Jagdish Kashyap, for Kashyap was not only his Hindu gotra name but it was also a famous name in the history of Buddhism. Jagdish Kashyap now joined Rahula Sankrityayana and Anand Kausalyayana to make that 'trio' of the new Buddhist monks of northern India destined to play a substantial role in a variety of ways for over four decades in the revival of Buddism or what was perhaps more properly labelled according to them as the 'Buddhist Movement' of India.

During the period of his study and training in Sri Lanka, Bhikkhu Kashyap had started translating *Dīghanikāya* into Hindi, jointly with Rahula Sanskrityayana. But the latter had planned a trip to Japan and he asked the former to accompany him. They sailed for Japan along with the manuscript from Calcutta. Though both got sick on board the ship, they continued doing their work. Their fellow passengers were amazed at their perseverence. When they reached Penang, the British Government police asked for Bhikkhu Kashyap and after questioning him for sometime showed him a telegram from the Government of India asking the local police not to permit him to proceed further. This happened on account of his participation in the non-cooperation movement of Mahatma Gandhi. So Rahula and Kashyap had to part company there. The former proceeded to Japan and the latter stayed on in Penang. After having completed the translation work in Penang, Kashyap sent the manuscript to the printers in India.

People in Penang were in fact, happy at the conspiracy of circumstances that led to Kashyap's stay in Penang. Before proceeding to Japan, Rahula had spent his time in Penang delivering speeches; he would deliver them in Sanskrit and Kashyap would translate them into English. People of Penang were very pleased with them for they were the first Indian Buddhist monks they had seen and they honoured them greatly. They arranged to put up Bhikkhu Kashyap in a residence near the sea coast. He spent about a year in Penang He chose to live in a Chinese monastary and learned some Chinese. A collection of his lectures at the Chinese Buddhist Association was published as a handy book under the title *Buddha Dhamma* in Penang in 1935. He also visited Singapore and other parts of Malayasia as well as Burma. He even sailed to some coastal places of China, near Canton, in an unauthorised manner because he was already told by the British not to travel beyond Malayasia.

In Penang due to contacts with some Chinese Mahayana monks he started practising meditation. He also practised psycho-therapy and successfully cured some of his lay disciples of their ailments. So, when Bhikkhu Kashyap returned to Sri Lanka, he decided to spend sometime in a forest hermitage in order to practice more meditation. Rahula Sankrityayana did not like this new interest of Kashyap. He wanted him to go to London for Dharmadūta work and sent Anand Kausalyayana to dissuade him

from practising Dhyana. According to Rahula this was a thing for old age and not for a young man like Kashyap. Anyway, the young Bhikkhu Kashyap did not obey his two Guru *bhais* this time and spent a year in the Salagala forest. He related to me some of his experiences there. One of them was how he tested one day his *maitrībhāvanā* with a deadly cobra, which had surprised him, standing face to face in the solitude of his cave and blocking its exit. His stay in Sri Lanka and South East Asian countries thus provided him with an opportunity on the one hand for seeing Buddhism in practice and the working of the Sangha and its relationship with the laity, and on the other, for developing contacts with some leaders of Buddhism who were interested in its spread in India.

He returned to India toward the end of 1936 after a plague epidemic in Sri Lanka. On his return, he went first to Allahabad and called on Rahula Sankrityayana at the residence of Pandit Udaya Narayan Tiwari and sought his forgiveness for not obeying his instructions to go to London. Rahula Sankrityayana smiled and patted him on the back; and Kashyap felt relieved. He spent some time there at Allahabad in the company of Rahula Sankrityayana, and of Anand Kausalyayana, who were living together. It is there one day that the 'Trio' expressed their individual programs for future; Rahula Sankrityayana said that he would write as many books as possible, Anand Kausalyayana said that he would love to undertake lecture tours and do journalistic work of writing articles, and serve the cause of Hindi literature. Bhikkhu Kashyap expressed his desire to spend his time in study, research and teaching, and in founding educational institutions. But before setting out on his mission Kashyap went to Laheriasarai to see his mother who was then visiting her second son, and from there Kashyap went to Ranchi to see his father as well as his eldest brother, to whom he was very much indebted for constant support and encourgement. The family and the neighbours saw him now in the yellow robe for the first time. He was received with mixed feelings. They also felt an element of pride and religious satisfaction. He told them about his plans to settle down at Sarnath and devote his time in the cause of Buddhism and Buddhist studies. He also asked my father and grand-parents for me and said that he would like to take care of my education. My father readily agreed but my grand-parents were at first reluctant and agreed to leave me with him only with the warning that they would not like him to make me a Bhikkhu because I was the only son of my father. My mother had died before Bhikkhu Kashyap's return to India and in taking care of me he also found a way to repay his debt he owed to my mother whom he loved and treated like his own mother and in whom he could always confide his thoughts and plans.

From 1937 his scene of activity moved to Sarnath. He became associated with the Maha Bodhi Society, and along with Rahula Sankrityayana and Anand Kausalyayana, the two other members of the 'Trio', started translating Pali Tripitaka into Hindi and doing other literary and scholarly works. But the entrepreneur in him was not satisfied with this only. He soon got involved in institutional organization and social service. With the erection of the Mulagandha Kuti Vihara, and because of the activities of the Maha Bodhi Society, the importance of Sarnath had increased both for the pilgrims and for the tourists. There was local support available for worthwhile projects of development and for social and cultural activities. Devapriya Valisinha, the General Secretary of the Maha Bodhi Society and Baba Ragho Das had decided to found a High School at Sarnath.

They invited Bhikkhu Kashyap to be the Head Master. In addition to the literary work, he accepted to do the work of the institution on a very nominal salary just to comply with the official formalities. With his experience of formal education as well as of administration as Principal of the Gurukula he was able to put this new institution on a very stable basis. The School was first housed in the Birla Dharmasala. Bhikkhu Kashyap came thus in contact with Seth Jugal Kishore Birla the well known philanthropist of India who had a liberal view of Hinduism, which he called the Arya Dharma, which included according to him Buddhism and all other religions and sects of Indian origin, and accordingly supported social, educational and religious activities of both Hindu and Buddhist organizations. One has only to go around in India to see the number of temples, rest houses, schools, colleges and hospitals built by him or through his help to realise his philanthropic role during the past fifty years. Bhikkhu Kashyap needed his money and good will and the Seth only wanted his money well spent and thus the two developed a friendship for common cause. Bhikkhu Kashyap did not want to house his school permanently in the rest house and he pursuaded the Seth to donate land for the School. Later he went to Burma and raised funds for its building. The school got financial stability and attracted students even from outside the locality. His idea was to develop gradually a Buddhist University at Sarnath, an idea which he had to give up soon on account of other activities in other places.[1]

At Sarnath, Bhikkhu Kashyap also did a lot of humanitarian work in nearby villages helping the poor and oppressed. His zeal for social reform and educational projects kept him in touch with men and institutions, having common aims, of Varanasi and of nearby villages and townships. On the one hand he became very popular and on the other he irked some narrow minded conservative Brahmans and high caste Hindus. Two incidents will suffice to illustrate these two aspects of responses he got. Once, there was a Hindu-Muslim riot in Banaras and one man was killed near the Chaukhandi stupa. The police in their search for culprits started harassing the people of the nearby Ganj village and arrested many young and old men on suspicion. The remaining men fled away and the village was left only with women and children. Having made sure that none of the villagers was involved in this killing Kashyap took up the matter with the Police and district authorities and saved the lives of the villagers from harassment; and for about a week he, himself, with the help of school teachers and students, stood vigil at night and patrolled the village so that no body harmed the women and children. This was also the time of harvesting and any delay in reaping the ready crop because the men were out, would have meant great loss. So he asked all students, and I was also one of them, to help in the harvesting. We were also assigned duties to clean the cattle pens and dry the cow-dung cakes because women were scared to work and come out of their houses. Care was taken to see that no routine daily work of the village suffered. Where there was no food, he supplied it and where there was no water he asked students to fetch it for them. This was indeed a great experience for students. To this day the villagers of Ganj remember this. The other incident is the reflection of the ire of his social opponents. Due to certain policies he pursued in the school administration and because of his promotion of the

[1]But toward the end of his life after he successfully completed his projects and mission elsewhere he again revived the idea but could not do much on account of his failing health.

oppressed classes some of the local men made an attempt on his life. One night when he was sleeping on a straw mat in one of the rooms of the local dispensary fire was thrown on him through a window and his straw mat caught fire immediately. Since the door was locked, by the time he woke up he was almost choked to death but saved himself miraculously by breaking open the door. But Bhikkhu Kashyap never complained about it to anybody nor did he lodge any report to the Police. He laughed it out and resigned from the school and left Sarnath for Kushinagar for sometime so that the atmosphere would calm down.

At Sarnath Bhikkhu Kashyap also contributed toward the training of the Śramaneras who were brought to India by Ven. Dhammapala by teaching them regularly philosophy, both western and Indian, in which he had formal university discipline. Bhikkhu Kashyap went to Burma in 1939. There he did, in addition to Dharmadūta work, some fund raising for his projects in India and studied Abhidhamma. He was back in India in 1940.

His literary production and his educational activities at Sarnath and contacts with the Buddhist countries had already made him well known in India and the Bhuddhist world. He was awarded the degree of Tipiṭakāchārya by the Vidyalankara Parivena of Sri Lanka. He came in touch with Pandit Madan Mohan Malaviya and S. Radhakrishnan through the good offices of Seth Jugal Kishore Birla and succeeded in pursuading the authorities of his alma mater, Banaras Hindu University, to start the teaching of Pali there. He offered his free services and accepted only Rs. 50 per month from Birla for his simple food and basic needs. He used to go daily to the University campus from Sarnath, a journey of 22 miles both ways. There was no bus service then. He used to cover the distance by a cycle rikshaw and would occasionally even walk the distance one way. Birla noted this and made a cottage for him in the University campus. This cottage known as Buddha Kuti has now been permanently assigned by the University authorities for use by teachers of Pali in the University. It was a small cottage of three rooms but was always over-crowded with students and monks from India and abroad who lived there along with him and myself. Among them are Bhikkhu Sangharakshita of England, Bhikkhu Amritanand of Nepal, Bhikkhu Dhammaratna of Sri Lanka, C.S. Upasak of Nalanda Institute, K.C. Khanna, General Manager of Bokaro Steel Co. and others who are all doing useful work in roles of leadership in their respective areas. Bhikkhu Kashyap worked for nine years at the Banaras Hindu University. He not only taught Pali in the Department of Sanskrit but also Buddhist logic in the Department of Philosophy. He tried his best to introduce Pali and Buddhism in the graduate program for M.A. and Ph.D. degrees and offered to teach all the papers single handed if the University failed to recruit an additional hand. But his proposal was not accepted then. The Universityh as now the graduate program and there are four teachers of Pali. In Banaras Hindu University Bhikkhu Kashyap was very much at home that being his alma mater. In addition to renewing his contacts in the Department of Philosophy, Psychology and Education with his old teachers as well as his class mates like S.K. Moitra, B.L. Atreya, Lalji Ram Shukla and T.R.V. Murti, he also came in touch with Jain, scholars like Pandit Sukhalji, Mahendra Kumar Jain, Dalsukh Malvania and others. During this period the eminent doyen of Pali Studies, Dharmanand Kosambi had come to live at Sarnath, and later at Kashi Vidyapith in Varanasi. Bhikkhu Kashyap took advantage of his presence and stengthened his knowledge of Abhidhamma

and *Visuddhimagga*. He also made an intensive and comparative study of Buddhist and Jain logic along with Nyaya with the help of the learned Pandits in the campus and in the city.

There are other interesting sidelights of his life at the Banaras Hindu University. We have noted earlier that he was a good sportsman and a gynmast in his sc ool and college days. But after he became a monk he hardly did anything other than taking long walks as an exercise. As he was gaining weight, he again started doing gymnastics and practised naturopathy and established contact with some well known naturopaths and their clinics. He was found making all sorts of experiments with food and exercise but he would never stick to one. He had also begun developing his own life style which was not always strictly according to the Theravada monastic discipline partly because of the nature and duties of his work at the University and partly because he needed to adapt himself to a social environment in which the monastic pattern of life as practised in the Theravada countries was not possible to live. He also had begun feeling that there should be a separate Buddhist Sangha for India. He developed contact with Hindu and Jain monastic orders and saints who were open minded as he wanted to collect the best from all. At one stage he even thought of making a social force out of the Sadhus of various sects. Since he was getting more and more involved in academic and research pursuits he felt that he was not getting ample opportunity for his social projects of reform and therefore through these contacts and programs, whenever possible, he gave vent to his ideas. So also his interest in nationalist movements, which had to be set aside after his entry to the Sangha, got an opportunity for expression, even though not very actively, in 1942, when Mahatma Gandhi gave the 'Quit India' call. Banaras Hindu University was one of the leading centres of movement then, and we all were participants in it. Political workers were going underground for the sake of keeping the flame alive. In August 1942, the University campus had become virtually free from the control of the British administration and it was a centre of underground movement after the key leaders had been arrested. The campus had to be 'occupied' by mounted armed police of the British administration and the government was seriously considering closure of the University and its conversion into a military hospital. Those were the days when the faculty and students, who had avoided arrest, were living a life of adventure and fear. Bhikkhu Kashyap, along with other colleagues, inspired courage and gave shelter to underground workers; and, they used to hold midnight meetings at his campus residence, the Buddhakuti.

During his period of stay at the Banaras Hindu University, Bhikkhu Kashyap also remained in touch with our family. It is true that he had left home for homelessness but I was an undeniable link between him and the whole joint family. As I have noted earlier, soon after he returned from Sri Lanka, he had taken me to Sarnath for high school studies; I was then twelve years old. When he left for Burma, in 1939, he had put me in charge of my second uncle at Laheriasarai. But after my Matriculation he brought me again to Banaras in 1941. He treated me like a son. He also converted me formally to Buddhism. In me and in my education he found a sense of fulfilment of his relation to, and he thought he owed this to, the family and particularly to my parents. When my University education came to an end and I got my teaching job at the Banaras Hindu University he saw to it that I got married. After my marriage ceremony, which was performed according to Buddhist rites, and in which he himself

played the role of the priest, he told my grandfather that he was returning me to the family and that he had thus kept the promise he had made to him when he took me away from the family in 1937. So, in this manner amidst all his monastic, social and educational commitments, he was also taking care of his self-imposed commitments to the joint family. Because of my being there with him he would occasionally also entertain other family members and help them in many ways. But the most involved one was his dedicated service to, and nursing of, his eldest brother, my father, Aditya Narayan for more than a year, when he was terminally ill, until his death in 1943. I have not come across such painstaking nursing as was done by him, and which was only repeated by him when he similarly nursed his own father almost twenty years later. At his instance my father was cremated according to Buddhist rites at Sarnath at the site where a new Sanghārāma stands now and in which some rooms were built by him later in his memory.

In 1949 Bhikkhu Kashyap decided to leave Varanasi. India had already become independent in 1947 and there was a new awakening and a sense of identity in the country. On account of the end of Western dominance this was so all over Asia. Buddhism appeared as a bond of friendship between many Asian countries. The first President of India Rajendra Prasad asked Bhikkhu Kashyap to accompany him on his visit to Burma and he took a sapling of Bo-tree as India's gift to the newly independent people. Bhikkhu Kashyap was sent to Tibet with the relics of Sariputta and Moggalana. In India, Jawahar Lal Nehru was showing keen interest in Buddhism as a means to Asian solidarity and friendship. This was reciprocated by Chou En Lai, the Chinese Premier, and the Sino-Indian treaty of friendship became known as the 'Pañcha-Śīla', using thus a Buddhist terminology. The time was ripe for starting new projects and strengthening the cause of Buddhist movement and studies. The state of Bihar, the ancient scene of important activities of Buddha, naturally had reasons to get strongly motivated to doing something for the glory of the state. Bhikkhu Kashyap, who hailed from Magadha and whose village home was close to Nalanda, Rajgir and Bodhgaya, had been harboring his intention for long to revive the interest in Buddhism and in Buddhist studies in Bihar, to introduce the teaching of Pali (Māgadhī) in the schools and colleges of Magadha and above all to reestablish the glory of Nalanda. He got an inner call that the time had come for a move towards that direction. First, he decided to create a climate for his projects in these areas and wanted to gauge the response of the people and the Government. He set out for Magadha from Kashi. He made a *cārikā* in Magadha in keeping with the ancient tradition of living on alms (*piṇḍapāta*). It was for the first time after eight centuries that the people in the interior villages of Magadha saw a Buddhist monk in yellow robes. And when Bhikkhu Kashyap spoke to them in their own dialect Magaḥī (modern Māgadhī) it was indeed a pleasant suprise to them to know that he was one of them and that he belonged to their own area.

It was a long time since Buddhism had disappeared from most parts of India. In Magadha the people could still find the images of the Buddha scattered all over the land. But, with the exception of the students of history and archaeology, people did not know their identity and significance particularly in the country side. Even to this day images of Buddha and Bodhisattvas are worshipped under various names of Brahmanic and local deities. Bhikkhu Kashyap would remind them of the story of the

Buddha and the history of Buddhism and impress upon them that it was their own thing. He would tell them how the prince of Kapilavastu practised meditation on the banks of their own river Phalgu (Neranjarā) and how he obtained Bodhi under a *pīpal* tree in their own town of Gaya. He told them how Buddhism spread not only all over India but in many parts of the world. How Nalanda became an internationally famous university and how the Chinese pilgrims like Hsuan Tsang came to study there. And finally, how Buddhism disappeared from the land of its birth and how fortunately it had been preserved in the neighbouring countries of Sri Lanka, Burma and Thailand in Pali, i. e. in Māgadhī, their own ancient language, which Budha had used for delivering his discourses. Bhikkhu Kashyap after narrating all these would tell them how he had gone to Sri Lanka and brought back their lost heritage, and also reminded them about Buddhaghosha, a son of Magadha, and his work in Sri Lanka. He would recite passages from the Pali Tipiṭaka to show how close was the language of Buddha to their own dialect Magahī and how it was their duty to revive the study of it. He also pointed out that the very name of the present state of Bihar was because the area was full of Vihāras in ancient times. Often he would go to villages and identify modern place names with ancient ones; and, there is no dearth of survivals in place names. He picked particularly those which were associated with celebrities or important events in the history of Buddhism, e.g., the modern village of Sāri-Chak near Nalanda associated with the name of Sariputta. This whole story came as a kind of revelation to the people. Many listened to him with tears in their eyes.

Although he toured in various parts of Bihar (and even Northern Bengal) he concentrated mostly in Patna and Gaya districts, the old Magadha. He wanted to establish universities both at Gaya and at Nalanda. He had succeeded in pursuading the principal of the Gaya College, Gaya, and that of Nalanda college, which was located in Bihar-sharif, to introduce the teaching of Pali in their institutions. He offered to teach the subject himself in the latter without any payment. It became a popular subject, for the students found it easier than Sanskrit and it fetched more marks. He preferred Nalanda as the first place for his work. He had found that Bodhgaya, being a living center of worship, was a place with competing vested interests and conflicts. Nalanda, on the other hand, provided a clean slate for new activity with no living vested interests and conflicts. In the silent ruins of Nalanda he found at once a visible source of inspiration and challenge, and where the past seemed to beckon him strongly. Perhaps, being an educationist he found more of a cause in restoring the Nalanda University than the Chaitya-Vihāra complex of Bodhgaya. As he told us the *devatā* of Nalanda won him over.

While Bhikkhu Kashyap was doing all this, the state government of Bihar was also planning to start three Institutes for the study of Sanskrit, Pali and Prakrit representing Brahmanic, Buddhist and Jain cultures, to all of which Bihar of ancient times had made very significant contributions. Mithila, Nalanda and Vaisali were selected respectively for the location of these three Institutes. The initiative and drive of J.C. Mathur, an I.C.S. officer of the Bihar government, in the establishment of these Institutes will always be remembered. Bhikkhu Kashyap was invited by him to organize the Institute of Pali at Nalanda. This was the founding of a new institution and everything had to be started from scratch. It demanded sacrifice and dedication. Nalanda was then a desolate place where no building was available even for temporary housing of

the Pali Institute and so he started the work first at Rajgir and it was only later that he moved to Nalanda. This Institute developed into the present Nava Nalanda Mahavihara. He collected money locally and bought land and built small hutments to house the first staff and students, as well as a house which included his living place, a chaitya, and a meditation chamber in the basement, and a guest room. All this he made out of his own resources and donated to the Institute. He did much of the organizational and teaching work himself. It was all labour of love, a mission of life for him. Finally he succeeded in pursuading the Muslim landlord of Islampur who owned the land near the ruins of the old Nalanda University to donate sufficient land for the new building of the Nava Nalanda Mahavihara for housing the Institute. He made the Muslim gentleman feel proud by convincing him how by making this gift he was at once being a participant in the renewal of Nalanda and being instrumental in wiping off the opprobrium of Nalanda's destruction by the Muslim invaders. Rajendra Prasad, the first President of India, laid the foundation stone of the new building of Nava Nalanda Mahavihara on the 20th November, 1951. The newly founded Institute received on this occasion special messages of goodwill and gifts from the Buddhist countries. His holiness the Dalai Lama sent a special representative with a complete set of Tibetan scriptures and an image of the Buddha. So also dedicatory presents and rare and valuable books were sent by other Buddhist countries. Bhikkhu Kashyap succeeded in bringing to Nalanda well qualified scholars like Satkari Mookherji and his student Nathmal Tatia. In selecting them he also gave evidence of his catholicity and broad vision for they were not Buddhist and were not exclusively involved in Buddhist studies; while the former was a staunch Brahman Professor of Sanskrit, the latter had specialised primarily in Jainism. But his idea was to develop Buddhist studies in a comprehensive and comparative framework first of the Indian cultural history and then gradually of Asian civilization by including Chinese and Japanese studies. It was with this idea in view, that he went to China is 1956 and pursuaded Chou En Lai to make a gift of the relics of Hsuan Tsang to Nalanda and wanted to use the occasion to start a department of Chinese studies. He also invited a Japanese scholar Prof. Kaziyama to study as well as to teach at Nalanda. In a remarkably short period of time, Bhikkhu Kashyap was thus able to build the Institute both physically and academically and it soon began attracting students from various countries.

But while he was busy establishing the Institute he had not forgotten his earlier task of making available the Tipiṭaka in the languages and scripts of India. Already the 'Trio' had begun since late thirties translating the Tipiṭaka into Hindi. They had also brought out jointly a Devanagari version of the P.T.S. edition of the various parts of the *Khuddaka Nikāya* In Bombay, and in Calcutta also some parts of the Tipiṭaka and some independent Pali works such as the *Milindopañho* had been edited in Devanagari mainly for the purpose of teaching. But the resources of the Maha Bodhi Society and isolated attempts were not sufficient to satisfy Bhikkhu Kashyap. He had been for long harboring a strong desire for a standard edition of the Tipiṭaka in Devanagari which could be used by all students of Pali in India; he was only biding his time for the right *muhūrta*. Since things were moving favorably after independence he started corresponding with both the State and the Central governments, as well as with individuals and institutions. But the right moment came only when the Government of India decided to celebrate the Buddha Jayanti to mark the

2500th anniversary of Buddha's Mahāparinirvāṇa. His scheme of publication of the whole of Tipiṭaka in Devanagari was accepted by the Government as a five-year project. He had the support of Rajendra Prasad, Jawahar Lal Nehru and S. Radhakrishnan. It was jointly sponsored by the State of Bihar and the Government of India. It was indeed an ambitious undertaking of organization and scholarship to complete the work of editing and publishing the 41 Volumes in a period of five years. But Bhikkhu Kashyap was a man of great will. The marathon labour which he and his team put in the work is difficult to imagine by those who did not witness it. There were three centres where three teams of his students worked and they all lived in or near the printing presses where the texts were being printed. Bhikkhu Kashyap worked on an average of sixteen to eighteen hours a day. There were incidents and moments during the preparation of the Series that speak of his boldness and pragmatism, generosity, sacrifice, perseverence as well as adventure. He would not brook any obstruction to, and any delay in, the work. If one printer showed slackness he would break the contract and go to another. If the Government red tape created problems he would go to the highest official and leave him only after the work was done. Once, when there was some delay in the release of salary and other payments to his workers, he sold his house and raised money to disburse the salary of his staff and to make other payments. He did not wait. He was lucky in having a very devoted team of students and he took care to see that not only they but their entire family had no problem whatsoever during the work of the publication. Thus, it was possible to complete this project of great magnitude in the stipulated period of time, a rare achievement. Since he insisted on making it available on subsidized price this set of Tipiṭaka is now the least expensive in the market and easy to possess by any student of even the most modest means. The first volume of the series had been brought out in 1956 on the occasion of the Buddha Jayanti and the complete set was ready in 1961. The completion of the project was celebrated at a function held at Sarnath in 1961 December when the first complete set was presented to Jawahar Lal Nehru.

During the publication of the Devanagari edition of the Pali Tipiṭaka, Bhikkhu Kashyap had moved to Varanasi, and made it the headquarter of his activities. While the printing was going on, his presence in the city also led the Sanskrit University of Varanasi to ask him to join as the first Professor and Head of the Department of Pali and Buddhism in 1959 and he thus started yet another center of Pali studies. Nalanda had already produced students not only to man his team of scholars for the Pali Tipiṭaka but also the new departments of Pali and Buddhism in the various colleges and universities of Bihar and U.P. as well as in the other parts of India. He remained in Varanasi until 1965 before he returned to Nalanda to rejoin the Directorship of the Nava Nalanda Mahavihara.

Bhikkhu Kashyap had the habit of initiating a new project even before one in hand was complete. So when he was at the Sanskrit University and was already engaged simultaneously with the publication project of the Tipiṭaka he initiated a project on *Tipiṭaka Mahākosha* to be done by his team at the Sanskrit University. And when he returned to Nalanda again he started yet another on *Pāli Aṭṭhakathā* under his editorship. Both projects are alive and volumes in both the series are coming out slowly; his failing health, of course, did not permit him, much against his will, to put in the same amount of energy as he had put in the Tipiṭaka project.

But in any case, indifferent health did not deter him from suggesting and inspiring his friends and students to do new projects. These include the projects on publication of the *Pāli Tīkā* and *Anuṭikā*, dictionaries and an abridged edition of the Tipiṭaka in five volumes.

Bhikkhu Kashyap retired from the second term of his Directorship of Nava Nalanda Mahavihara in 1973. During the first part of his second term at Nalanda he directed his attention toward developing and expanding the Institute; his idea was to develop it into an autonomous university or as an institution of similar status. He did make some progress in his plans but partly his failing health and partly the uncertainties of political climate of the late sixties and early seventies stood in his way to accomplish his objective during his tenure of office and even life time. In addition to the supervision of literary productions of the Institute, like the editing of *Pali Aṭṭhakathā*, he was encouraging his old students and colleagues to take up new projects, as mentioned above, he also took interest in promoting the causes of social and cultural programs in the two main areas of his activity, i.e. Kashi and Magadha. He revived the ideas of developing centers of Buddhist learning and founding universities at Sarnath and Bodhgaya. Whenever he got an opportunity in the course of his public meetings and contacts with local and central Governments and with funding agencies he would broach these ideas for their support. In 1974 he took a vow at Sarnath for establishing an International University of Buddhist studies and secured the support of the Chogyal of Sikkim and other local social celebrities.

Bhikkhu Kashyap also took active interest in all such activities which led to international understanding and peace through the spread and growth of Buddhism in India irrespective of their national and sectarian background and commitments. He considered Buddhism as one movement and he was liberal in outlook. He had already contributed to, and participated in, the activities of the Maha Bodhi Society initially run mainly by the men and money of Sri Lanka. He also lent his cooperating hand to the Burmese Bhikkhus Uttama, Kittima and Rewatadhamma as well as to U Nu in their dharma projects. He actively supported the Thai Buddhists at Bodhgaya and he donated a plot of 1.25 acres of land and six buildings at Nalanda to the Thai Buddhist Sangha in March 1974. He also became the Mahānāyaka of the Indian Bhikkhu Sangha in 1970 founded at the initiative of some Thai and Indian Buddhists. Similarly he took active interest in the Japanese Buddhist programs in India particularly at Rajgir. He had been invited to Japan in 1954 on the occasion of the inauguration of the first Viśva Śānti Stūpa in Japan. Since then he became friendly with the Venerable Nichidatsu Gyosho Fujii and took interest in the Nichiren sect and the work of Japan Buddha Sangha in India. He participated at every stage in the project of having a Śānti Stūpa at Rajgir. In 1970 at the first annniversary of the foundation of the Stūpa he even offered himself in their service and became the Vice-President of the Bharat-Japan Buddha Sangha. He expressed a desire to his Japanese friends that on retirement he would like to live his last days on the Ratnagiri hill of Rajgir by the side of the Śānti Stūpa and spend his time preaching the Saddharma-puṇḍarīka sūtra. From Theravāda he was moving to the Bodhisattva ideal towards the end of his life. Although he could not spend his last days on the Ratnagiri he did it in the Japanese temple at Rajgir where he passed into nirvana. From his Penang days he had been in touch with the Chinese Buddhists and

he was friendly with the Chief Abbot of the Chinese Buddhist temple at Sarnath as well as with eminent scholars like Ven. I Fa-fang of China. He was actively collaborating with Tan Yun-shan in the establishment of World Buddhist Academy at Bodhgaya. We have referred above to his meeting with Chou En-lai. He was very much moved by what happened in Tibet leading to His Highness Dalai Lama's refuge in India; he had already visited him earlier. He did his best to help, financially and otherwise, the Tibetan refugee monks. He donated lands at Sarnath and at Nalanda for their use. He joined hands with Kushak Bakula of Ladakh to provide various facilities to the Dalai Lama and actively helped in the establishment of the Tibetan Institute at the Sanskrit University of Varanasi. But in all his involvements with international Buddhist activities the moment he would sense any political orientation or commitment his interest would become lukewarm. He did not therefore participate in the meetings of some of the World and Asian Buddhist conferences.

Amidst all his preoccupations, Bhikku Kashyap was not oblivious to his responsibilities to the Buddhists and the Buddhist movement of India. He had been in touch with B. R. Ambedkar and his movement in Maharashtra from the early fifties, and with similar other movements in Rajasthan and Uttar Pradesh, for the conversion of the untouchables and people of other lower castes to Buddhism. He even presided over some of the group conversion ceremonies; he also gave initiation to individuals. But he was not a full time participant in these movements; he could not afford to do so in view of his many commitments which did not permit him sufficient time and the required mobility in those parts of India. He had at one time, in the early sixties, founded a Bhikkhu training center, named as Aśoka Āśram, at Sarnath. He had already received promise of support from the Government of India in this project and had received an ad hoc grant for a pilot project. But this project at Sarnath had to be abandoned when he had to leave for Nalanda to take the Directorship of the Nava Nalanda Mahavihara. His idea was to train the Bhikkhus from among the newly converted Indian Buddhists and to send them on exchange basis to other Buddhist countries.

From the beginning of his Buddhist career, Bhikkhu Kashyap was greatly interested in the meditational practices of Buddhism Not only did he continue practising dhyāna himself but promoted several schemes for the development and application of Buddhist system of meditation. He was closely associated with his friend Lalji Ram Shukla's Centre of Psycho-therapy where *ānāpāna sati* was successfully used to cure patients of some of their diseases at his instance. He had sponsored a scheme to develop a meditational school at Nalanda and he built a dormitory with meditational cells which he later donated to the Thai Buddhists. He also supported the organization of the Vipassanā meditational training camps in India directed by Goenka of Burma. Even as late as 1974, when he was seriously ill, he discussed establishing a center for the application of Buddhist meditational practices for mental and physical health with an eminent physician of Patna.

Another activity of Bhikkhu Kashyap, which was not much known outside Bihar, was in the field of Magahī language and culture. In the early fifties when he was busy establishing the Nalanda Pali Institute he came in close touch with the villages of Magadha and, as we have noted above, he preached in the local Magahī dialect. Along with his work in the cause of Buddhism and Buddhist studies he also took to promoting

the cause of Magahī language and culture. He became the founder president of the Magahī Cultural Association in 1954 and chairman of the Magahī Research Institute in 1960. A Magahi Journal called *Vihān* was also brought out under his patronage.

Bhikkhu Kashyap had his own medicinal and dietary ideas and idiosyncracies. By and large he believed in naturopathy, and gave much importance to fasting and rest. He often used to give the example of dogs who stop eating and sleep when unwell. He loved experimenting wi h any new suggestion and would follow it up for sometime and give it up for yet another. But, while he remained in the grip of a new idea he would ask his friends and disciples insistently to do the same. There are people who still continue following his advice fruitfully though he himself gave it up long ago. Towards the last decade of his life he became a staunch advocate of urine therapy and identified it with the *muttabhesajja* of Pali sources. Following it, he successfully cured his diabetes and helped cure some victims of various types of skin diseases. But toward the end of his life he gave it up and consequently got a relapse of diabetes. So also he was very unconventional in his food habits and he enjoyed change. For weeks he would live only on liquid diet and sometimes only on raw fruit and vegetables, and sometimes on steamed and half-cooked food. From his childhood he had been a vegetarian but in his middle age he did not mind trying non-vegetarian food for a change in course of one of his experiments.

Inspite of his obesity, Bhikkhu Kashyap's health for most of his lifewas robust for he was a man of active habits and he could control his diet, and did, exercise. But during the five-year period of the editing and publication of the 41 volumes of Tipiṭaka he did not take care of his health. His exemplary determination and pious will were directed towards only one objective i.e. to bring out all the volumes within the stipulated time, and nothing else mattered to him. It was then that he developed diabetes. After he retired from Nalanda in 1973 his general health began deteriorating. In 1974 he became seriously ill at Nalanda. Since I happened to be in India then, I pursuaded him to undergo regular medical treatment and brought him to Patna where he was treated by an eminent doctor of Patna Medical College. My wife and I nursed him. He started recovering and so I left for U.S.A. again. My wife stayed behind to look after him. But when I was gone, Bhikkhu Kashyap would not listen to anybody's advice. He left my father-in-law's home in Patna where he was being nursed by my wife, and again started moving between Nalanda, Gaya and Sarnath, and inspite of his failing health started indulging in promoting ideas and projects in these places. Again in 1975, while he was at Sarnath his friends and disciples one day had to take him to the hospital attached to the Institute of Medical Sciences at the Banaras Hindu University and I was informed on telephone in U.S.A. about his serious condition. I flew to Varanasi and made proper arrangements for his medical care and nursed him. After he showed signs of recovery I took him to my uncle's place in Laheriasarai and left him under his care. But after I left for U.S.A. again he did not remain there for long and started moving from one place to another. By now his health was shattered and finally he became bedridden and decided to live in the Japanese Buddhist temple at Rajgir. I asked him if he could come to U.S.A. for treatment and I began making arrangements for him. But he was not in a condition to travel abroad or even inland, and he wanted to live close to Nalanda. From the window of his room in the Japanese temple he could see the hills of Rajgriha famous in

the Buddhist tradition as well as the recently built Śānti Stūpa on the Ratnagiri. Toward the end he had given up food and he wanted to fast unto death. And one day he expired. That was Wednesday, the 28th January of 1976, and the time was 3 p.m. I was informed by telegram in U.S.A. after he passed away and had been cremated. I was deprived of the last darsana of him.

The news of Bhikkhu Kashyap's demise spread fast in and around Rajgir and Nalanda and thousands of people from the villages came to have the last darsana of him. The Government of Bihar made state arrangements for his funeral. A chaitya is being proposed to be built on his relics and a marble statute of him has been installed in the Thai temple at Nalanda. But the greatest monuments to remind the posterity of Bhikkhu Kashyap are the Nava Nalanda Mahavihara and the Devanagri edition of the Pali Tipiṭaka.

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1

Equanimity (Upekkhā) in Theravāda Buddhism

HARVEY B. ARONSON

A. Introduction

Two important modern Western scholars characterize the ultimate ethical ideal of Theravāda Buddhism as equanimity (*upekkhā*). Winston King asserts that the 'Nibbana ethic,'[1] which he also calls the 'Ethic of Equanimity,'[2] is the *basis* of monastic Buddhism,[3] and that this ethic entails, "withdrawal from the active life of historical involvement into a life of intense contemplation; it is the search for an experience of the timeless and ultimate."[4] The core of this ethic, according to King, is the sublime-attitude equanimity (*brahmavihāra-upekkhā*), which he identifies with the limb-of-enlightenment equanimity (*bojjhaṅga-upekkhā*).[5] These technical terms will be discussed below.

Melford Spiro asserts that "the only emotional state ultimately valued by nibbanic Buddhism—[is] that of detachment (*upekkhā*)."[6] He notes that "ultimately, the behavior of the true Buddhist (unlike, say, the true Christian) is governed not by love but by detachment."[7] It is clear from the context of Spiro's statement that he understands "detachment" to refer to the sublime-attitude equanimity.[8] Spiro ascribes the following dimensions to "detachment": (a) emotional detachment with respect to both one's own fate and the fate of others and (b) the destruction of all emotion. If we were to summarize the picture painted by King and Spiro, it would be that the practice of Theravāda Buddhism should lead one to the ethical equivalent of catatonia—"immobility. . . stupor, negativism, and mutism."[9]

In order to evaluate Kings and Spiro's assertions, I will present the Theravāda commentarial tradition concerning the various distinct meanings of equanimity in the Theravāda canon.[10] I will then present a very brief scriptural passage which describes the Theravāda ideal—the fully liberated individual—in terms of equanimity

and examine this passage in the light of the commentarial tradition. I will conclude by responding to Spiro and King on the basis of the Theravāda discourses and commentaries.

B. Seven kinds of Equanimity

Etymologically, equanimity (*upekkhā*) can be understood to be formed from the prefix *upa* meaning "toward" and a derivative of the verb *ikkh* meaning "to see." The term has come to have several denotations, which flow from the notion of over-looking a situation from a distance. These denotations range from "the feeling of neither pleasure nor pain," which can be understood to be akin to the experience of the distant, disengaged overlooker, to "pure and stable mental balance," which is akin to the attitudinal perspective of the wise overseer.

In the Theravāda canon there are seven contextually-individuated denotations of "equanimity" which we should be acquainted with if we are to analytically evaluate Kings and Spiro's assertions.

1. *The Feeling Equanimity*

The "feeling equanimity" (*vedanā-upekkhā*) is the distinct experience of neither pain nor pleasure (*Vism.* iv. 162). This feeling can arise in virtuous, nonvirtuous, and ethically neutral states of mind. It can be noted here that according to Theravāda psychology there are both virtuous and nonvirtuous intentional states of mind (*Vism.* xiv. 82). The virtuous are associated with either the feeling of mental pleasure or equanimity (*Vism.* xiv. 83). For example, if, out of generosity, one gives a gift to an inspiring religious teacher, one is likely to have a virtuous, generous, balanced mind associated with the feeling of mental pleasure (*Vism.* xiv. 84). On the other hand, if one gives the same gift to a lackluster monk, one is likely to have a virtuous, generous, balanced mind associated with the feeling of equanimity (*Vism.* xiv. 85).

Nonvirtuous states of mind are divided into three categories—greed states, aversive states, and deluded states (*Vism.* xiv. 89). Greed states are associated with either the feeling of mental pleasure or equanimity (*Vism.* xiv. 90). For example, the greed connected with finding a ten-dollar bill on the street is likely to be associated with the feeling of mental pleasure, whereas the greed connected with finding a penny in the street is likely to be associated with no more than a feeling of equanimity (*Vism.* xiv. 91). Aversive states are always conjoined with the feeling of mental suffering/grief (*Vism.* xiv. 92). Deluded states are always associated with the feeling of equanimity (*Vism.* xiv. 93). This can be charted in the following way :

State of Mind	Associated Feeling		
	Mental Pleasure	Mental Suffering	Equanimity
I. Virtuous	Possible	Impossible	Possible
II. Nonvirtuous			
a. Greed	Possible	Impossible	Possible
b. Aversion	Impossible	Occurs	Impossible
c. Delusion	Impossible	Impossible	Occurs

The above chart represents the feelings associated with our common reactions. Practitioners cultivating concentration successively achieve the uncommon states of mind called "the absorptions" (*jhāna*). The first three of these states are associated with bliss; the fourth is associated with the feeling equanimity (*Vism.* xiv. 86). Furthermore, when a practitioner realizes nirvana, his mind is at the level of one of the four absorptions and thus the realization of nirvana is associated with either the feeling of bliss or equanimity (*Vism.* xiv. 158).

2. *Equanimity which consists of Constituential Balance*

"Equanimity which consists of constituential balance" (*tatramajjhatta-upekkhā*) is the mental-factor/attitude which "conducts the mind and [its co-arisen] mental factors evenly" (*Vism.* iv. 164 ; xiv. 153). This attitude "hinders deficiency and excess" (*Vism.* xiv. 153). Constituential balance "looks on the mind and [its co-arisen] mental factors as a charioteer looks on his evenly progressing thoroughbreds" (*Vism.* xiv. 153). This is the attitude in the virtuous mind which maintains and observes the balance of the other attitudes present. By one name or another it is present in every virtuous mind (*Vism.* xiv. 156-58). There are no virtuous states of mind without mental balance. A corollary of this is that nonvirtuous states of mind are characterized by an absence of balance and the presence of agitation to one degree or another (Vism. xiv. 160-78).

Equanimity which consists of constituential balance is a virtuous conditioning mental-factor/attitude (*saṅkhāra*). It can thus be understood that an individual creates this attitude in dependence on previous familiarity with it, and that present familiarization with balance will serve as a condition for its generation in the future. This conditioning mental-factor is functionally distinct from the feeling equanimity. The former maintains an evenness of attitude. The latter is the experience of neither pain nor pleasure. This distinction is amply illustrated in the case of a generous act. The individual who gives a gift to another has a virtuous, generous, balanced mind possessed of the equanimity which consists of constituential balance (*Vism.* xiv. 84-85, 156). This individual will possess equanimity which consists of constituential balance, whether he gives the gift to an ordinary monk and has the *feeling* equanimity or gives the gift to a more inspiring monk and has the feeling of pleasure. Having a virtuous mind, his responses are balanced whether his feelings are equanimous or pleasurable.

The following five types of equanimity are actually various forms of constituential balance (*Vism.* iv. 167). They are given individual names because they occur on different occasions. It is like one individual who at various times in his life is called "young man," "general," "King," and so forth. The six kinds of constituential balance, being contextually distinct, are mutually exclusive—when one occurs the others are absent (*Vism.* iv. 167).

3. *Equanimity with Regard to Absorption*

"Equanimity with regard to absorption" (*jhāna-upekkhā*) is the equanimity—present in the third absorption—which prevents the arising of a bias in relation to the supreme

feeling of bliss which occurs in this absorption (*Vism.* iv. 165). Bliss (*sukha*) is the feeling associated with the third absorption of the fourfold system (*Vism.* iv. 100, 153, 175). The mental-factor/attitude equanimity which prevents imbalance with regard to the bliss of the third absorption is equanimity with regard to absorption.

The fifth-century commentator Buddhaghosa points out that though equanimity which consists of constituential balance occurs in the first two absorptions of the fourfold system, its function is not clearly manifest in these absorptions (*Vism.* iv. 171). The presence of "initial application of mind" (*vitakka*) and "sustained application of mind" (*vicāra*) in the first absorption and the presence of "pleasurable interest" (*pīti*) in the second absorption make it hard to discern the equanimity of the first two absorptions (*Vism.* iv. 171). Therefore, equanimity does not receive special mention in the standard descriptions of the first two absorptions.[11] Equanimity's function is clearly manifest in the third absorption; thus, in the standard descriptions of the third absorption it is specifically stated that the meditator "maintains equanimity."[12]

4. *Equanimity of Purity*

"Equanimity of purity" (*parisuddhi-upekkhā*) is the equanimity associated with the fourth absorption of the fourfold system (*Vism.* iv. 166). In contrast to the equanimity which occurs in the first three absorptions, the equanimity of purity is not occupied with calming the opposing factors of initial application of mind, sustained application of mind, pleasurable interest, or bliss which occur in the first four absorptions (*Vism.* iv. 166). The first four limbs of absorption—initial application of mind and so forth—oppose equanimity in the sense that they are more manifest than it is. These four factors are absent from the fourth absorption; thus, equanimity of purity—occurring in the fourth absorption—is purified of all opposing factors. This equanimity is alluded to in the description of the fourth absorption, which states that this absorption possesses "purity of mindfulness due to [purity of] equanimity."[13]

Equanimity occurs in the first three absorptions, but it is neither pure (*aparisuddha*) nor clear (*apariyodāta*) in them (*Vism.* iv. 195). Buddhaghosa explains that in the first three absorptions equanimity resembles the crescent moon which occurs during the day and is neither pure nor clear because it is overpowered by the radiance of the sun and is lacking the assistance of its ally the night (*Vism.* iv. 195). In the first three absorptions, the crescent moon which consists of constituential balance is not pure because it is overpowered by the brilliance of the limbs of absorption, initial application of mind and so forth, and because it is without the assistance of its ally, the feeling equanimity.

The fourth absorption is unique because the conditioning mental-factor equanimity is accompanied by the feeling equanimity. (The first three absorptions are associated with the feeling of bliss). The feeling equanimity helps make the conditioning mental-factor equanimity conspicuous. In the fourth absorption, the crescent moon of equanimity which consists of constituential balance, is exceedingly pure because it is not overcome by the brilliance of the opposing mental-factors, such as initial application of mind and so forth, and because it is accompanied by its ally, the feeling.

equanimity.

5. *Equanimity as a Sublime Attitude*

"Equanimity as a sublime attitude" (*brahmavihāra-upekkhā*) is a combination of both internal balance of mind and neutrality with regard to sentient beings cultivated at the level of the fourth absorption (*Vism.* iv. 158). This neutrality is cultivated by considering that individuals determine their fate by their own activities (*Vism.* ix. 96).[14] This attitude is said to be similar to the attitude of parents who, subsequent to their son's leaving home and becoming independent, think, "Now he can take care of himself."

In the normal course of practice this attitude would be developed subsequent to the development of the sublime attitudes of love, compassion, and sympathetic joy.[15] A meditator is motivated to cultivate the sublime-attitude equanimity because he has seen the dangers in the cultivation of the earlier sublime attitudes. The danger in the cultivation of love and sympathetic joy is that the practitioner may become attracted or attached to others' well-being (*Vism.* xi. 88, 93, 95). The danger in the cultivation of compassion is that the practitioner may develop repulsion for the disturbing conditions besetting others and experience the mental grief associated with the nonvirtuous attitude of aversion (*Vism.* ix. 88, 94 ; xiv. 92). Furthermore, the first three sublime attitudes are considered inferior because they are associated with bliss, which is gross when compared to the subtle feeling of equanimity which accompanies the sublime-attitude equanimity (*Vism.* ix. 88).

The sublime attitude equanimity, being free from the dangers associated with the first three sublime attitudes (*Vism.* ix. 88), being peaceful (*santabhāva*, *Vism.* ix. 88), and being endowed with all the virtues of the equanimity of purity[16], is considered the best of the sublime attitudes.

6. *Equanimity as a Limb of Enlightenment*

"Equanimity as a limb of enlightenment" (*bojjhaṅga-upekkhā*) is the balance among the constituents of the mind which realizes nirvana (*Vism.* iv. 159). There are seven mental-factors which predominate in the mind which realizes nirvana—mindfulness (*sati*), investigation of phenomena (*dhammavicaya*), energy (*viriya*), pleasurable interest (*pīti*), tranquility (*passaddhi*), concentration (*samādhi*), and equanimity (*upekkhā*). The simultaneous occurrence of these seven factors with nirvana as their object constitutes enlightenment (MA. i. 289). Equanimity as a limb of enlightenment insures that all the mental-factors present at the time of enlightenment are working in a proper proportion.

7. *Six-limbed Equanimity*

"Six-limbed equanimity" (*chaḷaṅga-upekkhā*) is the type of equanimity possessed by fully-liberated individuals, namely, Buddhas and worthy ones/*arahants* (*Vism.* iv. 157). This equanimity consists of not abandoning the natural condition of mental purity with regard to desired or undesired objects which might appear to any one of the six senses (*Vism.* iv. 157). In other words, fully liberated individuals have an unbroken

succession of constituential balance. Their minds are balanced regardless of the type of object they come in contact with.

C. Scriptural Description of the Fully Liberated Individual

One discourse passage, in presenting the virtues which make a fully liberated individual[17] worthy of respect states, "[when] he sees form with his eye he becomes neither mentally pleased nor mentally displeased, but remains equanimous, mindful, and discriminating [and so on for all six senses]" (A. iii. 279). Now on the surface, this description gives some credibility to Spiro's characterization of the Buddhist ideal as (the destruction of emotion). It may even be that this passage helped generate Spiro's characterization. The quote seems to indicate that fully-liberated individuals are without the affects of pleasure or displeasure and that they maintain equanimity. However, armed with our knowledge of the various contextual meanings of equanimity, we might like to know more specifically which type of equanimity the fully-liberated individual possesses. Are all his or her experiences tinged with the feeling of neither pain nor pleasure ? Is he or she always cultivating neutrality to beings in the sublime-attitude equanimity, or what ? The commentary is very helpful for identifying the contextual meaning of equanimity in the above-quoted passage, as well as for shedding light on its overall meaning. It explains :

> *Neither mentally pleased nor mentally displeased*; he does not become mentally pleased with regard to a desired object due to the mental pleasure which arises with greed, nor does he become mentally displeased with regard to an undesired object due to the mental displeasure which arises with hatred.
>
> *He remains equanimous, mindful and discriminating*; he does not attain [the feeling] equanimity with regard to a neutral object due to unknowing-equanimity which is [merely] an absence of consideration. Having become mindful and discriminating, he remains balanced with regard to the object.
>
> In this [above-quoted] discourse, the continuous state of one who has destroyed all the harmful influences [a fully-liberated individual] is explained. (AA. iii. 335).

This commentary delineates the types of experiences a fully-liberated individual cannot have. He cannot have the type of pleasure which arises with greed ; he cannot have the displeasure which arises with aversion ; and he cannot have the type of equanimous feeling which arises with unknowing-equanimity (*aññāṇupekkhā*)/absence of consideration [delusion].[18] The commentator complicates the picture somewhat by introducing an unusual usage of equanimity into his discussion. However, his meaning is clear—fully-liberated individuals do not experience the feeling equanimity which arises with delusion (here called either absence of consideration or unknowing-equanimity). Basically, the commentator is asserting that insofar as a fully-liberated individual has given up all greed, aversion, and delusion, he would no longer experience the types of pleasure, displeasure, and equanimity associated with these attitudes. Furthermore, a fully-liberated individual would maintain mental balance in the face of any experience, and the balance mentioned here is specifically identified as six-limbed equanimity (*Vism.* iv. 157). What is most important to realize is that the fully-liberated

individual who has abandoned defiled attitudes and their associated feelings has a whole gamut of attitudinal responses open to him, and that these responses will occur in association with either the feeling of equanimity, pleasure, or bliss (Vism. xiv. 109, 133-57).[19]

Liberated individuals with pure and balanced minds can have sympathy and can cultivate love or compassion.[20] In whatever activity they pursue they will have the constituential balance which is called six-limbed equanimity. This equanimity is not necessarily associated with the feeling equanimity, nor is it the equivalent of the sublime-attitude equanimity. Fully-liberated individuals are not unemotional. Their emotions can be joyous or concerned. They are however always pure and balanced.

D. A Response to King's Position

At this point, it is appropriate to evaluate Winston King's characterization of Theravāda Buddhism. King's incorrect identification of the sublime-attitude equanimity with the limb-of-enlightenment equanimity beclouds the rather significant contextual differentiation of these two types of equanimity, which was set out above. The goals associated with the sublime-attitude equanimity are distinct from the goals associated with the limb-of-enlightenment equanimity, with only a small area of overlap. A more significant problem though is whether either of these attitudes can rightfully be said to represent the ethical ideal of Buddhism as King would like us to believe. Here it would perhaps be best to look at the value of these two types of equanimity and their contextualization among other attitudes in Buddhist practice.

1. *The Value of the Sublime-Attitude Equanimity*

The cultivation of the sublime-attitude equanimity is just one of many forms of con centration taught by the Buddha. A practitioner might be moved to cultivate this attitude due to the advice of his teacher or due to his own attraction to the rewards it offers. This attitude is said to be especially effective for the suppression of the attitudes of aversion and lust.[21] The successful cultivation of this attitude will bring such worldly benefits as peaceful sleep, pleasurable dreams, and rebirth in the satisfying world of Brahmā.[22] (These worldly benefits are also obtainable through the successful cultivation of the first three sublime-attitudes.) In addition, the sublime-attitude equanimity is conducive to the development of the factors of mind necessary for the realization of nirvana.[23] Of the four sublime attitudes, equanimity would be the most potent in terms of helping a practitioner develop the limb-of-enlightenment equanimity which is necessary for the realization of nirvana.[24] The sublime-attitude equanimity, coming as it does at the level of the fourth absorption, would familiarize the practitioner with pure balance of mind and thus be most conducive to producing the balance necessary for the realization of nirvana. The other sublime attitudes being developed in the first three absorptions would be conducive to the development of the latter form of balance, but to a lesser degree.[25]

From the earlier discussion of the sublime-attitude equanimity and the above discussion, it is clear that the sublime-attitude equanimity has virtues and characteristics that set it apart and distinguish it from the first three sublime attitudes. Nevertheless, it is not the case that these distinguishing characteristics make this attitude

qualitatively of a different order from the first three sublime attitudes, as King would suggest when he says, "with upekkhā, or [the sublime-attitude] equanimity, considered to be the crown and fruition of the other aspects [namely, the other sublime attitudes], one moves *definitely* [emphasis added] into the realm of nibbanic ethic."[26]

We can grant that in so far as nirvana is called peaceful (S. iv. 368) and the sublime attitude equanimity is called peaceful (*Vism.* ix. 88) there is an homology between the former supramundane condition and the latter state of mind. We can also accept that insofar as the sublime-attitude equanimity would be more conducive to the development of the limb-of-enlightenment equanimity, it would be more efficacious for the realization of nirvana. However, even if we accept these two points, it does not lead us to the conclusion that the sublime-attitude equanimity is in a relationship to nirvana or its realization which would make it qualitatively distinct from the first three sublime attitudes. The first three sublime attitudes, being virtuous states of mind, would be associated with tranquility (*passadhi*, Vism. xiv. 157) ; thus, they too would be homologous with nirvana to some extent. Furthermore, as was pointed out above, the sublime attitude equanimity's superiority in generating the limb-of-enlightenment equanimity is a matter of degree not of kind.

King seems to have intuited what a close analysis of the texts and commentaries indicate, namely, that the sublime-attitude equanimity is similar in character to nirvana and causally significant for its realization. Unfortunately, King's presentation suffers from analytical imprecision with regard to the similar virtues of the first three sublime attitudes. King thus ends up exaggeratingt he uniqueness, and hence the value, of the sublime-attitude equanimity. He unfortunately compounds this exaggeration when he mistakenly identifies the sublime-attitude equanimity with the limb-of-enlightenment equanimity and adds the normative value of the latter to the former.[27]

2. *The Context and Consequences of the Sublime-Attitude Equanimity*

King's assertion that the sublime-attitude equanimity is qualitatively distinct from the other sublime-attitudes also obscures the fact that these four attitudes are always supposed to be developed together in a complementary relationship to one another.[28] Traditionally, it has been pointed out that much as parents have love, compassion and sympathetic joy for their children in their youth and equanimity toward them when they become independent and involved in their own affairs, so too a meditator first develops the concerned attitudes of love, compassion and sympathetic joy, and then complements these with the neutrality of equanimity.[29] This analogy between parents and a meditator is useful for clarifying the nature of the four sublime attitudes, but it suffers from the drawback of creating the wrong impression that just as parents who have completed rearing their children will continuously adopt a more or less equanimous attitude to them, so too a practiced meditator would maintain an equanimous attitude to beings in (or out of) meditation. This is not the case. Achieving skill in the cultivation of equanimity does mean that one has completed one's *training* in the four sublime attitudes, but it does not mean that equanimity is to supplant the first three sublime attitudes in one's future practice. One is to develop skill in all four sublime attitudes and continue to reiterate the practice of all four of them. Equanimity can be understood to be the peaceful but temporary complement to the first three, more

concerned attitudes. Buddha, who was skilled in the sublime attitude equanimity, continued to cultivate all four sublime attitudes after his enlightenment (A. i. 181).[30] He did not just limit himself to the sublime-attitude equanimity. King is aware of the complementary nature of the sublime attitudes,[31] but he neglects this important facet of these attitudes when he gives the misleading impression that the attainment of equanimity leaves one free from any interest in the first three attitudes and devoid of any concern for others. He states :

> Whatever [English] term we adopt [for *upekkhā*], something of its quality is evident : controlled balance of mind, emotional non-attachment or neutrality, and 'beyondness' with regard to ordinary ethical uncertainties and struggles. It is seemingly a calm detachment of eternity-mindedness that has *little interest longer in the ordinary affairs of men* [emphasis added] ; . . . the possessor of equanimity goes on, completely unshaken emotionally or mentally by the world's mental, moral, or social disturbances.[32]

Within this characterization, King makes the serious error of stating that the possessor of equanimity (and for him this means both the sublime-attitude equanimity and the limb-of-enlightenment equanimity) "has little interest longer in the ordinary affairs of men." We can understand that this means in or out of meditation. This is the ethical ideal of monastic Buddhism according to King. As a counter example to King's assertion, I would present the case of the Buddha, who had thorough experience with the sublime-attitude equanimity (and the limb-of-enlightenment equanimity). Gotama spent the last forty-five years of his life wandering to different parts of India and teaching individuals from all walks of life on assorted topics, including those relating to the "ordinary affairs of men", such as gambling, investment and conjugal relations.[33] King's generalization with regard to the consequences of the sublime-attitude equanimity cannot stand up to the evidence. On the basis of the example of the Buddha, we can say that practitioners are supposed to deepen their sympathy and concrete concern for others as a consequence of their cultivation of love, compassion and sympathetic joy ; they are supposed to deepen their balance of mind (not a neutrality towards others) as a consequence of their cultivation of the sublime-attitude equanimity.[34]

3. *The Context for the Realization of Nirvana*

We should now look at King's asertions regarding the limb-of-enlightenment equanimity. There is much prescriptive material in the Theravāda canon urging practitioners to realize nirvana. The full realization of nirvana entails permanent liberation from all greed, hatred and delusion, and, at death, freedom from rebirth and its attendant sufferings. At the time that one realizes nirvana, the seven limbs of enlightenment are predominant. One could say that the goal in cultivating insight is the simultaneous achievement of the seven limbs of enlightenment with nirvana as their object. It is something of a distortion to single out the limb-of-enlightenment equanimity, as King has done, and say this one limb is the ethical ideal of Buddhism. There is, however, an even broader problem here—are the realization of nirvana as well as the liberation from mental defilement and the freedom from rebirth it entails the ethical ideals of

Buddhism, or are these goals embedded in yet some other scheme of value?

If we look first to the case of the Buddha, we see that he became enlightened/*buddha* (realized nirvana) out of concern for the happiness and welfare of the multitudes, and out of sympathy for the world.[35] Fraternal concern motivated the Bodhisattva, during his numerous births, to develop the skills and collect the merit necessary to realize nirvana independently. The realization of nirvana, the liberation from all mental defilement and freedom from rebirth are goals which benefit a practitioner. Gotama, however, was motivated to achieve these goals not merely for his own benefit, but by the wish to exemplify their benefits to others and the wish to teach others how to achieve them. For Gotama, enlightenment was a means; his own and others' happiness and welfare was the end. After his enlightenment, Gotama continued to practice in an exemplary way and teach others out of concern for their happiness and welfare, out of sympathy for them.[36]

For practitioners, Buddha prescribed three types of acceptable motivations. He said it was fitting for practitioners to make effort if they see some benefit (a) to themselves, (b) to others or (c) to both (A.iv.134-35). Context demands that we understand "benefit" (*attha*) to mean religious benefit in this instance. At first glance, it would seem that Buddha was willing for practitioners to have either egocentric, altruistic or hybrid (egocentric/altruistic) motivations. However, one of Buddha's final exhortations to the monks qualifies this assumption and indicates that Gotama wanted practitioners ultimately to have altruistic or hybrid motivations. He said :

> Monks, you should carefully take up those practices which I have taught for the sake of direct knowledge [of nirvana]. You should practice them so that this religious practice will last for a long time, will be long standing. This would be for the welfare of the multitudes, the happiness of the multitudes, the profit, welfare and happiness of gods and men. This would be out of [your] sympathy with the world. (D. ii. 119)

This is a descriptive statement with prescriptive force. The word "monks" here can be understood to apply to all practitioners (DA. iii. 755). Gotama urged all his followers (a) to undertake the profound practices conducive to the realization of nirvana, namely, morality, concentration (concentration on the breath, the sublime attitudes, and so forth) and insight; and (b) to do this with an eye to the benefit for others arising from this undertaking—exemplification of the fruits of practice, and effective transmission of the practice to others. Every practitioner was to embed his practices for the realization of nirvana in the larger goal of concern for others' happiness and welfare. Even an individual with an egocentric motivation at the start of his practice should eventually qualify this motivation by taking cognizance of the benefits of his practice for others.[37] The prescription to realize nirvana (which involves possession of the limb-of-enlightenment equanimity) is thus inextricably linked with a concern for others. This belies King's characterization of the limb-of-enlightenment as entailing "little interest longer in the ordinary affairs of men."[38] The realization of nirvana and the benefits it entails are not ends in themselves, but means for bringing happiness and welfare to others.

It would be worthwhile to investigate briefly some of the material that may have

caused King to come to his conclusion, in an effort to sort out how he went wrong. One of the techniques for generating the limb-of-enlightenment equanimity is the cultivation of neutrality with regard to sentient beings (*Vism.* iv. 62), though not necessarily in absorption. This neutrality in turn is engendered by the reflections (a) that beings are heirs to their own deeds and (b) that in the ultimate sense there are no sentient beings.[39] When these reflections are well cultivated, they can lead to the generation of the balance necessary for the realization of nirvana. At the time of this realization, the object of one's mind is nirvana, not sentient beings.[40] By just considering the nature of the reflections that lead up to the limb-of-enlightenment equanimity and the absence of beings as the object of one's mind at the time of the realization of nirvana, it would be possible to assume, as King does, that there is not much room for concern towards beings in Buddhism. I would, however, point out that the reflections used in the cultivation of the limb-of-enlightenment equanimity are temporary expedients that do not preclude subsequent concern for others.[41] Similarly, the brief and crucial realization of nirvana does not preclude subsequent concern for others. In fact, it is said to facilitate such concern.[42] King in his characterization of Theravāda Buddhism has taken certain aspects of practice and generalized them beyond their range of applicability. He has exacerbated his error by failing to take account of the large amount of descriptive and prescriptive material in the canon on the contexutalization of practice within a framework of concern for others.

4. *Involvement with the World*

So far, we have seen that a practitioner is supposed to undertake his efforts with the understanding that his own religious progress will be of benefit to others. This benefit arises in two major ways—through the practitioner's exemplification of the rewards of practice, which inspires others to practice and accomplish the same, and through his helpful instruction of others. Depending on his preceptor's advice, his own temperament, and the needs of the society at large, a practitioner will spend anywhere from a few moments a day to several consecutive years in the pursuit of meditative realization. His involvement with teaching will vary similarly. The amount of time an individual devotes to meditation and/or teaching is one of the major differentiating factors among individual practitioners. It is to be noted, however, that restricting oneself to the exemplification of practice and its rewards without involvement in teaching is not enough. Gotama insisted that monks travel about and teach religion to others in the following way :

> Monks, go and travel around for the welfare of the multitudes ; for the happiness of the multitudes ; out of sympathy for the world ; for the benefit, welfare, and happiness of gods and men. Two should not go on one [path]. Monks, teach the dharma that is beneficial at the start, beneficial in the middle, and beneficial at the end. (S.i.105)

No matter how much time practitioners spend in the temporary withdrawl necessary for the cultivation of meditative realization, they are enjoined to complement it by active instruction of others. Monks who are devoted to practice must balance their

personal progress by actual involvement with others. This constant play between activity and retreat[43] is a far cry from the unidirectional (once-and-for-all) "withdrawal from the active life of historical involvement" which according to King characterizes monastic Buddhism.[44] Even the most cursory investigation of the discourses will reveal many lengthy contacts between the Buddha and the leaders of his own society.[45] Similarly, a perusal of the historical records will reveal extensive and active involvement by monks in the societies where Buddhism has established itself, primarily in education.[46]

E. A Response to Spiro

Spiro's characterization of "detachment" (*upekkhā*) as the ultimate value of Theravāda Buddhism is inaccurate and confusing. First of all, if "detachment" means the sublime-attitude equanimity, as he indicates it does, then it is patently obvious that this is not the most highly-valued attitude of Theravāda Buddhism.[47] Buddha and his followers did not limit themselves to an attitude of neutrality with regard to beings, nor did they ever assert that this was the best and only attitude to have. On the contrary, Buddha emphasized that he acted out of sympathy, and he encouraged his disciples to do likewise.

In going on to identify "detachment" as the destruction of all emotion, Spiro has apparently merged several distinct Buddhist concepts into one erroneous whole. It seems as if he has taken the normatively-important limb-of-enlightenment equanimity, which is efficacious for abandoning *negative* attitudes (emotions) such as hatred,[48] combined it with the normatively important six-limbed equanimity, which is the continuous pure balance of the fully enlightened, added in the experiential neutrality of the feeling equanimity and the attitudinal neutrality to others of the sublime-attitude equanimity, and come up with a highly-valued super-equanimity which has neither doctrinal equivalent nor theoretical validity.[49] Fully-liberated individuals have abandoned all the negative emotions of greed, hatred and delusion. They have not, however, destroyed *all* their emotions and feelings. Such individuals have the ability to develop love, compassion or sympathetic joy and would be encouraged to do so.[50] They can experience the feelings of pleasure or bliss and would be encouraged to do so.[51] They can act out of concern and sympathy for others and would be encouraged to do so.[52] It is thus totally misleading to state that the goal of the Buddhist practitioner is the development of an emotionless personality. Fully-liberated individuals have the possibility of a very rich and subtle emotional life.

Spiro goes on to say that the ideal act in Buddhism is *governed* by "detachment." Insofar as he identifies "detachment" as the sublime-attitude equanimity, we can emphatically disagree and state that nowhere is this attitude held up as the guiding light of Buddhist activity. Nor is the ideal act governed by an absence of emotion. We could say that the ideal act, embodied in the personage of the fully-liberated individual would be *accompanied* by six-limbed equanimity. This is the pure balance that accompanies such an individual's responses to material situations and sentient beings, whether he be responding with insight, joy or sympathy. In the light of what has been said above about Buddha's own sympathy and his exhortations to the monks, it would be far more fitting to assert that the ideal act in Buddhism is governed

by some consideration and concern for others' happiness and welfare.

F. Conclusion

There are scriptural sources which indicate that fully-liberated individuals continuously maintain equanimity. The commentaries indicate that the equanimity intended here is six-limbed equanimity, namely, a pure balance of mind in the face of desired or undesired objects. This balance can accompany the whole gamut of attitudinal responses that are normally associated with a wholesome mind. It could accompany the attitudes of generosity, or sympathy. It would be associated with the feeling of equanimity, pleasure or bliss.

Winston King and Melford Spiro have understood some amorphous and impossible combination of the limb-of-enlightenment equanimity, the sublime-attitude equanimity, the feeling equanimity, and six-limbed equanimity as the ultimate attitude of Theravāda Buddhism. This attitude is supposed to be the goal of those seeking full liberation and the cause for monks purported withdrawal from contact with society. According to King and Spiro, Buddhists would ideally sustain neutrality towards one another and experience only the feeling of neither pleasure nor pain.

The discourses indicate a rather different picture of the ethical ideal of Theravāda Buddhism as well as the results of its practice. Buddha primarily followed an altruistic ethical ideal. Motivated by sympathy for others, he achieved enlightenment and went on to be involved in society through his teaching. Gotama, the paradigm for the results of practice, was capable of a wide range of attitudes, including those of love, compassion, sympathetic joy and equanimity. He was capable of enjoying the feelings of pleasure or bliss. In contrast to the solitary unemotional persona that Spiro and King would conjure up, Gotama was a man of sympathy, a man capable of balanced concern, a man capable of joy, a man who shared his insights. In other words, Gotama was a man who was capable of touching others' hearts and inspiring them to follow him.

NOTES

In both the text of this article and the notes, references to Pali texts are to the standard Pali Text Society editions unless otherwise noted. The abbreviations of titles used in the Pali Text Society Dictionary have been followed. References to the commentaries are to the standard Pali Text Society commentaries. The commentaries to the discourses are referred to by a capital A following the appropriate discourse abbreviation. For example, the commentary to the Dīghanikāya would be referred to as DA.

1. Winston King, *In the Hope of Nibbana* (La Salle : Open Court, 1964), p. 168.
2. Ibid., p. 165.
3. Ibid., p. 168.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid., p. 162.

6. Melford Spiro, *Buddhism and Society* (New York : Harper Paperbacks, 1972), p. 48.

7. Ibid.

8. Ibid.

9. *American Heritage Dictionary*, ed. William Morris (Boston : American Heritage Publishing Co., Inc., 1969), p. 211.

10. The major commentarial source for this article will be the fifth-century commentator Buddhaghosa and his work the *Visuddhimagga*, ed. Henry Clarke Warren, Harvard Oriental Series, Vol. 41 (Cambridge : Harvard University Press, 1950). All future references to this work will be to chapter and section number with the title abbreviated Vism. All translations from this work and the other Pali works quoted in this article are by the present author.

11. See for example, D. i. 73-74 ; Vism. iv. 79, 130.

12. See for example, D. i. 75 ; Vism. iv. 153.

13. See for example, D. i. 75 ; Vism. iv. 166, 183, 194.

14. Elsewhere, I have shown that both (a) the reflection that beings reap in accordance with what they have sown and (b) the reflection that in the ultimate sense there are no sentient beings can be used in the preliminary stages of developing the sublime attitude equanimity. See, Harvey B. Aronson, "Love, Compassion, Sympathetic Joy, and Equanimity in Theravada Buddhism" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Wisconsin, 1975), pp. 276-82.

Though Theravāda doctrine affirms that in the ultimate sense there is no sentient being, this does not preclude some acceptance of conventional concepts such as "beings". In the preliminary stages of developing neutrality with regard to beings, one may consider that in the ultimate sense sentient beings do not exist. This is aimed at weeding out mental imbalance. Unbalanced reactions toward others cannot survive the analytical realization that in the ultimate sense there are no sentient beings (see for example *Vism.* vi. 90-91 ; ix. 38). Having removed any imbalance that may have been present, one proceeds with the cultivation of neutrality by once again establishing sentient beings as the object of one's mind. The Theravādins unfortunately did not articulate the philosophical justification behind the provisional acceptance of conventional realities which are ultimately unreal. It is clear though that this is practically possible. This is evidenced by the example of the Buddha. He realized that in the ultimate sense there is no self, but subsequently went on to act on behalf of provisionally accepted other selves.

I am indebted to Professor David Little of the University of Virginia for bringing this problem to my attention. I am also most indebted to him for his stimulating questions on Theravāda ethics, which helped me arrive at several of the formulations presented in sections C and D.

15. AA. iii. 126 ; Vism. ix. 88 ; Dhammapāla, *Paramatthamañjūsānāmavisuddhimaggamahāṭīkā*, ed. Rewatadhammo (Varanasi : Varanaseya Sanskrit Vishvavidyalaya, 1969), p. 672.

16. The sublime-attitude equanimity differs from the equanimity of purity in that the object of the former is sentient beings (*Vism.* ix. 102) and not the counterpart sign (*paṭibhāga-nimitta*, *Vism.* iv. 31, 181).

17. AA. iii. 335.

18. Buddhaghosa did not include unknowing-equanimity (*aññāṇupekkhā*) in his rather exhaustive analysis of equanimity (*Vism.* iv. 156-71), though he himself makes use of the compound (*Vism.* ix. 101). The sixth century commentator Dhammapāla helps us understand this compound when he glosses it as "the act of not knowing" (*aññāṇaṃ*). See, Dhammapāla, p. 682.

19. Within the discussion of the psychology of meditative states, the feeling equanimity is said to be more subtle than bliss (*Vism.* ix. 88). There is no similar valuation stated for nonmeditative states, and hence no prescriptive preference for the feeling equanimity outside of meditation. Even the meditative valuation of the feeling equanimity is not absolute. For example, meditators (even fully-liberated ones) cultivating the sublime attitudes are expected to alternate (*not replace* !) the attitudes associated with bliss with the sublime-attitude equanimity associated with the feeling equanimity (see section D. 2 below).

20. The most elaborated evidence in the discourses on fully-liberated individuals relates to the Buddha. On his sympathy see Aronson, pp. 110-42 ; on his love and compassion see Aronson, pp. 291-95 ; A. i. 181 ; M. i. 369.

21. See Aronson, pp. 326-32.

22. Ibid., pp. 216-24.

23. Ibid., pp. 298-304. All four sublime attitudes are conducive to developing the attitudes necessary for the realization of nirvana. However, the sublime-attitude equanimity has virtues in this regard not shared by the first three sublime attitudes. (see note 24).

24. Ibid., pp. 268-76.

25. This discussion should not create the impression that in order to realize nirvana one *must* cultivate one or all of the sublime attitudes. One can cultivate insight after having achieved absorption through any number of techniques besides the cultivation of the sublime attitudes (Vism. xviii. 3). There is even a way of cultivating insight without first developing concentration up to the level of absorption. See, Mahasi Sayadaw, *The Progress of Insight*, trans. Nyanaponika Thera, 2nd revised ed. (Kandy : Buddhist Publication Society, 1973), p. 6. The path one chooses will vary according to one's teacher and one's temperament. The point I am making in the text is that *if* one were cultivating the sublime-attitudes the sublime-attitude-equanimity would be the most efficacious for producing the limb-of-enlightenment equanimity.

26. King, p. 161.

27. Ibid., pp. 161-62.

28. See note 15.

29. AA. ii. 204 ; *Vism.* ix. 108.

30. If we were to speculate on why Buddha still engaged in these meditations after his enlightenment we would have to give the answer he often gave regarding the motives behind his behavior—personal satisfaction and sympathy for the people of the future (M. i. 23) Buddha understood that he was an exemplar to others of the conduct and fruits of practice. Thus, after his enlightenment, he continued to engage in practices that were satisfying to him and that would be helpful for others to follow in the future (MA. i. 129).

31. King, p. 162.

32. Ibid.

33. See for example the "Siṅgālovāda Suttanta," D. iii. 180-93.

34. In a mathematical universe, we might expect that the cultivation of the sublime attitudes in meditation would lead to an equal effect from all four attitudes on the practitioner outside of meditation, certainly not a greater effect from equanimity. However, Theravāda Buddhism is not mathematical in this instance. On account of the normative importance of sympathy for others in Theravāda Buddhism (discussed in sections D. 3-4 of this article) the first three concerned sublime attitudes, if cultivated, are to exert a controlling influence on a practitioner's behavior outside of meditation; the last attitude, if cultivated, a qualifying effect. All concerned attitudes are to be qualified by balance of mind. Balance of mind, not neutrality with regard to others, is what the practitioner is to bring into his daily life from his cultivation of the sublime-attitude equanimity. This is made clear from the example of the Buddha. (See, Aronson, 132-33 ; S. i. 206, 111.)

Though the sublime-attitude equanimity has virtues which recommend it in terms of concentration and insight, outside of periods of meditation it is of less consequence than the first three sublime attitudes for nourishing sympathy. Sympathy for others is supposed to motivate the whole religious life (including the cultivation of the sublime attitudes). It is thus implicit that the effects from the cultivation of the sublime attitudes are to be weighted in such a way as to sustain sympathy. (I may note here that even the temporary cultivation of the peaceful sublime-attitude equanimity should be motivated by an understanding of the beneficial ramifications for others of one's own cultivation of this attitude of neutrality. This is discussed further in D. 3-4.)

35. A. i. 22 ; AA, i. 98-99.

36. It is held traditionally that the being who ultimately became Gotama Buddha had the capacity to achieve full liberation as a worthy one/*arahant* in an earlier life. See, Henry Clarke Warren, ed., *Buddhism : In Translations* (New York : Atheneum, 1963), pp. 14-15. He did not pursue this end, but instead, out of concern for others committed himself to realizing the four noble truths when they were no longer being taught in the world and then going on to teach them to others. The training necessary for completing this task is said to have taken a large number of rebirths and a vast span of time. Buddha did benefit from his enlightenment, but his primary motivation for realizing the four noble truths, becoming a Buddha, and teaching others was concern for others' welfare. I would thus consider his motivation primarily altruistic.

37. On the basis of Gotama's description of his own motivations and on the basis of his exhortation quoted in the text, I would see the basic ethical structure of Theravada Buddhism as either altruistic or hybrid (egocentric/altruistic).

Furthermore, I would suggest that isolated instances of egocentric exhortations were meant for flagging practitioners who were not even capable of seeking their own welfare, let alone that of others. Once such practitioners achieved some personal progress, we can suspect that the normative expectation would be that their motivation would broaden to either an altruistic or hybrid motivation.

This assessment is further supported by the Theravāda precept against suicide (*Vin.* iii. 82). Fully-liberated individuals are free from all attachment to life. They have accomplished their purpose of burning up all the causes of future rebirth. Egocentric considerations, such as the physcial hardships associated with the monastic life, might lead such an individual to consider suicide. Fully-liberated individuals, being free from

rebirth and the suffering it entails, would need not fear any suffering subsequent to their death. They would achieve the immortal condition of nirvana. Buddha, being mindful of the benefits that advanced practitioners can bring to others, proscribed suicide (Miln. 195-6). No matter what motives draw individuals to practice, they should end up living with a recognition of the good they as practitioners can bring others through exemplification of the conduct and fruits of practice, and its transmission.

38. King, p. 162.

39. See, Soma-Thera, *The Way of Mindfulness : The Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta and Commentary* (Kandy : Buddhist Publication Society, 1967), pp. 144-45 ; and note 14 above. It is perhaps worth noting here that any neutrality towards beings outside the context of the fourth absorption would not constitute the sublime-attitude equanimity. It would be the preliminary aspect of the sublime-attitude equanimity, and technically would fall into the category of equanimity which consists of constituential balance. See Aronson, pp. 280-81, and Buddhaghosa, *Path of Purification* (*Visuddhimagga*), trans. Ñāṇamoli Thera (Colombo : Semage, 1964), p. 352, nt. 20.

40. *Path of Purification*, p. 528, nt. 67.

41. In fact these reflections are suggested as antitodes to the imbalance of hatred so that one can subsequently go on to cultivate love for others (*Vism.* ix. 23-24, 38 ; and note 14 above).

42. This is according to the twentieth-century meditation teacher U Satyanarayan Goenka.

43. See for example the case of Buddha, who even after enlightenment would alternate between teaching and meditation, occasionally doing half-month retreats (AA. i. 69070 ; Henry Clarke Warren, pp. 91-95).

44. King, pp. 162, 168.

45. See for example the "Sāmaññaphala Sutta" (D. i. 47-86), or the "Kūṭadanta Sutta" (D. i. 127049).

46. See for example, Walpola Rahula, *The Heritage of the Bhikkhu : A Short History of the Bhikkhu in Educational, Cultural, Social and Political Life*, trans. K.P.G. Wijayasurendra (New York : Grove Press, 1974).

47. Spiro indicates that the practitioner cultivates "detachment" once he has proceeded through love, compassion and sympathetic joy (Spiro, p. 48). It is thus clear that he is referring to the standard progressive development of the sublime attitudes, and that "detachment" here refers specifically to the sublime-attitude equanimity.

Spiro's statement that "detachment" (*upekkhā*) [the sublime-attitude equanimity] is emotional detachment with respect to both one's own fate and the fate of others is acceptable if we understand that (a) this detachment is cultivated at the level of the fourth absorption and (b) this detachment is associated with the understanding that one reaps what one sows, and is not mere dumb indifference (*Vism.* ix. 96, 101). This qualified acceptance in no way means that we accept any of the rest of Spiro's assertions regarding "detachment" (upekkhā).

48. When one attains the path consciousness which realizes nirvana, one abandons defilements forever (*Vism.* xxii. 122). At this time all seven limbs of enlightenment would be present. It is a distortion to separate out the limb-of-enlightenment equanimity from the other limbs which are equally important for this process. However, insofar as Spiro has focused attention on "detachment" *upekkhā* [equanimity], and I am

trying to unravel the etiology of his usage, I have singled out the limb-of-enlightenment equanimity (*bojjhaṅga-upekkhā*) for mention here.

49. The sublime-attitude equanimity itself does not have the ability to permanently destroy negative attitudes, though it does have the capacity to suppress them temporarily (*Vism.* xxii. 111).

50. Witness the exemplary model of the Buddha (see note 20 above).

51. On the feelings associated with the sublime attitudes see, *Vism.* ix. 111.

52. Buddha did so (see note 20 above), and urged his practitioners to follow suit (see, S. i. 105, and note 37 above).

2

The Theravāda School of Buddhist Thought

ANUKUL CHANDRA BANERJEE

A. Introduction

In the sixth century B.C. when Buddhism originated writing was hardly used. Recitation and memorization were then the means for the preservation of records; these methods had been in use in India since the earliest Vedic period. Gautama Buddha's speeches, sayings, discourses and conversations were accordingly transmitted orally through successions of teachers (*ācariyaparaṃparā*). The *Mahāparinibbāna Suttanta*[1] records that Buddha anticipated that his sayings might be misrepresented and so he advised his disciples to verify his words in four ways (*cattāro mahāpadesā*); this prophecy came true after his *Mahāparinibbāna*. About a hundred years after his *Mahāparinibbāna*, dissension arose among the monks regarding the actual words of the Buddha and their proper interpretation; this controversy ultimately led to the origin of different schools of thought in Buddhism, all claiming to have preserved his teachings. Within a few hundred years of his *Mahāparinibbāna*, eighteen or more such schools of thought came into existence. They took up the cause of Buddhism with great zeal and tried to popularise it inside and outside India. E. Conze writes : "The first five centuries of Buddhist history saw the development of a number of schools, or sects, which are traditionally counted as eighteen. The historical traditions about them are uncertain, contradictory and confused."[2] André Bareau has, however, discussed chronologically the origin of these different schools.[3] Lamotte[1] has also dealt with the geographical distribution of the different schools on the basis of the inscriptions.

The *Samayabhedavyūhacakra*, *Nikāyabhedavibhaṅgavyākhyāna*, *Samayabhedaparacanacakrenikāyabhedopadeśanasaṃgrahanāma*, *Kathāvatthu*, *Milindapañha* and the like

record the tenets of different schools. But the *Samayabhedavyūhacakra* is considered to be the most authoritative in this regard. The first dissension was created by the monks of Vaiśālī, through their breach of the rules of discipline as laid down in the *Vinayapiṭaka*. The *Cullavagga* and the Ceylonese chronicles record that the Second Buddhist Council was held at Vaiśālī just a century after the passing away of the Buddha, to examine the validity of the ten observances (*dasa vatthūni*)[5] practised by the Vajjian monks. The works of Vasumitra, Bhavya and Vinītadeva preserved in Tibetan and Chinese translations furnish us with a quite different account. According to, them the Council is said to have been convened, because of the differences of opinions among the monks in regard to the five dogmas[6] propounded by Mahādeva.

Traditions differ in regard to the cause of the convening of the Second Council. But all the accounts record unanimously that a schism occured about a hundred years after the *Mahāparinibbāna* of Buddha, due to the efforts of a few monks for a relaxation of the rigour of the rules of conduct current at the time; the orthodox monks were not ready to allow that. The orthodox views prevailed and the monks opposed to them were expelled from the Saṅgha. They were not, however, disappointed. They gained strength gradually and convened shortly another Council in which ten thousand monks participated. In the history of Buddhism it is known as *Mahāsaṅgīti* (Great Council). The monks who joined the Council later on were called the Mahāsaṅghikas, while the orthodox monks were distinguished as the Theravādins. Thus occured the first schism which divided the early Buddhist Saṅgha into two primitive schools—the Theravāda and the Mahāsaṅghika. It was a "division between the conservative and the liberal, the hierarchic and the democratic". Undoubtedly this Council marked the evolution of new schools of thought in Indian Buddhism.

It would be quite relevant to point out in this connection that this schism was followed by a series of schisms, and in course of time several sub-sects branched off from these two sects. The Theravāda was split up into twelve sub-sects and the Mahāsaṅghika into six. But these different sects could not maintain their individual existences for long. Most of them either disappeared or merged with other sects shortly after their origin; only four schools survived. The four schools that could outlive and expand their own field of influence were the Vaibhāṣika, Sautrāntika, Mādhyamika and Yogācāra. These four schools only are referred to in the Hindu and Jaina philosophical works. In his *Sarvadarśanasaṅgraha* Mādhavācārya has briefly dealt with the views of these four schools.

Buddhism today has two main sects, known as Hīnayāna and Mahāyāna. The former prevails in Ceylon, Burma, Thailand (Siam), Cambodia and other countries, the latter in Tibet, China, Nepal, Japan and others. We will now discuss the views of the Theravāda school.

The Theravāda (Sthaviravāda) is the original school of Buddhism according to the Pali tradition. It is the most conservative school, preserving its doctrine in Pali. According to the Ceylonese tradition, the alternative name of Theravāda is Vibhajjavāda[7]. In the *Kathāvatthu* we find the term *Sakavāda* in place of Sthaviravāda or Vibhajjavāda. The followers of Theravāda are called Theravādins. According to them, Buddha was a human being possessing many superhuman qualities. In the Nikāya texts, however, he has been described as the god of gods (*devātideva*).

The Theravādins hold that Buddha's teaching is very simple, and can easily be

understood even by a common man (*puthujjana*). The fundamental tenet of this school is to refrain from all kinds of evil, to accumulate all that is good and to purify the mind[8]. These things can be accomplished only through the practice of *Sīla* (good conduct), *Samādhi* (meditation) and *paññā* (wisdom). *Sīla* is the foundation of all progress in human life. By *Sīla* is generally meant the ten precepts (*sikkhāpadas*), which are refraining from killing beings, theft, unchasity, falsehood, intoxicating drinks, eating at the wrong hour, worldly amusements, using unguents or ornaments, sleeping on a high and big bed and accepting any gold or silver[9]. *Samādhi* is the concentration of mind on an object of thought; this is of two kinds—*samatha* and *vipassanā*. The objects suitable for *samatha* meditation are usually forty in number. *Vipassanā* 'is the wisdom which in its own being is the comprehension of reality as it truly is'. *Paññā* (wisdom) removes *avijjā* (ignorance), which is the non-comprehension of the *ariyasaccas* (the fourfold noble truth), *pubbanta* (the past), *aparanta* (the future), *sassata* (eternity), *uccheda* (annihilation) and *paṭiccasamuppāda* (dependent origination)[10]. Through the cultivation of *Paññā* (wisdom) one understands the *ariyasaccas* (four noble truths) and *paṭiccasamuppāda* (dependent origination).

According to this school, all things are *anicca* (impermanent), *dukkha* (full of suffering) and *anatta* (without any substance). Everything is momentary and subject to decay. All constituted things originate from *nāma-rūpa* (non-material and material), which is subdivided into *pañcakkhandhas*, viz., *rūpa* (material quality), *vedanā* (sensation), *saññā* (perception), *saṃkhāra* (mental formatives) and *viññāṇa* (consciousness). The *pañca-khandhas* are *saṃskṛta* (constituted). They are subject to origin and decay. According to this school, the *majjhimapaṭipadā* (middle path) is the real path which avoids both indulgence in the pleasures of senses and self-mortification[11]. It is also known as the *Ariyaṭṭhaṅgikamagga* (noble eightfold path) consisting in the practice of eight noble virtues[12]. It also lays much emphasis on the *riyasaccas* (four noble truths), *anattavāda* (non-existence of soul), *kammavāda* (doctrine of kamma) and *paṭiccasamuppāda* (dependent origination).

The *Abhidhammatthasaṅgaha* discusses the psycho-ethical philosophy of this sect. According to it, *citta* (consciousness), *cetasika* (mental property), *rūpa* (material quality) and *nibbāna* are the four ultimate categories. *Citta* is of 89 types (according to another classification 121), *cetasika* 52, *rūpa* 28 and *nibbāna*. Nibbāna is a happy state which is free from wordly sufferings and delusion. It is a state which can not be described in words.

Finally, it should be mentioned here that the ideal of the adherents of this school is the attainment of the life of an Arahant—"a life where all (future) birth is at an end, where the holy life is fully achieved, where all that had to be done has been done and there is no more return to wordly life"[13]. This is the highest stage of the path leading to nibbāna. The aim of the Theravāda is liberation for oneself, rather than the liberation of others, as is the case with the Mahāyāna sect.

NOTES

1. *Dīghanikāya* Vol. II (Nalanda Devnagari ed.) pp. 96-98
2. Edward Conze, *Buddhist Thought in India*, p. 119.
3. *BEFEO*, 1956, pp. 16ff.
4. *Histoire du Bouddhisme Indien* p. 578.

5. They are:—
   (i) *Siṅgiloṇakappa*—the practice of carrying salt in a horn, i.e. storing articles of food.
   (ii) *Dvaṅgulakappa*—the practice of taking meals when the shadow is two fingers broad, i.e. taking meals after midday.
   (iii) *Gāmantarakappa*—the practice of going to an adjacent village and taking meals there the same day for the second time.
   (iv) *Āvāsakappa*—the observance of the Uposatha ceremonies in various places in the same parish (*Sīmā*).
   (v) *Anumatikappa*—doing a deed and obtaining its sanction afterwards.
   (vi) *Āciṇṇakappa*—the customary practices as precedent.
   (vii) *Amathitakappa*—drinking of butter-milk after meals.
   (viii) *Jalogiṃpātuṃ*—drinking of toddy.
   (xi) *Adasakaṃnisīdanaṃ*—use of a rug without a fringe.
   (x) *Jātarūparajataṃ*—acceptance of gold and silver.

6. They are:—
   (i) An Arhat may commit a sin under unconscious temptation.
   (ii) One may be an Arhat and not know of it.
   (iii) An Arhat may have doubts on matters of doctrine.
   (iv) One cannot attain Arhatship without the aid of a teacher.
   (v) The noble ways may begin by a shout, that is, one meditating seriously on religion may make such an exclamation as 'How sad! How sad!' and by so doing attains progress towards perfection—the path is attained by an exclamation of astonishment.

7. It may be noted that the term 'Vibhajjavāda' is applied to Sarvāstivāda or other sects as well. It is very likely that the term 'Vibhajjavāda' implied that the adherents belonged to the main set with some special views, for which they distinguished themselves as 'Theravāda—Vibhajjavāda' or 'Sarvāstivāda—Vibhajjavāda'—A.C. Banerjee, *Sarvāstivāda Literature* pp. 3-4.

8. Cf. *Dhammapada*, v 5.

9. Pāṇātipātā veramaṇī, adinnādānā veramaṇī, abrahmacariyā veramaṇī, musāvādā veramaṇī, surāmerayamajjapamādaṭṭhānā veramaṇī, vikālabhojanā veramaṇī, naccagītavāditavisūkadassanā veramaṇī, mālāgandhavilepanadhāraṇamaṇḍanavibhūsanaṭṭhānā veramaṇī, uccāsayanamahāsayanā veramaṇī and jātarūparajatapaṭiggahanā veramaṇī.

10. Paṭiccasamuppāda contains twelve links. They are: avijjā (lack of true knowledge), saṅkhāra (thought constructions) viññāṇa (perception), nāma-rūpa (mind and matter), saḷāyatana (six sense organs), phassa (contact) vedanā (feeling), taṇhā (thirst), upādāna (attachment), bhava (existence), jāti (birth) and jarāmaraṇa-soka-parideva-dukkha-domanassa (old age, death, grief, lamentation and sorrow).

11. Kāmesu kāmasukhallikānuyogo attakilamathānuyogo—*Mahāvagga*, vol. I, p. 10.

12. They are : sammā-diṭṭhi (right view), sammā-saṅkappa (right resolve), sammā-vācā (right speech), sammā-kammanta (right action), sammā-ājīva (right livelihood), sammā-vāyāma (right effort), sammā-sati (right mindfulness) and sammā-samādhi (right concentration).

13. Khīṇā jāti, vusitaṃ brahmacariyaṃ, kataṃ karaṇīyaṃ, nāparaṃ itthattayāti.

3

Remarks on Four Buddhist Sanskrit Works Composed in Sri Lanka

HEINZ BECHERT

In a contribution on "Sanskrit Literature in Sri Lanka as a Paradigm of Regional Sanskrit Literatures" (published in *Malalasekera Commemoration Volume*, ed. O.H. de A. Wijesekera, Colombo 1976, pp. 23-35), I have dealt with some general aspects and with the periodization of Sanskrit literature in Ceylon. Here, I propose to supplement these remarks with some notes on Buddhist Sanskrit works composed in Sri Lanka. Sanskrit is known to have been a rather important factor in the literary history of the island, though the Buddhist scriptures were handed down and studied in the Pali version there, not in Sanskrit versions.

There are several quotations from Indian Buddhist Sanskrit literature in classical Sinhala works which give evidence of the importance of this literature in mediaeval Ceylon. The four works which I have selected for my remarks, however, were composed in the island of Sri Lanka itself and belong to the period from the 13th to 17th centuries. These works have also been incorporated into the curriculum of the traditional monastic schools of Ceylon. (For details of this system of teaching and references see my "Über Sanskrit-Bildung und Schulsystem in Birma und Ceylon", *Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Süd-und Ostasiens* 7, (1963, pp. 1-12).

The first of these Sanskrit texts is the *Buddhagadya*. This is a Buddhastotra consisting of 41 stanzas, and it was used for teaching correct spelling and pronunciation in the monastic schools. Its contents, however, were not explained to the students, so that it was handed down without a *sannaya* (word-for-word commentary). As a consequence, there is an unusually large number of clerical errors in most of the manuscripts and printed editions of the work. In some manuscripts, the text is distorted to the degree of making it almost impossible to recognize it as a Sanskrit work. Thus, Edmund Hardy, who is known to have been an excellent Sanskrit philologist, described

its language as "a strange mixture of a corrupted Sanskrit with Pali-forms, having a few words of its own", when he edited the work from a single manuscript ("On Some Stanzas in Eulogy of the Buddha", *Journal of the Pali Text Society* 1897-1901, pp. 43-54). I have attempted to give a corrected text of the *Buddhagadya* (in my edition of some of the works of the monastic curriculum of Sri Lanka *Sanskrittexte aus Ceylon*, ed. Heinz Bechert, part 1 : Schultexte, Muenchen 1962, pp. 15-22). Local tradition ascribes the authorship of this book to Attaragama Baṇḍāra (18th century), or to Vīdāgama Maitreya Mahāthera (15th century), but both these traditions have no reliable basis. Stylistically, the work is influenced by late popular Sanskrit works of Vaiṣṇava tradition. Vaiṣṇava influence was strong in 17th century Ceylon and we may suppose that the *Buddhagadya* was composed in the 17th or early 18th century.

The second work to be mentioned in this context bears the name of *Anuruddhaśataka*. This work is available in many locally-printed editions and in a large number of manuscripts. It was also edited by C.A. Seelakkhanda Thera, in Nagari script (Calcutta 1900). A description of the work is found in James d'Alwis, *A Descriptive Catalogue of Sanskrit, Pali, Sinhalese Literary Works of Ceylon*, vol. 1, Colombo 1870, pp. 168-172. The *Anuruddhaśataka* is a kāvya of 101 stanzas dealing with Gautama Buddha and His qualities. It is written in elegant verses and can be described as one of the best Sanskrit compositions written in Ceylon. Later tradition claims that the author of the *Anuruddhaśataka* is identical with Anuruddha, the author of the *Abhidhammatthasangaha*. This identification is, however, wrong as we can infer from the text itself, because the author describes himself as *upasthavira* i.e. deputy chief of the Uttaramūla community, which was established ca. 1050 A.D. The *Abhidhammatthasangaha*, however, belongs to an earlier period. From the list of authors found in Jayabāhu Dharmakīrti's *Nikāyasangrahaya* it can be concluded that the *Anuruddhaśataka* was composed between the middle part of the 13th and the middle part of the 14th century. Thus it is later than the Polonnaruva period to which it is attributed in most reference works.

The third Sanskrit work to be included in the said curriculum is Rāmacandra Bhāratin's *Bhaktiśataka* or *Bauddhaśataka*, a poem of 107 stanzas. This work belongs to the 15th century, but it was erroneously dated to the 13th century by several modern authors, including M. Winternitz. It deserves special attention as the best example of Buddhist bhakti literature. The bhakti movement, which originated in Vaiṣṇava circles, is known to have influenced Mahāyāna Buddhism, but there is not much evidence from other sources for influence of the bhakti movement on the development of Theravāda Buddhism. Therefore, it is particularly surprising to find a work like the *Bhaktiśataka* in the literary tradition of orthodox Theravāda in Ceylon and forming part of the curriculum of Theravāda monastic schools, when bhakti is the central concept of this text and Mahāyāna influence is clearly evident in the work. The author of the *Bhaktiśataka*, Rāmacandra Bhāratin, alias Candrabhāratin, was born in a village named Vīravatī in Bengal. He was brought up as a devotee of Viṣṇu, but he left his home-country, moved to Ceylon and converted to Buddhism. Here he became a pupil of Toṭagamuvē Śrī Rāhula Thera, one of the most celebrated Sinhala poets. The *Bhaktiśataka* seems to have been Rāmacandra's first work, written when he was still known as the brahmin Kavibhāratin Rāmacandra; after that, king Parākramabāhu VI (1412-1467) of Ceylon conferred the title of Bauddhāgamacakravarttin upon

the poet. In 1455 A.D, he wrote the *Vṛttaratnākarapañjikā*, a detailed commentary on Kedārabhaṭṭa's *Vṛttaratnākara*, a well-known compendium of metrics. From this commentary, Rāmacandra's devotion to Avalokiteśvara, the main bodhisattva of Mahāyāna Buddhism, becomes evident, because he inserted several stanzas in praise of Avalokiteśvara or Avalokitanātha.

In the *Bhaktiśataka*, however, Avalokiteśvara is not mentioned. Though this śataka poem can be described as a stotra, it is very different from the usual poems of this genre. It is a very personal document, written by a man who found the meaning of his life in Buddhism, which was not the religion into which he was born and brought up, but the faith of his own choice. He criticizes the gods of Hinduism as not worthy of devotion or praise, because these gods are totally ignorant of the truth. Thus, he does not want to continue any communion with those who accept the authority of the Vedas. The Buddha alone is his refuge, from Him alone salvation can be hoped for, by His grace alone the sorrows of worldly existence can be overcome. Without deep and lasting devotion to the Buddha, merit and ascetic life are absolutely useless. The poet is not able to live without the Buddha for a single moment, but he can bear every misfortune, if the Buddha is with him.

It is evident that, for Rāmacandra Bhāratin, the Buddha is not only the teacher who showed the way to men who must go this way by their own efforts, but that for Rāmacandra the Buddha is present as the only saviour who grants salvation to helpless mankind. In this way, the bhakti concept introduced into Buddhism causes a complete reorientation of values to an approach which is very near to the thinking of Mahāyāna Buddhism.

Rāmacandra was clearly indebted to contemporary Vaiṣṇavism for his concept of bhakti, but we do not exactly know from which sources his devotion to Avalokiteśvara may have been derived. It is possible that Rāmacandra's first encounter with Buddhism already had taken place in his home-country, because there is evidence that some devotees of Mahāyāna Buddhism still lived in East Bengal in the early 15th century. In this case, he might have come to Ceylon with the intention of learning more about Buddhism, which was quickly fading away in Bengal during that period. (see also the present author's contribution "Zur Geschichte des Theravada-Buddhismus in Ostbengalen", *Beitraege zur Indienforschung*, Berlin, in the press).

In any event, Rāmacandra's works were well received in his new home-country, Sri Lanka, where he was awarded the most distinguished honours by the king, and two of his works became highly popular by being incorporated into the monastic curriculum, viz. *Bhaktiśataka* and *Vṛttamālākhyā*. This latter work, which has the alternative title of *Mahānetraprāsādamūlamahāsthaviracarita*, provides a biography of a thera named Dīpankara who dwelt in the Mahānetraprāsāda of the Śailāntaramūla monastery. This monastery can be identified with the present Galapata Vihāra, in Bentota, on the south-west coast of Sri Lanka. The 57 stanzas of the text are written in different meters to serve as a book of examples for the student of metrics.

The four works dealt with in this short contribution are not the only Buddhist Sanskrit works composed in Sri Lanka, but they are the only works of this literature to have had a lasting impact on the religious and literary tradition of the island of the dhamma.

4

The Nature and Meaning of the Netti-Pakaraṇa

GEORGE D. BOND

Of all the works in the Pāli Canon or in early Pāli literature, the *Netti-Pakaraṇa* is probably one of the least read and least understood, yet it holds potentially great insights into both the Dhamma and Theravāda Buddhism. The few Western scholars who have investigated the *Netti* have differed sharply in their views of it. Hardy, the editor of the Pāli Text Society's Roman script text, described the *Netti* as a commentary on the whole of the Dhamma, and cited the ancient commentator Dhammapāla in support of this opinion (N. xx). The Venerable Ñāṇamoli, the English scholar-bhikkhu who translated the *Netti*, noted Hardy's opinion that "The *Netti* may be styled a commentary" and observed wryly, "It may; but doing so does not illuminate its function" (G. xlv). Ñāṇamoli said, "It is not a commentary but a guide for commentators; it deals with scaffolding, not with architecture" (G. vii). He reasoned that it cannot be a commentary because "it draws no conclusions, proves nothing and is incapable of being made to do either" (G. xliii). Wilhelm Geiger seems to have agreed with Hardy about the purpose of the *Netti*, for in describing the *Netti* and the *Peṭakopadesa* Geiger said, "As the titles show, they serve as introductions to the teachings of Buddhism."[1] A totally different description of the *Netti* comes from a modern Buddhist scholar, Venerable Dhammādhāra Mahāthera, who expressed his view in an article entitled "*Netti-Pakaraṇa*—a Book on Theravāda Logic."[2] The Buddhists themselves seem to have disagreed also about the importance of the work for Burmese Theravādins count the *Netti* among the books of the canon but Sinhalese Theravādins exclude it from their lists of canonical works (Dhs. A. 17ff.). This chaos of opinions prompts one to ask, "What is the *Netti-Pakaraṇa*?" In this essay we shall answer this question by examining the nature of the *Netti* and by analyzing the meaning and function of its contents.

We may begin by stating our thesis as to the nature and purpose of the *Netti* : the

Netti has come down to us as a treatise on hermeneutics which presents a distinctive Theravāda method for interpreting the teachings of the Buddha. Theravāda Buddhists from an early period have associated the *Netti* with the problem and process of interpretation, for they have traditionally attributed the work to Mahā-Kaccāna. Mahā-Kaccāna is remembered as the Buddha's disciple who displayed great skill in interpreting his master's teachings. In the *Majjhima-Nikāya*, the bhikkhus ask Mahā-Kaccāna to explain a brief teaching by the Buddha. Having heard Mahā-Kaccāna's explanation of the teaching, the bhikkhus subsequently ask the Buddha whether Mahā-Kaccāna's interpretation is correct. The Buddha supports his famous disciple and says : "For if you, bhikkhus, had questioned me as to this meaning, I too would have explained it precisely as it was explained by Mahā-Kaccāna. Indeed, this is the exact meaning of that and thus you should understand it" (M. I, 109ff.). The Buddha is also said to have selected Mahā-Kaccāna as the author of the *Kaccāyana-vyākarana*, an ancient Pāli grammar, by saying "Bhikkhus, amongst my disciples capable of elucidating in detail what is expressed in the abstract, the most eminent is Mahā-Kaccāna."[3]

The Theravādins thus have looked upon the *Netti* as Mahā-Kaccāna's interpretation of the Dhamma. The Burmese Theravādins' commentaries to the *Netti* support this understanding of the book by teaching that the *Netti's* instruction is indispensable for an understanding of the suttas. One Burmese commentarial writer says : "Without depending upon the instruction of the *Netti* no correct understanding of a sutta can arise."[4]

The most conclusive proof for our thesis that the *Netti* represents a treatise on hermeneutics comes from the internal nature of the *Netti* itself. Upon opening the *Netti* the reader immediately confronts an elaborate system of guidelines (*nayā*), root terms, and exegetical categories. For example, we find there a list of sixteen categories called *hārā*, which include the *hārā* of teaching, investigation, construing, footing, characteristic, four-fold array, conversion, analysis, reversal, synonyms, descriptions, ways of entry, cleansing, terms of expression, requisites, and co-ordination. This system of categories does not constitute a summary of the teachings of the Dhamma or a list of the central doctrines, such as we might expect to find in a commentary upon or an introduction to the entire Dhamma. Rather, this system represents an outline of exegetical techniques which are appropriate to the Dhamma because they are consistent with the internal structure and logic of the teachings themselves. Thus, the *Netti* does not present a formulation of the overall meaning of the Dhamma, but instead offers instructions for investigating, analyzing, construing, and identifying common themes in the Dhamma so that an interpreter can derive from the texts a correct understanding of the meaning of the Dhamma.

The *Netti's* method of interpretation rests upon a view of the Dhamma as an organic whole, as a body of teachings with perfect coherence and symmetry. This view presupposes a belief that the Buddha set forth his teachings in numerous ways and on diverse topics, yet that the same fundamental meaning and purpose ran through all the levels of application and varieties of expression. The Dhamma was perfectly conceived and imparted by the Buddha to guide beings to the truth, and the interpreter must be able to recognize its meaning, logical structure and purpose in order to interpret correctly any particular teaching.

The *Netti* describes the nature of the Dhamma by commenting upon a passage from the suttas.

Assādam, ādīnavaṃ nissaraṇaṃ, phalaṃ, upāyam, āṇattiṃ. Dhammaṃ vo bhikkhave desissāmi ādikalyāṇaṃ majjhe kalyāṇam pariyosānakalyāṇaṃ sātthaṃ sabyañjanaṃ, kevelaparipuṇṇam parisuddhaṃ brahmacariyaṃ pakāsissāmī ti. (N. 5).

(By the aspects of) gratification, disappointment, escape, fruit means, and injunction, O Bhikkhus, I shall teach you a Dhamma that is good in the beginning, good in the middle, and good in the end, with its own meaning and its own phrasing; I shall make known a Brahma-faring entirely perfect and pure.

This passage is intended to represent the Buddha's own description of the nature and manner of his teaching. It occurs several times in the suttas (e.g. M. I, 344; D. I, 62), but in this instance six terms have been prefixed to the passage to enable it to serve as a paradigm of the structure and intention of the Dhamma. In the first section of the *Paṭiniddesavāra*, the *Netti* carefully analyzes this passage to describe the nature of the Dhamma and to set forth the problem of interpretation.

The six terms preceding the passage represent the variety of ways in which the Buddha expressed his teachings. This variety of expression served to relate the Dhamma to individuals with different needs and different levels of intelligence and development. The *Netti* illustrates this aspect of the Dhamma by describing the classifications of persons into three groups and into four groups and showing how the various forms of the teaching were intended to guide persons in these classifications. (N. 7).

Tattha Bhagavā ugghaṭitaññussa puggalassa nissaraṇaṃ desayati, vipañcitaññussa puggalassa ādīnavañ ca nissaraṇañ ca desayati, neyyassa puggalassa assādañ ca ādīnavañ ca nissaraṇañ ca desayati. (N. 7).

Herein the Blessed one teaches escape to a person who learns from what is condensed; he teaches disappointment and escape to a person who learns by what is expanded; he teaches gratification, disappointment and escape to one who is just guidable.

Having established one purpose of the variety of teachings, the *Netti* demonstrates that the variety of teachings represented by the six terms, conveys the fundamental and essential ideas of the Dhamma. The Netti says,

Sāyaṃ dhammadesanā kiṃ desayati? Cattāri saccāni : dukkhaṃ, samudayaṃ nirodhaṃ, maggaṃ. Ādīnavo phalañ ca dukkhaṃ, assādo samudayo, nissaraṇaṃ nirodho, upāyo anatti ca maggo. Imāni cattāri saccāni. (N. 8).

What does the teaching of the Dhamma teach? The Four Truths : Suffering, Origin, Cessation, and the Path. (With reference to the six terms) Disappointment and fruit are suffering, gratification is the origin, escape is cessation, and means and injunction are the path. These are the Four Truths.

Although the expressions and teachings of the Dhamma vary, the same fundamental meaning and intention underlies all Dhamma teachings. When understood correctly,

all Dhamma teachings convey the essential truths about existence and liberation expressed here as the Four Noble Truths.

Carrying this analysis of the Dhamma a step further, the *Netti* describes the procedure employed in the Dhamma to express the fundamental ideas through the various teachings of the Dhamma. To explain this, the *Netti* comments upon the terms "with its own meaning and its own phrasing (*sāttham sabyañjanaṃ*)." The Dhamma contains specific meaning and phrasing elements, which work together to expand the Dhamma into its manifold expressions. These meaning and phrasing terms also structure the Dhamma in its goodness in the beginning, middle and end (N. 9). Thus, the meaning and phrasing terms provide the key to the complex structures and interrelationships among the elements of the Dhamma. With the eloquence of a poet and the precision of an architect drawing a blueprint, the author of the *Netti* portrays the structure and intention of the Dhamma. There are diverse expressions of the teachings, diverse levels of application, and terms of meaning and phrasing, yet all these elements cohere and are interrelated as embodiments of the Buddha's essential meaning and purpose.

What then must the interpreter of the Dhamma do? What is the problem of interpretation according to the *Netti*? The Theravādin belief that the Buddha had unlimited wisdom or omniscience represents a major assumption behind the problem of interpretation (N. 103, Dhs. A. 11ff.). On the basis of his supramundane wisdom the Buddha set forth the Dhamma as a unique body of teachings about human existence. The *Netti* describes the teaching of the Four Noble Truths and the *Dhammacakkappavattana-Sutta* as *aparimāṇa*, boundless and profound (N. 8-9). In the *Atthasālinī* this term, *aparimāṇa*, refers to the infinite scope of the Dhamma, a scope so great that although the Buddha realized it all in a week, a disciple could not learn it all in a thousand years (Dhs. A. 15, cf. A. II, 182). Yet in other contexts we see that this infinity of scope (*aparimāṇa*) also connotes boundlessness, all-inclusiveness, and profundity (Kh. A. 248; D. I, 117 and D. A. I, 288). Thus, the supramundane source together with the infinite breadth and depth of the Dhamma teachings constitute the problem of interpretation : how can ordinary human beings understand a profound Dhamma?

In setting up the problem of interpreting the Dhamma, however, the *Netti* at the same time indicates the solution to the problem. Unlike the *Atthasālinī*, which uses the term *aparimāṇa* to refer to the entirety of the Dhamma-teaching with hundreds of thousands of divisions (Asl. 12ff.),[5] the *Netti* describes the Four Noble Truths as *aparimāṇa*. That is, the *Netti* says that these essential truths implicitly contain all the boundless forms and varieties of the teachings (N. 8-9, cf. S. V, 430). This use of *aparimāṇa* supports the *Netti's* demonstration (cited above) that the various teachings represented by the six terms in the key passage from the *Desanā-hāra* can be reduced to the Four Noble Truths. Thus, the *Netti* suggests that the problem of interpreting the Dhamma can be solved by an interpreter who understands the essential or fundamental truths of the Dhamma and who recognizes that all of the various teachings imply these truths. In order to correlate the various teachings with the essential truths, the interpreter must also comprehend the function of the meaning and phrasing terms. The *Aṅguttara Nikāya* advises that the two things which lead to the confusion and disappearance of the Dhamma are wrong expression of the words (or phrasing

and wrong guiding (or interpreting) of the meaning; "Dunnikkhittañ ca padavyañjanaṃ attho ca dunnīto" (A. I, 59). For the *Netti*, the meaning and phrasing elements have significance because they indicate how the various teachings relate the basic truths of the Dhamma and how the teachings were adjusted to apply to persons at different levels of development (N. 6-9).

The *Netti's* method of interpretation is based upon this understanding of the structure and intention of the Dhamma and presents a mirror image of the Dhamma itself. That is, just as in his teachings the Buddha employed definite techniques and a consistent logic in order to expand the Dhamma to guide beings, so the *Netti* presents techniques of interpretation presupposing this logic in order to examine the Dhamma to reduce it to its essential meaning. The elements of meaning and phrasing in the Dhamma determine the structure of the *Netti's* method, with special categories being developed to treat these elements. The term *attha*, usually translated as "meaning," seems to denote in the context of the *Netti's* method the purpose or goal of the Buddha's teachings, *nibbāna* or the path to *nibbāna*. With regard to the element of meaning, the method of interpretation brings out the underlying intention of all teachings to lead to the goal of *nibbāna* and demonstrates the interrelationships among the various levels of teaching and the essence of the Dhamma. The interpretation of the phrasing element (*byañjana*) calls for ways of recognizing the unity of meaning behind the variety of phrasing. The two main categories employed in the method of interpretation to accomplish these tasks are the *nayā* and the *hārā*.

The *Netti's* method of interpretation comprises twenty-one categories or techniques (sixteen *hārā*, five *nayā*) that the interpreter can employ to comprehend the meaning of a teaching. The interpretation of the phrasing is accomplished by the sixteen *hārā*, modes of conveying, and two of the *nayā*, guidelines. The two phrasing *nayā* or guidelines, called Plotting of Directions (*disālocana*) and the Hook (*aṅkusa*), enable the interpreter to identify which terms in a teaching belong on the side of profit (*kusala*) and which belong on the side of unprofit (*akusala*). In addition, these two *nayā* refer the interpreter to a list of eighteen root terms (*mūlapada*), consisting of nine pairs of concepts representing the essence of the Dhama. Each pair consists of one profitable (*kusala*) term expressing the true idea and ethical intent of the Dhamma and one unprofitable (*akusala*) term expressing its opposite. The aim of the interpreter is to correlate the profitable and unprofitable terms in a teaching with the appropriate root term and to recognize that *eko attho byañjanam eva nānaṃ* "(their meaning is one, only the phrasing is different)" (N. 122). Having correlated the terms in a passage under consideration with the basic ideas of the Dhamma *mūlapada*, the interpreter understands the meaning of his passage in terms of the implicit fundamental ideas of the Dhamma.

The sixteen *hārā* further clarify the interpretation of the phrasing by indicating how the correlation of the phrasing can be accomplished through Buddhist logical connections and other means. The purpose of the *hārā* and the nature of the *Netti's* method of interpretation can be seen in the third *hārā*, *Yutti-hārā*. In this context, *Yutti*, means "right construing" or "fitness of meaning." The *Netti* describes the function of this *hāra* as "looking for right and wrong construing in the case of all the *hāra* . . ." (N. 3). Since right construing for the *Netti* consists of interpreting a passage to be in accord with the essence of the Dhamma, the *Yutti-hāra* defines the

essence of the Dhamma which must be shown to be inherent in any passage for an interpretation to be accepted.

The criterion for acceptable interpretation or right construing is said to be found in the "Four Mahāpadesas" (D. II, 123ff. ; A. II, 167f.). The *Netti* mentions the four authorities as the passages or the sources of the passages which are to be construed (N. 21, G. 120). Then the key phrase from the "Four Mahāpadesas" is cited :

"Tāni Padabyañjanāni sutte otārayitabbāni, vinaye sandassayitabbāni, dhammatāyaṃ upanikkhip itabbāni, (these terms and phrasing must be placed beside the sutta, compared with the vinaya, and be patterned after the essential nature of the Dhamma)" (N. 21).

Significantly, the last part of this sentence, concerning being patterned after the essential nature of the Dhamma, does not occur in the *Sutta Pitaka's* versions of the passage. As a final step in establishing this passage as a criterion for acceptable interpretation, definitions are given for the key terms, *sutta*, *vinaya* and *dhammatā*. The *sutta* to which all passages must be compared is said to be the Four Noble Truths (N. 22). *Vinaya* is defined as the outguiding of lust, hate and delusion (*rāga*, *dosa*, *moha*), and the essential nature of the Dhamma to which a passage must be patterned is declared to be dependent origination (*paṭicca samuppāda*) (N. 22).

Thus, the *Netti* establishes a norm for correct interpretation of the phrasing to assist the interpreter in identifying the "one meaning" implied in the differences of phrasing. The concepts mentioned in *Yutti-hārā* constitute the heart of this norm for interpretation, but concepts given in other *hārā* supplement them and form an outline of the essential ideas of the Dhamma. Included in this outline are the eighteen root terms, the six terms given in *Desanā-hārā*, five concepts listed in the twelfth *hārā* (*paṭicca samuppāda*, *indriya*, *khandha*, *dhātu*, and *āyatana*), and other concepts explicitly or implicitly referred to in the *hārā*. For example, *sīla*, *samādhi* and *paññā* are not specifically mentioned, but are implied in the Fourth Noble Truth. Therefore, the *Netti* employs them as concepts which can provide a point of contact between the wording of a passage and the true Dhamma (N. 81).

Since all acceptable interpretations must be in accord with the *Netti's* formulation of the essential ideas of the Dhamma, the remaining *hārā* present the interpreter with the necessary word connections, logic connections, and procedures for examining any passage in order to find some link between the passage and the concepts from this normative formulation. We might say that the *hārā* represent ways of understanding any authoritative passage as an *avatāra* of the Dhamma.

We mentioned above that the *Netti's* method of interpretation grows out of a distinctive understanding of the structure and intent of the Dhamma, and this holds true both for this formulation of the essence of the Dhamma and for the hermeneutical methods taught in the *hārā*. The logic taught in these categories of interpretation (*hārā*) represents the intrinsic logic of the Dhamma itself. The *Netti* teaches that this logic has significance for interpreters because only by understanding the inner principles of the Dhamma can one understand the manifold teachings correctly. For example, at least five of the *hārā* explain the logical relations between terms of the Dhamma on the basis of *paṭicca samuppāda*. *Paṭicca samuppāda* refers to the conditioned and interrelated nature of all things ; thus, these *hārā* teach ways of establishing that any idea is directly or indirectly related to any other idea. The fourth *hārā*, *padaṭṭhāna-hārā*, teaches the interpreter about *padaṭṭhāna* or footings which constitute

the "proximate causes" for other terms. The interpreter should analyze a passage for the footings implicit behind the terms in it, and should determine for which concepts the terms in the passage are footings. The *Netti* shows how this logic in practice links the elements of the Dhamma together by indicating that the four distorted views (*vipallāsa*) constitute the footing for ignorance (*avijjā*) ; and ignorance, in turn, constitutes the footing for the *sankhārā* which thus lead one to posit the rest of the chain of *paṭicca samuppāda* (N. 27f.). This logic is essential to the *Netti's* method of interpretation, for when an interpreter recognizes the principle of *padaṭṭhāna*, or footings, he can begin with any teaching and demonstrate how it implies all of the fundamental ideas of the Dhamma, either as the footing for them, or with one of them as a footing (N. 81). In addition, the seventh *hārā*, *Āvatta-hārā*, complements the idea of footings by indicating how the footings of negative or unprofitable terms should be converted to their opposites to establish the positive virtues of the Dhamma.

To cite another example, *Lakkhaṇa hārā*, the Mode of Characteristics, also is closely related to the idea of *paṭicca samuppāda* and facilitates the kind of interpretation taught by the *Netti*. This mode teaches that a logical connection exists between the terms of the Dhamma, which share a common characteristic in the sense of being classified or grouped together ; so that when a passage mentions one of the *indriya*, or faculties, all of the *indriyas* can be inferred because they share a common *lakkhaṇa*.

We should briefly note some of the other *hārā*, which explain other kinds of logical connections and word connections inherent in the Dhamma and useful to the interpreter. *Parivattana-hārā*, the Mode of Conveying a Reversal, reminds the interpreter of the Buddha's teaching in the *Mahācattārīsaka Sutta* (M. III, 71) (N. 51). It warns the interpreter that to reverse a true idea is to fall into a wrong idea. *Hārā* eleven, *Paññatti-hārā*, advises that although the truth is one, there are many aspects to it ; and a single teaching can represent several aspects when seen from different points of view (N. 56f.). *Adhiṭṭhāna-hārā* shows that in the Dhamma one idea may be explained by unity or by diversity. The idea of suffering may be explained by the word *dukkha* or by lists of the many diverse forms of suffering (N. 72). The interpreter learns from *Catubyūha-hārā* that other aspects of the Dhamma, which might be considered part of its inner logic, should be considered for full comprehension of a passage. Among these aspects are *nerutta*, grammar; *adhippāya*, the intent of a teaching; *nidāna*, the occasion; and *pubbāparasandhi*, the logical consecutive sequence uniting the ideas of a discourse (N. 32f.). In addition to these, the other *hārā* explain various kinds of word connections, like *vevacana*, synonyms; and various procedures for analyzing and investigating a passage.

An interpreter who was well-versed in the *hārā* would be able to correlate the phrasing of any passage with the prescribed fundamental ideas of the Dhamma. The *Netti's* conception of the problem of interpretation, however, requires the interpreter simultaneously to establish the meaning (*attha*) of a passage. The interpretation of the meaning seems to involve grasping how a teaching leads to the goal of the Dhamma, *nibbāna*, and how it applies to various classifications of persons. The three meaning guidelines (*attha nayā*) function in two ways to interpret the meaning of a passage.

First, each of them has a linguistic function in enabling an interpreter to lead from the mere semantic meaning of a passage to the spirit of it by identifying the unprofitable root terms and counteracting them with profitable root terms which lead

directly to the goal. In this function, the *nayā* strengthen the aim of the *hārā* and guide the interpreter from the periphery to the essence of the Dhamma. The *Netti* implies that every authentic text implicitly points to the *attha* of the Buddha's teachings, but unless an interpreter is aware of the guidelines, this indication of the goal could be overlooked or misunderstood.

The second function of the meaning guidelines goes beyond this linguistic aspect and involves the application of the various viewpoints to specific types of persons. Thus, the meaning guidelines are intended to represent the ways in which the Buddha diagnosed the problems of definite categories of individuals and presented a teaching which would facilitate their reaching the goal. The root terms, which represent the essence of the Dhamma, are shown to correspond to these categories of individuals. This function of the meaning guidelines enables the interpreter to recognize the various levels in the Buddha's teachings as different paths to the same goal and to avoid mistaking these levels for irreconcilable differences in the teachings.

The first meaning guideline is termed *Nandiyavatta* or "Conversion of Relishing." The two functions of all meaning guidelines and the inter-relation of the two functions can be seen clearly in the "Conversion of Relishing."

The summary verse which describes the guideline is as follows :

> That which guides craving (*taṇhā*) and ignorance (*avijjā*) by means of quiet (*samatha*) and insight (*vipassanā*), and construes properly the (Four Noble) truths. This guideline is Conversion of Relishing (N. 4.17).

In this verse, the guideline is described in its linguistic function of counteracting the two unprofitable root terms, craving and ignorance, with each term's opposite, profitable root term, quiet and insight respectively. The third line of the verse mentions the Four Noble Truths which, as we have seen, represent the essence of the Dhamma. By properly educing these two pairs of root terms from a passage, an interpreter can move from the passage under consideration to the meaning of the Dhamma contained in the Four Noble Truths.

Looking beyond the summary verse to the exemplification of this guideline in the *Netti*, the second function becomes apparent. The *Netti* begins (N. 109) by distinguishing two types of persons, the *diṭṭhicarita* and the *taṇhācarita*, who correspond to the two unprofitable root terms, ignorance (*avijjā*) and craving (*taṇhā*). That is, the spiritual sickness or fetter of the *diṭṭhicarita* is primarily ignorance while the *taṇhācarita* is led astray by his natural craving. For these problems, quiet and insight are prescribed as the "cleansing" or "medicine." The interpreter should understand the connection between these two pairs of root terms and their application to these two general categories of individuals. Seeing the way in which the root terms apply to the different types of persons, the interpreter would be able to make his preaching of the Dhamma more relevant to his audience. However, this aspect is probably secondary to the importance of recognizing that the Buddha's teachings had various levels of relevance: the Dhamma had one goal but multiple paths to that goal.

The second meaning guideline is called "Lions' Play," *Sīhavikkīḷitam*. The lions in the Lions' Play guideline are the Buddhas, Paccekabuddhas, and Sāvakas, who have destroyed lust, hate and delusion. Since they are superior beings, it is their play to set

forth the Dhamma in which four unprofitable root terms are balanced by four profitable ones. The summary verse for "Lions' Play" describes it as follows :

> That which leads (*netti*) the defilements (*kilesa*) by the perversions (*vipallāsa*), and the true objects of faith (*saddhamma*) by the faculties (*indriya*), the wise in guidelines have called this guideline Lions' Play (N. 4).

The unprofitable root terms dealt with in this guideline are represented by "the perversions" (*vipallāsa*). *Vipallāsa* means a perversion of perception or a distorted and harmful view of reality. The *Netti* intends this term to refer to the traditional formulation of four perverted views (cf. Aṅguttara II, 52) : regarding something impermanent as permanent; regarding something unpleasant as pleasant; regarding something without a self to have a self; and regarding something ugly as beautiful (N. 2). These four root terms lead to the plane of defilements (*kilesa*) which is the total condition of a person bound up in *saṃsāra* and estranged from Nibbāna (N. 2).

The profitable root terms are represented in the summary verse by the term "faculties," *indriya*. Thus, the four perverted views would appear to be counterbalanced by four of the faculties : energy, mindfulness, concentration, and wisdom. Despite the indications that this should be the case, however, the exemplification of this guideline shows the profitable root terms to be the four foundations of mindfulness rather than four faculties. An explanation for this apparent discrepancy between the summary verse for the guideline and the exemplification of it could be that "faculties" in the verse means the "plane of the faculties" which is a more comprehensive term including the four foundations of mindfulness and perhaps all the profitable root terms (N. 1). These profitable terms lead to the *Saddhamma*, the life which is free from the *kilesas*.

The interpreter who understands the play of these lions should employ the Plotting of Directions guideline to correlate any teachings about the defilements with the four perverted views and then should parallel and counteract these with the ten profitable states and the four foundations of mindfulness. Although it is exemplified most clearly in conjunction with the Lions' Play guideline, the Plotting of Directions guideline works with each of the three meaning guidelines to enable the interpreter to make explicit in any passage the singular truth of the Dhamma (cf. N. 125-6).

The interaction of the Lions' Play and Plotting of Directions guidelines is evident also in those passages which exemplify the second function of this meaning guideline : the application of the guideline to types of persons. Since Lions' Play encompasses four pairs of root terms, there are four types of persons to whom these terms apply (N. 117-118, cf. N. 112). Having employed the Plotting of Directions guideline to correlate all of the unprofitable defilements with the four perverted views and the profitable counterparts with the four foundations of mindfulness (N. 117), the Lions' Play guideline demonstrates how these sets of terms apply to the four types of persons.

The remaining guideline is called the Trefoil (*tipukkhala*). This third meaning guideline is described by the summary verse as follows :

> That which guides ideas of unprofit (*akusala*) by its (triple) roots (*samūlehi*) and ideas of profit by profitable roots (*kusalamūlehi*) to the truth and not to untruth.

This is called the Trefoil (*tipukkhala*) guideline (N. 4).

The Trefoil guideline indicates how the three unprofitable root terms—greed (*lobha*), hate (*dosa*), and delusion (*moha*)—are offset by their opposites. The second function of this guideline is accomplished when the interpreter sees the three unprofitable terms and their equivalents to constitute the corruption of three types of persons, while the three profitable terms and their equivalents lead to the liberation of these persons (N. 125-126).

Thus, the three meaning guidelines are seen to perform their dual functions in harmony with Plotting of Directions and the Hook. In a concluding section of the exemplification of guidelines, the *Peṭakopadesa* shows the extent to which all three of the meaning guidelines are interrelated (pp. 255-258). After an explanation of which of the root terms belong to each guideline, a demonstration is given of the way in which the profitable and unprofitable root terms belonging to any two of the guidelines can be subsumed under the root terms of the third guideline. The *Netti* makes the same point by indicating how the four types of persons from Lions Play can be reduced to three types for the Trefoil and how elements from the other guidelines can be tailored to the three types (N. 125). "According as one Guide-Line (is demonstrated), so can all the (three) Guide-Lines, each including the others be demonstrated . . ." (PD. 1106). Since the truth of the Dhamma is one, the guidelines can never be taken to be more than relative perspectives and approaches to that truth.

To conclude our analysis and description of the *Netti*, we may observe that although this entire system of categories and guidelines for interpretation seems unusually involved, the author(s) of the *Netti*, or the system, designed it in this way to deal with the complex nature of the Dhamma as they understood it. Using this method, an interpreter seeking to explain a particular teaching would be able to place that teaching into the total context of the Dhamma and to give the teaching a meaning consonant with the accepted understanding of the fundamental meaning and intention of Dhamma.

We should note, however, that by carefully defining the fundamental meaning of the Dhamma and establishing it as the norm for correct interpretation, the *Netti* represents a well-defined Theravāda viewpoint. For the *Netti*, truth in interpretation means correlating all teachings with a Theravādin formulation of the essential meaning of the Dhamma. This hermeneutical method leads us to believe that the *Netti* probably developed at a time when Theravāda Buddhism had become an established and conservative school. Its method of interpretation suggests a situation in which Theravada Buddhism was seeking to defend its orthodox beliefs and to reject all other interpretations of the Dhamma. Challenged by rival schools with differing interpretations of the Dhamma, the Theravādins protected their position by setting out a method of interpretation which both followed the inherent logic of the Dhamma itself and led to what they understood to be the true meaning of the Dhamma.

As a phenomenon in the history of religions, the *Netti*'s approach to the interpretation of scripture is not without parallel. We see the significance of the *Netti* and its method of interpretation by comparing them with the way in which the Christian Church sought to safeguard the true religion from heresy. The Church established tradition or the "rule of faith" as the standard for true interpretation in order to

prevent subjective and heretical interpretations of scripture. Just as the Church defined the "rule of faith," so the *Netti* defined the essence of the Dhamma and said, "Whatever is construable (in this way) . . . can be accepted." Both the *Netti* and the Church desired "exposition without peril" and "legitimate interpretation."[6] Although the historical circumstances of both religions probably played a major role in determining their attitudes concerning the interpretation of scripture, both Theravāda and the Church had philosophically consistent explanations for these limitations upon the freedom of human beings to interpret the scriptures. The Church argued that it alone had the right to determine the true meaning of scripture, since it was the heir of the true interpretation handed down from the first apostles. For its part, the *Netti* implies that in the interpretation of the Dhamma, human freedom has no value because it does not bring one closer to a solution to the problem of interpretation. The Dhamma is profound and the body of teachings immense; allowing people to interpret the scriptures in whatever way they understand them will result only in subjectivism and error. The only hope for a true interpretation of the Dhamma, according to the Theravāda school as represented in the *Netti*, lies in understanding the ancient formulation of the essence of the Dhamma and applying the hermeneutical methods set forth in the *Netti-Pakaraṇa*.

NOTES

1. Wilhelm Geiger, *Pali Literature and Language*, trans. B. Ghosh (Calcutta: Calcutta University Press, 1943), p. 120.

2. Ven. Dhammādhāra Mahāthera, "Netti Pakaraṇa—a Book on Theravāda Logic," *Prajna, Buddha-Gaya Quarterly*, Vol. III, No. 3 (Nov. 1975), p. 57.

3. *Commentary to Rupa-siddhi*, cited in G. P. Malalasekera, *The Pali Literature of Ceylon* (Colombo: M. D. Gunasena, 1928), p. 180.

4. Cited by Ven. Dhammādhāra Mahathera in the article listed above. "Nahi Nettiupadesaṇnissayena vinā aviparītasuttavabodho saṁbhavati."

5. Buddhaghosa, *Atthasālinī*, Paññānanda (ed.), Simon Hewavitarane Bequest series (Colombo : Tripitaka Publication Press, 1940), p. 12ff.

6. Irenaeus, cited in R. M. Grant, *The Interpretation of the Bible* (New York: Macmillan, 1948), p. 103.

5

The Notion of "Refuge" (Saraṇa) in the Theravāda Buddhist Tradition

JOHN ROSS CARTER

For many centuries, Buddhist men and women, monks, nuns, and laity, have taken the refuge (*saraṇa*) in the Buddha, in Dhamma, and in the Sangha. At first glance, a notion of refuge might suggest a passive, retrogressive move, a retreat, a withdrawal ; and one might interpret this as corroborating an interpretation that "Buddhism is world-denying or world-negating." Buddhists have demonstrated otherwise : they have entered into commerce, have written poetry, have dug canals and tanks for irrigation, have tried to minimize overhead and increase profits, have frequented royal courts, have given to the poor, have coped with famine, have celebrated colorful festivals. Very little withdrawal is manifested here—and yet Buddhists have participated in these activities and have taken refuge.

The notion of refuge is both delicate and complicated. Perhaps many who have seen themselves as part of the Buddhist community have given little thought to what is meant when one chooses to take refuge in the three gems : the Buddha, Dhamma and Sangha. Yet others, in one way or another, have thought about it, and it is largely due to their efforts that one can note the presence of Buddhists living in the world today.

Buddhists have said that refuge (*saraṇa*) is like a cave (*leṇa*), like a protective enclosure (*tāṇa*). At the same time, they have stressed that refuge is not a passive matter, a recoiling in the face of the world(s). Rather, it seems, their point has been that this refuge provides a recourse, a source of aid. When one finds this refuge, one is not fleeing from the world ; rather, one is entering a process of transcending. Simultaneously with a discernment that one has found refuge, it would seem, there is a recognition that the world is defined (*definire*), limited. So the movement into refuge, this protective enclosure, represents an understanding that one is moving onwards in a

liberating process because the world has been placed into a meaningful context, defined.

Very early in the Buddhist movement the notion of going for refuge, taking refuge, was made the standard, formalized expression representing a new relationship which was the consequence of a profoundly personal reorientation of one's life. It appears that at an early stage of the Buddhist movement, refuge was taken in the *Bhagavan*, the glorious exemplar, and Dhamma, the patterned process of living well and the supportive ideal. Those who made this move, professed this commitment, and confessed this protection, were called in the *Vinaya*, "two-word-ones" (*dvevācikā*).[1] Theravāda Buddhists have tended not to forget this early historical setting, and so a reader is reminded of the early twofold formula in the commentary on the *Jātaka*,[2] in the *Upāsakajanālaṅkāra* (13th century),[3] and in a Sinhalese text, the *Śrī Saddharmāvavāda Saṃgrahaya* (18th century).[4] A Sinhalese glossary of the *Jātaka* commentary, the *Jātaka Aṭuvā Gāṭapadaya* (12th century ?) provides an obvious explanation for the twofold formula, "because the Sangha-gem had not arisen in the world."[5]

Rather soon in the history of the Buddhist movement, a threefold formula became established and, for centuries, has remained the standard expression representing one's reorientation. Also in the *Vinaya*, one meets the word *tevācika*, "three-word-one," used to designate a person who had found refuge in the *Bhagavan*, Dhamma, and the *bhikkhusangha*.[6] The commentarial tradition has been consistent in insisting on the regularity of the triple refuge ; that refuge is found in the Buddha, Dhamma, and the Sangha. On occasions when the canonical texts mention praise only of the Buddha and Dhamma, the commentaries remind the reader of the standard expression for praising the Sangha.[7]

In the course of time, the term "Buddha" became standard in this formula, and it appears as *Sāvakasangha*, in a comprehensive sense designating all those persons, the eight noble persons, engaged in a process that leads to liberation, and was also used along with *bhikkhusangha*, which designated the order of monks. In time, Theravāda Buddhists preferred an interpretation of Sangha in the threefold refuge to mean the community of disciples, *sāvakas*, who had made the breakthrough into Dhamma, who had entered the stream—in short, those realizing the effectiveness of the way characterized as having four paths and four fruits with *nibbāṇa* as the culmination. Apparently, Theravāda Buddhists have been aware for quite some time that institutions, the status of being a *bhikkhu*, a monk, that rites and rituals, what some Western scholars tend to mean when they write about something called "Buddhism," in themselves are not an adequate basis for refuge.[8]

Frequently, the term "gems" or "jewels" is used for the Buddha, Dhamma and Sangha, hence one speaks of the *tiratana*, "three gems, or jewels." The commentary on the *Khuddakapāṭha* elaborates the meaning of *ratana*, "gem or jewel" as follows : "*Ratana* is a synonym for that which induces, brings, produces, increases delight (*rati*), for whatever is valued, very costly, inestimable, rarely seen, having incomparable enjoyment for beings."[9]

In considering the relationship Buddhists have continually discerned in the Buddha, Dhamma and Sangha, one becomes aware that for Buddhists this relationship is one of delightful refuge, joyful protection.

What, then, is meant by going for refuge? The commentarial tradition provides a seuenfold classification.

For the sake of proficiency in the acts of going for refuge, this classification should be understood : namely, (1) refuge, (2) the going for refuge, (3) one who goes for refuge, (4) the mode of going for refuge, (5) the effect of going for refuge, (6) defilement and (7) breach [of the going for refuge].[10]

And why is this called refuge ? Note the dynamic thrust of what follows :

'Refuge' [*saraṇa*] is so called because it slays [*hiṃsati*], such is the force of the term. Of those who have gone for refuge, by just this act of going for refuge, it [i.e., *saraṇa*] slays, it destroys fear, affliction, *dukkha*, and misery of unsatisfactory [future] abodes. This [i.e., *saraṇa*] is a synonym for the three gems themselves.

In other words, the Buddha, by causing the performance of what is beneficial and by causing one to turn from what is not beneficial, destroys fear on the part of beings. And Dhamma, by causing one to cross over the wilderness of becoming, by giving consolation [destroys fear], and Sangha, by causing even those who have done little to derive great benefits [destroys fear]. Therefore in this manner are the three gems a refuge.[11]

Going for refuge, taking refuge, discovering refuge represents a lively religious awareness demonstrated by Theravāda Buddhists. When this credal statement is pondered, a reflective person might recall the moment when first he found the statement true and, because the triple refuge is frequently uttered, a person has the opportunity to determine whether he is being consistent. The triple refuge can be said either in a private setting or in public, as part of a corporate religious service. In any setting, the process involved is deeply personal. The recitation of the triple refuge is ritually structured in a threefold repetition to develop reflective alertness. The repetitive pattern sets the expression apart from routine patterns in normal discourse, serves to check a participant from running roughshod through a communal affirmation that has echoed through history, and tends to engender a sense of thoroughness in personal involvement.

Part of what it means to live religiously is to discover that in so living one is engaged in a process of transcending, in the widest sense : transcending what one has known, how one has thought, what one has been, how one has lived. Theravāda Buddhists have attested that in this process of transcending there is an exemplar (the Buddha), there is his testimony (dhamma), that Truth (Dhamma) is salvific, and that there is a crowd of witnesses, those disciples (*sāvakasangha*) who have entered and gone far in the paths that fructify, a mixed metaphor that falls sharply into focus in the lives of persons, and that there is the monastic order that has contributed to continuity within the traditional *bhikkhusangha.*

One has not begun to understand what *saraṇagamana*, going for refuge, has meant to Theravāda Buddhists without taking seriously their affirmation that anxieties and pressures, can be extinguished thereby and that a fragmented life can be made whole. The commentarial tradition has long known the human predicament, subtly held in the notion of *dukkha*, and it is noteworthy that going for refuge is said to slay, put an end to this *dukkha*. We are on to something weighty here. *Dukkha* reflects a meaning of

disarrangement, disorientation, disorder, being disjointed, and, through extension, discontent, discord, and "dis-ease" concerning the physical (*kāyikadukkha*) and mental (*mānasadukkha*) dimensions of life, individually and socially considered. To say that *dukkha* suggests "the world is out of joint"[12] or "all life is awry"[13] would be on the mark. And all of this is sensed as causing oppression (*paṭipiḷana*).[14]

So the movement involved in going for refuge represents a process of putting an end to *dukkha*. For such a person the world becomes defined, put into perspective; fear of the future and bitterness for the past are put to rest; purpose for living is discerned and a mode of conduct remarkably consistent with this purpose is endorsed. On the deepest level, going for refuge represents an orientation to transcendence as goal and as process in which one's personality is holistically integrated in the commonality of living beings, in community among men and women.

A delicate transformation occurs when one goes for refuge, a transformation within the person that enables him no longer to rail with disoriented frustration against a world that is out of joint, no longer to whimper because all life is awry, no longer to engage in a Grand Revolt against meaninglessness, which, it is said, enables some to live meaningfully, but, rather, now to live with an admirable composure that reflects an awareness of the efficacy of a Gospel message, now to instill order where there is disorder, to heal the wounds of life, to put an end to *dukkha*. *Dukkha* can be terminated. This is part of the Gospel; *dukkha* is antepenultimate.

A reader of the Pāli commentaries learns that going for refuge is not merely a ritual that a Buddhist does, or a bit of liturgy that some people perform. The commentaries tell the reader to turn his attention to what one might call the seat of emotions, even the heart (*citta*), to look there in order to discern the depth of the thoughts involved in this going for refuge :

> The going for refuge is the arousing of thoughts [*cittuppāda*], which are free of defilement by virtue of being gladdened in it [going for refuge] and showing respect for it, which are activated by reason of being inclined to it. It is a being endowed with this [going for refuge] that does go for refuge.[15]

Nor are we dealing here with what one might consider merely an inchoate religious awareness, an incipient emotional sensitivity. The commentarial tradition has interpreted this going , this movement as an activity of knowing, of understanding.

> Whatever [philological] roots convey the meaning of 'going' convey also the meaning of 'knowing' [*buddhi*]. Hence, for this [expression] 'I go' the meaning 'I know, I understand' is expressed.[16]

A person who is inclined to go for refuge, who considers going for refuge a weighty matter, who makes the commitment with a pure and joyous heart and mind, enters a process of knowing, of deepening understanding of himself, his neighbor, his world and that which transcends the world.

So refuge, the going for refuge, and the person who goes for refuge are three elements inseparably fused in a momentous religious experience.

The commentarial discussion also provides an explanation of the modes of going

for refuge, and does this by introducing two categories, a *lokuttara* going for refuge and a *lokiya* going for refuge. These two terms, *lokuttara* and *lokiya*, are well known to students of Pāḷi. For quite some time I, as have others, have translated these terms as "transcendental," (*lokuttara*) and "mundane" (*lokiya*). It might come as a surprise to some for me to suggest that in reflecting on the meaning of refuge, I found the latter term, *lokiya*, to be the more difficult to translate adequately. As contrasting terms, one might say whatever *lokiya* means, *lokuttara* somehow transcends, goes beyond (*uttara*) the world (s) (*loka*, *lokiya*) and hence one occasionally finds *lokuttara* translated as "supermundane."

Loka, the noun, has a broad spectrum of meaning, but basically it means "world" or "realm" and also "people" or "mankind". In most cases, *lokiya*, the derivative adjective, means "like the world," i.e., common, ordinary, usual, customary, and hence has been translated as "mundane". To describe something as mundane suggests that it somehow has to do with human activity that in most cases has a practical orientation, that is concerned with the immediate situation, that is, like the world, transient, and that it, like the world, is common, ordinary. Some might interpret mundane as having to do with things of the world, with little or no concern for the ideal or for what is heavenly.

In attempting to communicate what is involved in the activity Theravāda Buddhists have called *lokiyasaraṇagamana*, or *lokiya* going for refuge, the introduction of the term "mundane" might be misleading. Western students of the Theravāda tradition are well aware of the attitudes expressed by Theravāda men and women about the ultimate objective in living. Ordinarily, Buddhologists tend to speak of this objective as *nibbāṇa*, although I, personally, prefer to represent it as *dhamma/nibbāṇa*. It is difficult to overstress the significance of the objective for Theravāda Buddhist men and women (nor to overlook the impact of this vision on the religious history of mankind generally) and yet in stressing the ultimacy of this objective, the centrality of this pursuit within the Theravāda tradition, one might tend to underrate, to make peripheral or somehow merely secondary the legitimate religious expression involved in the *lokiya* going for refuge, might interpret this going for refuge as mundane.

Buddhists have seen this world in which we are living as part of a larger whole, as one world among many; some worlds, planes of existence, are more enjoyable than this; some are much worse, and a person is where he is because of what he has done and he will be where he will be because of how he lives now—this is sobering. Buddhists have spoken of the justice perceived in one's coursing through the worlds as integrally related to how one lives, thinks, i.e., *kamma*. Buddhists have come to discern that *kamma*, volitional activity expressed in body, mind and speech, is set in a context in which justice reigns, a context in which a concomitant subtle presence of righteousness and mercy (i.e., it is a context not arbitrary, whimsical, despotic, chaotic, nor is there fate) seem to be acknowledged. In this setting, *kamma* represents an affirmation that a moral order (Dhamma) abides, that we reap what we sow: wholesomeness in so far as our intentions and actions are in accordance with Dhamma or detrimental consequences in so far as our intentions and actions are divergent from Dhamma. Lest one consider the notion of *kamma* to be a "theory" of impressive intellectual cogency only, Buddhists have tried to make the point that faith (*saddhā*) is involved. One puts one's heart (*saddahati*) into the moral significance of volitional activity and one sets about to arrange

one's life in accordance with the norm that volitional activities yield consequences.[17] And, of course, *lokiya* going for refuge yields significant consequences in this world and other worlds in the future.

Fortunately, we are not without instructive testimony about what is involved in this *lokiya* going for refuge. The commentarial discussion says,

> The *lokiya* going for refuge is this: by arresting whatever defiles the going for refuge on the part of the average person it [*lokiya* going for refuge] takes on the virtues of the Buddha etc. [Dhamma, Sangha] to be its objective and flourishes in this way. In effect, it means the attainment of faith [*saddhā*] in the Buddha and other subjects [Dhamma, Sangha]. Proper vision conditioned by faith is called straight conduct following from proper views, and this pertains to the ten fields of meritorious action. That proper action with regard to the subjects, Buddha, [Dhamma, and Sangha] functions in four ways : (1) by the dedication of oneself, (2) by being inclined to them, (3) by undertaking the state of a pupil, (4) by prostration.[18]

In a brief transitional passage introduced by the commentary, the reader is struck by two phrases that occur in the brief statements used to catch the force of the four modes being considered here.[19] Firstly, one meets "from today onwards," and one is placed face-to-face with the seriousness of the dedication, the orientation, the discipleship, and prostration. Persons are putting their lives on the line. Secondly, this is not exclusively a private matter, though it is deeply personal. One reads the phrase "you all consider (*dhāretha*) me as one who has done thusly" and this public dimension adds to the totality of the commitment in the person and the person senses the buttressing influence of others by his movement into a religious community.

With impressive conciseness, the commentary, following a long-established procedure in Theravāda hermeneutics, quotes passages from the older literature, and in this way one who goes for refuge is enabled to interpret his own activity as a participation in a communal continuity of faith.

(1) dedication

> "And also I dedicate myself to the *Bhagavan*, I dedicate myself to Dhamma and the Sangha, and my life I dedicate, dedicated indeed is myself, dedicated also is my life even until the end of my life. I go for refuge to the Buddha. The Buddha is my refuge, shelter, protection."[20]

(2) the state of a resident pupil

> "And indeed I would see the teacher [*Satthar*], I would see only the *Bhagavan*, and I would see the *Sugata*, I would see only the *Bhagavan*. And indeed I would see the *Sammāsambuddha*, I would see only the *Bhagavan*."[21]

This passage is quoted from the *Saṃyutta-nikāya*, and there the original continues,

> And then I, having fallen prostrate at the feet of the *Bhagavan* thusly, said to the *Bhagavan*, "Sir, my teacher [*Satthar*] is the *Bhagavan*, I am his disciple."[22]

(3) on inclination

> "Thus I will wander from village to village,
> from town to town,
> revering the Sambuddha and the excellent
> reliability of Dhamma [*dhammassasudhammataṃ*]."[23]

(4) on prostration

> "Now Brahmāyu, a brahman, stood up from his seat,
> placed the outer robe on his shoulder, bowed his
> head to the feet of the *Bhagavan* and [now] covers
> the feet of the *Bhagavan* with kisses with his
> mouth and strokes [them] with his hands and
> announces his name, saying, 'I am, O Gotama,
> Brahmāyu, a brahman, I am, O Gotama, Brahmāyu,
> a brahman.'"[24]

The commentarial discussion, I should think, does not intend to suggest different ways of *lokiya* going for refuge, or different levels or steps, with an assumption that a Buddhist is to see himself at any one time as participating in one and not the others. Rather, it appears that the discussion works along the line of a "this too" principle : this too is a way of going for refuge as is noted in this or that passage and further, this too is a dimension of a person's personal interpretation of what is involved in his activity of going for refuge on, perhaps, the first occasion some years ago and even now, today.

The commentarial tradition has made a significant contribution to the continuity of the tradition in which the commentator participated. With regard to the notion of going for refuge, the commentators drew together strands of religious awareness embedded in passages scattered throughout the canonical literature, not only because the strands were there to be collected but also, and profoundly I should think, because these strands had been planted in the lives of Buddhists for quite some time. It would seem that for centuries men and women have sat at the feet of *bhikkhus* who utilized the commentarial discussion in preaching dhamma, and have been inspired by an exhortation to dedicate their lives, to study and to learn, to trust the reliability of Dhamma in the context of loving devotion springing not from a state of frenzy but from a calm heart, delicately quickened with a delightful sense of being taken up.

The attitude suggested by the act of prostration in going for refuge has been further interpreted by considering what constitutes proper motivation for obeisance. The commentarial tradition makes the point quite clearly that family loyalty is no basis for going for refuge; neither is fear of retribution, nor an appreciation for practical benefits imparted by one's instructor (*ācariya*). Rather, the discernment of the inherent, incomparable worthiness of the one before whom prostration is made (i.e., the Buddha) provides the proper motivation[25] and further, prostration before others as a socially-sanctioned gesture of respect does not, in this case, constitute a breach in the commitment involved in going for refuge. Consequently, the commentarial tradition notes that

paying homage to one's elder relatives, even should it be the case that an elder relative has become committed to the way of another religious teacher and tradition, does not rupture the commitment of going for refuge. Similarly, when homage motivated by fear is paid to a great king and when homage motivated by sincere appreciation is paid to an instructor (*ācariya*) who has imparted the skills of a craft, even though this instructor be committed to the way of another religious teacher and tradition, no rupture occurs in the commitment of going for refuge.[26]

The *lokiya* going for refuge is certainly a religious act : we have noticed the seriousness of the activity, the presence of faith, the sense of a lifelong commitment to the eradication of *dukkha*, and the discernment of the inherent worthiness of that which constitutes this refuge, among other things. There is, further, an affirmation that living one's life in accordance with the commitment to and confidence in this refuge leads to a better life in this world and in worlds to come in the future. The commentarial tradition reminds one that being faithful to this refuge has as its effect the enjoyment of future existence among the gods and the enjoyment of plenty.[27]

Ignorance, doubt and misapprehension with regard to the Buddha, Dhamma and Sangha taint this *lokiya* going for refuge and, consequently, inhibit the effulgence of the religious awareness and the effloresence of the experience in one's life now and in the future. The continuity of the commitment can be ruptured by devoting oneself, as depicted in this going for refuge, to another religious teacher and upon by death. In the former case, the breach in the continuity of commitment is censurable and carries with it unfavorable consequences. In the latter case, the act of death itself, being without volition or desire, yields no consequence and consequently this breach in this commitment is blameless.

Such is the *lokiya* going for refuge. Is this going for refuge mundane? Yes and no. It is mundane in the Buddhist sense, in so far as taking refuge in this way will enable one to live in a process of transcending, but a process, nevertheless, not finally transcending the worlds, i.e., *saṃsāra*, the whirl of existence (*vaṭṭa*) as Buddhists customarily speak of it. However, *lokiya* going for refuge is not mundane as Westerners might tend to understand what is usually considered mundane. *Lokiyasaraṇagamana*, *lokiya* going for refuge, is not in opposition to what might be considered spiritual or lofty, as the term "mundane" might suggest. Nor is *lokiya* going for refuge to be viewed as a practical activity—again, as the term "mundane" might suggest—an activity that is primarily considered useful. This activity of going for refuge is praised for being beneficial ; yet, for one to pose as having taken refuge for this reason—because it is useful for making better one's station in life—would be to overlook, indeed not to see, the swift, pungent reminder that craving (*taṅhā*) and greed (*lobha*), in whatever conceptual garb they might be disguised, drag one downward, cause one to stumble, check a process of transcending.

A Westerner might catch the force of *lokiya* in *lokiyasaraṇagamana* by interpreting *lokiya* to mean "heavenly," keeping in mind that Buddhists, have apperceived the heavens to be a part of *saṃsāra*, and remembering that Buddhists have discerned a higher stage in the process of transcending, one they have called *lokuttara*. Consequently, one might understand the relationship between the adjectives *lokiya* and *lokuttara* as roughly analogous to "heavenly" and "Godly" in Western religious terminology. To speak of *lokiya* in the context of going for refuge as representing

an activity that is mundane or wordly might tend to lead a non-Buddhist Westerner, not to be aware of the lively religious emotion and active commitment to a way of life that is with purpose, that is integrative, that seeks to alleviate *dukkha* in one's life and in the world.

There is another dimension of going for refuge, one that is transcendental, a *lokuttarasaraṇagamana*, a going for refuge that transcends the world(s)—this world and the heavens. One is told that this transcendental going for refuge has as its consequence not the attainment of the heavens, but the realization of the four fruitions of one striving for inward calm (*samaṇa*) : stream enterer, once-returner, non-returner and *arahant*. This going for refuge has as its reward not the acquisition of plenty but, rather, the destruction of all *dukkha*.'[8]

Such *lokuttara* going for refuge occurs when one has had a vision of the truths, which is concomitant with the moment of entering the path (*maggakkhaṇa*), together with a complete cutting off[29] of what harms this going for refuge. The objective of this undertaking is not to be found in the virtuous qualities of the Buddha or Dhamma or Sāvakasangha, but, rather, in the attainment of that which provided the basis for the virtuous qualities of the Buddha, the availability of which corroborates the virtuous qualities of Dhamma, the quest of which makes worthy of emulation the virtuous qualities of the Sāvakasangha: *nibbāṇa*[30] (*dhamma/nibbāṇa*).

Proper insight into the four noble truths is of utmost importance in this transcendental going for refuge. The commentarial tradition quotes from the *Dhammapada*:

> He who has gone to the Buddha and Dhamma and Sangha
> Sees by proper insight [*sammāpaññā*] the four noble truths:
> *Dukkha*, the arising of *dukkha*, and the overcoming of *dukkha*,
> And the noble eightfold path that leads to the quieting of *dukkha*.
> Indeed, this is the refuge that is tranquil, this is the highest refuge [*etaṃ saraṇaṃ uttamaṃ*].
> Having come to this refuge, he is released from all *dukkha*.[31]

The reward of this transcendental going for refuge is the termination of regarding certain conditions as permanent. The commentarial tradition again provides a quote:

> This, O bhikkhus, is impossible, that a person possessed of [proper] view [i.e., stream-attainer] would regard any psycho-physical synergy [*saṅkhāra*] as permanent [*nicca*], would regard them as blissful [*sukha*], would regard any *dhamma* as self [*atta*],[32] would deprive his mother of life, would deprive his father of life, would deprive an arahant of life . . . would with a corrupt heart draw the blood of the Tathāgata, would cause disunity in the Sangha, would turn towards another teacher; this cannot take place.[33]

On reading this quotation, one might wonder why it was chosen to elaborate what is involved in *lokuttara* going for refuge—indeed, murder is a stunning transgression of the commitment involved even in the *lokiya* going for refuge by one who takes seriously the first precept of virtue, i.e., to refrain from taking life. The passage was

probably chosen first to elaborate the integral relationship of the *tilakkhaṇa*—that all *saṅkhāras* are fleeting (*anicca*), awry (*dukkha*) and that all processes (*dhammas*) are without self (*anatta*)—with the four noble truths. Secondly, the commentary is working in the realm of *certainty*, and doing so by quoting a passage from the *Aṅguttara-nikāya* (I, 26-27) enumerating patterns of behavior resolutely dissociated from the behavior of one possessed of proper vision. The point is straightforward and is made with full confidence—the transcendental going for refuge is never soiled by misapprehension, nor is it ever ruptured.

> There is not at all a rupture of the transcendental [going for refuge]. Even in the transition from one life to another, the noble disciple does not propose another teacher.[34]

Were there a possibility of a rupture in the transcendental going for refuge, there would remain a gap of sorts within the Theravāda soteriological vision, a zone of uncertainty engendered by a recognition of man's capacity to delude himself, crowning himself ruler of his future by the exercise of his will. It appears that Buddhists are affirming that one does not take refuge in one's will because one knows oneself well enough to realize oneself as other than the source of liberation. There is no need of a savior, as Buddhists continually remind one, not because man is his own savior but because of the efficacy of *dhamma* when made the integral basis of one's life.

Nor would there be a need to quest for another teacher. In the customary mode of going for refuge (*lokiyasaraṇagamana*), one is to maintain a loyalty to the Buddha as one's teacher. In the transcendental mode of going for refuge (*lokuttarasaraṇagamana*), one has already penetrated that about which the teacher taught, that which will lead onward, will not fail, is sufficient to meet every situation. When one recognizes that this breakthrough has occurred, it is not necessary to look for another teacher. One does not consider abandoning this process of living, nor think of standing in the way of others who are engaged in similar pursuits. Such would be inconceivable.

Refuge, although elaborated within the tradition as three-fold, is one. And for Buddhists, it is not locked within the vicissitudes of history—we are. But because there is refuge, persons who discern that refuge are thereby enabled to transcend the vicissitudes of history or *saṃsāra*, as some of us view the situation, not because history or *saṃsāra* has changed but because persons have changed.

The study of the Buddha, the four noble truths, dependent origination, *kamma*, the Sangha, etc., is, indeed, important. However, such study would yield little that is momentous for the history of a religious community that has participated in and perpetuated an impressive religious tradition, without an understanding of what Buddhists have discerned in the notion of refuge (*saraṇa*).

NOTES

This paper was presented in a slightly abridged form at the 30th International Congress for Human Sciences in Asia and North Africa in Mexico City on Thursday, August 5, 1976.

1. *The Vinaya Piṭakam* (PTS edition), I. 4, referring to two male lay devotees, *upāsakas*.

2. *The Jātaka; Together with Its Commentary* (PTS edition), I. 80-81.

3. *Upāsakajanālaṅkara* (PTS edition) Chapter I. 44.

4. *Śrī Saddharmāvavāda Saṃgrahaya*, edited by Vēragoḍa Amaramoli Thera, Colombo: Ratnākara Mudraṇālayaya, 1956, p. 77.

5. *Jātaka Aṭuvā Gāṭapadaya*, edited by Mäda-Uyangoḍa Vimalakīrti Thera and Nähinnē Sominda Thera, Colombo : M.D. Guṇasēna & Co., 1961, p. 47 (on *JāA.*, I. 81.1).

6. *The Vinaya Piṭakam* (PTS edition), I, 16-17, referring to an *upāsaka*, and, *ibid*, p. 18, referring to an *upāsikā*, a female lady devotee.

7. See, for example, *Sutta-Nipāta Commentary; Being Paramatthajotikā II* (PTS edition), I, 216 (on *Sutta-Nipāta* vs. 180); *Saratthappakāsinī*: the commentary on the *Saṃyutta-nikāya* (PTS edition), I, 81 (on *Saṃyutta-nikāya*, I, 215).

8. See further, E. F. Perry and S. Ratnayaka, "The Sangha of the Tiratana," *Religion and Ethics Institute, Inc., Occasional Papers*, No. 1, 1974.

9. *The Kuddaka-Pāṭha; Together with Its Commentary Paramatthajotikā I* (PTS edition), 170 (on the *Ratanasutta* [see also *Sutta-Nipāta* vs. 224]).

10. *Papañcasūdanī Majjhimanikāyaṭṭhakathā:* the commentary on the *Majjhimanikāya* (PTS edition), I, 131-132. See also *Manorathapūraṇī*: the commentary on the *Aṅguttara-nikāya* (PTS edition), II, 108-112 and *Paramatthajotikā I*, 16-17. I have chosen to follow the *Papañcasūdani* (which is the same as the *Manorathapūran* account) because it is more concise than *Paramatthajotikā I.* The commentarial explanation in the *Papañcasūdani* has been rather freely translated into English by Nyanaponika Thera as *The Threefold Refuge*, in "The Wheel Series," No. 76 (Kandy, Ceylon [Sri Lanka] : Buddhist Publication Society, 1965 [first published by the "Servants of the Buddha," 1949]. *Paramatthajotikā I* has been admirably trans lated into English by Bhikkhu Ñāṇamoli in the Pali Tex Society translation series, No. 32, as *The Minor Readings and the Illustrator of Ultimate Meaning*, London Luzac & Co., Ltd., 1960.

11. *Papañcasūdanī*, I, 132. See also *Vaṃsatthappakāsini*: the commentary on the *Mahāvaṃsa* (PTS edition), I, 308 (on *Mahāvaṃsa*, Chapter XI, vs. 35), and *Dharmapradīpikā*, edited by Baddēgama Vimalavaṃsa Thera, 2nd ed., Colombo: M.D. Gunasena & Co., 1967, 179-183, a Sinhalese version of the *Papañcasūdanī* passage, and *Madhuratthavilāsinī nāma Buddhavaṃsaṭṭhakathā* (PTS edition), 122-123 (on *Buddhavaṃsa*, II, 189, p. 17). This last source makes it clear that the commentarors tended, for homiletical purposes, to take *saraṇa* as being derived from the root *śṛ*, "to crush," as in the following: "*sarati hiṃsati vināsetī ti saraṇam*," "to crush, to slay, to destroy, hence [the meaning of] *saraṇam*." The term "*saraṇa*" can be derived, of course, from the root *śri*, "to resort".

12. C.A.F. Rhys Davids, *A Manual of Buddhism: For Advanced Students*, London :

The Sheldon Press, 1932, 60.

13. W.C. Smith, "Religious Atheism? Early Buddhist and Recent American," *Milla wa-Milla*, No. 6 (December, 1966), 9.

14. See *Papañcasūdanī*, II, 113 (on *Majjhima-nikāya*, I, 138); *Saddhamma-Pajjotikā*: the commentary on the *Mahāniddesa*, I, 74 (*on Mahāniddesa* 1, I, 17); and *Paramatthajotikā II*, I, 151 (*on Sutta-Nipāta*, vs. 80).

15. *Papañcasūdanī*, I, 132 (on *Majjhima-nikāya* I, 24).

16. Ibid., p. 130.

17. See, for example, the commentarial discussions in *The Khuddaka-Pāṭha; Together with Its Commentary Paramatthajotikā I* (PTS edition) I. 183 (on *Sutta-nipāta*, vs. 227), *Sumaṅgala-vilāsinī*: *Buddhaghosa's Commentary on the Digha-Nikāya* (PTS edition) I. 181 (on *Digha-Nikāya*, I. 5), *Paramattha-Dīpanī Theragātha—Aṭṭhakathā*: *The Commentary of Dhammapalācariya* (PTS edition) II. 71 (on the *Theragāthā* vs. 204), I. 102 (on the *Theragāthā* vs. 249), and III. 41 (on the *Theragāthā* vs. 789).

18. Ibid., p. 132.

19. Ibid.

20. Ibid., p. 133.

21. Ibid.

22. *Saṃyutta-nikāya* (PTS edition), II. 220.

23. *Papañcasūdanī* I. 133 quoting from the *Sutta-Nipāta* (PTS edition) vs. 192.

24. Ibid., quoting from the *Majjhima-nikāya* (PTS edition) II. 144.

25. Ibid.

26. Ibid., p. 134.

27. Ibid.

28. Ibid., p. 134.

29. Ibid., p. 132. Note that in this *lokuttarasaraṇagamana* one "roots out what harms this going for refuge," (*saraṇagamanūpakkilesasamuccheda*), whereas in the *lokiya* going for refuge, one only arrests (*vikkhambana*) what harms the process.

30. Ibid.

31. Ibid., p. 134. The quote is from the *Dhammapada* (PTS edition) vss. 190-192.

32. Compare a related passage in the *Dhammapada* vss. 277-279.

33. *Papañcasūdanī*, I, 134. The quote is from *Aṅguttara-nikāya*, I. 26-27.

34. Ibid., I, 135. *The Commentary on the Dhammapada*: *Dhammapadaṭṭhakathā* (PTS edition), III, 246 (on *Dhammapada*, vss. 190-192) focuses on the worship of the teachers, etc., as an example of how refuge, either that taken by a householder or by one who has gone forth, can be shaken; not so, however, for one who has a vision of the immovable state (*acalabhāvan*), i.e., *nibbāṇa*.

6

The Garland of Love : A History of Religions Hermeneutic of Nembutsu Theory and Practice[1]

R.J. CORLESS

A : Introduction

The rosary is the world's best-kept open secret. It is used in at least six world religions, but scholarly persons customarily ignore it as 'mere muttering', and fail to examine it in the context either of systematic dogmatics or of the History of Religions. The few studies that do exist, however, suggest that repetitive devotional mantra and its vehicle, the rosary, exhibit a significant consistency amongst *Homines Religiosi.*

The *Hasting's Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics* once again surprises us with an insightful and comprehensive article,[2] which does not seem to have been superseded; and whereas the *New Catholic Encyclopaedia* dutifully mentions the rosary,[3] it is not as curious about its origins as is Herbert Thurston in the older *Catholic Encyclopaedia.*[4] Thurston demolishes as pure invention the sanctified nonsense of the deranged Alain de la Roche, that Saint Mary bestowed the rosary on Saint Dominic, and cataloguing its obvious analogues in 'paganism', created a major controversy amongst Dominicans and pious confraternities. More recently, Ernst Benz has compared the Nembutsu of Shinran with the Hesychast tradition of the Greek and Russian 'Prayer of Jesus', or 'Prayer of the Heart',[5] but the unevenly balanced elements of this comparison serve only as an introduction to readers unfamiliar with either topic. Undoubtedly the best study is a long article by Father Louis Gardet stretching over two issues of the *Revue Thomiste*[6] which, though it is hampered by an investigation of the pseudo-problem, 'Is it (i.e., Muslim *dhikr*) natural or supernatural mysticism?'[7], combines a mass of information on repetitive mantra in Islam with sensible correlations in other religions according to the available secondary material.

What will be attempted here is a review of the origin and development of the

Nembutsu in the light of what is known about similar phenomena in other religions, even though, due to the aforementioned cultured dispisers the data is depressingly incomplete.

Whatever may have been its status in India, the first reasoned defence of *Nembutsu /Nien-fo*[h] is in the 'Commentary on the Pure Land Discourse' (*Wang-sheng-lun Chu*[a], T.XL,826-844) of T'an-luan[b] (c.488-c.554 A.D.)[8]. We shall examine his defence in some detail, and then study selected passages from Hōnen and Shinran, with whom the Nembutsu doctrine evolves to term, passing rapidly but honourably over Tao-ch'o, Shan-tao, Kūya and Kakuban. We shall then pan back and assay a comprehensive phenomenology of repetitive devotional mantra, concluding with the inevitable note on possible shamanistic referents, and finally, return to the history of the Nembutsu and view it in our new perspective to see if some lucidity can be discerned in the close darkness of Shinran Shōnin's compressed logic.

B : The Development of Nembutsu

1. *T'an-luan*

According to tradition, T'an-luan, abandoning a Taoist search for immortality, received from Bodhiruci I the latter's Chinese translation of a *gāthā* and *upadeśa* by Vasubandhu, on Birth[9] in Sukhāvatī. If this incident is historical[10], it must have occured about 529-530 A.D. T'an-luan then wrote his own commentary on the *gāthaupadeśa* which, as the *upadeśa* is itself an auto-commentary on the *gāthā*, presents us with a commentary at three removes from the Sanskrit sūtras[11] on which the *gāthā* claims to be based, a situation which one may find either vexingly cumbersome or mysteriously *ehi-passiko*. In the second *chüan* of this two *chüan* treatise, T'an-luan discusses the Invocation of the Name of the Buddha Amitābha under the heading, 'The Gate of Praise' (T.XL, 835bll-cl7). This is the second of the five 'Gates to Recollection' (*nien-men*[e]) into which he divides the Pure Land praxis: the Gates of Worship, Praise, Resolution (*praṇidhāna*), Contemplation and, 'Turning Towards' (*hui-hsiang*[f]). This last Gate has both the ordinary meaning of turning over one's merit to other beings (*parināmaṇā*) while still in saṃsāra and the special meaning of turning back to re-enter saṃsāra to help beings once one has entered Sukhāvatī. The first four Gates obtain merit for the body, speech and mind, according to the usual classification into *trīṇi karmāṇi*, while the fifth disperses the merit thus gained. The character *nien*[g] ('to read out loud so as to remember') is used in the dual sense of 'remembering' (*smṛti, smaraṇa*) and 'reciting' (*japa*) as well as, occasionally, 'instant of time' (*kṣaṇa*). Thus the term *Nien-fo/Nembutsu*[h], a translation of *buddhānusmṛtyupasthāna*, can be interpreted as, 'calling Buddha to mind', 'calling on Buddha' and 'Buddha in the Now.' T'an-luan explicitly discusses the first two of these interpretations : the Gate of Contemplation is 'calling to mind' and the Gate of Praise is both 'calling to mind' and 'calling on'. Shinran, we may suggest proleptically, emphasised the third interpretation.

T'an-luan begins his discussion of the Gate of Praise by emphasising its vocal character : it is *vāk-karma*, and the praise is to be made public by being audible. The *upadeśa* says of Amitābha Buddha that, 'as that Tathāgata's glory (*prabhāsa*) is the image of his wisdom (*prajñā*), so his Name is [the image] of his essence, and thus we

wish to exercise (*bhāvanā*) in this correspondence according to the Truth.' 'T'an-luan explains that the light of Amitābha dispels ignorance : as he says elsewhere (T.XL,837 a19-20), it is both an intense physical light that penetrates objects and a mental light that enlightens beings. Similarly, this correlation of outer (physical) light and inner (mental) light is found in the outer Name of the Buddha, *Amitābha* ('He of Infinite Light'), and his inner essence, *amitābhā* ('infinite light'), which is also *amitaprajñā*. In order to experience mental illumination, the practitioner must consciously 'exercise in this correspondence' of the Name and Essence, by unifying his mind on the model of the Buddha who is simultaneously perfectly still in his essence (*dharmatā*) and perfectly active in his economy (*upāya*).[12] This unified mind is called *hsin-hsin*^{k} (Jap : *shinjin*), 'the trustworthy mind/heart', and is normally Englished as that slippery word, 'faith'. *Hsin-hsin* may be out of the Name-Essence correspondence in three interdependent ways (T.XL,835b25-27) :

(i) One's *hsin-hsin* is not genuine, it is not quite absent, yet it 'scarcely exists' [*Tao Te Ching*, VI].
(ii) One's *hsin-hsin* is not unitary (*i*^{l}), it does not have determination.
(iii) One's *hsin-hsin* is not constant, one's recollection (*nien*^{g}) is intermittent (or, 'other thoughts interpose themselves').

It was because of the perfect interlocking of these three 'minds' that Vasubandhu began his *gāthā* with, 'I take refuge (*śaraṇam gacchāmi*) in the Buddha *with one mind* (*i-hsin*^{mi})'. Thus, the Nien-fo is only effective when the mind accords with the voice, the inner state with the outer activity.

The objection is raised that a name is only an indicator, 'like a finger pointing to the moon': but it is the moon, not the finger, that gives light. How then can a name enlighten our minds? T'an-luan replies by dividing the major premise. Names are of two classes : 'names which are other than things', *i.e.*, labels arbitrarily attached to objects, 'like a finger pointing to the moon', and 'names which are the same as things' which are so intimately connected with objects that they effect what they signify. All the members of this latter class are *in-tz'u*^{n}, 'audible words' or 'spoken phrases'. It includes the Names of Buddhas and Bodhisattvas, mantras and (Taoist) spells. He shows the existence of such effective names by referring to, in the ordinary world, the proven effectiveness of medicinal and other spells, and, in the transcendental realm (*acintyadhātu*), the poison-dispelling drum (*vipravāsa-dundubhi*) of the Śūraṃgama-samādhi Sūtra[13], which symbolises the *kleśa*-dispelling sound of *Buddha-vacana*.

Thus, it is established that the Name *Amitābha* effects its essence, *amitābhā*, which is in turn the effector of *amitaprajñā*, but that for this to be operative, it must be consciously appropriated by the *hsin-hsin*^{k} of the practitioner. Students of Shingon may be reminded of the doctrine of *kaji*^{o}, where Vairocana 'adds' (*ka*) his power and the *sādhaka* 'holds' (*ji*) on to it[14], and a Catholic thinks of the doctrine that a sacrament is effective of itself (*ex opere operato*) but remains dormant in the recipient until activated by faith (*fides*).

A further question deserving attention is whether T'an-luan used or advocated a rosary. The account of his death in the 'Discourse on Sukhāvatī' (*Ching-t'u Lun*^{p}, T.XLVII, 97b9-98a3), by Chia-Ch'ai (c.650 A.D.), indicates that he died sitting

upright, facing west, chanting Nien-fo, and holding a censer, but makes no mention of a rosary. Tao-ch'o[q] (562-645) is normally credited with introducing the rosary in the form of jars of beans. However, a passage in T'an-luan may indicate that the rosary was known to him, but that he did not regard it as necessary. At the end of the first *chüan*, the *Wang-sheng-lun Chu*[a] attempts in the form of eight questions and answers, to counter some objections to the discussion of the *gāthā*, before going on to the deeper matters in the *upadeśa* (T.XL,833c20-834c27). The last two questions interpret the exhortation in the so-called Amitāyurdhyāna Sūtra to repeat Nien-fo 'ten times' (cf. S.B.E., 49:2, pp.197-99). It is objected that one can either concentrate on the number of Nien-fo, which would distract one's attention from the Nien-fo itself; or one can concentrate on the Nien-fo, when one has no mental faculties left over to keep account of the number. T'an-luan replies that 'ten' means 'perfection', not a mathematical quantity, and asks, 'Why should you want to know the exact number of Recollections?' (T.XL,834c24-25). 'But', he goes on, 'if you *must* know, there is a method...' The next ten characters[r] are interpreted by D.T. Suzuki[15] to mean, '... whose instruction is to be given orally, but which must not be committed to writing.' This implies some sort of esoteric transmission (*mikkyō*[s]), which seems quite out of keeping with the rest of the text. If we translate, 'they (*i.e.*, the Nien-fo—the subject is not expressed) must be given out orally, not written, with a brush,' we have a recommendation for vocal rather than written repetition (*likhita-japa*), such that the mind is wholly concerned with the Nien-fo as the fingers (perhaps) automatically keep the tally on some sort of physical device such as a rosary : this, indeed, appears to be the primary function of a rosary—to ensure a set number of repetitions while freeing the mind for the repetition alone.

2. *Hōnen and Shinran*

The story of the development of Nembutsu doctrine from T'an-luan to Hōnen and Shinran has yet to be written. The textbook summaries merely accept the denominationally-biased exegesis of Jōdo and Jōdoshin apologists. What is needed, at the least, are full studies of all those quoted 'patriarchs' and 'authorities' in their own right, so as to discover how the *Historie* became the confessional *Geschichte*. In the absence of such studies, all we can do is make respectful kowtows to a few of the gentlemen upon whom the Kamakura spotlight has deigned to fall. It is said that Shan-tao[t] (613-681) elevated the Nien-fo to the 'primary practice' without abandoning the other 'Gates', although it now appears that he was in fact far more interested in the techniques for visualising Sukhāvatī.[16] It is certain that Kūya[u] (903-972) sang and danced the *hachi-tataki*[v] ('metal-bowl drumming') Nembutsu through Kyoto, although we do not know why he thought it would illuminate, and his temple, the Rokuharamitsuji[w] ('Temple of the Six Pāramitās') is now associated chiefly with the exposition of scary pictures of the hells during Obon-matsuri, under the influence of Genshin[x] (942-1017). Kakuban[y] (d.1143) is said to have assisted the popularity of the Nembutsu by using it as a mantra to Vairocana—possibly a factor in the persistent Shinshū refusal to allow that the Nembutsu is in any sense a mantra.

However, of Hōnen[z] (1133-1212) we can be sure that he advocated the Nembutsu as the only practice, superior to all others because it contains all others.[17] Whatever

Shan-tao thought he was saying, Hōnen tells us he meant to say only *Namu Amida Butsu*.[18] *Namu*[aa] means the devotion of self to Amida, while *Amida Butsu*[ab] means the light (wisdom) and power of the Buddha: thus the two worlds are joined.[19] The recitation should be audible[20] and continuous,[21] although to avoid laziness one should fix a set number of repetitions of up to a hundred thousand a day[22] aiming at a full crore before death,[23] although even then, final perseverance, and thus Birth (*ōjō*[c]) is not assured.[24]

Shinran[ac] (1173-1262) went further, and compressed all Buddhist teachings, practices and attainments into the One Thing, 'faith', (*shinjin*[k]) : craftily, he omitted the pivotal new word from the official title of his major apologetic work, *Ken Jōdo Shinjichi Kyōgyōshō Monrui*[ad], 'Proof Texts Demonstrating the True Teaching, Practice and Attainment relating to Sukhāvatī' (now popularly called *Kyōgyōshinshō*, with 'faith' (*shin*[ac]) in its title). He carefully selected passages which identified everything with the vocal Nembutsu, e.g., Shan-tao is found to say that single-mindedness is one-mind, is not two-minds, is one practice, is one recollection, is one utterance, is the right practice, is right activity, is the right recollection, is *Namu Amida Butsu*.[25] He then reflected that this One Thing (one thought, etc.) is 'the shortest possible moment in which faith reveals itself, and the feeling [*kokoro*[ag]] of joy, incomprehensively [*sic*] great, is manifested.'[26] The moment of faith is the moment of Nembutsu, and it is atemporal, transcendental. In a strange passage, totally untranslatable but given here slightly modified from the brave attempt of D.T Suzuki, he says :[27]

> ...*namu*[aa] is *ki-myō*[ah] [*śaraṇāgama*]. *Ki* means 'to reach' or 'to arrive.' It is also *ki-echi*[ai] ['to arrive at speaking'] where [the character *setsu*[aj], 'speak'] is pronounced *echi*[ak] ['joy']. It is again *ki-sai*[ai] ['to arrive at speaking'] where [*setsu*[aj]] is pronounced *sai*[al] ['duty']. The character *setsu*[aj], has two sounds, *echi*[ak] and *sai*[al]. It means, 'to tell' 'to state', that is, 'to give utterance to what is going on in one's mind.' *Myō*[am] ['lifespan', translating *śaraṇa*] means 'action', 'calling up', 'message', 'teaching', 'way', 'trust', 'calculation' and 'summoning.' Thus, *ki-myo*[ah] ['going for refuse'] is 'the sovereign invitation of the Fundamental Resolution [*hongan*[an]].'

If this means anything, it seems to mean that the reverence of beings for Amida (the *namu*[aa]) is identical with the invitation of Amida to beings, an invitation which, being from a Sovereign, cannot be refused. This produces the solidification of all mental activities into the 'true mind which is like a *vajra*'.[28] Wholly identified with Amida, the Nembutsu is neither a pious practice nor a good work (*higyō-hizen*[ao]),[29] the Nembutsu occurs spontaneously, 'through the wise operation (*onhakarai*[ap]) of the Tathāgata.'[30] Shinran does not perform Nembutsu, the Nembutsu performs itself.

C : Toward a Phenomenology of Repetitive Devotional Mantra

The curious lack of interest in repetitive mantra shown by Historians of Religion may be due to the ideological dominance, hopefully now fading, of Muscular Ethical Rationalism amongst them. If it isn't intellectual and textual, it is left to the Anthropologists. But as soon as one allows it to be a respectable subject for study, it is seen

to be so common that one is at first overwhelmed by the interpretive possibilities, and then underwhelmed by the lack of data. A full study would require a massive grant to a team of polylinguists who would travel round the world without, somehow, alienating their folk-informants. For, the material is primarily at the folk-level : repetitive mantra is often regarded as merely simple, and therefore simplistic, even within a tradition by its 'high' adherents. Time and again one hears and reads to the effect that, '*Our* mantra works because we think about it : *theirs* is merely "vain repetitions." '[31] This may be only to say that the thinking is not visible to an observer. After we have taken a more positive look at repetitive mantra, we may be able to appreciate why those who actually use it value it above all other spiritual practices, and how it is that thirty million Japanese can agree with Shinran when he says, 'I know no other way than Nembutsu.'[32]

We will try to contain what data there is under six heads : form, instrument (i.e., rosary), sound, worship, simplicity and spontaneity ; and we will examine under each head some evidence from Buddhism, Jainism, Hinduism, Islam, Sikhism, Christianity (Orthodox and Catholic), and Judaism, more or less in that order.

1. *Form*

The mantra is short, easily memorised, and considered to contain the essential idea of a religion, or all of the ideas.

Sino-Japanese mantras are typically of the form *Nan-mo/Namu*^{aa}, representing *namas* in *saṃdhi* before a voiced consonant, being the ordinary Indian reverential greeting, followed by the name of the entity reverenced : *Namu Amida Butsu* ; *Nam' myōhōrengekyō*^{aq} ('Hail ! Lotus Sūtra !') ; *Namu Daishi Henjō Kongō*^{ar} ('Hail ! [Kōbō] Daishi [of the?] All-Illuminating Vajra!'), etc. Hōnen and Shinran found all in Amida ; Nichiren found all in *Myōhōrengekyō* ; the vajra is the primary symbol of Daishi. Tibetan Buddhism is liberally supplied with short mantras to every conceivable and inconceivable hypostasis taken as supremely important to a particular *sādhaka* at a particular time. Burmese Buddhists recite *Phra-Tara-Sangha*, i.e., Buddha-Dharma-Saṃgha, a universal encapsulation of Buddhism.[33] Jains salute their Five Great Ones in the *navakāra mantra*.[34] Repetitive mantras in Hinduism are to be found everywhere: Oṃ is the chief, and then frequently *namas* followed by the name of a deity : *Namaḥ Śivāya, Namo Nārāyanāya* , etc.[35] Muslim *dhikr* prescribes *lā ilāha' llāh* ('There is no god except Allah', the central confession of faith) for beginners, the name *Allāh* for intermediate practitioners, and the more abstract *Huwa* ('He') for the advanced.[36] Sikhs refer to the Absolute simply as *Nāma* ('Name') and may repeat *wah-i-guru*, an imageless title meaning something like, 'The Master is Truth/Life.'[37] Orthodox Christians practise the 'Jesus Prayer' which may be in a long form such as *Kurie Iēsous Christe huie theou eleēson me* [38] ('Lord Jesus Christ Son of God have mercy on me') or simply the Name *Iēsous*, which, as the earthly Name of the Deity, contains all of Christianity. Catholics presently recite the Ave Maria ('Hail! Mary, etc.'), although the Paternoster ('Our Father, etc.' the central Christian prayer) was formerly used. and its modern replacement by the Ave Maria is still only partial.[39] Jewish worship contains set responses which are repeated by the congregation in litany form ; e.g., the 'Angelic Song' of the High Holidays, where each verse ends with an ascription of praise to God, *leḥay 'ōlāmīm*, 'to Him who exists eternally.'[40]

2. *Instrument*

The repeated mantra is for remembering. Chinese *nien*[9] (thus Sino-Japanese *nen*, *nem* in saṃdhi before a voiced consonant), Sanskrit *smaraṇa*, Punjabi, *simaran*, Arabic *dhikr* and Hebrew *zākār* are all used to mean, 'call to mind' and 'call on'. This remembering must be performed a certain number of times, and the number must be remembered. Hence, in all traditions except Judaism, the rosary.[41]

Attempts to find a single origin for the rosary have not been fruitful. Except in cases where its form is similar in different religions, as in Hinduism and Buddhism, and Islam and Eastern Orthodoxy, there seems no evidence for diffusion. In most cases, wherever rosaries are found, it seems that they have evolved independenly from whatever counting system already was in secular use, into a specific instrument for counting sacred recitations. To take one example : fingers, or bags of stones, have been commonly used throughout the Middle East for counting sheep, as far back as anyone can remember.[42] Goldziher claims that the Muslim rosary was imported from elsewhere,[43] but he notes that Muḥammad recommended counting the praises of God on one's fingers, and we know also that pebbles were used early.[44] By the time the Muslim rosary is known to have existed in its developed form (3rd. cent. A.H. according to Goldziher), it had already evolved to the threaded form in India and Christendom.

The most primitive form of counting is what one finds literally on hand : most cultures count on fingers, and many have developed complex methods of keeping count above ten by using the knuckles of each hand, one for units and one for tens. Whenever a rosary is unavailable or considered undesirable,[45] fingers are again used. There is no need to 'explain' the origin of such a method. Loose counters may next be used. Abba Paul of Egypt (d. 341) gathered three hundred pebbles and dropped one at each recitation. About 800 A.D., Irish monks, themselves bound to the weekly recitation of the hundred and fifty Psalms, recommended the laity to recite a hundred and fifty Paternosters, using leather pouches containing a hundred and fifty pebbles.[46] Tao-ch'o counted the Nien-fo with jars of beans, Hindus use a threaded rosary, but keep it in a bag (*gaumukhi*, 'cow's mouth') or covered with a cloth.

Subsequently, knotted cords are developed. Knots are almost everywhere used as mnemonics: the Peruvian and Chinese official Knotted Records are only the most sophisticated systems. The customary Orthodox rosary is knotted, and hence calle *komboschoinion* (*kombos*, 'knot'; *schoinion*, 'cord') in Greek. Poorer Jains use knotted cotten thread.[47] A knot is made under the master counting bead of the Shingon rosary, and persists in the Nichiren rosary, which is clearly a variant of the Shingon form, and in the Jōdo rosary, which is more distantly related to it. In Judaism, the worshipper touches, but does not count, the knotted fringe (*tsītsit*) of his prayer shawl to *remind* him of the commandments of God.[48]

Finally, a rosary of threaded beads evolves. At this point, if not (sometimes) before, the sacredness of the mantra is transferred to the counting instrument itself, even the very word 'bead' in English deriving from Anglo-Saxon *bede*, 'prayer'. Thus, the material of the beads, their number and configuration, accord with the entity worshipped. The *rudrākṣa* is used for Śiva, the *tulasi* for Viṣṇu; each Tibetan hypostasis has a separate rosary; the colour of Jain beads varies with the colour of the Tīrthaṃkara

being addressed; each Japanese Buddhist sect has a rosary of a distinct form. The number of beads represents a sacred number for each tradition: 150 for the 150 Psalms of Christian monastic liturgy; 100 for the 100 Names of Allah;[49] and 108 in Hinduism, Jainism and Buddhism, this being, for obscure reasons, the sacred Indian number.[50] The configuration of the string may be a microcosm. This seems especially true in Japan, where the Shingon rosary is the *vajradhātu*,[51] the similar Nichiren rosary is Śākyamuni in his cosmic Lotus-Sūtra-preaching form, and the Jōdo Shū rosary is two interlocking circles, for the linkage of Amida and beings.

Because the rosary assumes the sacrality of its function, it begins to act of itself. Hōnen's rosary emitted light.[52] In Tibet, touching the rosary is the beginning of the mantra.[53] The Hindu is instructed to worship his rosary. The *tasbīḥ* of the founder of a Sufi Order, possessing the *baraka* ('blessing') of his *dhikr*, is kept in a guarded box and passed on as a symbol of authority to subsequent leaders.[54] Orthodox Christians may parade a rosary through a house to ward off misfortune. It is also, then, a weapon. The process of tying the *komboschoinion* is a microcosm of the Christian *Heilsgeschichte*, and when finished it is called the Sword of the Spirit.[55] Hōnen compares Nembutsu to a sword.[56] The chanting of the Name of Jesus defeated the Turks at the Battle of Belgrade in 1456.[57] For Swami Sivananda, the rosary is 'a strong weapon.'[58] Its use as a weapon becomes more or less unconscious : pilgrims to Kōyasan wear a small wrist rosary as a talisman, Hindu pilgrims hang *pūjāmālā* round their necks, Catholics who have otherwise lapsed may keep a rosary about them 'for luck' and 'worry-beads', derived in form from the Muslim rosary, are employed by Jews, Christians[59] and Muslims throughout the Middle East 'for a soothing effect.' Thus a brahmacārin who loses his rosary must fast in penance:[60] he has been careless with God.

In all traditions, a physiological connection is made between the repetition and a bodily function, such as the heartbeat (e.g., 'The Prayer of the Heart') or breath.[61]

3. *Sound*

Hindus will sometimes write mantras (*likhita-japa*), combining these with mental repetition, and there are Kabbalistic diagrams where the Name of God appears repeatedly and curiously (not always the right way up), but most usually a mantra must be audible to be effective. We have seen that T'an-luan specifically requires this. Hōnen is no less definite.[62] In Islam, '*dhikr* of the tongue' is the first stage.[63] The Prayer of Jesus begins with oral recitation.[64] The Catholic is instructed to move his lips while telling his beads.

Music and dancing may occur. The tune and steps are simple and repetitive. Kūya banged his drum and danced to simple songs; the dances at Obon-matsuri conspicuously lack invention; many Jews rock back and forth repeatedly (*davenen*) during prayer,[65] and the Ḥasidim dance and clap to a *da capo* melody of a few notes (less than an octave), sung to nonsense syllables such as *Oy*;[66] Hindus sing kīrtan to a mṛdaṅgam (double-ended drum) and mañjra (a wooden clapper with bells); and the 'whirling dervishes' are famous for just that, chanting the Name as they move in endless pirouettes.[67] The dance may be regarded as a pilgrimage, as the invocation is a progress. Caitanya Vaiṣṇavas have developed the 'city-praising' (*nagarkīrtan*) procession;[68] Islamic *wird* is a 'litany of approach' and may mean, 'arrival';[69] litanies in

Christianity are commonly processional, and in Old Slavonic, a rosary is called *liestovka*, 'a ladder.' The rosary uses the Name as a way to the Named.

Hindus and Sikhs place all this within a cosmology of the universe as Sound (Sanskrit, *śabda*;[70] Punjabi, *shabad*). OṂ is the Beginning; it unfolds to give all other sounds: music, mantra and *veda* (knowledge in its broadest sense), so that Sarasvatī (whom Tibetans call Svarasvatī, 'She of the Voice') holds a vīnā, a rosary and a book. Meditating on all sounds at once (by going to the bazaar and listening in general but not in particular) one hears OṂ or the humming of insects. Internal *dhikr* is like bees buzzing.[71] The large Tibetan trumpets sound OṂ, the shawms are the neighing of the horses carrying one to Sukhāvatī, and mantras are heard in the sounds of insects.'[72] Japanese Buddhist laypeople rub, rather than count, the rosary, and the sound, which frightens demons in Nō drama, resembles that of a cicada (*semi*). Sikhs are famous for their music, and regard it as essential to spiritual development. It leads one to hear cosmic sound, so that, 'the whole world appears as repeating God's name.'[73] Chinese and Japanese Buddhists hear *gāthās* in the sounds of Nature,'[74] as if already in Sukhāvatī, wherein all things preach Dharma (Larger Sukhāvatīvyūha: SBE 49:2, pp. 38-40). Kū Amidabutsu^{as} (d.1228) introduced vernacular hymns (*wasan*^{at}) and the wind-bell (*fūrin*^{au}) as a foretaste of the music of Sukhāvatī.[75] Catholic monks began to chant the Psalms antiphonally, it is said, after one of them had a vision of the angelic choirs singing in this fashion : but the heavenly repertoire consisted of one word only, endlessly repeated : *Sanctus*('Holy'). In Orthodox practice, 'the material universe... murmurs secretly the name of Jesus.'[76]

4. *Worship*

Repetitive mantra almost always seems to have a devotional context, in which the worshipper confronts the Worshipped and requests help. Even in Zen, where this confrontation is minimal, the most commonly used repetitive mantra is the *Emmei Jukkū Kannon Gyō*, ^{av} (T.XLIX,345c,4-6), which seeks the aid of the beneficent Ekadaśamukhasahasrārabhujāvalokiteśvara Bodhisattva, on the basis of Lotus Sūtra XXV (in Kumārajīva's version). The Worshipped is commonly male, as in most of Buddhism except the Tibetan forms, and as in all monotheisms, in which case the worshipper is regarded as female : thus the Rabbinic and the mystical Christian interpretations of the *Song of Solomon*, and the Vaiṣṇava worshipping Kṛṣna in the form of Rādhā. Sexual energy is clearly called upon in *bhakti*, and the resulting psycho-somatic disturbance, resembling passion, is catalogued in the eight Vaiṣṇava ecstasies.[77] The rhythmic singing and dancing occasionally accelerates and leads to prostration in Hinduism and Islam.[78] Directing the passions towards God requires coolness towards the natural world, and thus the *sādhu*, etc., takes elaborate precautions against seminal emission. Buddhists are generally uneasy with the word *bhakti*, preferring *śraddhā*, and the devotion to Amida seems to be couched in parental rather than conjugal terms : Hōnen compares Amida to a father and mother,[79] and Amida is commonly called by the powerfully protective word, *Oyasama*, 'The Parent.'

5. *Simplicity*

T'an-luan opens his Commentary by quoting (pseudo?) Nāgārjuna on the 'Difficult and Easy Paths', and identifies devotion to Amitābha with the Easy Path (T.XL,826[a] 28-bll). The Difficult Path is the traditional combination of the *triśikṣā*, whose efficacy he does not deny, but he is clearly puzzled as to why anyone should bother with it. All subsequent Pure Land Masters seem to agree with him, and gradually intensify the difference, declaring the Difficult Path in fact the Impossible Path since the *paścimaḍharmakāla* has arrived, until Shinran openly abandons the monastic life and gets married. Theophan the Recluse (1815-94) quotes Gregory of Sinai to the effect that either 'activity or work' or 'invoking the Name of Jesus' is a valid practice, but the latter is 'quicker and more effective.'[80] Islam preserves 'a sound *isnād*' (chain of authority) that 'Alī ibn' Abī Ṭālib, 'asked the Prophet saying, "O Apostle of God guide me to the nearest way to God and the easiest for His worshippers." Then the Prophet said, "The best is (to say) what I and the Prophets before me said, *Lā ilāha illā 'llāh.*"'[81] Repetitive mantra is recommended to Hindu householders as especially suitable to their *svadharma*, although sādhus do practise it, and it substitutes for the monastic liturgy amongst Catholics. Eastern Orthodoxy (except for the Old Believers) reserves the rosary for monks, but especially recommends it for the illiterate ones, and divides up the beads according to the structure of the chanted version of the Psalter.[82] Maronite laity pray the rosary, but they have been heavily influenced by the French, and use the Dominican form.

The practice is simple in that it does not require intellectual ability or learning, nor does it require retreat from the world and elaborate liturgies and meditations ; but it is full in that it contains everything, and all traditions agree that the mind and voice must be 'united' (as T'an-luan says) for it to be effective.

6. *Spontaneity*

Theophan the Recluse says, 'To stop this jostling [of discursive thoughts] you must bind the mind with one thought, and the thought of One only. An aid to this is a short prayer, which helps the mind become simple and united...'[83] T'an-luan, Hōnen and Shinran constantly link the word 'one' with the Nembutsu and its effects. The end result is a unification of worshipper and Worshipped, of the spark and the Flame, such that the invocation invokes itself in the fine point where the ego used to be. The Nembutsu does itself in Shinran by the *onhakarai*[ap] of Amida. Hindu *japa* progresses from vocal (*vaikhari*) through whispered (*upaṃsu*) and mental (*manasika*) to non-invocation invocation (*ajapa-japa*).[84] The Muslim division,[85] sometimes subdivided, is into '*dhikr* of the tongue', '*dhikr* of the heart (*qalb*)' and '*dhikr* of the *sirr*' : *sirr* is described as more interior than *ruḥ* (subtle breath) and *qalb* ; it is the place of the Unity (*tawḥīd*) of Allah ; it is, according to al-Hallāj, 'the unity of God proclaimed and lived by God Himself in the soul.' Ibn 'Aṭā' Allāh says that the whole being becomes 'a tongue which does *dhikr*' ('une langue qui *dhikre*').[86] Guru Nānak in the Japji sees the Sikh travelling from *dharmakhanda*, the physical world seen as a place subject to God's laws, through five stages of interiorisation ending in *sachakhanda*, the Truth Realm, on entering which, 'the past, present and future blend into an all-present

Now.'[87] The moment is transcendental and unconditioned: *so neh-karmi jo shabad bichare*, 'He is without karma who practises The Sound.'[88] The Prayer of Jesus led Mother Maria 'to a *place*, a place both inside and outside, and this place was open towards a far distant land—a secret place...my Lord and my God...alone, yet together with *all*...'[89] Saint Isaac the Syrian (6th. cent.) says, 'When the spirit takes its dwelling place in a man he does not cease to pray, for the Spirit will constantly pray in him...the perfumes of prayer will breathe in his heart spontaneously.'[90] Theophan the Recluse calls it a flame in the heart,[91] 'this flame of love always ascends to the Lord and sings a song to Him.'[92] Richard Rolle (d. 1349) speaks of warmth, song and sweetness, attributes them to the Name of Jesus, and says, '...his heart will be living in splendour and fire, and marvellous music will exalt him.'[93] Ar-Ruṭbī stipulates the aspiration of the Name, 'so that the glorious name Allāh will settle in the heart and burn out all wicked notions.[94] It has such power because, as Jīva Gosvāmin says, 'the Name is nothing else than the Lord's own Form' (*bhagavat-svarūpam eva nāma*).[95] The Ḥasid visualises the letters composing his prayers, passes from speech (*dibbūr*) to thought (*maḥash' vah*), watches the letters dissolve, and finds the transcendent Nothing (En, spelled aleph-yod-nun) identified with his 'I' (*anī*, spelled aleph-nun-yod).[96]

By means of 'one' the One has been reached, and one and One are not two.

D : Shamanism

Ever since Mircea Eliade discovered the Shaman in Central Asia and brought him back to Paris for observation, Historians of Religion have been tempted to see Shamans under every altar. Without committing ourselves either to Diffusionism or to Archetypes, it will still be instructive to examine one of the principal 'archaic techniques of ecstasy' : the drum.[97] The material of the drum is related to the ecstasy desired : wood from a special 'cosmic tree', skin from the theriomorphic Ancestor. The drumming is (of course) audible, and rhythmic. There may be a dance. The drum awakes and becomes a vehicle to carry the shaman on a pilgrimage to the One Centre of the cosmos. Time and space are annihilated. The drum is linked with the bow and arrow, and is a weapon. In some cultures (this fact is not mentioned by Eliade), the shaman who can 'fly' without a drum is ranked above one who needs a drum. The drum therefore has all the characteristics of a rosary, except for that of a counting device which, as should now be clear, is only its most obvious function.

Archaic drumming (if Leroi-Gourhan will allow us to extrapolate backwards from a modern 'primitive') was probably quite monotonous. Dr. Allyn Roberts, a Madison (Wisconsin) psychotherapist who lived for a time with Amazonian Indians, describes his reaction, as a then unrepentant 'reformer of savages', to a drumming session.[98] A man brought out a drum and began beating, giving one beat every two seconds. The audience fell silent. The booming did not vary. Dr. Roberts requested the drum, and began beating a few fancy 'modern' rhythms, to show them what music was really about. The audience became bored. The drum passed to another man who resumed the monotonous beating. After about twenty minutes, Dr. Roberts relaxed 'into something like a trance', and noticed that the audience had become rigid, staring with mouths agape. Then he, 'became aware that the beat was synchronised almost perfectly with that of the heart', and that, 'the background chorus of an infinity of singing

frogs and insects came to blend perfectly with the beat of the drum, with the beat of me. I could make no separation.' An ASC of unified thought-field had been attained through the repetitive performance. According to René Guénon, 'the science of rhythm...is...the basis of all the means that can be brought into action in order to enter into communion with the higher states of being. This is why it is said in an Islamic tradition that Adam while in the earthly paradise, spoke in verse, that is, in rhythmic language.'[99] The unvarying rhythm and clichés of theme and phrase in epic song have been shown by Albert Lord to be intentional and precise;[100] epic is a shamanistic drum-journey in words—Sarasvatī speaking rather than playing for us. Pali Sutta-form exhibits these clichés, since it was originally oral, and one never 'gets the point' of a Sutta by reading it from a book with the 'etceteras' (as if one might read, 'Refrain'), but by hearing it chanted. Mahāyāna Sūtra-form is then obviously a frozen imitation of the oral Sutta.[101] Buddhist mantra is simply a more concentrated Sūtra-chanting (as is obvious when one hears it, especially if one hears the Heart Sūtra chanted), and it is no surprise to find that it had its origin in India, a predominantly oral culture,[102] nor that T'an-luan insists, in the face of his countrymen's reverence for the written character, that the mantra must be 'given out orally, not written with a brush.'

E : A Psychological Historiography of Nembutsu

> The knot is now finished. All that remains is to pull the two ends down evenly so that the two loops are absorbed into the knot and [strands] A and B disappear in what seems a strange and quite surprising manner.[103]

We are now in a position to re-examine the historical development of Nembutsu in the light of what we have discovered about the process of sacred invocation in general, and, like the completion of the final knot of the *komboschoinion*, the strands of our argument can be united simply and quickly.

T'an-luan required that the Nien-fo be vocal, and ranged it alongside other practices. Shan-tao, according to Shinran, raised it to primary status. Hōnen made it unique. Shinran dissolved it in the moment of faith. This historical sequence is paralleled in the psychological progression experienced by any sincere mantric exercitant.

The novice at Invocation is instructed to repeat orally, and is not specially pressed to abandon other sacred exercises. As he advances, he finds that the mantra becomes increasingly important and, like the cuckoo in the nest, it gradually ejects its weaker companions. The rosary becomes his prize, his physical weapon in the spiritual combat, a link between the worlds, expressed in Jōdo by the interlocking chaplets : even the mere touch of the rosary brings on the mantra, or a mental state associated with the mantra. The Name is the Worshipped ; his love for both is unitary ; 'every little breeze seems to whisper, "Louise" ' ; the cosmos chants with him and in him until, finally, *cittaikāgratā* is reached, and it is impossible to say who is who.

> This is the right teaching ; this is the right meaning ; this is the right way [*caryam*]; this is the right understanding ; this is the right practice [*karma*] ; this is the right

knowledge [*prajñā*]. The triple mind is one mind. One mind is the mind of vajra. The answer is now given. Let it be so known.[104]

Shinran finds himself being uttered *Namu Amida Butsu* ! The rosary is wrapped around his hands, but he neither tells nor rubs it.[105] Ibn 'Aṭā' Allāh is 'a tongue which does *dhikr*' ; Shinran is a mind which does Nembutsu.

ABBREVIATIONS

SBE *Sacred Books of the East*

T *Taishō Shinshū Daizōkyō*

NOTES

1. For helpful comments on Islam and Judaism I am indebted to my colleagues at Duke University : Professor Lloyd R. Bailey of the Divinity School ; Professors Kalman Bland, Bruce B. Lawrence and Orval S. Wintermute of the Department of Religion ; and for helpful comments on Hinduism, Mr. Avinash C. Maheshwary of the Duke University Library South Asia Collection.

2. Winifred S. Blackman, 'Rosaries', *Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics*, ed. James Hastings, (New York : Scribners ; Edinburgh : Clark ; 1908-1926), vol. 10, pp. 847-856.

3. W.A. Hinnebusch, 'Rosary', *New Catholic Encyclopaedia* (New York : McGraw-Hill, 1967), vol. 12, pp. 667-670.

4. Herbert Thurston, *et alii*, 'The Rosary', *The Catholic Encyclopaedia* (New York : The Universal Knowledge Foundation, 1912), vol. 13, pp. 184-187.

5. Ernst Benz, 'Nembutsu und Herzensgebet', *Buddhism and Culture*, [*Essays*] *dedicated to Dr. Daisetz Teitaro Suzuki in Commemoration of his Ninetieth Birthday*, ed. Susumu Yamaguchi, (Kyōto : Suzuki Gakujutsu Zaidan, 1960), pp. 126-149.

6. Louis Gardet, O.P., 'Un probléme de mystique comparée : la mention du nom divin (*dhikr*) dans la mystique musulmane', *Revue Thomiste*, 52-III (1952), pp. 642-679, and 53-I (1953), pp. 197-216. Fr. Gardet's article '*Dhikr*' in *The Encyclopaedia of Islam* (Leiden : Brill, 1965), vol. 2, pp. 223-227, summarises in English, with slight modifications, the main points of his larger study in French.

7. This strange creature of nineteenth-century Catholic scholarship is satisfyingly banished into the wilderness by William Johnston, S.J., *The Still Point* (New York : Harper, 1971), pp. 129-150.

8. According to the *Hsü Kao Seng Chüan* (T.L, 470), his dates are 476-542. The evidence against this tradition is given in Ching-fen Hsiao, *The Life and Teachings of T'an-luan* (Princeton Theological Seminary Th.D. Dissertation, 1967, published on demand by University Microfilms, Ann Arbor MI), pp. 15-66.

9. *Wang-sheng*[e] (Jap : *ōjō*), 'to go to Birth', becomes a technical term indicating release from saṃsāra by re-birth in Sukhāvatī. This pregnant (!) use of 'Birth' parallels the Christian designation of a martyr's death-day as his birthday (*dies natalis*).

10. The only source for this tradition is the *Hsü Kao Seng Chüan*, from which all

other witnesses copy. On internal textual evidence there are serious grounds for believing that the 'Vasubandhu' text is a Chinese pseudepigraphon, and even that T'an-luan never met Bodhiruci. Mythologically, however, the story accurately represents T'an-luan's position as a mediator of Sukhāvatī Buddhism to China and the opponent of the merely intra-saṃsāric longevity of Taoism : see my, 'T'an-luan : The Taoist Background', address before the American Academy of Religion. St Louis, 29th October, 1976, to be revised and published in David W. Chappell, ed., *Buddhist and Taoist Studies II.*

11. The tradition of selecting the larger and smaller Sukhāvatīvyūha and the so-called Amitāyurdhyāna Sūtra as the principal Pure Land Sūtras seems to have begun with T'an-luan. The last-named does not exist in Sanskrit, and may have been composed in Uigur. (Fujita Kōtatsu, *Genshi Jōdo Shisō no Kenkyū*,[d] Tōkyō : Iwanami, 1970, pp. 121-126).

12. The two embodiments of the Buddha are here called *shih-hsiang shen*,[i] 'True (*tattva* ?) *Kāya*' and *wei-wu shen*,[j] '*Kāya* for the sake of creatures' [sic : not 'beings']. These terms have occasioned much discussion. I take them as no more than synonyms for the two aspects of the *dharmakāya* (*dharmatādharmakāya; upāyadharmakāya*) which T'an-luan introduces later (T.XL, 841b12-15).

13. T.XXV, 633b. Etienne Lamotte, 'La concentration de la Marche Héroïque', *Mélanges Chinois et Bouddhiques*, 13 (1965), p. 151.

14. Yoshito S. Hakeda, *Kūkai* (New York : Columbia University Press, 1972), p. 92.

15. Gutoku Shaku Shinran, *The Kyōgyōshinshō*, trans. D.T. Suzuki, ed. by the Eastern Buddhist Society (Kyōtō : Shinshū Ōtaniha, 1973), p. 168 (Shinran quotes T'an-luan at this point.) See T.XL, 834c25-6.

16. Julian F. Pas, 'Shan-tao's Interpretation of the Meditative Vision of Buddha Amitāyus', *History of Religions*, 14 : 2 (Nov. 1974), pp. 96-116. Professor Pas has argued that the distinction between 'primary' and 'secondary' practices in Shan-tao is entirely eiegetical : address before the American Academy of Religion, 'Shan-tao's Significance for the Pure Land Movement in China and Japan', St Louis, 29th. October, 1976.

17. H.H. Coates and R. Ishizuka, *Honen the Buddhist Saint* (Kyōto : 1925 and reprints), p. 343.

18. Ibid., p. 396.

19. Ibid., p. 772.

20. Ibid., p. 434.

21. Ibid., p. 426.

22. Ibid., p. 423.

23. Ibid., p. 187.

24. Ibid., p. 407.

25. Translation : D.T. Suzuki, op. cit., p. 61f. Text : *Shinran*, ed. Hoshinō Gempō, Ishida Mitsuyuki and Ienaga Saburō (Nihon Shisō Daikei, 11:[af] Tokyo : Iwanami, 1971) p. 292.

26. Translation, p. 125. Text, p. 321.

27. Translation, p. 42. Text, p. 282. I have inserted the words in brackets, and re-translated the concluding phrase.

28. Translation, pp. 118, 128. Text, pp. 319, 322.

29. *Tannishō*, VIII.

30. Ibid., XI.

31. For instance, Dr. Sher Singh, *Philosophy of Sikhism* (Jullundur : Sterling Publishers (Pvt.) Ltd., 2nd. ed., 1966), p. 285f., contrives to 'know' that Hindus, Buddhists and Muslims believe in 'magical' repetition, whereas only Sikhs are aware that the voice and the spirit must pray in harmony. Muslim *dhikr*, '.....is suspect amongst some orthodox theologians, and illegal in Turkey...' Constance E. Padwick, *Muslim Devotions* (London : SPCK, 1961), p. 16. Again, the innocent admonition, *mē battologēsēte*, found at MAT. 6 : 7, which apparently means, 'do not [pray] wordily', has been used by English and English-influenced researchers as a stick to beat any 'they' who use repetition, merely because the Authorised ('King James') Version translates it, 'use not vain repetitions.' Thus His Majesty's learned translators inverted the meaning of the text.

32. *Tannishō*, II.

33. Blackman, art. cit. , p. 850.

34. Mrs. Sinclair Stevenson, *The Heart of Jainism* (New Delhi; Manoharlal, 1970; reprint of 1915 edition), pp. 254, 256.

35. A list of thirty-five common mantras is given by Swami Sivananda, *Japa Yoga* (Sivanandanagar; Divine Life Society, 1972), pp. 34-41.

36. Gardet, 'Un probléme...', p. 652. Professor Bruce B. Lawrence tells me that he is more familiar with the invocation *huwa'llāhu āḥadu* ('He, Allah, is One', Qur' ān 112: l) prescribed for beginners and reduced to *huwa'llāhu* ('He, Allah') and *huwa* ('He') for intermediate and advanced practicioners; he also reports hearing a *dhikr* session in India using only the monosyllable *hū* (from *huwa*).

37. Amarjit Singh Sethi, *Universal Sikhism* (New Delhi: Hemkunt, 1972), p. 73.

38. This form, with the addition of, 'a sinner', is prescribed by Saint Basil, but in the Athonite tradition it may only be used penitentially, the ferial form being, 'Lord Jesus Christ, Son and Word of the living God, through the intercessions of thine all pure Mother and of all thy Saints, have mercy and deliver us.' N.F. Robinson, S.S.J.E., *Monasticism in the Orthodox Churches* (London: Cope and Fenwick, 1916), p. 155f.

39. For the blending of Christocentric and Marian devotion to form the Dominican rosary, see Marcel Mahé, S.M. , 'Aux sources de notre rosaire', *La Vie Spirituelle*, Suppl. 5: 16 (1951), pp. 101-120. This division of concentration between two Worshipped Entities, and its further division by the injunction to meditate upon incidents in the life of one or other of the Entities, militates against the general purpose of the rosary, and makes the Dominican form quite eccentric. In practice, one notices that this division is largely ignored by groups of reciters, and a continuous flow of sound is produced: thus does the *consensus fidelium* correct the excesses of the *magisterium*. The Franciscan rosary ('Franciscan Crown') does not require the meditations, and is therefore more normal.

40. Gershom G. Scholem, *Major Trends in Jewish Mysticism* (New York: Schocken, 1961), p. 58f. Similar responses are found in Psalm 136 (Masoretic numbering) and the Hebrew text (discovered in 1896 and subsequently) of *Sirach* 51:12ff.

41. Jewish tradition shows a consistent aversion to counting and census-taking

(cf. 2 SAM. 24). The difficulty seems to me to be felt with *numbering off* rather than *calculation*. Thus, a precise calendar is kept, but the minyan is ascertained by the recitation of a set number of verses, one verse per male adult, the completion of the verses indicating a quorum. Repeating God's Name (not, of course, the Tetragrammaton, which is not pronounced) is thought to imply more than one God. The refrains mentioned above (note 40) are counted by the acrostic of the verse.

42. Abigail's oath of allegiance to David, 'the life (*nefesh*) of my lord shall be bagged in the bag of (*ts' rūrāh bits'rōr*) the living which belongs to YHWH your God' (1 SAM. 25:29) may refer to a shepherd's bag of counting stones.

43. Ignaz Goldziher, 'Le rosaire dans l 'Islam', *Revue de l 'histoire des religions*, 21 (1890), pp. 295-300.

44. Blackman, art. cit., p. 852.

45. Sainte Thérèse de Lisieux (1873-1897), when a child, invented a game called 'hermits' for herself and her cousin. When her aunt made the two girls go for a walk, '. . . we kept up our game as we went along the street, saying the rosary together as hermits should, but only on our fingers, so as not to attract the attention of the general public. '*Autobiography*, trans. Ronald Knox (New York : Kennedy, 1958), p. 78. Coptic Christians sometimes use fingers, and Wahhabi Muslims consciously returned to fingercounting as the only method sanctioned by the Prophet (Blackman, art. cit., pp. 855, 852).

46. *Scriptural Rosary* (Chicago : Scriptural Rosary Center, 1961), p. 10.

47. Blackman, art. cit., p. 848.

48. The worshipper recites NUM. 15:37-41, which specifies that a *tsītsit* (fringe?) be put at the four corners of a garment as a reminder of the commandments. The fringe is traditionally tied into 613 knots, since there are considered to be 365 negative and 248 positive commandments. The four fringes are gathered together during the recitation, kissed at each of the three references to them in the text, and looked at during the words, 'and it shall be to you for a *tsītsit* and you will look upon it.' The Kabbalists regard the *tsītsit* as symbolic of the intra-deical structure and dynamics, so that seeing it is more important than hearing the text.

49. The Muslim *tasbīḥ* may also have 99, 301 or some other number of beads. J. Spencer Trimingham, *The Sufi Orders in Islam* (London : Oxford University Press, 1971), p. 201.

50 Explanations of the number 108 are many, but none are very convincing. The commonest, and least convincing, is that it represents 100 plus a fudge factor in case some beads are missed. But this would render the rosary imprecise, contradicting the general principle here under discussion, and introducing a curious vagueness into the serious matter of constructing an instrument of salvation. A student pointed out to me that :

$$1^1 \times 2^2 \times 3^3 = 108$$

Given the known sophistication of Hindu mathematics (e.g., the account of the dice game in the *Nālopakhyānam* displays an exact knowledge of statistical probability), some such mathematical, rather then textual, reason is quite probable.

51. E. Dale Saunders, *Mudrā* (New York : Bollingen, 1960), p. 174.

52. H.H. Coates, op. cit., p. 214.

53. Conversation with Dr. Artsa Tulku at Bodhgayā, 22nd July, 1974.

54. Trimingham, op. cit., p. 201.

55. D.M. Deed, 'The Sword of the Spirit : the Making of an Orthodox Rosary', *The Sword of Gnosis*, ed. Jacob Needleman (Baltimore : Penguin, 1974), pp. 376-385. The rosary is given during the clothing of a monk with the words, 'Take, Brother N., the sword of the Spirit...', N.F. Robinson, op. cit., pp. 154, 159.

56. Coates, op. cit., p. 705f.

57. Peter R. Biasiotto, O.F.M., *History of the Development of Devotion to the Holy Name* (St Bonaventure, NY : St. Bonaventure Seminary, 1943), p. 111.

58. Sivananda, op. cit., p. 77.

59. Amongst Greek Christians, these are called *kombologion* to distinguish them from the knotted rosary or *komboschoinion*. N.F. Robinson, op. cit., p. 154f.

60. Blackman, art. cit., p. 849.

61. Breathing in-and-out is heard by Hindus as *soham* ('I am He') (Sivananda, op. cit., p. 108f.) and by Muslims as *huwa* ('He') (Martin Lings, *What is Sufism* ?, Berkeley : University of California Press, 1975, p. 85).

62. Coates, op. cit., p. 434.

63. Gardet, 'Un problème...', pp. 663-668. Professor Bruce B. Lawrence tells me that according to Persian sources (e.g., chap. 1 of the *Chahār Unṣūr* by the eighteenth century Indo-Muslim poet 'Abdul Qādir Bedil), sound is not given up when silence is reached. Other traditions assume a progression from sound to silence (on which see section 6, below) : Padwick, op. cit., p. 20.

64. *The Art of Prayer*, compiled by Igumen Chariton of Valamo, trans. E. Kadloubovsky and E.H. Palmer (London : Faber, 1966), p.63.

65. Jewish Law requires prayer to be articulated orally, at least in a whisper. It is perhaps worth noting that silent reading is in any case comparatively modern: thus Saint Augustine's amazement that Saint Ambrose could read a book without vocalising (although it is now recognised that during 'silent' reading, the mouth-parts are in fact moving very slightly ; 'sub-vocal speech'.)

66. 'Ḥasidism', *Encyclopaedia Judaica* (New York : Macmillan, 1971, vol. 7, columns 1423-5.

67. The pattern of movement varies with the Sufi Order. Trimingham, op. cit., pp. 205-7.

68. Norvin J. Hein, 'Caitanya's Ecstasies and the Theology of the Name', *Hinduism : New Essays in the History of Religions*, ed. Bardwell L. Smith (Leiden : Brill, 1976), p. 19f.

69. Padwick. op. cit., pp. 20-22.

70. Strictly, *nāda* is the cosmos as unintelligible sound, *śabda* is intelligible sound or Scripture. On the metaphysical implications of considering the universe to be fundamentally Sound (rather than Light, or Nothing, or Being, or any other option), a great deal could be said, but will not.

71. Gardet, '*Dhikr*', p. 225.

72. Peter Crossley-Holland, 'The Ritual Music of Tibet', *The Tibet Journal*, 1:3-4 (Autumn 1976), pp. 48 and 50. This transcription of Crossley-Holland's address at the Newark Museum, 19th October, 1975, omits the mention of the trumpeting OṂ and calls the 'shawms', 'thigh-bone trumpets'.

73. Sher Singh, op. cit., p. 297.

74. Shōjun Bandō, 'The Preaching of Non-Sentient Beings', *Young East*, New Series, 1:1 (Winter 1975), pp. 16f.

75. Coates, op. cit., p. 779f.

76. A Monk of the Eastern Church, *The Prayer of Jesus*, trans. by A Monk of the Western Church (New York : Desclée, 1967), p. 104.

77. *The Kṛṣṇa Consciousness Handbook for the Year* 484, *Caitanya Era* (ISKCON Press U.S.A. 1970), p. 51.

78. Hein, op. cit., pp. 22-3. Trimingham, op. cit. pp., 206-7.

79. Coates, op. cit., p. 437.

80. *Art of Prayer*, p. 96.

81. Padwick, op. cit., p. 17.

82. Blackman, art. cit., p. 855. N. F. Robinson, op. cit., pp. 155-157. Here as in Tibet, there is no necessary connection between illiteracy and the rosary, for even exalted monks may use it in both traditions, but the mind is made to function in a non-intellectual way : it is therefore especially, but not exclusively, suitable for the unlettered.

83. *Art of Prayer*, p. 97.

84. Sivananda, op. cit., pp. 57, 108f.

85. Gardet, 'Un problème. . .', pp. 663-675.

86. One who has lost his consciousness in Allah is called *majdhūb* ('attracted') : see glossary in Trimingham, op. cit., p. 306, and references there given.

87. Ducan Greenless, *The Gospel of Guru Nanak* (Madras : Theosophical Publishing House, 1958), p. 260; quoted in Sethi, op. cit., p. 70. See also Sethi, p. 69.

88. *Adi Granth*, Majh Mahalla III; quoted in L.R. Puri, *The True Name of God* (Beas : Radha Soami Satsang, 1963), p. 37. My translation.

89. Mother Maria, *The Jesus Prayer*, publ. by the Greek Orthodox Monastery of the Assumption, Whitby, North Yorkshire (formerly at Newport Pagnall), 1972, pp. 41, 44. Emphases original.

90. *Art of Prayer*, p. 23.

91. On fire in mysticism, see David Knipe, *In the Image of Fire* (Delhi : Banarsidass, 1975). The heat is clearly both a symbolic and a physical warmth, as in the Buddhist *uṣmagata* (Tib : *gtum mo*).

92. *Art of Prayer*, p. 60.

93. Richard Rolle, *The Fire of Love*, trans. Clifton Wolters (Baltimore : Penguin, 1972), pp. 88-90, 93f., 146.

94. Ar-Ruṭbī, *Miṇhat al-aṣḥāb*, p. 87, quoted in Trimingham, op. cit., p. 206f., note 2.

95. Hein, op. cit., p. 29. My translation.

96. 'Ḥasidism', art. cit., col. 1411f., Scholem, op. cit., pp. 216-218. In the emanation of the Senfiroth, God begins as 'Nothing' (*Ēn*) and proceeds to 'I' (*Anī*), the immanence of the Shekhinah. Man meets God by going from 'I' to 'Nothing'. As the words are partial enantiomorphs, there is a suggestion of enantiomorphic synergy between God and man structurally comparable to that of the Buddha and *sattvas* expressed in Shingon by the merging of the *Vajradhātumaṇḍala* and *Garbhakośadhātumaṇḍala* in *añjali-mudrā* (Saunders, op. cit. pp. 32f., 78) and, in the Jōdo rosary, the linked chaplets.

97. Mircea Eliade, *Shamanism*, trans. W.R. Trask (New York : Bollingen, 1964), pp. 168-176.

98. Allyn Roberts, 'Listen. The Jungle Natives are telling you Something', *Chicago Tribune Sunday Magazine*, 23rd November, 1969, pp. 74-91. This was a 'drumming for pleasure' : Eliade, op. cit., p. 180.

99. René Guénon, 'The Language of the Birds', Jacob Needleman, op. cit., p. 301.

100. Albert B. Lord, *The Singer of Tales* (Cambridge MA : Harvard University Press, 1960), esp. chapter 3.

101. Ibid., chapter 6.

102. The *spoken* sound OṂ (not the abstract Logos) creates the world. The *sounds* of the Vedas are eternal. Indian scripts are *ex post facto* to the pronunciation of the language. One crosses an Indian street by listening, not by looking. And so on.

103. Deed, art. cit., p. 384.

104. *Kyōgyōshinshō* IV. Suzuki's translation (cit.), p. 128. Bracketed words mine. Text (cit.), p. 323.

105. The Shinshū rosary used by laypeople is designed merely to fit closely over the hands joined in *añjali-mudrā*, 'to', it was explained to me, 'remind us that we are nothing but a bundle of passions before the Buddha.' 'Here, the knots (beads) remind of knots (passions). The number of beads seems to be indeterminate : my specimen has 1+6+1+12+1+6=25. The first '1' is the *meru* (central bead which, in Hinduism and in Buddhist rosaries used for counting, is not crossed), the other '1's are reminiscent of the Shingon *shitennō*$^{a\omega}$ (guardians of the four quarters) beads.

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CHINESE CHARACTER INDEX

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b 曇鸞
c 往生
d 原始淨土思想の研究·藤田宏達著
e 念門
f 迴向
g 念
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i 實相身
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k 信心
l 一
m 一心
n 音聲
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r 必須口授不得題之單點
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aj 說
ak 悅
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am 命
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ao 非行非善
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aq 南無妙法蓮華經
ar 南無大師遍照金剛
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aw 四天王
ax 真宗全書 妻木直良編 圖書刊行会

7

Methodological Remarks on 20th Century Study of Buddhist Inference (Anumāna)[1]

DOUGLAS DUNSMORE DAYE

The study of the Indian Inference schema (*parārthānumāṇa*), its metalogical theories and its comparative relationships to the study of contemporary logic, has (understandably) not been as popular with Indologists and Buddhologists as has the study of doctrine, philology and the religious aspects of India and China, etc., but there remains a considerable literature on Indian logic written during the 20th century. I shall make several critical remarks on the history of this literature and its comparative methodological assumptions, and say a word or two about the virtues and faults of such implicitly comparative studies. However, since the two classes, Buddhologists and logicians, rarely, if ever, share the same members, a note about the word 'logic and my textual sources may be in order at the beginning of such an article.

The word 'logic' has a long history of equivocation; here I wish to make four brief comments on its use and meanings. First, in the modern "Western" context, the word 'logic' is, in textbook fashion, usually divided into those unrepresentative rubrics of 'deductive' and 'inductive,' which comprise explicit rules and theories for the generation of formalized schemas, their attendant theories, and criteria of evaluation. Of relevance here is the historical fact that (deductive) *analytic* arguments have been used as the paradigm in the development of Western logic since Aristotle. Thus most of ordinary language argumentation has failed to meet this paradigm, since only a relatively small range of ordinary language arguments has been translatable into the small, non-isomorphic but precise frameworks of formalistic ideal languages. Since Buddhist logic (anumāna), (as with 'Western' logic too) has developed from debate (vāda), the problem of translation from ordinary language to ideal language remains important here also. Second, psychologism and most questions of epistemology and metaphysics have generally been rejected as non-formalistic, since the influence of analytic or

mathematical models for the development of logic and mathematics has always remained most attractive to Western logicians. Third, in the Buddhist context, the word 'logic' (*nyāya* or *anumāna*) has been used in at least two different ways : first, it has been used to refer to the 'Buddhist logicians', e.g., Dignāga, Dharmakīrti, etc., where the word refers to those thinkers of the Buddhist Pramāṇa Vāda tradition : second, this tradition, of course, is divided into "two legitimate sources and means of reliable knowledge" (*pramāṇa's*), *pratyakṣa* (perception) and *anumāna* (inference). In this paper, I shall refer to '*anumāna*' as 'inference', as in the inference schemas denoted by the term "inference for another" (*parārthānumāṇa*). Fourth, I wish to distinguish between a) the components of the logical schemas themselves, such as models and fallacies (*ābhāsa*) given in the text, b) the explicit rules of combination and well-formedness in the Sanskrit/Chinese/Tibetan *anumāna* traditions, and c) the most important philosophies of logic, which deal with the relationships between formal expressions and epistemological, ontological and metaphysical assumptions. This is important because many of the incompatibilities between Western 20th century logic and some Indian schemas revolve around the incompatibilities between philosophies of logic, and not necessarily around the process of translating one semi-formalized expression into the fully-formalized tradition of another.[2]

Also, a word may be in order for those who consider these problems to be 'too narrow'; I would suggest that various methodological fads, incompatibilities and possible distortions have been very much in fashion in the Buddhist scholarly literature since 1900, and are unreflective of (or methodologically non-isomorphic with) the scholarly world in the 1970's. Many scholars and/or Buddhists (and the two are not necessarily extensionally equivalent) have welcomed interest in Asian thought in general, and in the interest shown in Buddhism on the part of North Americans and West Europeans in particular. Although the field of Buddhist logic has generated less interest because of its supposed scholarly unattractiveness when compared (perhaps) with religious or value aspects, it is a part of the Buddhist tradition, and is a part that has been surveyed fairly well by scholars since the turn of the century. In short, I would suggest that, as the benefits from interest shown in Buddhism have supported and delighted a few, so shall the following criticisms and comparisons (which may or may not delight a few) be a necessary effect of the interest shown in Buddhism. That is, I am suggesting that in a world perspective, in which all major religions and philosophical traditions are being slowly compared, and the many similarities and dissimilarities are being made explicit, one cannot escape with any degree of scholarly honesty either the criticisms or accolades that may or may not be heaped upon the Buddhist tradition, be it of either a logical or of a religious nature. Thus, this study is only one more in a long list (some of which are yet to come) of such analytical comparisons, which could only have occurred in the latter part of this century.

The literature on 20th century studies of Buddhist logic exhibits at least four developmental stages, or methodological fashions, concerning the analysis and formal translation of inference schemas in the general Pramāṇa Vāda tradition. They are: (1) the Early Syllogistic phase, 1900-1929 (Suigura[3]-Stcherbatsky[4]); (2) the later Syllogistic phase. 1929-1939 (Stcherbatsky-Kunst[5]); (3) the Ideal-Language phase, 1951-1969 (Ingalls[6]-Chi[7]); and (4) (only partially apparent) the postulated Anti-Ideal-Language phase,[8] 1973-1978. It is obvious that I have defined these four stages solely with

respect to formalistic methodological pre-suppositions, which strongly contrast with four general stages in the uses of formalized logic as a primary model in the contemporary Anglo-American-European philosophical tradition. They are: (1) the "Classical Syllogistic" phase (Renaissance 1910, e.g. to *Principia Mathematica*); (2) Ideal-Language philosophy, 1910-1930+; (3) Ordinary Language philosophy 1930-1965+; and, (4) Anti-Ordinary Language philosophy, 1965-1978+.

My first hypothesis is that there is usually at least a twenty-year lead time between certain developments in Western logic and their subsequent incorporation in interpretations of Buddhist logic. For example, interest in ideal-language methodology, stemming from analyses such as those of Russell and Carnap, were not 'picked up' in the studies of Buddhist logic until the 1950's, although such formal machinery was available in the 1920's and 1930's. It was not widely incorporated by Indologists until the 1950's and (more so in) the 1960's. However, during the 1930's, such writers as Randle,[9] Keith[10] and Stcherbatsky[11] all were still using the (so-called) "Post-Classical Syllogistic" logic to describe the Indian schemas, while international logicians/philosophers were picking up" modern calculi in many diverse areas. Also, there was very little discussion of the philosophies of logic on either compared side in such studies of anumāna. Thus, within the context of these studies (even taking into consideration the scholarly setbacks of the second world war), there was a 20-year delay before the developments in Western logic were utilized in the description of Buddhist logic.

My second hypothesis is that in the present state of scholarship, I believe that the use of ideal-language methodology with Buddhist nyāya should be rapidly coming to an end, since it is now over some forty years since the beginning of its demise in contemporary philosophy. However, in contemporary Buddhological literature there is little (if any) indication that logicians and philosophers have profited from the analytical excesses and methodological fads of these prior phases of Western philosophy. In other words, Buddhologists have not learned some relevant methodological lessons from philosophers; on the contrary; they have uncautiously embraced many questionable aspects of these controversial logical methodologies in their philologically accurate studies of anumāna, if the two *can* be separated.

My general conclusion is that the use of ideal-language methodology (modern calculi) should be viewed in a more balanced, self-conscious manner. That is, it should be viewed as a valuable heuristic device, capable of both great clarity in restricted contexts and the generation of new precise questions. It also is capable of generating great distortion and obscuration if used incautiously. Such an ideal-language methodology may presuppose that a formal language is an ideal model of analysis and a better instrument for the formal translation of the parārthānumāṇa. However, an alternative anti-ideal-language methodology generally questions such assumptions, and attempts to keep such analyses and formal translations more restricted to the context of (ordinary) non-formal discourse. Also, a greater emphasis would be placed here upon the analysis of the partially-implicit darśana metalogical and epistemological theories that have generated the particular mixture of formal and non-formal technical terminology of the Buddhist anumāna. Such ideal-language models may be found to be neither isomorphic with Buddhist metalogical theory nor compatible with the Procrustean structural demands of the modern syllogistic or first-order predicate calculus. Such alternative methodological emphases would, I believe,

be more appropriate to the ordinary Sanskrit (!) Pramāṇa Vāda tradition. Surely such emphases are most relevant in today's cross-cultural studies of Buddhism; however, the arguments for such emphases have been little examined by Buddhologists.

It is most important to note that there is no necessary a *priori* reason to *assume* that ideal-language emphases will generate superior expositions of Buddhist *anumāna*; '*anumāna*' does not *entail* ideal-language; perhaps 'logic' does. And to this point, one famous exponent of ordinary-language philosophy states :

> "Neither Aristotelian nor Russellian rules (of formalized logic) give the exact logic of any expression in ordinary language: for ordinary language has no exact logic."[12]

Several points follow from the above: (1) Scholars have made the unconscious assumption that the various forms of modern logic, as the medium of translation, *are* sufficient to clarify important points in the theory of *anumāna*; this is, of course, broad enough to be innocuous.

However, (2) if one looks at the history of scholarly studies of Indian *anumāna*, one sees in some cases that such methodologies are (in part) a function of non-formal assumptions about the sociology of the historical development of scholarly knowledge. In 20th century studies, the use of modern 'Western' logic in various forms as a means of expression, is/was dependent not upon informed analyses of the *metalogical* compatibilities of such cross-cultural translations (which are almost absent in the literature). Rather, such uses were (sometimes) a function of philologically oriented translators, ignorant of logical theory and/or such questions, in their rush to achieve a questionable aura of modernity, usually by means of (by then) out-moded formal machinery. This was certainly the case with Stcherbatsky[13] (1930), Vidyābhūṣaṇa's *History of Indian Logic*[14] (1920) and Sueki[15] (1973). Of course, there are varying degrees and types of distortion involved in *all* translations, and some lesser degrees *may* be well worth the increased expository clarity. For example, J.F. Staal[16] and A.C. McDermott[17] have explicitly noted the heuristic values of modern logic, and used it to admirable ends. However, this problem generally remains ignored. It is a fact that graduate training programs in Buddhology and in logic have very little in common; this seems dependent on the rubrics of professional organization in today's universities, and *not* dependent upon the necessary training demanded by the topics in the texts. Thus, the sociology of Buddhological knowledge is a source of this problem. This history of nyāya scholarly literature indicates that these formalistic uses have varied greatly, from muddled syllogistic (e.g. Vidyābhūṣaṇa, Randle, Stcherbatsky) to the sophisticated multi-ordered predicate calculi (Chi).

(3) For example, the reverse case, using *anumāna*, metalogical terminology to express and describe mathematical logic, has never even been considered as a heuristic method to examine these methodological assumptions; it does seem a reasonable heuristic for generating cross-cultural formalistic awareness. Even if the foregoing (3) should fail, (as I think it would) for pragmatic reasons of conceptual economy, linguistic complexity and a non-analytic textual paradigm, such an attempt would, nonetheless, bring to light many an implicit assumption as to the proper use of modern ideal languages.

(4) I suggest that it is obvious that ordinary-language inferences or technical metalogical discourse in Sanskrit has not any fully formalized logic of its own, if and only if the paradigm remains the predicate calculus and/or the analytic argument; however, the *parārthānumāṇa* does have explicit sequential rules of evaluation and rationally-justified sequences of argumentation. But the attempt to use the formalized rules and techniques of modern mathematical logic does not guarantee that the latter is a non-distorting medium for the expression of the former.

(5) All such formalized translations presupposes an ordinary-language (metalanguage) explanation, usually in the target natural language of the analyist. This should be a prerequisite (a) to clarifying the incapabilities and/or the non-isomorphism between modern logic and *anumāna* expressions and (b) to offering explicit translation procedures and rules. Only in carefully delineated contexts can mathematical logic function as a helpful descriptive and heuristic device, which then may generate insights into isomorphic and non-isomorphic expressions *and* into the important attendant metalogical theories between both target and source languages. Then, and only then, can ideal-language be considered a help in philosophical analysis by the Buddhologist-scholar.

It is my position that this strong implicit emphasis upon formal systems (ideal-language) translation should be de-emphasized, and that more emphasis should be placed upon the sequential structure of ordinary language (Sanskrit !) metalogical argumentation—*ityāha*. The use of mathematical logic, etc., should be continued, but should be continued in a modified, less ostentatious manner. This suggests that mathematical logic as a medium of expression will no longer connote *a priori* acceptance, nor will its use be considered a self-evidently superior tool of clarification with nyāya texts.

Such criticisms and methodological lessons about the limited but important uses of such formal languages have already been developed in contemporary philosophy, by those who belong to the general school of "ordinary-language philosophy." They have come to realize that, as a methodological alternative, it may be legitimate to rely upon the "inherited experience and acumen of many generations of men" and that ". . .it is at the same time very unlikely that any invented artificial or *ad hoc* terminology will be an obvious improvement upon that which has already satisfied the most stringent of tests, that is, survival in (probably) centuries of constant actual use."[18] Note also that the Pramāṇa Vāda tradition *is* one which has already survived "centuries of constant use." To document such obscuration, I refer to six relevant points : 1) the irreversibility of the ablative case ("because") in Sanskrit with the *trirūpahetu* rules such reversibility being a prerequisite for the use of material implication ("⊃"), and thus for the questionable use of the latter mathematical functor with *anumāna* [19]; 2) the concept of proto-variables in sixth century Buddhist logic (e.g. *sādhya, pakṣa, hetu-dharma, dṛṣṭānta, sapakṣa* and *vipakṣa*), where the rules for their substitution, as compared with formalistic free substitution, involve a great increase in the number of implicit non-formal assumptions restricting the substitution rules of these proto-variables, e.g. *āgamaviruddha, svavacana, viruddhāvyabhicāri*; 3) my discussion (along with others, such as Richard S. W. Chi) of the existential quantifier and its concomitant theories of possible ontological commitment in light of standard Buddhist ontological controversies (e.g. *śabdatva, ākāśa, svalakṣaṇa*[20]; 4) my analysis of logical circularity in the

Jaina concept of Tarka as justification for vyāpti and the role of epistemic probability in Tarka as a *pramāṇa*.[21] In this latter case, formal problems in inductive logical theory work beautifully as a formidable heuristic device ; 5) the non-truth-functionality of the functors "⊃" and "·" in the *parārthānumāṇa*[22]; and 6) a final but complex example, which may illustrate the above point. I refer to the non-formal "psychologism" of the discussion of the sufficient condition for a legitimate *parārthānumāṇa* being the production of a *svārthānumāna* in the consciousness of the receiver, which generates great logical and philosophical problems for those contemporary logicians who argue strongly that such references and appeals to first-person (introspective) reports should play no significant part in a fully formal logic.[23]

With the use of mathematical logic in these contexts, there remains unexplained and unexpressed the operative metalogical, epistemological and ontological presuppositions, which Indian philosophers spent so much effort arguing and clarifying between darśana positions. Also, the use of mathematical logic in these nyāya contexts may mislead the non-Buddhologist reader into thinking that there is more formalistic structure and metalogical clarity, which he may expect as a (Western) logician, but which is either largely absent or greatly modified in the non-isomorphic proto-formalistic theories of the Buddhist logicians. It is these types of lessons that Buddhologists and Indologists might now learn from the methodological context of international contemporary philosophy.

I realize that I may appear to disagree with some of the methodological assumptions of such international scholars as Professors Chi, Nakamura,[24] Sueki and Barlingay,[25] all of whom have utilized ideal-languages extensively; I employ such formal languages too, but the important point here is that many of these Indologists/Buddhologists have shown little awareness of the regrettable limitations of some of their formal translations. And in passing, I noted while reading Buddhist and Jaina logical texts with a pandit in India this last academic year, that some Indian academic philosophers too, are explicitly suspicious of such ideal-language methodology, but many times from a standpoint of ignorance of formalized languages. However, those former international scholars I am criticizing here are not wholly ignorant of such formal languages and their concomitant non-isomorphic philosophies of logic. It is my purpose, therefore, to offer here a simple word of caution against the unreflective expansion of such scholarly fashions. Just as western philosophers in the ordinary-language tradition of contemporary methodology have learned that there are serious limitations and distortions inherent in the uses of such formalistic methods, so should Buddhologists and Indologists, regardless of their ethnic and geographical origins, be aware that the use of such methodologies is not without a heavy expository price. In the eyes of many contemporary philosophers, this price is too dear, in light of the obscuration and distortion inherent in the wholesale employment of such formal methodologies. It also may be so in the context of *anumāna*. At least the converse is not self-evidently so.

On the other hand, I am not suggesting that ordinary-language methodology should be imported and applied wholesale to studies of Buddhist *anumāna* or Indian philosophy as a whole. On the contrary, I quite realize that because of the excesses of this particular methodology, it too has its limitations, e.g., the implicit assumption that ordinary-language discourse is "alright as it is." Philosophers of all geographical

origins have always found a need to coin new terminology for expressing their precise insights, which have been obscured and distorted by ordinary language, and which do not accurately reflect their epistemological analyses or even the myriad ways in which people draw and justify reliable conclusions.

Therefore, I am not arguing for the importation of ordinary language philosophy, nor for the complete cessation of the use of formalistic systems; rather, I am suggesting that a more context-restricted, carefully examined employment of both should be incorporated as methodological models into the study of the long, proud tradition of Indian anumāna. Also, I think that the above represents the general methodological position of many contemporary analytical philosophers, who have realized the virtues and disadvantages of both ideal-language and ordinary-language analyses. Hence, I am suggesting that a more balanced methodological view, a formalistic 'Middle Path,' should now be proposed as a heuristic model for contemporary Buddhologists, such that their studies of the history of anumāna and the methodological theories inherent in the Indian Pramāṇa Vāda tradition might be neither obscured nor distorted by the implicit limitations of such contemporary methodological fashions as may not yet have come to their notice.

NOTES

1. This paper was read at the conference entitled "The History of Buddhism : A Cross-Cultural Study in World Perspective, An International Symposium," sponsored by the Department of South Asian Studies, The University of Wisconsin, Madison, Wisconsin, August 19-21, 1976; its comments are therefore oriented towards the philological and historical, but not formalistic nor philosophical backgrounds of that audience.

2. In passing I wish to note that although there is a sizable literature on Hindu and Buddhists traditions of logic, almost no work at all has been done from the standpoint of comparative uses of semi-formalized logics concerning the Jaina tradition. However, see my paper "Circularity in the Justification of Inductive Arguments (Tarka) in 12th century Jaina Logic," accepted for publication in the *Proceedings of the 30th International Congress of Orientalists*, Mexico City, August 3-5, 1976.

3. Sugiura, S. *Hindu Logic as Preserved in China and Japan*, Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania Press, 1900.

4. Stcherbatsky, Th., e.g. *Buddhist Logic*, two volumes, New York, Dover Press, 1962. (Reprint of circa. 1930).

5. Kunst, A. e.g. *Probleme Der Buddhistischen Logik in Der Darstellung Des Tattvasaṅgraha*, Krakow, Nakladem Polskiej Akademii Uniejetnosci, 1939.

6. Ingalls, D.H.H., *Materials for the Study of Navya-Nyāya*, vol. 40, Harvard Oriental Series, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1951.

7. Chi, R.S.Y., *Buddhist Formal Logic*, London, Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland, 1969.

8. The only mentions I know of 'ordinary language' methodology as a methodological point *against*, Chi's extensive use of ideal-language formalism are A) the author's review article in *Philosophy East and West*, vol. 23, no. 4, October, 1973, pp. 525-535, A general study of such methodological problems will be found in my book

Metalogical Studies in 20th century Logic and Ancient Buddhist Inference (accepted for publication by the L. D. Institute of Indology, Ahmedabad, and also submitted to an American publisher). In various articles on comparisons between anumāna and nyāya and modern logic, I have considered such metalogical problems, e.g., B) "Japanese Rationalism, Madhyamika and Formalism," in *Philosophy East and West*, vol. 24, no. 3, July 1974, pp. 363-388; C) "Buddhist Logic," in *Buddhism: A Modern Perspective*, C. Prebish, editor, Pennsylvania State University Press, 1975, pp. 127-132; D) "Metalogical Incompatibilities in the Formal Description of Buddhist Logic," in *The Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic* vol. 18, no. 2, April 1977, pp. 221-231; E) "On Logic and 'Algerbraiac and Geometric Logic'," in *Philosophy East and West*, vol. 25, no. 3, July 1975, pp. 357-364 ; F) "Remarks on Early Buddhist Proto-Formalism (Logic) and Mr. Tachikawa's Translation of the *Nyāyapraveśa*," in *The Journal of Indian Philosophy*, vol. 3, nos. 3/4, September/December, 1975, pp. 383-398; G) "Some Comparative Aspects of the Indian and Western Traditions of Formal Logic," in *Dialectics and Humanism*, the Polish Academy of Science, Nos. 3-4, 1976, pp. 197-217; five articles on the same general comparative topics have been accepted for publication.

9. Randle, H. N., *Indian Logic in the Early Schools*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1930.

10. Keith, A.B., *Indian Logic and Atomism*, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1921.

11. Stcherbatsky, op. cit. His apparent sources of formal logic were e.g. Sigwart, Bradley and Brentano; his references to B. Russell seem concerned solely with ontological and epistemological topics, not metalogical or formal ones.

12. Strawson, P.F., *Introduction to Logical Theory*, London, 1963. Parentheses added by the author.

13. Stcherbatsky, op. cit.

14. Vidyābhūṣaṇa, S. *History of Indian Logic*, New Delhi, Motilal Banarsidas (reprint of 1920 edition), 1961.

15. Sueki, T., "An Example of Japanese Rationalism," in *Philosophy East and West* vol. 24, no. 3, July 1974, pp. 349-362. cf. Daye's critique, note 6B.

16. Staal, J.F., e.g., "Negation and the Law of Contradiction in Indian Thought," in *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies*, vol. 25, pp. 52-71.

17. McDermott, A.C.S., *An Eleventh-Century Buddhist Logic of 'Exists'*, Foundations of Language, Supplementary Series, vol. 11, Dordrecht-Holland, 1970.

18. Attributed to Professor Mary Warnock.

19. See note no. 6D.

20. See note no. 6A.

21. To have been read at the 30th International Congress of Orientalists; see note 2.

22. See note no. 6D.

23. cf. Vinītadeva's Nyāyabindu-Ṭīkā, translated and edited by M. Gangopadhyaya, Indian Studies: Past and Present, Calcutta, 1971. p. 159ff. See my review in *Philosophy East and West*, vol. 27, no. 1, January 1977, pp. 115-117.

24. Nakamura, H., "Buddhist Logic Expounded by Means of Symbolic Logic," in *Indogaku Bukkyōgaku Kyu*, vol. 7, 1958, pp. 375-395.

25. Barlingay, S.S., *A Modern Introduction to Indian Logic*, New Delhi, 2nd edition, 1976.

8

Karma Doctrine and Sectarian Development

THOMAS L. DOWLING

The centrality of the principle of karmic continuity and fruition to Indian Buddhism is such that one can easily understand the concern for formulating an intelligible and consistent explanation of this principle in the sectarian literature The wide agreement about the principle of karma itself stands out in marked contrast to the disagreement about the manner or mechanism whereby that principle is effected. The aim of this paper is to isolate some central issues in the area of karma theory and grasp the manner in which concern for these issues either generated specific sectarian positions or imparted specific and significant dimensions thereto. Our understanding of sectarian development can perhaps be enriched if we focus on the particular karma doctrines (or, more appropriately, vocabularies explanatory of karma doctrine) of various schools. An analysis of the pertinent texts of the various schools of Indian Buddhism reveals common underlying problems as well as unique attmpts at the solution of these problems.

In certain cases it is apparent that concern with karma doctrine or vocabulary explanatory thereof played a distinctly causal role in sectarian evolution. In other cases it is safer to say that the concern for an intelligible karma vocabulary was one among many complex factors that helped give decisive shape and substance to already distinct or emerging sectarian positions.

Among the cases in which we can assign a causal role to karma theory in sectarian development are the *pudgalavādin* 'heresy' and the doctrine of *sarvāstivāda.* Two authoritative (though admittedly hostile) texts, the Kathā Vatthu (hereafter cited as KV) and the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya of Vasubandhu (hereafter cited as Kośa), document the obvious concern with establishing a mechanism of karmic continuity that generated these sectarian positions.[1] The orthodox response to the

ploy of the *pudgala* as the instrumentality of karmic continuity is widely known and requires no comment. The Sarvāstivādin attempt to tie up the deed and the fruit by taking the position that past and future *dharmas* 'exist' met with equal resistance in many sectarian contexts. The Kośa lists several arguments in favor of their position. Of concern for our purposes is a karma related argument that raises the question with which the remainder of this paper will be concerned—how is there future fruition for virtuous and unvirtuous acts ? For the Vaibhāṣikas one mechanism that would assure the workings of karma is the doctrine that past *dharmas* 'exist' : "If the past did not exist, then how would there be fruit (or fruition, *phalam*) for auspicious and inauspicious acts in the future ? Since, we say, at the time of the origination of the fruit the cause of maturation is not present."[2] On the one hand we cannot deny the position that there is fruit for past morally qualifiable acts, and on the other, we cannot affirm that the cause of maturation is 'present' (occurring now, *vartamāno*). From this the Vaibhāṣikas conclude that the past and the future 'exist' (*tasmād astyeva atītānāgatam iti vaibhāṣikah*).

The root problem that generated both Pudgala-and Sarvāstivāda as sectarian perspectives was also addressed by other schools. This problem is the description of the manner or mechanism whereby the trace, force or residue of defilement of virtue inheres in the psychophysical stream without thereby pervading or continually coloring the moment-to-moment thoughts of that stream. Different sects gave different names to their theoretical candidates for the 'carrier of the Karma'. The KV for example contains references to several controversies about the notions of karmic residue (*anusaya*, Skt., *anuśaya*) and its emergence into consciousness (*pariyuṭṭhāna*) Skt., *paryavasthāna*)[3]. The Mahāsanghikas and Sammitīyas are said to have maintained that the residues of defilement are morally indeterminate (*abhyākata*, Skt., *avyākṛta*) and by nature dissociated from thought (*citta-vipayutta*, Skt., *-viprayukta*). The Theravādin takes the position that only form (*rūpa*) and Nibbāna itself are so characterisable. This position will not do for the opponents who want to know how, then, one explains the mutual presence of defilements and virtuous thoughts in an average person. While the average person (*pṛthagjana*) is definitionally characterised by defilement (*kleśa*), we cannot deny that he occasionally has virtuous thoughts and does virtuous deeds. Unless the residue of defilement is disassociated from thought, it will pervade the stream of moment-to-moment thoughts and render it impossible for him to entertain a virtuous thought. The Theravādin admits that there cannot be both virtuous and unvirtuous thoughts before the mind at the same time and is forced to admit that residue is not by nature associated with thought (*na citta-sampayutta*). The opponents then conclude that if the residue is not *citta-sampayutta*, then it must be *citta-vipayutta*. At this point the Pali text of the controversy ends. However, if we consult the Pali Text Society translation of the same material we find an extra paragraph, the thrust of which is to give the last word and apparent victory to the Theravādin. The added material, for which there is no corresponding Pali, reads as follows :

> If, as you admit, such a person is still possessed of lust while thinking moral or unmoral thoughts, your denial that lust is conjoined with those thoughts does not necessarily lead to the false conclusion that lust is independent of mind.[4]

Similiar arguments are found elsewhere in the KV.. XIV, 5 concerns the assertion of the Andhakas that residues are different from their emergences into consciousness; IX, 4 concerns the assertion of the Andhakas and some of the Uttarapathakas that *anusaya* is without mental object (*anārammaṇā*). These controversies all hinge on what seems to be the crucial issue in the elaboration of an intelligible karma doctrine—how is there inherence of defilement in the stream without moment-to-moment pervasion thereof? The *anusaya/pariyuṭṭhāna* debate will come up again when we consider the role of karma doctrine and vocabulary in the Vaibhāṣika/Sautrāntika disputes.

The literature of the various sects reveals that several other theoretical entities, often held to be substantial (*dravya*) *dharmas*, were put forth to account for or describe the unseen and empirically unverifiable karmic link up of deed and fruit. The following schools are associated with the following entities: Sammitīya—the *avipranāśa* or 'indestructible', a *dharma* of the *citta-viprayukta class*. Sarvāstivādin/Vaibhāṣika tradition—*prāpti* and *aprāpti* or adhesion and non-adhesion, and the *avijñapti-rūpa* or form that does not indicate. Sautrāntika tradition—the *bīja* or seed, the *ekarasa-skandha* or aggregate of unique essence, the *mulāntika-skandha* or proximate root aggregate and the *paramārtha-pudgala*. Yogācāra/Vijñānavādin tradition—the *ālaya-vijñāna* or store house consciousness. Again, the central question that these entities seem to have been constructed to answer is that of how the karmic force inheres in the psychophysical stream without thereby coloring or pervading each discrete moment of that stream. What accounts for the 'idling' or non-active aspect of defilement when a given thought is of a virtuous or morally indeterminate nature? P.S. Jaini has put the problem well:[5]

> If the *akuśala-mūlas* are not annihilated till the attainment of arhatship and if they are incompatible with the *kuśala-mūlas*, how are we to explain the operation of *kuśala-mūlas* or of *kuśala* volitions in a mundane (*laukika*) existence? Being incompatible they cannot operate successively, for succession demands a certain amount of homogeneity between the preceding and succeeding moments. If a *kuśala-citta* were to follow an *akuśala-citta*, then it will depend for its nature on a heterogeneous cause. This will amount to an admission of the unacceptable position that good springs out of evil or vice-versa.

The problem can be illustrated by the example of a criminal. Suppose that one decides to commit theft on a given day in the future. Nonetheless, between the time of the decision to commit the crime and its actual commission, he may undertake various virtuous projects and have virtuous thoughts. How do we account for the mutual presence of the virtuous thoughts and the unvirtuous resolution in the same stream? On the face of it, the problem seems to require some sort of subconscious realm wherein the temporarily non-functional inclinations, predispositions, etc., might reside. The need for such a realm is a factor that should not be overlooked in any treatment of the *ālaya-vijñāna* of the Yogācāra/Vijñānavāda tradition. This consciousness, the repository of all seeds (*sarvabījakam*), solves many of the problems that have been pointed out so far in connection with karma doctrine. The theory of the 'seed' or *bīja* is developed by Vasubandhu in the Kośa and can

best be understood when seen in the light of the Vaibhāṣika entities and theoretical constructs in opposition to which it was developed.

In the second chapter of the Kośa, Kārikā 36, Bhāṣya and ff., the Vaibhāṣika list of *citta-rūpa-viprayukta-samskāras* is given. While Vasubandhu criticizes these *dharmas* and denies substantial (*dravya*) status to them, of particular interest for our purposes is his critique of *prāpti*, the *dharma* of 'reach' or 'adhesion'. Despite the observation of Vasubandhu (qua Sautrāntika) that these *dharmas* can neither be seen nor inferred, the Vaibhāṣika arguments in favour of their postulation are given. *Prāpti* is said to be the cause that originates (*utpatti-hetu*) a specific nature in a given stream of consciousness at a given time Further, *prāpti* is the cause that differentiates (*vyavasthā-hetu*) the Noble one from the average person *when the Noble one is characterised by mundane thoughts.*[6] The Vaibhāṣika position is that there is a qualitative difference between the Noble one and the average person, even if the Noble one is momentarily characterised by mundane or morally indeterminate thoughts. For them, the difference is the presence of certain auspicious *prāptis* that result from meditational accomplishments, etc.

Vasubandhu accepts that there is a difference between the two, but denies that the entity *prāpti* need be resorted to in order to describe this difference. As he puts it, the difference is merely the state of having destroyed or not having destroyed defilements.[7] Without accepting the Vaibhāṣika proliferation of theoretical entities Vasubandhu accounts for the distinction between the two by referring to the qualitative transformation of the psychophysical stream. "Verily, the physical basis of the Noble one has undergone transformation by virtue of the path of vision and the path of cultivation such that the defilements that are to be destroyed thereby no longer have the ability to shoot forth."[8] At this point, the seed model is introduced : "For this reason, one is called a destroyer of defilement for those defilements when the physical basis has the seeds in an impotent (or non-seminal) state, as in the case of burnt rice seeds."[9] Further, as regards the notion of 'endowment' with this or that nature, Vasubandhu says the following : "Therefore, the expression 'endowed with' is appropriate just when there is the seed, undiminished, undamaged, and whole; there is no other substantial thing (involved in) the notion of endowment.' "[10]

As if inspired by the success of the Sautrāntika unpacking or residual analysis of their pet karma related *dharma*, the Vaibhāṣikas try to isolate the actual content of the seed and related concepts. Keeping in mind that the Kośa is ultimately a pro-Sautrāntika work, we should not be surprised by the success with which the 'seed' is defended. The 'dialogue' is as follows:

> What, pray tell, is this seed ? (Seed is) that name and form capable of originating fruition, either directly or mediately, by reason of the stream-transformation-distinction. What, pray tell, is the this transformation ? It is an alteration of the stream. What, pray tell, is this stream ? It is the *samskāras* of the past, present and future, made up of causes and fruits.[11]

This dispute about *prāpti* concludes with the Sautrāntika observation that *prāpti* is a designational (*prajñapti*) *dharma* and not a substantial (*dravya*) one. This

observation reflects the broader Sautrāntika concern for epistemological economy and opposition to the Vaibhāṣika proliferation of theoretical entities. Thus qualified the seed image is employed in the fifth chapter of the Kośa in the course of Vasubandhu's rather unique solution of the above mentioned residue/emergence debate. The Vaibhāṣikas maintained that residue and emergence of defilement into consciousness are the same, despite a sūtra passage that affirms their difference.[12] Vasubandhu affirms their difference, but not as two substantial (*dravya*) *dharmas*. In fact, he denies that residue is either *citta-samprayukta* or *citta-viprayukta*, since it is not a real *dharma* in the first place.[13] The correct explanation is couched in terms of the seed, itself a mere designation for unseen and empirically unapproachable processes in the individual psychophysical stream.[14] His description of the manner in which defilement lies dormant is as follows :

> Verily, when defilement is dormant it is called residue, when it is awakened it is called emergence. And what is its dormant state? When it does not face (consciousness) it endures in the seed state. What is its awakening? It is the state of facing (or having presence in) (consciousness). And what, pray tell, is this seed state? It is the power to originate defilement, which power is engendered by defilement, that pertains to one who has attained existence. This is like the case of the power to originate the stations of mindfulness, which power is engendered by the knowledge based on experience, like the power of the sprout to originate kernels of rice, which power is itself engendered by kernels of rice.[15]

If we are still in the dark about the mysterious workings of karma, at least we are carrying less conceptual baggage around with us while there. The theory of the seed rests on the recognition that, at some point, perhaps the best that we can do is make designations about the workings and mechanisms of consciousness by recourse to theoretical entities, the employment of which will hopefully aid us in the task that necessitated their postulation in the first place. Of the theoretical entities developed by Freud, for example, one authority has made the following observation :

> The reader should bear in mind that there are no sharp boundaries between the three systems. Just because they have different names does not mean that they are separate entities. The names, id, ego and superego, actually signify nothing in themselves. They are merely a shorthand way of designating different processes, functions, mechanisms and dynamisms within the total personality.[16]

In the case of Freud, the intentional structure that informed his choice of theoretical entities was clinical and his corcept of personality development did not extend to more than one life. In the case of Vasubandhu, the aim is soteriological[17] and the notion of the person includes development over many lives, Within these conceptual parameters I think that we have to credit Vasubandhu with the most complete and concise karma vocabulary to be found in non-Mahāyāna Buddhism. Perhaps the major weakness of the seed theory as it is developed in the Kośa is that we still do not know 'where' the seeds reside, That is, we do not yet have a fully

developed notion of a subconscious realm wherein the seeds might find a comfortable home. We will turn to this problem after treating what is perhaps the most representative Vaibhāṣika entity pertinent to the karma process—the *avijñapti-rūpa* or 'form that does not indicate.' This highly anomolous *dharma* is the subject of intensive debate in the first 22 kārikās of the fourth chapter of the Kośa, the Karma Nirdeśa.

Unlike many of the other theoretical entities purported to play a role in the karma process, the *avijñapti* is not classed by the Vaibhāṣikas as a *citta-viprayukta-saṃskāra.* Instead, it is put in the *rūpa* or form aggregate. Its inclusion under the heading of form apparently assures its dissociation from thought, making possible inherence in the overall psychophysical stream without pervasion of the moment-to-moment thoughts. What then, is this curious *dharma* and how does it function in the karma process ? The eleventh *kārikā* of the first chapter of the Kośa gives the Vaibhāśika's brief introductory description of the entity. In short, it is held to be an interconnection, of a morally qualifiable nature, that arises in dependence on primary elements and pertains to one even if he be of distracted or unlike thoughts or momentarily devoid of thought (as in certain meditational states).[18] Vasubandhu reserves comment on this entity until the fourth chapter when its *kriyā* or activity is discussed. After establishing the canonical justification for including such an entity under the form heading, the Vaibhāṣikas proceed to advance arguments in favor of its substantial status. There are several arguments of concern for our purposes. For example, a *sūtra* passage affirms the position that the merit of the 'son of the family or the daughter of the family' increases, even if the individual is sleeping, walking, etc. That is, regardless of the later states of mind of the individual, the merit abides and even increases. Thus, even if unvirtuous thoughts are entertained, the virtuous or meritorious influx resulting from certain acts is not necessarily thereby abrogated. According to the Vaibhāṣikas, the *avijñapti* is the mechanism whereby this process is possible. "And, unless there be a non-indication (*avijñaptī*), the enhancement of merit for one who has other states of mind would not be possible."[19] Vasubandhu agrees that such increase of merit is possible, but denies that this mandates the postulation of the *avijñapti.* He accounts for the increase of the merit by reference to another sūtra passage that describes the process in terms of a 'subtle transformation distinction' of the stream of the individual. This *sukṣma-pariṇāma-viśeṣa* is nothing other than the functional 'stuff' to which the seed refers.

Another Vaibhāṣika argument in favor of the *avijñapti* has to do with the manner in which the course of karma (*karma-patha*) is effected for the one who does not himself do the morally qualifiable deed, but employs another to do it. The *avijñapti* is the Vaibhāṣika candidate for the effector of this mutually accepted karmic process. Vasubandhu again counters by referring to the subtle transformation of the stream. As far as he is concerned, the key element in the notion of the *karmapatha* is the functional equivalent of the seed : "It is yonder stream-distinction transformation that is called the course of karma because it is the cause's approach to the effect."[20] The cause (morally qualifiable act) approaches (*upacar-*) the effect (*phala*) by means of a subtle transformation of the stream. To talk about the course of karma is to talk about a series of distinct transformations within the stream that amounts to the phenomenal individual. Two other Vaibhāṣika

arguments in favor of the *avijñapti* have to do with the manner in which the actional members of the Eightfold Path apply to one in meditation and the manner in which the restraint of the Prātimokṣa ceremony applies to the monk or nun who later has morally unlike thoughts. In both cases, the issue is inherence without pervasion. Vasubandhu accounts for both of these karma related areas by reference to the stream of consciousness-distinction-transformation, the functional ancillary of the seed image.[21]

As Stefan Anacker[22] has pointed out, the Buddhist theory of meditation, which posits states devoid of thought and feelings, raises even further problems in the area of karmic continuity. Thus, a domain of consciousness seems to be called for that will enable the continuance of the metaphorical seeds in even these sublime states. A later work of Vasubandhu, the Karmasiddhiprakaraṇa, brings in this additional domain in the form of the *ālaya-vijñāna* or storehouse consciousness. Anacker suggests that Vasubandhu's position evolved to include the *ālaya* in order "to fill holes in the *karman*-theories maintained by the Hīnayāna scholastics..."[23] Lamotte, the translator of the Chinese and Tibetan versions of the Karmasiddhi, suggests that Vasubandhu systematized a rudimentary theory of the store house consciousness from then current entities associated with the earlier Sautrāntika and Sūtrapramāṇika schools.[24]

If the *ālaya-vijñāna* can be shown to not contradict any basic Indian Buddhist tenets, then it would appear that the basic problem of inherence without pervasion, even in light of the demands made by the *samjña-vedanā-nirodha-samāpatti*, is solved. This meditational state was traditionally regarded as being *acitta* (and thus, without *vijñāna*). Vasubandhu qualifies the *acitta* status of this state by positing two mutually sustaining streams of *vijñāna*—a *pravṛtti* or functional stream and an *ācaya* or accumulational stream[25] which is later identified with the *ālaya-vijñāna* of the Yogācāra/Vijñānavāda tradition.[26] Our survey of karma related theoretical entities will conclude with the following remarks from the Karmasiddhi :

> There are two sorts of thought : a repository thought (*ācayacitta*), because it is the place where innumerable seeds (*apraṁāṇabīja*) are stored; a multiple thought (*nānācitta*), because they function with different objects (*ālambana*), aspects (*ākāra*) and modalities (*viśeṣa*). Because the second thought is laking in these states of meditation, etc., it is called without thought. Thus, when a chair has but one leg and the others are missing, one says that it is without legs.[27]

That this *ācayacitta* is the same as the *ālaya-vijñāna* is made clear in an adjacent passage :

> Because that consciousness continues (*pratisaṃdadhāti*), because it appropriates (*upādadāti*) the body (*kāya*), it is called the appropriating consciousness (*ādānavijñāna*). Because the seeds (*bīja*) of all dharmas lie there, it is called the storehouse consciousness (*ālayavijñāna*). Because it is the retribution for acts done in past lives (*pūrvajanman*), it is also called the maturational fruit consciousness (*vipākaphalavijñāna*).[28]

As we have stated above, there seems to have been an ongoing need for a coherent theory of a subconscious realm in Buddhism in order to account for karmic continuity. As a theoretical entity in a larger descriptive and salvational system, the *ālayavijñāna* seems appropriate to this task. That fundamental problems of verification, etc., still remain is obvious. Moreover, the curious relationship between the *ālaya* and the other consciousness (neither the same as nor different from them, etc.,) pointed out in such texts as the Laṅkāvatāra Śutra, is highly reminiscent of the relationship that was held to exist between the 'heretical' *pudgala* and the other personality aggregates. These, however, are perhaps problems appropriate for another study. Our aim has been to trace the evolution of sectarian vocabularies related to the doctrine of karma, not to champion one theoretical solution over another.

In conclusion, it would appear that our initial assertions about the instrumentality of karma doctrine in sectarian evolution are justified and perhaps exemplified by the evolution of Vasubandhu's thought. His career encompassed activity within Sarvāstivādin/Vaibhāṣika, Sautrāntika and Yogācāra/Vijñānavādin spheres. In each of these phases the role that karma theory played in his overall soteriological and epistemological development cannot be overestimated. Thus it is the case that one fruitful avenue of exploration in the area of Buddhist sectarianism is that of karma theory.

NOTES

1. Shwe Zan Aung and C.A.F. Rhys Davids, trans., *Points of Controversy* (London : Pali Text Society, 1960), pp. 26-35 ; and Swami Dwarikadas Shastri, ed., *Abhidharmakośa and Bhāṣya of Acharya Vasubandhu with Sphuṭārtha Commentary of Ācārya Yaśomitra* (Benares : Bauddha Bharati, 1973), p. 1,214 (in vol. IV) :
   yadi tarhi pudgalo nāsti ka eṣa samasarati/
   nahi samsāram eṣa samsaratīti yuktam/.
2. Kośa, V. 25 and Bhāṣya :
   yadi cātītan na syāt śubhāśubhāsya karmaṇaḥ phalam āyatyām katham syāt/
   na hi phalotpattikāle vartamāno vipākahetur astīti/.
3. Aung and Rhys Davids, trans., *Points of Controversy*, IX, 4; XI, 1; XIV, 5.
4. *Points of Controversy*, p. 255.
5. P.S. Jaini, "The Sautrāntika Theory of Bīja," *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London*' vol. XXII, p. 238 ; for equally important and related material see P.S. Jaini, "The Development of the Theory of the Viprayukta-Samskāras," B. S.O.A.S., vol. XXII, pp. 531-547.
6. Kośa, II, 36 and Bhāṣya :
   kas caivam āha—utpattihetu prāptir iti kim tarhi vyavasthāhetuh prāpti /
   asatyām hi prāptau laukikamānasānām ārya-pṛthagjanānām ārya ime pṛthag-jana ime iti na syād vyavasthānam /
7. Kośa, II, 36, Bhāṣya :
   prahīṇāprahīnakleśatā viśeṣād etad bhavitum arhati/.

8. Kośa, II, 36, Bhāṣya :
āśraya hi sa āryānām darśanabhāvanā mārgasāmarthyāt tathā parāvṛtto bhavati yathā na punas tatpraheyānām klesānām prarohasamartho bhavati/.
9. Kośa, II, 36, Bhāṣya : *ato 'gnidagdhavrīhivad abījībhūta āśrayaḥ kleśānām prahīṇakleśa iti ucyate /.*
10. Kośa, II, 36, Bhāṣya : *tasmād bījam evātra anapoddhṛtam anupahatam paripuṣṭam ca vasitvakāle samanvāgamākhyam labhate na anyad dravyam/.*
11. Kośa, II, 36, Bhāṣya ;
kim punar idam bījam nāma/
yannāmarūpam phalotpattau samartham sākṣāt paramparyena va santatipariṇāmaviśeṣāt/
ko 'yam pariṇāmo nāma/
santater anyathātvam/
ka ceyam santatiḥ/
hetuphalabhūtastraiyadhvikāḥ samskārāḥ/
12. See P.S. Jaini, "The Sautrāntika Theory of Bīja," p. 240 ; and Kośa, V, 2, Bhāṣya :
tasya tatkāmarāgaparyavasthānam sthāmasaḥ samyaktvasusamavahatam sanuśayam prahiyate iti/
"The emergence of his desire for sensuality, when vigorously and rightly combatted, is destroyed along with its residue."
13. Kośa, V, 2, Bhāṣya :
na ca anuśaya samprayukto na viprayuktaḥ tasyādravyāntaratvāt/
14. See Kośa, IV, 4, Bhāṣya for the admission that this entire area is *asamjñāyamānaḥ* or difficult to cognize, which is glossed by Yaśomitra in his valuable commentary *duravabodha* or hard to understand.
15. Kośa, V, 2, Bhāṣya :
prasupto hi kleśo 'nuśaya ucyate prabuddhaḥ paryavasthānam/
kā ca tasya prasuptiḥ/
asammukhībhūtasya bījabhāvānubandhaḥ/
kaḥ prabodhaḥ/
sammukhībhāvaḥ/
ko 'yam bījabhāvo nāma/
ātmabhāvasya kleśajā kleśotpādaśaktiḥ/
yathā anubhavajñānajā smṛtyutpādanasaktiḥ yathā cānkuradīnām śaliphalajā śaliphalotpādanaśaktir iti/
16. Calvin S. Hall, *A Primer of Freudian Psychology* (New York: Mentor Books, 1961), pp. 34-5.
17. On the generally neglected salvational dimension of Abhidhamma/ Abhidharma texts see, e.g. Kośa, I, 3 : *dharmānām pravicayamantarona nāsti kleśānām yata upaśantaye 'bhiupāyaḥ /*
kleśaiś ca bhramati bhavārnave 'tra lokas taddhetor ata uditaḥ kilaiṣa śāstra/.
18. Kośa, I, 11 : *vikṣiāptācittakasyāpi yo 'nubandhaḥ śubhāśubhaḥ/*
mahābhūtānyupādāya sa hyavijñaptirucyate//
19. Kośa, IV, 4, Bhāṣya : *na cāvijñaptim antareṇānyamanaso 'pi punyasya abhivṛddhir yujyate/*

20. Kośa, IV, 4, Bhāṣya : *sa 'sau santatipariṇāmaviśeṣaḥ karmapathaḥ ityākhyāyate kārye kāraṇopacārāt|.*
21. See Kośa, IV, 4 and Bhāṣya.
22. Stefan Anacker, "Vasubhandhu's Karmasiddhiprakaraṇa and the Problem of the Highest Meditation," *Philosophy East and West*, XXII, 3 (July 1972), pp. 246-58.
23. Stefan Anacker, "Vasubandhu's Karmasiddhiprakaraṇa...," p. 247.
24. Etienne Lamotte, "Traite de la Demonstration de l' Acte," *Melanges Chinois et bouddhique*, vol. IV, 1935-6, p. 170.
25. Etienne Lamotte, "Traite...," p. 245.
26. Etienne Lamotte, "Traite...," p. 247.
27. Etienne Lamotte, "Traite...," p. 245.
28. Etienne Lamotte, "Traite...," p. 247.

9

Pāli averaṁ, Dhammapada 5

IVO FIŠER

It is well known that the Old Indian particle *a-*, *an-* (corresponding to the English *un-*, Latin *in-* etc.), when prefixed to a nominal or verbal form, cancels or negates its meaning, and that the Buddhist authors exploited this mode of expression to the utmost. By using that particle, namely, the speaker is able to make void a statement without committing himself to a distinct specification of the opposite value. The occurrence of the privative particle *a(n)*-in Sanskrit is on the whole adequate to the needs of current expression, whereas in Pāli texts it becomes boundless : one glance at the first volume of the CPD makes it clear that the words prefixed by *a-*, *an-* constitute the main bulk of important terms of Pāli vocabulary.

It is, therefore, somewhat surprising to find out how little attention has been hitherto paid to this striking phenomenon, especially since all the necessary material lies at hand in CPD vol. I. Thus, we know practically nothing about the proportions of the use of *a(n)*- in Vedic, Buddhist, Jaina and later Sanskrit texts This prevents us from establishing how far its occurrence in Pāli scriptures corresponds to the needs of genuine re-thinking of inherited ideas, i.e. to what extent it represents an expression of certain attitudes towards traditional values, and eventually at what point it turns into a mere rhetorical device. Another interesting question would be whether there is any marked difference in the use of negation in canonical and later texts and, last but not least, what is the proportion of positive terms and their negative counterparts. To answer such questions would mean acquiring a much better understanding of ancient Indian thought.

The process of annulling the positive sense of a verb or noun is a very intricate affair, as the privative particle is practically unlimited in use, so that the exact degree of negation has to be established, if possible, in each case individually from

the context and by way of comparison. It is especially difficult to find an accurate relation between a simple cancellation of the meaning and a direct reverse of it ; the latter seems to be more common in modern Indo-European languages (a purely neutral sense in English being often better expressed by *non-*).

The term *avera* in its substantival application may serve as an eloquent example of the complexity of the problem. It has been chosen partly because it is of rare occurrence and thus does not involve more tangled issues (e.g *anattā*), partly because its use is limited to Buddhist texts only.

The word *avera* n. "absence of hatred or enmity", used as a noun, occurs in two different contexts : in the sequence *abhaya-avera-avyāpajjha*, and in the formula *averena verāni sam-*. The first one is found in AN iv 246 Saddh 338-9, the second one in Dhp 5=Ja iii 212 and 488.[1] Its Sanskrit counterpart, which belongs to the second group, occurs in Udāna-v xiv 11 and in Jātakam. 127.17. In non-Buddhist Sanskrit the word does not appear at all. This is both surprising and interesting, since the positive *vaira* n. "enmity, quarrel or feud" is richly attested in various strata of Sanskrit literature and its usage far exceeds that of Pāli *vera* n.

The meaning of *avera* in AN and Saddh is clear enough. AN iv 246 reads : *pāṇātipātā paṭivirato bhikkhave ariyasāvako aparimāṇānaṁ sattānaṁ abhayaṁ deti averaṁ deti avyāpajjhaṁ deti ; aparimāṇānaṁ sattānaṁ abhayaṁ datvā averaṁ datvā avyāpajjhaṁ datvā aparimāṇassa abhayassa averassa avyāpajjhassa bhāgī hoti* "An Aryan disciple, monks, abstaining from taking life, to innumerable beings he gives fearlessness, non-enmity, and non-suffering ; and in so giving, he becomes a partaker in unbounded fearlessness, non-enmity, and non-suffering." A similar passage appears in Saddh 338-9.[2]

In both cases *avera* clearly denotes "absence of enmity or hatred" which was doubtless the original meaning of the term. It is coupled with *abhaya* and *avyāpajjha*; the privative particle of both terms equally negates their meaning without converting them into their opposites. It was also understood in this sense by the commentator who explains *avera* by *akusalavera-puggalaverarahita* (Mp iii 356, iv 172).

Much more difficult is to establish the exact meaning of *avera* in the group of texts where it appears in the other context. Dhp 5 (=Ja iii 212, 488) reads:

Na hi verena verāni sammant' idha kudācanaṁ :
averena ca sammanti, esa dhammo sanantano.
"Surely, enmities do not cease by enmity at any time:
they cease by non-enmity ; this is an eternal law."

There are three possible interpretations of *avera* in this context : (1) it may mean the same as in AN and Saddh, i.e. "absence of" or "abstention from enmity" ; (2) the negation is used in conjunction with *vera* in order to express its opposite value, i.e. "friendliness, loving kindness" and the like; (3) the rôle of *avera* in this context is confined to a more or less mechanical device of metrical convenience and its importance should not be overestimated.

These options as well as the uncertainty as to which is the most likely one are correspondingly reflected in various translations of Dhp 5. Most literal, though rather non-committal, are the interpretations of Mrs. Rhys Davids "non-wrath" and

S. Radhakrishnan 'non-enmity' which follow the first option The second one is reflected in translations of V.Fausböll 'placabilitas' and A.P. Buddhadatta Mahāthera 'loving-kindness'. Quite impossible is the interpretation of F. Max Müller and E. W. Burlingame who translate *avera* by 'love', a term which is certainly not applicable here and in general should be avoided as much as possible.

(1) The first option is the most attractive and psychologically sound one : the best way to quench an impending quarrel is to face the other person with complete equanimity, i.e to abstain from the urge to quarrel. Unfortunately, it is very difficult to prove that this was the 'original' intention of the author, since other two texts where *avera* appears in the same context, do not render any clue to its elucidation. Jātakam. 127.17 reads : *evam avaireṇa vairāṇi śāmyanti, saṃyamataś ca vairaṃ na cīyate* "thus enmities cease by non-enmity, and by self-restraint enmity is not accumulated."[3] Here, as in Dph 5, *avera* in the sg. represents one sort of attitude confronted with various kinds of *vera* feelings in the pl. A similar passage occurs in MSV. ii 184.8 : *śāmyanti vairāṇi avairatābhiḥ* where the term appears singularly in the abstract form *vairatā* f. "the state of being without enmity" (Edgerton) and is used in the pl. Thus these two passages do not provide any evidence to support the interpretation under (1).

(2) There can be no doubt that later tradition opted for the second possibility and understood *avera* as a certain degree of the opposite of *vera*. So Dhp-a explains *avera* as *khanti-mettā* "patient loving kindness". Even more eloquent is the version of Udāna-v, a text widely popular among the Buddhists of East Turkestan, which reads xiv 11:

na hi vaireṇa vairāṇi śāmyantīha kadā cana
kṣāntyā vairāṇi śāmyanti eṣa dharmaḥ sanātanaḥ

The only word which differs from the Pāli version is *kṣānti*, though the term *avaira* appears in the following stanza which does not occur in Dhp.[4] It is clear that both Udāna-v and Dhp-a understood *avera* as a positive value.

(3) There is little reason to suppose that the formula *averena verāni sam* —played the rôle of a stock phrase deprived of any real significance, since it appears only four times in the whole range of ancient Indian literature altogether. Therefore, the quest can be confined to (1) and (2).

The passage in question does not contain any specifically Buddhist idea. It can be classified as one of the innumerable gnomic stanzas that were "floating" throughout ancient India and found their way into many kinds of Indian literature, both religious and secular. Indeed, Dhp and Udāna-v are nothing but anthologies of such stanzas. We find similar quotations like *na cāpi vairaṃ vaireṇa vyupaśāmyati* in non-Buddhist Sanskrit texts as well (see PW s. v. *vaira*). The only significant difference is the negation of *vaira* which does not appear in non-Buddhist Sanskrit. It is to be regretted, therefore, that the verses found in Dhp 5 and the canonical portion of Ja were not found in the highly valuable version of the Prakrit Dharmapada.[5] The only help to elucidating the meaning of *avera* is provided by *avera* and *averin* used as adjectives. Here, the sense is unmistakably 'free from hatred' in both cases. This can be deduced from passages like Dhp 197 *susukhaṁ vata jīvāma verinesu averino* "amid men who hate let us dwell unhating" (Mrs. Rhys Davids) while can hardly

imply 'loving kindness'. The verse is corroborated by Prkt. Dharmapada 166 "*suha'i vada jivamu veraṇeṣu averaṇa* and Udāna-v xxx 47 *susukhaṃ bata jīvāmo vairikeṣu tv avairikāḥ*. In both versions of Dhp the verse occurs in a sequence of similar negations (*anāturā* 'not unhealthy', *anussukā* 'unstraining') which continues in Dharmapada *suha'i vada jivamu yeṣa mu nasti kajaṇi* corresponding to Dhp 200 *susukhaṁ vata jīvāma yesaṁ no natthi kiñcanaṁ*. These passages speak in favour of the interpretation of *avera* n. as 'absence of' or 'abstention from enmity', but there is no conclusive proof for it. Again, later commentators tend to reverse the meaning and to explain *avera* by *mettā* and the like (see CPD s.v.).

Whatever the original application of *avera* might have been, it seems that the meaning oscillates between a simple negation annulling the meaning of *vera* and a more active element of conciliatoriness. In any case, the use of the term can be regarded as a definitely Buddhist attitude of abstention rather than positive activity. Besides, the word *avera* offers itself for comparison with two other great religions as a good example of polarization of East-West ideas of human behaviour.

In the Old Testament, a similar situation to that of Dhp 5 is resolved very differently. Exodus 21 reads : 23. And if any mischief follow, then thou shalt give life for life, 24. Eye for eye, tooth for tooth, hand for hand, foot for foot, 25. Burning for burning, wound for wound, stripe for stripe.

The message of the New Testament is just the opposite, as Matthew 6 reads: 38. Ye have heard that it hath been said, An eye for an eye, and a tooth for a tooth: 39. But I say unto you, That ye resist not evil: but whosoever shall smite thee on thy right cheek, turn to him the other also...44. Love your enemies, bless them that curse you, do good to them that hate you, and pray for them which despitefully use you, and persecute you.[6]

There can hardly be a better illustration of the Buddhist 'Middle Way' than a comparison of these three different attitudes towards an extreme situation in human life. A more precise specification of the usage of negation in Buddhist teaching waits for a comprehensive exploration of the function of the privative particle *a(n)*- in Pāli tradition. The profit in such a research is beyond any doubt.

NOTES

1. Surprisingly enough, CPD I does not mention the Ja parallels.
2. *Sattānan tv appameyyānaṁ dussīlā virato jano*
   averaṁ abhayañ cāpi abyāpajjhasukham pi ca 338.
   dadāti datvā pacchā so averaṁ abhayam pi ca
   abyāpajjhasukhañ cāpi labhatīti jino 'bravi 339.
3. J.S. Speyer translates, rather inconsistently, "in this manner unfriendly feelings are set at rest by friendliness, and by self-restraint hatred is not allowed to grow", The Jātakamālā, trsl. by J.S. Speyer, 1st Indian ed., Delhi : Motilal Banarsidass, 1971, p. 180.
4. *Vairaṃ na vaireṇa hi jātu śāmyec chāmyed avaireṇa tu vairabhāvaḥ*
   vairaprasaṅgo hy ahitāya dṛṣṭas tasmād dhi vairaṃ na karoti vidvān 12 .
5. The Gāndhārī Dharmapada, ed. by John Brough. London Oriental Series,

Vol. 7, London: Oxford University Press, 1962.
6. The Holy Bible. Cambridge 1865.

ABBREVIATIONS

CPD A Critical Pāli Dictionary, begun by V. Trenckner...Copenhagen 1924-48 (still in a somewhat slow progress).
AN The Aṅguttara-Nikāya, Part iv, ed. by E. Hardy. PTS London 1899.
PTS The Pali Text Society, London.
Saddh Saddhammopāyana, ed. by Rev. Richard Morris. JPTS 1887, p. 55.
JPTS Journal of the Pali Text Society, London.
Dhp The Dhammapada, ed. by V. Fausböll. London 1900, p. 2.
Ja The Jātaka, ed. by V. Fausböll. London 1883.
Udāna-v Udānavarga, herausgegeben von Franz Bernhard, Band I. Sanskrittexte aus den Turfanfunden X. Abhandlungen der Akademie der Wissenschaften in Göttingen, Philologisch-Historische Klasse, Dritte Folge, Nr. 54. Göttingen 1965, p. 210.
Jātakam. The Jātakamālā, ed. by Hendrik Kern, Harvard University, Boston Mass. 1891. HOS vol. 1.
HOS Harvard Oriental Series.
Mp Manorathapūraṇī, ed. by H. Kopp. PTS London 1936 and 1940.
Mrs. Rhys Davids The Minor Anthologies of the Pali Canon, Part I. Dhammapada, SBB vol. vii, London 1931, p. 5.
SBB Sacred Books of the Buddhists. PTS London.
S. Radhakrishnan The Dhammapada. Oxford University Press, London 1950, 2nd Indian impression 1966, p. 60.
V. Fausböll Dhammapadam. Hauniae 1855, p. 2 ; London 1900, p. 3.
A.P. Buddhadatta Mahāthera Dhammapadaṁ. An Anthology of Sayings of the Buddha. Colombo, no date, p. 2.
F. Max Müller The Dhammapada, in SBE vol. X. Part 1. 2nd ed. Oxford 1898, p. 5.
SBE Sacred Books of the East.
E.W. Burlingame Buddhist Legends, in HOS vol. 28, Part 1. Cambridge, Mass. 1921, p. 174.
MSV. Mūla-Sarvāstivāda-Vinaya.
Edgerton Franklin Edgerton, Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit Grammar and Dictionary, vol. ii : Dictionary s.v. New Haven : Yale University Press 1953, p. 79.
Dhp-a The Commentary on the Dhammapada, new ed., vol. I. Part 1., ed. by Helmer Smith. PTS London 1925, p. 42.
PW Sanskrit Wörterbuch, herausgegeben...von Otto Böhtlingk und Rudolph Roth, St. Petersburg 1855-75.

10

On Buddhist Historiography

BALKRISHNA GOVIND GOKHALE

One of the chronologically older *suttas* in the Theravāda Buddhist canon has an interesting observation bearing on history. This passage occurs in the Brahma-jāla sutta ('The Perfect Net') of the Dīgha Nikāya (Book of 'Long Discourses'). Therein the Buddha says that among many things for which the common man might praise him is that, unlike his contemporary ascetics and Brahmans, the Buddha does not indulge in 'low' talk (*tiracchāna kathā*—literally animal talk). The passage then goes on to give a list of topics regarded by the Buddha as varieties of such 'low' talk. The list includes tales of kings and their high ministers, armies and wars, stories of communities, villages, trading towns and cities, tales of the countryside or heroes and about adventures on the seas.[1] Now precisely these are the stuff out of which the chronicles of history are made. On this reckoning the Buddhists should not have evolved an historical tradition of their own.

There is another reason why history should be either impossible or irrelevant for the Buddhist. Among the three principles which characterize human existence, as understood by the Buddhists, are impermanence (*anicca*), suffering (*dukkha*) and the complete absence of a lasting entity such as soul (*anattā*). If everything is impermanent then all events are also essentially impermanent by their very nature and such fleeting or evanescent events can have, philosophically speaking, no intrinsic 'historical' value. Finally, time, as such, has no independent existence for he Buddhists. It is only a concept, a mental construct, a convenient matrix against which the flow of certain human activities can be sequentially placed. As examples Buddhaghosa, the celebrated Pāli commentator of the 5th century A.D. refers to the common usage as bathing time, eating time, sleeping time, etc. What we are talking about, Buddhaghosa seems to imply, is a set of human behavioral

patterns occuring in certain sequences and we designate each by affixing to it the concept of time. But time *per se* does not exist; it is at best a convenient concept and at worst an illusion.[2] And if time as such does not exist, is there then any possibility of constructing history which is essentially anchored to time?

But the paradox is that the Buddhists, more significantly than the Brahmanists, developed a pronounced historical outlook firmly moored to the life of the historical Buddha and his *nirvāṇa*[3] with which began the scheme of Buddhist chronology now current in all Buddhist countries. The purpose of the present paper is to examine the circumstances in which Buddhist historiography evolved and the peculiar forms which it took in the great Buddhist chronicles beginning with the Ceylonese Dīpavamsa (Chronicle of the Island of Ceylon of the early 5th century A.D.) to Sāsanavamsa ("Chronicle of the Religion," a Burmese work of A.D. 1861).

II

The three most memorable events for the Buddhists during the formative stages of 'Buddhism' were the birth and early life of Gotama, his Enlightenment which made him the Buddha (*sambodhi*) leading to his preaching of the *dhamma* (truth, norm, way), and his final departure from the totality of human becoming (*parinibbāna*). The Buddha himself seems to have been aware of the 'historical' nature of his pursuit and discovery of the truth underlying existential becoming and the significance of the way to freedom from the human predicament which he claimed to have discovered. In the Mahāvagga (a part of the *Vinaya* or code of Buddhist monastic life) for instance, we are given a firsthand account of the first few weeks of the Buddha's life after the Enlightenment. The Buddha said that he had "come into the possession of this truth (*dhamma*), profound, difficult to see and comprehend, tranquil, excellent, transcending logic, subtle and capable of comprehension only by the wise." After some initial hesitation, for fear that his preaching it may not have the desired result on the people at large and would result only in frustration, he decided to "set into motion the wheel of the Law" and "throw wide open the doors to immortality" (*amata*) to those who had the capacity to understand what he was saying.[4] Thereafter the Buddha went on preaching his *dhamma* for the next forty-five years until his departure from the world at the age of eighty at Kusinara in the Himalayan foothills.

By all accounts the impact of the Buddha's personality on his followers and those who became members of the Buddhist community in the following centuries was of extraordinary significance in the making of the "Buddhist" historical consciousness. Two distinct trends emerged from this impact. One was the gradual development of the concept of the Buddha as a "Great Person" (*mahāpurisa*) finally elevating him to a transcendental "Person". The second was the emerging identification of the Buddha with the *dhamma*. Two interesting passages from the Theravāda canon indicate the process of this identification. One concerns the monk Vakkali who longed to see the Buddha personally. The Buddha said to him that his flesh and bone body was of little consequence, for he who sees the Buddha sees the *dhamma*, and he who sees the *dhamma* sees the Buddha. The second passage concerns the last days of the Buddha, when he tells his grieving followers that after his death the

dhamma would continue to be their teacher for ever. Then there is another passage in the *Aggañña Sutta* of the Dīgha Nīkāya where it is stated that the Norm-body (*dhammakāya*) is the designation (*adhivacana*) of the *Tathāgata*. Finally, the Milinda Pañha (*Questions of King Milinda*, a text of the First Century B.C --First Century A.D.) carries the trend forward. In a conversation, the Indo-Greek King Milinda-Menander (middle of Second Century B C.) asks the Buddhist Monk Nāgasena how the monk could vouch for the historical existence of the Buddha if the monk or any of his immediate predecessors could not claim to have seen the Master personally. The monk replies that the historicity of the Buddha must be perceived through the *dhamma*-body.[5] The *Tathāgata* (One who had fared thus) and his *dhamma*, thus, became focal points in the Buddhist consciousness as the one was identified with the other.

This identification of the Buddha with the *dhamma* helped the Buddhists formulate a nexus between the two levels of reality called the *sammuti* and the *paramaṭṭha* (phenomenal and transcendental). The Buddha, in his earthly life, operates within the bounds of the phenomenal world whereas the *dhamma* belongs to the transcendental realm. The phenomenal is the realm of 'facts' to be perceived through the operation of the factors of form, sensation, perception, "confections" and consciousness and ascertained through the instrumentality of the initial and final application of thought-processes (*vitakka* and *vicāra*).[6] On the *paramaṭṭha* or transcendental level what subsists is truth which is without a beginning or an end, eternal and timeless, uncreated and changeless. Truth, in this context, cannot be the subject of history which is a chronicle of events set in a vertical (time) and horizontal (space) continuum. But the seemingly unbridgeable gap between the two levels is arched over in the Buddhist historical consciousness by the process of identification between the *dhamma* (*paramaṭṭha*) and the historical Buddha. The Buddha is born, grows into youth and old age, and dies and hence belongs to the *sammuti* or phenomenal world of "facts" reflecting events.[7] But he is also the *dhamma* and when the *dhamma* "becomes" the Buddha, history begins. The *dhamma* as preached by the Buddha ("personified") becomes the "watershed" in the continuum of human history for the Buddhists. They, together, invest human life and its history with an extraordinary significance bringing about a qualitative change through the promise of liberation. The transcendental and the phenomenal are thus linked together to initiate the processes of "history." They become, so to speak, two sides of the same coin and just as light can only be comprehended in the context of darkness, the *dhamma* "enters" the stream of history through the Buddha discovering and preaching it. Time, as the monk Nāgasena states, may be a ceaseless flow, an unending circle, but segments of this circle become illumined by the appearance of the Buddha who is, in himself, the 'core' of the Buddhist historical consciousness.[8]

The phenomenal world is described by the Buddhists as comprising many and diverse elements (*anekadhātu nānādhātu*) whose parameters extend from the gods in their various heavens through the world of men and animals to the denizens of the nether regions including the world of spirits (*petas*, *pisācas*), gods, Yakkhas (goblins), nagas (half-human, half-snake), Maras (Evil Ones) as well as the various social categories such as the "caste-clusters" (*vaṇṇas*).[9] The history of the Buddha, therefore,

must necessarily include all these categories and since the Buddha himself is a *Mahāpurisa*, various events in his life such as his conception, birth, going forth into the wilderness, enlightenment, preaching and passing away are "naturally" accompanied by extraordinary terrestrial events such as earthquakes. The Buddha's knowledge, explains Buddhaghosa, extends over the three worlds—*samkhāraloka*, *sattaloka*, and *okāsaloka* (existence sustained by "food," all sentient creatures and the world extending across the entire spectrum from the sun and moon in all directions). All these become essentially parts of Buddhist 'history.'[10]

Though the appearance of the Buddha is unique, it is no accident because it follows the law of *dhammatā*.[11] *Dhammatā* is one of the two terms of crucial significance in our understanding of the development of the Buddhist historical consciousness, the other being *samavāya*. The dictionary meaning of the term is "conformity to *dhammniyāma*...fitness, propriety; a general rule, higher law, cosmic law, general practice, regular phenomenon, usual habit." Buddhaghosa explains *niyāma*[12] as the way to an end or aim causatively related to *kamma* (Sanskrit : *karma*), seasons, seed, psychical states and nature. It is *dhammatā* which is the basis of the order in the universe, the principle that separates chaos from cosmos. The operation of *dhammatā* is based on three factors, namely the substratum of causal relationships (*hetu*), subdivided into five categories such as the influence of past action, conditioned by supernatural factors, a combination of diverse occurences, occasioned by relationships with a species and those related to the observable order of things (*pubbekata*, *issaranimmāna*, *samgati*, *abhijāti*, and *diṭṭhadhammūpakkama*).[13] *Dhammatā* is further understood as an integral effect of a congeries of fivefold epiphenomenal processes included under the rubric *samaya* comprising *samavāya*, *khaṇa*. *kāla*, *samūha* and *hetu*. *Khaṇa* and *kāla*[14] are explained as the opportune moment and the general process of time ; *samūha* is a causally related aggregation and *hetu*, as mentioned above, is the substratum of causal relationships.[15] The theory of *dhammatā* is first adumbrated in relation to the theory of 'former' Buddhas. The Mahapadāna sutta of the Dīgha Nikāya gives us the earliest version of this theory when it purports to give an account of the five Buddhas preceding Gotama. That this concept of former Buddhas preceding Gotama had found general acceptance among Buddhists by 250 B.C. is indicated by the fact that the great Buddhist emperor Aśoka (*circa* 272-232 B.C.) tells us in one of his inscriptions that he enlarged the *stūpa* ('funerary' or 'votive monument') of Koṇāgamana, a former Buddha, a second time. This *sutta* also gives us an idea of the early Buddhist conception of the span of time named *asamkheyyas*, *kappas* and *yugas* 'incalculable' and aeons). This theory of the former and "Buddha To Come" had a part to play in Buddhist historiography as will be indicated below:[16]

The most interesting idea, however, is that of *samavāya*[17] which may be described as the specific Buddhist theory of causation, historical or otherwise. It may be rendered as 'harmony of antecedents' which is "a concurrence of causal relations established by their bringing about a common result." In the Buddhist view, then, every event has two aspects. One is that it is unique and the other is that it is the result of not one cause but the concatenation of diverse potentially causative factors coming into a unique relationship which makes the event itself unique. The point emphasized by Buddhaghosa is that this theory specifically rejects all theories of

'single causes' (*ekukāraṇavāda*) producing a given effect or event. The assumptions are that an event is caused not by one given cause but by a variety of potential causes and that these potential causes must enter a harmonious relationship in order to produce a given result. The result ensues because potential causes are actuated when they act in "concord" to produce a common result, and not because of a haphazard or accidental combination of various antecedents. The event occurs because the diverse causes act in harmony and in the absence of such harmony (*samavāya*) there could be no result. The illustration given by Buddhaghosa is that of the seed and the sprout, the former being regarded as the cause of the latter. But in order that the seed may transform itself into a sprout it must be good, must fall on the appropriate soil at the appropriate time, must be nurtured with adequate supply of water and other nutrients and that all of these must act in harmony which alone transforms the potentially causative factors into a result whereby the seed grows into a sprout. The main thrust of the argument is to exclude all theories of absolutism, nihilism, chance, accident and indeterminism.[18]

III

The Buddhists formulated three distinct ideals related to the 'savior' and his role in history. One was that of the *Pacceka* Buddhas (individual Buddhas) who secure their own *nirvāṇa* but do not preach and numerous such Buddhas may exist simultaneously. The *Pacceka* Buddha, as pointed out by a recent study[19] is related to the pre-Buddhist Vedic *muni* (hermit-sage) and the non-Brahmanical *samaṇa* (ascetic) and is somewhat of an intrusive and peripheral phenomenon in the history of Buddhism. Then there was the ideal of the *Bodhisattva*, the being of wisdom and compassion who defers his own *nirvāṇa* in order to remain in the world to save suffering humanity. This concept became a major factor in the development of Mahāyāna Buddhism because of its "quasi-theistic" and savior roles.[20] Finally, there was the *Sammāsambuddha* (the totally enlightened being who preaches to the world the *dhamma*, establishes an organization of monks and nuns [*Samgha*]) as an instrument of continuing succor. Neither the *Pacceka* Buddha nor the *Bodhisattva* is capable of a *vamsa*, a tradition of historical continuity both in doctrine and organization. It is this concept of *vamsa* that is of great significance in our understanding the elements comprising Buddhist historiography.

There are more than a dozen works which purport to be histories related to the vicissitudes of Buddhism. Almost all of these are called *vamsas* (chronicles) of traditions (*paramparā*). The transmission of a tradition of Buddha (or Buddhas), the *dhamma* in its textual and doctrinal form, and the lineages of teachers in the *Samgha* (monastic fraternity) are the *raison d'être* of the Buddhist history called the *vamsa*. Round the core of this tradition are woven accounts of kings and emperors, regions and countries, and accounts of single monasteries and relics of the Buddha, literature and even 'Buddhas to Come.'

The choice of the term *vamsa* for history in the place of the more traditional *itihāsa* and/or *purāṇa* ('Thus it has been' and Chronicle of Yore) is of significance in our understanding of Buddhist historiography. As pointed out at the beginning of this paper the Buddhists had a derogatory attitude toward *itihāsa*. The

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early Buddhists used a variety of terms for historical or quasi-historical accounts floating about during their days. The simplest is *kathā*—a tale or story, legendary or otherwise—and the common varieties of such narratives are characterized as species of 'gossip' indulged in by narrators aiming to entertain or by women gathered at a village well. Their basic nature is called unedifying and hearsay or simply imaginative or unverified information. We have already referred to *tiracchānakāthā* ('low' or 'animal' talk) which included tales of kings, warriors, wars, cities, regions, sea and heroes. The other two terms used are *akkhāna* and *akkhāyikā*, the first examplified by the two great epics the Mahābhārata and the Rāmāyaṇa and the others simply called lore such as lore of the sea or nature. Buddhaghosa adds to these the term *itihāsa* which he defines as an ancient tale (*purāṇakathā*) signifying "thus it has been" (*it-ha-āsa*) which may include narrative categories from the great epics and *purāṇas* of the Hindus to simple folk tales. In the standard description of the intellectual equipment of a learned Brahman a knowledge of *itihāsa* as "the fifth" (the other four being aspects of the Vedic and Brahamanical lore) is invariably included.[21] It is noteworthy to mention here that history (commonly understood as *itihāsa*) is lumped together by the Buddhist as a variety of 'low' or 'unedifying' talk. At no point did the Buddhists deign to call what they compiled as 'histories' as *itihāsa* but took special care to designate them as *vamsas*. Properly speaking, therefore, the Buddhist historical consciousness was designed to articulate itself in terms of a *vamsa*, a chronicle concerning primarily the Buddha, the tradition or succession of oral, recitational or written tradition. Whatever was relevant to these grand themes became legitimate parts of the *vamsa* but not *itihāsa*. The principle idea was that of an unbroken continuity, whether of pupilary succession or royal and dynastic sequences regarded as relevant to the main purpose of Buddhist history.

That purpose was ethically conceived; i.e., that the composition should provide joy and delight, "full of faith, pleasant and that which consists of various forms" leading to elation. It should be a chronicle handed down from generation to generation. It should be composed for the "furtherance of teaching (*sāsanavuḍḍhi*)," for "the creation of faith among the listeners", to "arouse serene joy and emotion."[22] The titles of these historical compositions give us some understanding of their purport and contents. Some like the Buddhavamsa and the Anāgatavaṃsa are "histories" of the Buddhas, past and future or his relics such as tooth (Dāṭhāvamsa), hair (Chakesadhātuvamsa) or the tree under which the Buddha was Enlightened (Mahābodhivamsa), or of the *stūpas* (Thūpavaṃsa and Dhatuvamsa) or the history of Buddhism and the Buddhist *Samgha* in Ceylon (Dīpavamsa and Mahāvaṃsa and its sequel *Cūḷavamsa*), or in Burma and Thailand (Sāsanavamsa, Jinakālamāli). Some of these do contain a great deal of material bearing on secular history dealing with the rulers of India (up to the time of the great Aśoka), Ceylon, Burma and Thailand but such material is part of the general history of the Faith. The value judgements rendered on these rulers are related more to their relationship with the history of the Faith and particularly their attitudes toward the Order than their governments. Modern scholarship tends to judge them more or less harshly. M. Winternitz states that the Buddhists shared the general Indian inability to distinguish clearly between myth, legend and history to the extent that history merely becomes a

branch of 'epic poetry.' In the Ceylonese chronicles historical facts are uncritically lumped together with myths and legends such as the visits of the historical Buddha to the Island to establish the faith there as also pious legends of the early kings. He would not go so far as to call authors of these works "deliberate forgers and liars" but adds that "they relate things which *they* looked upon as veracious history, though *we*, it is true, are compelled to regard much of it as myth, legend and fiction."[23] L.S. Perera finds the influence of the Indian traditions of *Itihāsa-Purāṇa-Kāvya* genre on the Ceylonese chronicles although in a very limited sense and emphasizes the role of the concepts of the cyclical nature of time and destiny and especially the imprint of the great theme he calls '*Dhammadīpa*' (Island of Faith) in these chronicles. In A K. Warder's view the Buddhists "compiled and preserved historical records" for the purpose of tracing "moral regress corresponding to the progress of society to its present stage of civilization," use of legendary kings as examples for contemporary royalty, positing of events concerning the *Buddha*, *Dhamma* and the *Samgha* as "momentous events of cosmic significance," the working out of the doctrine of *karma* illustrated by historical examples and the crucial importance of the *Samgha* in spiritual as well as mundane life [24]

That the Buddhist sense of history frequently betrays cosmic overtones cannot be denied. This is due to the Buddhist world view of events which, as pointed out above, happen across a vast spectrum stretching from the heavens to the nether worlds and are constantly related to those happening 'here and now.' There is also a penchant for explaining royal characters in terms of the influence of past actions and the eagerness to enlist the services of 'supernatural' beings such as various classes of gods, genii and spirits in the furtherance of the glory of the Buddha, his *Dhamma* and the *Samgha*. In certain cases, the Buddhist interpretation of the career of Aśoka is an instance in point. There is also the obvious aim to interpret greatness in terms of the transforming influence of Buddhism on character. Aśoka before conversion, is a monster who almost becomes a saint after his conversion to Buddhism.[25] There is also the influence of 'sectarian' bias against groups whose dissidence in doctrinal beliefs and monastic practices from the authoritative stance of the established school is roundly denounced.

These peculiar characteristics can be explained as a result of the process of the growth of historical consciousness and its development in literary traditions preceding the compilation of these *vamsas* or chronicles. Already in the Theravāda Buddhist canon (of Ceylon, Burma, Thailand, Cambodia and Laos) certain definite ideas about the nature of the Buddha had been growing through the centuries (Fourth to First B.C.) when the Canon was taking shape. At the end of this process the Buddha had emerged as a *Mahāpurisa* (Supernal Man) and the basic ideas identifying the Buddha and the *Dhamma* (the later *Dharmakāya* doctrine) had become common. Secondly, there was in progress the process of the compilation of commentaries (*aṭṭhakathās*) on what the Buddha had said in the course of which a great deal of historical material relating to the lives and actions of kings who were contemporaries of the Buddha as well as those in whose reigns important events in the history of the *Samgha* took place. Finally, there was the problem of authenticity based on an unbroken succesion of teachers and their disciples going

back to the Buddha which became the *parampara* tradition, the basis of a *vamsa*. The importance of royal patronage, for the *Samgha* as also for the historical attitudes of the compilers of the chronicles, should also be duly recognized in any evaluation of these works as histories.

But within these limitations these texts do display a consistent historical consciousness nurtured and pruned by a more or less well defined methodology. The tradition (*parampara*) was not considered to be merely a matter of assertion and faith. It related to both doctrinal and organizational history The material to be included in the *vamsa*, by and large, had to be subjected to critical analysis (*vinicchaya*). The beginning of this critical tradition is ascribed to the Buddha himself through a passage in the Sutta of the Great Departure (*Mahaparinibbana*) entitled the Four Great Authorities. The Buddha advised his disciples to check critically the authenticity of statements ascribed to him after his demise on the grounds of whether or not such statements were received from the Master himself, statements received from a *Samgha* in a given location (*avasa*), from monks recognized for their learning and loyalty to tradition and even one monk known for his scholarship and faithful adherence to the letter and spirit of the doctrine.

Then there was the influence of a method of categorization called the *Abhidhammika naya*. This school, so prominently affiliated with the Theravadins, evolved its own scheme of criteria of reliability of information and categorization. These criteria are listed in a series of questions such as "by whom was the statement attributed" and "how was it transmitted"? The veracity of the material, it is stated further, must depend on factual remembrance and transmission through an unbroken lineage of teachers and elders.[26] There are, thus, four components which enter the making of a historical tradition namely, *vamsa* (chronicle), *tanti* (text), *anvaya* (lineage) and *parampara* (transmissional succession). All of these must be used to determine the 'historicity' of a chronicle.

The result of all this activity in thinking, memorization and compilation created a distinctive Buddhist historiography the value of which must be assessed on its own assumptions. Its limitations, as viewed in the context of modern historical methodology and structuring of material, are too obvious to need comment here. On the other hand, its merits are also not inconsiderable. Many parts of these Buddhist chronicles have been attested for their general veracity by independent literary, archaeological, numismatic and epigraphic evidence. To characterize their authors as "deliberate forgers and liars" is *passé* even for Western critics today. But their major interest lies in some of the distinctive features of their historical consciousness. Their sense of chronology is firmly anchored to what they believe to be a specific date (the passing away of the Buddha) which stands in contrast to contemporary Brahmanical historiography. Its theory of causation as implied in the concept of *samavaya* (concatenation of diverse potential causes in a harmonious relationship to produce an "event") is a distinct advance on contemporary theocratic interpretations of history and its criteria for evaluation of the historicity of given events be speak a critical attitude in preservation of tradition and the writing of chronicles. By and large their succession lists of kings are fairly trustworthy and the historical material embedded in them does provide a secure framework for arranging an intelligible historical scheme. Hagiology, the use of myths ("substance of the collective

unconscious"), legends and intervention of supernatural elements in human events are undoubtedly parts of this historiography which was primarily the work of pious monks living in monasteries under royal patronage.[27] But our understanding of the cultural ethos of Buddhism, if it is to be realistic and perceptive, cannot ignore the assumptions and results of the Buddhist historical consciousness and its historiography.

NOTES

1. J. Kashyap (ed.), *Dīgha Nikāya* (Nalanda, 1958), I. p. 9 ; the Buddhist texts used here, unless otherwise indicated, belong to the series published under the editorship of J. Kashyap by the Naland-Devanagari-Pali Series from Nalanda, Bihar during 1956-1961 and are abbreviated as follows : *Mahāvagga=MV* ; *Dīgha Nikāya =DN* ; *Majjhima Nikāya=MN* ; *Samyutta Nikāya=SamN* ; *Samantapāsādikā= SamP* ; *Sumangalavilāsini=SV* ; *Visuddhimagga=VM* ; *Milinda Pañha=MilP* ; *Khuddaka Nikāya=KhN ; Aṭṭhasālinī=Atth.*

2. For the three 'signs' see *MV*, pp. 16-17 ; on Buddhist ideas on time see P.M. Tin and Rhys Davids (trans.), *The Expositor* (London, 1958), I, p. 78; for Nagarjuna on time see K.K. Inada, *Nāgārjuna* (Tokyo, 1970), pp. 117-118; F. J. Streng, *Emptiness* (Nashville, 1967), pp. 49-50, 205.

3. For the date of Buddha *parinibbāṇa* see M.M. Singh, "The Date of Buddha Nirvana, "*Journal of Indian History*, XXXIX, iii (December, 1961), pp. 359-363 ; P.H.L. Eggermont, *The Chronology of the Reign of Aśoka Moriya* (Leiden, 1962), pp. 142-143.

4. For autobiographical details see *KhN*, I, pp. 329-332 ; 374-379 ; *DN*, I, pp. 100ff, 148ff ; II, pp. 8, 55ff, 108-109 ; *MN*, I, pp. 23ff, 219ff, 194, 301 ; II, pp. 329, 484ff ; *MV*, pp. 6-10.

5. *SamN*, III, p. 120 ; *DN*, II, p. 118; III, p. 66; V. Trenckner (ed.), *The Milinda Pañho* (London, 1880), p. 73.

6. For thought-processes see P.M. Tin and Rhys Davids (trans.), *The Expositor* (London, 1958), I, pp. 151-152, 188.

7. For two levels of reality see S.Z. Aung and C. A. F. Rhys Davids (trans.), *Points of Controversy* (London, 1915), pp. 8-12 ; E. Mullar (ed.), *The Atthasālinī* (London, 1897), p. 4.

8. *MilP*, p. 51.

9. *MV*, p. 37, *DN*, I, pp. 55, 86, 104 ; III, pp. 7, 150ff ; *SamP*, I, p. 113 ; *MN*, I, pp. 102, 310, 399 ; II. pp. 143, 376ff.

10. *DN*, II, p. 211 ; *MN*, I, pp. 103, 320-321 ; III, pp. 95, 162ff ; *SamP*, I, p. 105.

11. T.W. Rhys Davids and W. Stede, *Pāli-English Dictionary* (London, 1959), pp. 211, 231, 339, 368, 684-685 ; *DN*, II, pp. 11-14.

12. *SV*, II, p. 432.

13. *MN*, III, pp. 19-20.

14. *Atth*, pp. 56ff ; *The Expositor*, I, pp. 76-77.

15. *MN*, III, pp. 19-20.

16. *DN*, II, pp. 11-14.

17. *The Expositor*, I, pp. 79-81.

18. H.C. Warren and D. Kosambi (eds.). *Visuddhimagga of Buddhaghosâcariya* (Cambridge, Mass, 1950), p. 44.

19. See R. Kloppenborg, *The Paccekabuddha* (Leiden, 1974).

20. For the *Bodhisattva* ideal see Har Dayal, *The Bodhisattva Doctrine in Buddhist Sanskrit Literature* (London, 1931) ; M.L. Matics (trans.), *Bodhicaryāvatāra of Śāntideva* (New York, 1970), pp. 20, 31-33.

21. *DN*, I, p. 9, *MN*, II, pp. 224, 247, 255 ; *SV*, I, pp. 84, 89-91; *KhN*, I, p. 354.

22. B.C. Law, (ed.), *Dīpavamsa* (Maharagama, Ceylon, 1959), pp. 17, 129-130 ; B.C. Law (ed.), *The Dathāvamsa* (Lahore, 1924), pp. 1ff ; N.K. Bhagwat (ed.), *The Mahāvamsa* (Bombay, 1936), p. 1 ; W. Geiger (trans.), *The Mahāvamsa* (London, 1964), p. 1.

23. M. Winternitz, *A History of Indian Literature* (New York, 1933), II, pp. 208-221.

24. C.H. Philips (ed.). *Historians of India, Pakistan and Ceylon* (London, 1961), pp. 29-56.

25. See B.G. Gokhale, *Asoka Maurya* (New York, 1966), pp. 47-48.

26. R. Morris (ed.), *The Buddhavamsa and the Cariyāpiṭaka* (London, 1882), p. viii ; W. Geiger, *The Dipavamsa and The Mahāvamsa* (Colombo, 1908), p. 17, Footnote ; *SamP*, I, p. 227.

27. For circumstances affecting the evolution of early Buddhist historiography see B.G. Gokhale, "The Theravāda Buddhist View of History," *Journal of the American Oriental Society*, 85/3 (July-Sept., 1965), pp. 354-360.

11

A Structural Analysis of the Abhidharmakośa : First Chapter

HERBERT V. GUENTHER

For the history and development of Buddhist philosophy a study of the Abhidharma is indispensable. In particular, it has been Vasubandhu's Abhidharmakośa[1] that has had a lasting influence. The arrangement of the philosophical topics in this work has been accepted by all philosophical movements and the critique which these various movements levelled at each other had to do with the logical status of these topics rather than with the introduction of new ideas.

In Tibet, Vasubandhu's work has been studied intensively. Its cosmological section superseded the older idea of an interpenetration of world-systems as detailed in the Avataṃsakasūtra and, taken as a whole, the Abhidharmakośa reflects a transition from a dynamic vision to a mechanical structure.

However, because of the importance of the Abhidharmakośa, without which no proper understanding of what classical Buddhist philosophy actually is about possible, an analysis of the First Chapter will be given here. It will serve as an introduction to the study of Buddhist philosophy as a philosophical 'system' rather than as a 'process'. The analysis follows the structural analysis (*sa-bcad*) offered by Rdza Dpal-sprul O·rgyan 'Jigs-med chos-kyi dbang-po (born 1808 A.D.).[2] This important author who, apart from his own unique contributions to Buddhist thinking and practice, has written a number of similar analytical outlines on other important works of Buddhist philosophy, belongs to the *rnying·ma* tradition which throughout Tibet's history has kept the spirit of philosophizing alive. His analysis, therefore, is based on an understanding of the subject-matter and is not merely a re-hash of stale phrases.

(The Analysis)[3]

A. The Introduction to the Treatise

I. The author's intent to compose a work of this nature by first making his salutation :

AK I la-c

II. The statement of the content of the work by way of explicating what the author wants to do :

AK I ld-2d

III. The validation of this treatise as representing the Teacher's (i.e. The Buddha's) word by way of stating its significance :

AK I 3

B. The Body of the Treatise

I. The specification of what is to be discussed :

AK I 4-5a

II. The elaboration of the above

(*a*) The elaboration of the 'absolute (s)' (*asaṃskṛta*)

AK I 5b-6d

(*b*) The elaboration of the 'conditional' (*saṃskṛta*) which comprises eight chapters of which the first (1) deals with 'fundamentals' (*dhātu*) and has three sections :

(1) The elaboration of what is termed *skandhas, dhātus, and āyatanas*

AK I 7a

(2*a*) The synonyma for the conditional

AK I 7b-d

(2*b*) The synonyma for all that is 'frail' (*sāsrava*)

AK I 8

(3*a*) The nature of the *skandhas dhātus*, and *āyatanas*

3 *aí*) The *rūpaskandha*

3 *aiIa*) Its subject-matter

3 *aiIa1*) A summary presentation
AK I 9a

3*aiIa2*) The detailed exposition

3*aiIa2i*) The exposition of the five senses by way of their specificity
AK I 9b-d

3*aiIa2ii*) The exposition of the sense objects by way of classification
AK I 10

3*aiIa2iii*) The 'gestalt'
AK I 11-13

3*aiIb*) The classification of the *rūpaskandha* as *dhātu* and as *āyatana*
AK I 14a

3*aiII*) The exposition of the three *skandhas* enumerated in between *rūpa* and *vijñāna*
AK I 14b-15

3*aiIII*) The exposition of the *vijñānaskandha*
AK I 16ab

3*aiIV*) The classification of the above as to what is 'substance' (*dravya*) and what is 'concrete meaning' (*dharma*)
AK I 16c-19

3*aii*) The individual meanings of *skandha*, *dhātu*, and *āyatana*
AK I 20

3*aiii*) The reason for listing 'feeling' (*vedanā*) and 'concepts' (*saṃjñā*) under *skandha*, *dhātu*, and *āyatana*
AK I 21-22b

3*aiv*) The logical order or sequence that exists between *skandha*, *dhātu* and *āyatana*
AK I 22c-23

3*av*) The validity to distinguish between two *āyatanas*
AK I 24

3*b*) The summary of the other entitative meanings

3*bi*) The summary of what is termed *dharma-skandha*
AK I 25-26

3*bii*) The relationship of the above to other topics
AK I 27-28

3(*c*) The sub-division in what is referred to by *dhātu*. There are twenty-one subdivisions which for the sake of simplicity can be summarized by eight groupings :

3*ci*) That which is demonstrable
AK I 29-31

3*cii*) That which has to do with selection and discursiveness
AK I 32-33

3*ciii*) That which has to do with an objective reference
AK I 34-35a

3*civ*) That which derives from elemental forces
AK I 35b-38a

3*cv*) That which is of the nature of substance
AK I 38b-39

3*cvi*) That which can be left behind by 'seeing' and that which can be left behind by 'cultivating (what has been seen)'
AK I 40

3*cvii*) That which is 'vision' and 'non-vision'
AK I 41-47

3*cviii*) That which can be known through two perceptual modes
AK I 48

There can be no doubt that such an analysis, meticulous in the best scholastic tradition, is extremely valuable. It is planned to offer in due course of time a complete aanlysis of the Abhidharmakośa as presented by Rdza Dpal-sprul O-rgyan 'Jigs-med chos-kyi dbang-po.

NOTES

1. In the following this work will be referred to by the abbreviation AK followed by chapter and verse number (e.g. AK I 3) and verse section (e.g. 4a).

Since the Abhidharmakośa was written in Sanskrit I have retained the Sanskrit terms. Dpal-sprul's analysis is, of course, made from the Tibetan translation. While he quotes the relevant verse terms I have changed them to the verse numbers and their sections. The Sanskrit text used is the critical 4-volume edition by Swami Dwarikadas Shastri. Abhidharmakośa and Bhāṣya of Acārya (sic) Vasubandhu with Sphutārthā (sic) Commentary of Ācārya Yaśomitra. Varanasi 1970-73.

On the importance of the Abhidharma see also Herbert V. Guenther, Philosophy and psychology in the Abhidharma. Shambhala, Berkeley and London, 1976, pp. 2ff.

2. A short biographical account is given by E. Gene Smith in The Autobiographical Reminiscences of Ngag-dbang-dpal-bzang – Late Abbot of Kaḥ-thog monastery. Critically edited from three Tibetan texts by Bya-bral Sangs-rgyas-rdo-rje. Reproduced by photographic process by Sonam T.Kazi Gangtok 1969, pp. 13f.

3. Mngon-pa-mdzod-kyi sa-bcad, pp. 45-77 of volume 2 of The Collected Works of Dpa-sprul O-rgyan-'jigs-med-chos-kye (sic) dbang-po. Reproduced from Dudjom Rimpoche's xylograph collection by Sonam T. Kazi. 6 volumes, Gangtok 1970-71.

12

The Buddha's Co-Natals

I. B. HORNER

As for a long time the number seven has been regarded as a symbol of completion or perfection,[1] so seven are those held to have been of simultaneous birth, co-natal with the Bodhisatta, born on the same day as he was, *satta sahajātāni*[2] ; and so, as they were also born on the same day as one another each had six co-natals, apart from the Bodhisatta,to form a set of seven. Though this set may not be intrinsically of much importance as a set, and in this respect differs from its individual members, yet, as possible quasi-history, even authentic history in some cases, and as a tradition surviving in some of the commentaries, a little investigation here may not be out of place.

The co-natals are listed three times in BvA[3] and at least seven times in five other ctys and also in Jkm.[4] Besides this, one cty speaks of one member of the set only, another cty of another member, and still a third of a different member as being co-natal with the Bodhisatta.[5]

With one interesting and curious exception, for which there is possibly some historical'' ground if not confusion, the seven co-natals are constant throughout these lists, though they may be slightly differently arranged or described : Rāhulamātā, Ānanda, Channa, Kanthaka, nidhikumbhā, Mahābodhirukkha, Kāḷudāyin.[6] The exception is always Ānanda's name for it does not occur with uniform regularity. It is found at BvAC 131, DA ii 425, ApA 58[7] 358, also at BvAB corresponding to BvAC 276 apparently as a genuine variant for BvAC's *Ājānīyo hatthirājā*[8] at this passage for it gives this reading in a footnote.

The list of the co-natals at Jā i 54, though spoken of as seven, contains only six names in Fausbōll's edn. These are Rāhulamātā devī, Channo amacco, Kāḷudāyi amacco, Kanthako assarāja, Mahābodhi rukkho, cattāro nidhikumbhiyo. Here

Ānanda's name is absent as is that of his substitute, the *hatthirājā*, the state-elephant of BvAC 276. But it is open to question whether it is not Fausböll who is responsible for the omission. For in the Bangkok edn. of Jātakanidāna p. 75, corresponding to Fausböll, vol. I, p. 54, Ānando rājakumāro is placed between Kāḷudāyi amacco and Kanthako assarājā.

Ānanda is also omitted at BvAC 298, but here again BvAB fills the blank, as it does that at BvAC 276, by giving his name, though it notes no other reading. One would therefore like to know whether what BvAB is giving here is a genuine reading or put in by later editors[9] to make BvA more consistent with itself. Attention has been called above to the omission of Ānanda's name at ApA 58 in the SHB edn.

This curious anomaly of the inclusion or omission of Ānanda's name would seem to suggest a certain doubt somewhere, some time, whether in fact his birth did or did not take place on the same day as the Bodhisatta's– a doubt very likely connected with conflicting views of his age when he died.[10] Else why the absence of his name almost as often as its presence ? The substitution made for it so as to achieve the required "seven" is always an elephant : the elephant called *Ājānīyo hatthirājā* at BvAC 276, and *ārohaniyahatthi* at AA i 301, ThagA ii 221, ApA 532, thus describing the elephant as a riding one and not a working one. Naturally the Bodhisatta had a riding elephant while he was still leading the household life, though the part it played is in no way comparable to that played by *Kanthako assarājā* above all on the night of the Great Departure to homelessness[11] for whose successful outcome the horse was essential.

At Vv 81. 15 Kanthaka is recorded to say, "In the superb city of Kapilavatthu of the Sakyans I was Kanthaka, co-natal with Suddhodana's son."[12] This is one of the only two canonical statements concerning co-natals in the sense being spoken of here that I have found. The other is at Ap 501, ver. 19 where Kāḷudāyin is represented as saying, *tadahe 'va ahaṁ jāto saha ten'eva vaḍḍhito*, "I was born on the same day as him (Siddhattha, ver. 18) and grew up with him." Neither of these passages concerns itself with more than one member of the seven co-natals, any more than do three commentarial passages that also treat of one member only. In the first place there is VvA 314 corroborating Kanthaka's statement. Secondly, at SA ii 317 in a brief description of Channa it is said *Tathāgatena saddhiṁ ekadivase jāto*, born on one and the same day together with the Tathāgata ; and thirdly, at DA i 284 we find *Tathāgatassa pana jātadivase.. .cattāro nidhayo upagātā*, on the day of the Tathāgata's birth four treasure-urns appeared.

With these four treasure-urns, *cattāro* or *catasso nidhikumbhā* or *nidhikumbhiyo* or *cattāro nidhayo*, we enter, so it seems, into a realm of fancy. Their measurements when given[13] are large : a gāvuta, half a yojana,[14] three gāvutas, a yojana.[15] Their contents, recorded at least once,[16] are somewhat baffling[17] : *saṅkho*, chank or mother-of-pearl in the first urn, then *elo* (salt ? water ?), then *uppālo*, and finally *puṇḍarīka*, normally two kinds of water-lily or lotus. Such urns were held to come, perhaps through Sakka's intervention, at the birth of an outstanding person, Jotika for example who possessed great merit,[18] and presumably their arrival portended a momentous event. So it was only natural to include them as one of the seven of simultaneous birth.

In mentioning the four great treasures as the 'shell' (*saṃkha*), the 'lotus'

(*paduma*), the *piṅgala*, and the *elapatra*, the Mahāvastu says[19] they are in four different localities, as does Divy 61; the former context also states that they were under the protection of Nāga-kings, and the latter that they were presided over by four great kings.[20]

In Vkn the four great treasures, *mahānidhāna*, filled with all the kinds of jewels of great potency and inexhaustible, are spoken of as the sixth of eight wonderful and marvellous things which are constantly manifest in a certain devī's abode.[21] Professor Lamotte, in an extremely interesting and informative note,[22] asserts that, according to most (Sanskrit) sources the four treasures will appear on the advent of the Buddha Maitreya ; and that, according to other sources, they exist already and appear of their own accord and are made use of by the local inhabitants on the seventh day of the seventh month every seven years. This is reminiscent of a passage in Miln[23] which, in speaking of the Jewel-treasure of a universal monarch, says that on the disappearance of one such monarch it lies hidden[24] and is produced for the next wheel-turning king because of his right practice, appearing as do his six other treasures, of its own accord.[25] It may not be unjustified, therefore, to assume that the four treasure-urns disappeared as mysteriously as they had come once they had signalized the exceptionally rare event of the birth of a Bodhisatta in the world. For nothing more is said to indicate their further existence.

The Bodhi-tree is in a category apart. It was a real tree, a cutting from which flourishes to this day at the Mahāvihāra in Anurādhapura, and is often said to be the oldest historical tree in the world.[26] But how to establish it was of simultaneous birth with the Bodhisatta, and therefore 35 years old at the time of the Awakening, and alive when Saṅghamittā, daughter of the Emperor Asoka (273-232 B.C.)[27], went from Jambudīpa to Srī Laṅkā taking this cutting with her? Perhaps there is some traditional lore to the effect that this Assattha had been growing for 35 years at the place, always in Jambudīpa, and always the same place, where, each under a different Tree, the Awakening of Buddhas occurs. But if there is such a tradition I do not know of it.

It may not be out of place to say a little here about the length of the life-spans of the others: a woman, three men, and a horse, who are held to have been born on the same day as the Bodhisatta.

Rāhulamātā died at the age of 78 according to Ap ii 584 (ver. 3 ff.) where she is called Yasodharā.[28] It is supposed she married Gotama when she was sixteen years old, and if they were co-natal he was sixteen also, but Rāhula, so it seems, was not born at all long, perhaps only a week[29] or even less than a week before Gotama, his father, left home on the Great Departure at the age of twenty-nine.[30]

Ānanda's death is not mentioned anywhere in the Pali canon so far as I know. However, at DhA ii 99 he is said to have been aged 120 years when he died.[31] Therefore, if he had been born on the same day as the Bodhisatta he would have lived another 40 years after the *parinibbāna*, and hence would have been an arahant for this number of years. But at DA ii 413 another view is taken of the length of his life-span. For here it is said that Ānanda, Mahākassapa and Anuruddhatthera all died at the age of 150—and Bakkulatthera at 160. All these are called long-lived, *dīghāyuka*, though not living as much as 200 years. Neither of these passages speaks of Ānanda as a co-natal. Besides the co-natal passages mentioned at

the beginning of this article that either include or omit his name, there are other commentarial passages which, though not mentioning his age when he died, or his co-nativity, yet bring forward another aspect of this latter tradition. For they say that after having been born in Tusitapura "together with our Bodhisatta", *amhākaṁ Bodhisattena saddhiṁ*, and deceasing from there, he was born in the household of Amitodana, the Sakyan,[32] Suddhodana's brother. Lamotte states[33] that Ānanda died one year before Ajātasattu, whose death he gives as having taken place in 463 B.C. It is traditionally held that the Buddha died in the eighth year of this king's reign If 462 B.C. is truly the date of Ānanda's death and if he lived to be 120 or 150, it is questionable whether he could have been born on the same day as Gotama[34] (M cty, ii 61, says he was younger). Northern sources, concerning Ānanda differ, I believe, from Pali commentarial sources, and have not been consulted.

There seems no indication of Kāḷudāyin's age when he died. After becoming an arahant and having successfully urged Gotama, very recently awakened, to return to Kapilavatthu at his father's insistent requests, he was declared pre-eminent among the disciples to gladden the clans,[35] but then becomes rather a shadowy figure of whom little more is recorded.

Channa, clearly, must have outlived the Buddha who, just before his *parinibbāna*, instructed Ānanda to impose the *brahmadaṇḍā* on this former charioteer of his,[36] notable for his pride and arrogance, with the result that he attained arahantship and the chastisement or penalty automatically lapsed.[37] It has not been possible to discover the length of his life-span, but had it been 120 years presumably he would have been mentioned with the others who reached this age. As it is, an old man of eighty or so when the *brahmadaṇḍa* was imposed on him, he is likely to have died not long after the Buddha.

The co-natal Kanthaka,[38] the Bodhisatta's horse, died of a broken heart immediately after he had borne Gotama away on the Great Departure from home and luxury. Gotama had gone on alone to seek for *nibbāna* leaving behind him his horse and the charioteer. As Gotama is supposed to have set out on his new life at the age of 29, therefore Kanthaka, when he died, was 29, quite a good age for a horse and in no way exaggerated. It is said he had been greatly attached to the Mahāsatta, the Great Being, in several former births.[39]

NOTES

1. E.g. the 7 jewels of a universal king, 7 priceless things at Jā vi 489, and the gifts each of 700, ib. 503.
2. At Jā vi 512 the phrase *Mahāsatto sahajāte saṭṭhisahasse amacce. . . oloketvā* is mistranslated (Cowell vi 265) as "the 60,000 courtiers who were born when he was" instead of "who were born simultaneously (with one another)". Further, it should be noticed that *sahajā* at Cp ii 4. 8 is not to be taken literally but as referring to the simultaneous "going forth" of a man and his wife, CpA 136.
3. BvAC 131 276 298
4. Jā i 54, DA ii 425, AA i 301, Thag A ii 221, ApA 58 358 531 f, Jkm 26.
5. DA i 284 (the 4 urns), SA ii 317 (Channa), VvA 314 (Kanthaka).

6. List as at BvAC 131, DA ii 425, ApA 58 358.
7. Here n. 11 says Ānanda's name is omitted in SHB.
8. Not found elsewhere ? At Mhvu ii 25 the Bodhisatta's elephant is called Candana.
9. EC 37 adds Kāḷudāyin to make its list come up to seven on the grounds that though it is not in Jkm, English edn. p. 26, the Bangkok edn. gives it. Here there is no omission of Ānandatthera.
10. See below, p. 117. For conflicting views concerning his birth, ordination and death see DPPN, s.v. Ānanda, and Encyclopaedia of Buddhism, fasc. 4, p. 529 ff.
11. See text p. 282 ff.
12. See also VvA 314.
13. Jā i 54, DA i 284, BvAC 276, DhA iv 208, ApA 58, PṭsA iii 677 (not at the Tathāgata's birth).
14. PṭsA iii 677 reads "two gāvutas", but this is the same as half a yojana.
15. See the table of measurements at *Chronicle of Thūpas*, p. 15, n. 38.
16. DA i 284.
17. DAṬ of no help.
18. DhA iv 208, PṭsA iii 677. He is one of five persons of great merit spoken of at Vism 382 f., AA i 405, DhA i 385.
19. Mhvu iii 383, and see Jones's transln. iii 380 f. and 381 n. 1.
20. See BHSD s.v. elapatra, piṅgala, and śaṅkha.
21. Vkn 278 f.
22. Ib., n. 34.
23. Miln 218.
24. In Vepulla Mountain, Jā iv 232.
25. D ii 175, M iii 174.
26. Though the famous plane tree at Kos, connected by popular tradition with Hippocrates, is also extremely old, there is no certain knowledge of its age.
27. Vincent Smith, Asoka, 1920, p. 73 f.
28. See DPPN, s.v. Rāhulamātā, for the names by which Rāhula's mother and Gotama's wife appear to have been called.
29. Jā i 62.
30. See Lamotte, Hist. du Bouddhisme Indien, p. 733 ff. for some conflicting possibilities for Rāhula's age when his father both left home and also first returned to Kapilavatthu.
31. I am grateful to Mr. John Ireland for having drawn my attention to this passage. The laywoman Visākhā and 4 brahmans, Pokkharasādi, Brahmāyu (M ii 133), Sela and Bāvari (Sn 1019), are all cited at DA ii 413 as having lived for 120 years. Everyone mentioned in this passage has a part to play in the Pali canon. Much less important was the grandmother of the girl the parents of Revata of the Acacia Wood planned he should marry, at the age of seven. She was alive at 120 years old, DhA ii 189.
32. DA ii 492, AA i 292, ThagA iii 111.
33. Hist. du Bouddhisme Indien, p. 102 ; see also ib. pp. 227-8, 331.
34. There is no consensus of opinion, however, that 563 B.C. as given in the Sinhalese tradition can be accepted for the year of Gotama's birth.

35. A i 25.
36. D ii 154.
37. Vin ii 292, VA vii 1403.
38. At Mhvu ii 193 also said to be co-natal, "born at the same time as he."
39. VvA 316.

ABBREVIATIONS

[All refer to Pali Text Society edns., except Divy, Mhvu text and Vkn]

AA=Aṅguttara cty
Ap=Apadāna
ApA=Ap cty
BvA=Buddhavaṁsa cty (BvAB=the Burmese edn. ; BvAC=PTS edn. based on SHB)
Cp=Cariyāpiṭaka
CpA=Cp cty
D=Dīgha-nikāya
DA=D cty
DAṬ=ṭīkā on DA
DhA=Dhammapada cty
Divy=Divyāpadāna
Jā=Jātaka
Jkm=Jinakālamālī
M=Majjhima-nikāya
Mhvu=Mahāvastu and translation
Miln=Milindapañha
PṭsA=Paṭisambhidā cty
SA=Saṁyutta cty
ThagA=Theragāthā cty
VA=Vin cty
Vin=Vinaya-piṭaka
Vism=Visuddhimagga
Vkn=Vimalakīrtinirdeśa (French transln.)
Vv=Vimānavatthu
VvA=Vv cty
cty=Commentary
DPPN=Dictionary of Pali Proper Names
EC=Epochs of the Conqueror (PTS)

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13

The Eight Deliverances

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Because it may help to understand the direction of the present study, a word or two may be devoted to an account of how it came about. It is, in origin, part of a long-term study of the impact of the notion of Buddhist salvation on Chinese believers of the fifth century. Examination of Abhidharma digests translated into Chinese at that time brings one into contact, at almost every turn, with the doctrine of the Five Anāgāmins (*antarāparnirvāyin*, *upapadya*^{0}, *sābhisamskāra*^{0}, *anabhisamskāraparinirvāyin* and *ūrdhvamsrotas*). This, in turn, leads to the *anāgāmin* himself. In homage to the late Master, this part of the study emphasizes the Theravāda tradition, specifically the *Patisambhidāmagga*. In as much as some of the categories are less than pellucid, an attempt shall be made to sort them out with the aid of the *Saddhammappakāsinī*. Since a good deal of the said commentary's statement is restated, in almost the same terms, in the *Visuddhimagga*, comparison shall be made as necessary with that text as well as with the *Visuddhimaggadīpikā*.

As is known, the *anāgāmin* is one who has achieved the third of four successive stages, of which the last is marked by the end of reincarnation. The four, to give their names in the nom. s. in both Sanskrit and Pāli, are (1) *srota' āpannah*/sotāpanno, (2) *sakrdāgāmī*/sakadāgāmī, (3) *anāgāmī* (4) *arhan*/araham. p.73ff. makes some general statements on the first three. It begins by posing a rhetorical question as to the meaning of the proposition that, where *dhammas* arisen are concerned, wisdom consists of 'view', while gnosis consists of 're examination'.[1] It proceeds to say, in terms of 45 'stations' and their corresponding achievements, who achieves what. The formula is that 'one standing in *a* achieves *á*. 'No. 33 of the forty-five says that 'one standing in the delivered achieves the deliverances' (*vimuttatthena vimokkhā tadā samudāgatā*, cf. p. 74). The whole list will be found on p. 2.38 ff., while for information on the

Sanskrit evidence one should consult LVP 8.204, n. 1. The eight deliverances in their Pāli form, accompanied by some comment, now follow.

1. *rūpī rūpāni passati*/ A person ponders inwardly the blueness of a thing (yellowness, redness and whiteness are also mentioned), apprehends it, considers it and establishes it as blue (or whichever colour is involved). Having done so, he cultivates the notion of blueness, etc., above all else, expands it and comes back to it repeatedly (*āsevati bhāveti bahulīkaroti* ; the interpretation of the expression is that of S 554). He then frames the thought that both the external object and the internal impression are 'form'. In other words, he conceives the notion of 'form'.

What this seems to mean is that the viewer concludes the substantial reality both of himself and of what he views. More than that, he forms the notion that the subjective impression has the same reality as the object on which it is based. S 554 glosses on the word *ajjhattam* (rendered above with 'inwardly') as indicating a process whose reference is the self (*attānam adhikicca pavattam*), *paccattam* (a word occurring immediately after *ajjhattam*) as indicating a process that goes back to the self (*attānam paticca pavattam*). Both have been summarized above under the word 'inwardly', supported by the commentary, which interprets them collectively with the word *ajjhattam*, the full expression being *dvayenāpi niyakajjhattam eva dīpeti*. In this connection, the practitioner thinks of such things as his hair and the orbs of his eyes. He then directs his thought to blue things outside. Where yellowness is concerned fat, skin and the 'yellow of the eyes' are mentioned ; for red, the flesh, the blood, the tongue, the palms and soles, the red of the eye ; for white, the bones, the teeth, the nails, the white of the eye.

2. *ajjhattam arūpasaññī bahiddhā rūpāni passati*/This seems to mean that the viewer concludes the objective reality of things, denying that they are subjective at all.

This is interpreted to mean that 'there is no sign of internal form' *ajjhattarūpanimittam natthīti attho*), but this does not seem to clarify anything.

3. *subham teva adhimutto hoti*/A monk, motivated by nothing but good will, traverses the entire universe. This, in turn, leads the beings in the world to react accordingly. The same is then repeated for compassion, sympathetic joy and equanimity.

The four, in our terms, mean (a) the wish that only the best may happen to others, (b) sorrow when it does not happen, (c) joy when it does, (d) indifference to whatever may befall oneself if in the process one contrives to save anyone else. Since the commentary adds to the understanding of this, it might be well to reproduce first the relevant passage from p. 2.39.

katham subham teva adhimutto hotīti vimokkho/vidha bhikkhu mettāsahagatena cetasā ekam disam pharitvā viharati tathā dutiyam tathā tatiyam tathā catuttham/ iti uddham adho tiriyam sabbadhi sabattatāya sabbāvantam lokam mettāsahagatena cetasā vipulena mahaggatena appamānena averena abyāpajjena pharitvā viharati/ mettāya bhāvitattā sattā appatikūlā honti/

In what sense does it constitute 'deliverance' for one to be motivated by nothing but good will? Here a mendicant monk conducts himself throughout one quarter, his intention being accompanied by good will, and so throughout a second, third and fourth, so also upwards, downwards, across, everywhither and to all purposes, throughout the whole world, likewise with intentions accompanied by good will, broad in scope, gone to greatness, limitless, free of enmity or of malice. Because he is thus informed by good will, the beings do not run counter to him.

On the three lowest *jhāna* stages of the Sphere of Form, the practitioner is marked by good will. His 'intention' refers to his thought (*cetasā ti cittena*). 'Throughout' means that the practitioner touches the object in question, that he makes it the object of his thought (*pharitvā ti phusitvā ārammanam katvā*). 'One quarter' means that he concentrates on one tiny area (*ekam ekissā disāya*), where he chooses a single being, then proceeds to all the living beings in the said area. He 'conducts himself' there in the sense that his conduct and his postures are based on the four above mentioned 'unlimited qualities' of the Bodhisattva.

'To all purposes' is based on the alternate reading *sabbatthatāya.* The reading *sabbattatāya,* given above, is glossed by the commentator to mean that the practitioner behaves toward all beings, whatever be their specific characteristics, whatever be their differences, as toward his very self, with no thought that 'this is someone else'. An alternate interpretation, given immediately thereafter, is that the practitioner's thought it totally free of any distraction whatsoever. The 'whole world' (*sabbāvantam lokam,* lit., 'world having all') is glossed to mean the world with all its animate inhabitants. The 'greatness' of which the text speaks is said to refer to the practitioner's stage of development, for he has attained greatness through his ability to shake off the defilements, through the widely ranging effects of his practice and the number of reincarnations through which the practice has been continuing (*dīghasantānatāya*). An alternative interpretation is not 'attained to greatness', but, rather, 'attained by the great', i. e., by those of noble wishes, exertions, thought and wisdom. 'Limitless' refers to the practitioner's unlimited capacity to take all beings as the objects of his salvific activity, while his freedom from enmity and malice is another way of saying that he is free of woe.

4. On the fourth step, which is the lowest stage in the Sphere of Formlessness (*ākāsānañcāyatanasamāpattivimokkho*), S and Vd have much to say, which makes it worth one's while to reproduce the P text on which they are based.

katamo ākāsānañcāyatanasamāpattivimokkho/vidha bhikkhu sabbaso rūpasaññānam samatikkamā patighasaññānam atthaṅgamā nānattassaññānam amanasikārā ananto ākāso ti ākāsānañcāyatanam upasampajja viharati ayam ākāsānañcāyatanasamāpattivimokkho/

What is the deliverance consisting of the attainment of the realm of the infinity of space? Here a mendicant monk, by altogether outpassing any notions of 'form', through the disappearance of any notions of 'resistance', by paying no attention to any

notions of 'variety', attains to, and disports himself in, the realm of the infinity of space, telling himself that space is infinite. This is the deliverance consisting of the attainment of the realm of the infinity of space.

It is to be understood that form, resistance and variety are three characteristics commonly associated with matter, and that this 'realm' is one in which the practitioner fancies the universe to be an infinity of unconstructed, empty space.

One proceeds with a paraphrase of the comments made in S and Vd, which, while not identical, are close enough to be restated jointly. 'Notions of form' (*rūpasaññā*) are two things, both the *jhānas* on the level of the Sphere of Form and their respective objects, all grouped together here under the heading of 'notion' (*saññāsīsena vuttarūpāvacarajjhānānañ ceva tadārammanānañ ca*). They go on to say that the word 'form' indicates the said *jhānas*. Thus, the 'one who has form' (*rūpī*), i.e., the one who has attained a *rūpajjhāna*, sees 'forms' (*rūpāni*), i.e., the objects of the said *jhāna*. It may also be regarded as a reference to the ten *kasinas*, which are devices preparatory to meditation, specifically contemplation of earth (*pathavī*, *pathavī*), water (*āpo*), fire (*tejo*), wind (*vāyu*), blue (*nīla*), yellow (*pīta*), red (*lohita*), white (*odāta*), space (*ākāsa*) and consciousness/cognition (*viññāna*). For a list, cf. *Aṅguttaranikāya* 5.60. The two commentaries proceed to say that 'outpassing' (*samatikkama*) means 'disenchantment' (*virāga*) and 'suppression' (*nirodha*), specifically of two kinds of 'notions of form'. The first of the two consists of 15 *jhānas*, having reference to the wholesome (*kusala*), to (eventual) fruition (*vipāka*) and to deeds (that are without effect, *kiriyā*). Vd 83 refers back to V, chapter 14, and three passages in the said chapter shall now be taken up in order.

The wholesome, with reference to the Sphere of Form, and in terms of the union and division of the 'limbs of contemplation' (*jhānaṅgayogabhedato*, where *jhāna* presumably refers to the *jhānas* of the Rūpadhātu), consists of five members, viz.,

(1) the first, bound to reflection (*vitakka*), investigation (*vicāra*), zest (*pīti*), joy (*sukha*) and concentration (*samādhi*);
(2) the second, which has transcended reflection ;
(3) the third, which has transcended investigation ;
(4) the fourth, which is disillusioned with zest ;
(5) the fifth, from which joy has departed, and which is bound to equanimity and concentration.

It bears mention that, in the passage above (V 86, p. 384), an implicit *kusalam*, modified by an explicit *rūpāvacaram*, must be deduced from what precedes. In what follows, similarly, *vipāka* is by abbreviation for *vipākaññāna*, cognition that will eventuate in fruition, specifically, in the reduction of lust (*lobha*). Similarly, *kiriya* is by abbreviation for *kiriyaviññāna* (cognition which has no such effect), a word that does, however, occur in the text.

Vipākaviññāna, where the Sphere of Form is concerned, is divided in the same way as *kusala* above (V 103, p. 386).

A similar statement is made about *Kiriyaviññāna* (V 109, p. 387).

The second group of 'notions of form' consists of the first nine of the ten kasinas, apparently for the reason that the tenth is not material. Both commentaries, S and Vd,

say that the realm of the infinity of space is unattainable to those who have not transcended 'notions of form', adding that the transcendence of the notion must be preceded by disenchantment with its respective object (*ārammane ca avirattassa saññāsamatikkamo na hoti*).

The 'elimination of the notions of resistance' is explained in terms of the Buddhist doctrine of sense perception, the eye serving as the example. The organ of sight (*cakkhindriya*, not the physical eye) and the form of the visible object (not the object itself) collide, the collision producing the sense perception (*cakkhuviññāna* in this case) that can be produced in no other way. All five forms of sense contact, wholesome as well as unwholesome, must be banished. This result cannot be achieved at will by one who has attained to the first *jhāna* in the Sphere of Form, for the present goal (*ākāsānañcāyatana*) is not a case in which thought proceeds through the doors of the five senses (? *na hi tasmim samaye pañcadvāravasena cittam pavattati*). This seems to mean that the realm just mentioned, being in the Sphere of Formlessness, has no sensual objects, hence no sensual faculties (which are made of matter, however subtle). Nevertheless, it is proper to mention the disappearance of notions of resistance in this context, for it conduces to the praise of the realm in question, hence to the willingness to attempt to gain it (? *evam sante 'pi . . . imasmim jhāne ussāhajananattham imassa jhānassa pasamsāvasena etāsam ettha vacanam veditabbam*/). It may also be said that none of these attainments (sc. on the level of the Sphere of Formlessness) is possible to anyone within the Sphere of Form, since the realization of the latter sphere (which includes meditation on that level), rooted as it is in that sphere, does not conduce to disenchantment therewith. The realm under discussion does, however, conduce to such disenchantment, which justifies not only statement but praise as well. In other words, one who has attained to the first *jhāna* (or, for that matter, to any of the others within the Sphere of Form) has not rid himself of notions of resistance, while one in the realm of the infinity of space has. The reason given is that, for the former, any sound is a thorn, as the Buddha Himself has said.[2] V 274 adds that Āḷāra Kālāma, once in the Sphere of Formlessness, neither saw nor heard some five hundred chariots rumbling by him.[3]

Where 'paying no attention to notions of variety' (*nānattasaññānam amanasikāro*) is concerned, the two texts diverge, at least on details. Both begin in the same way, saying that 'notions of variety' can mean one of two things, viz., (a) notions directed at variety as an object or (b) varied notions (*nānatte vā gocare pavattānam saññānam nānattānam vā saññānam*, an interesting expression if only because *nānatta*, usually a noun, is plainly an adjective in its second occurrence, possibly in both, in which latter case *nānatte gocare* would mean 'a varied object'). V proceeds to quote *Vibhaṅga* 261 f., which says, 'What, then, is *nānattasaññā*? The notion (*saññā*), the perception (*sañjānanā*), the "state of having been made aware" (*sañjānitatta*), characteristic of one who has none of the attainments of the Sphere of Formlessness, but who is party to the mental sphere and to the sphere of mental cognition (*asamāpannassa manodhātusamaṅgissa vā manoviññānadhātusamaṅgissa vā*), are called the "notions of variety". The text adds that these notions, comprised under the mental realm and the realm of mental cognition act on distinct objects such as form, sound and the like; on variety, on what is varied in its very nature. Vd glosses the 'mental realm' by saying that there are three of them, one of 'deeds' (without effect, *kiriyā*), two of (even-

tual) fruition (*vipāka*), the first referring to the act of sensation through the five doorways, the last two to mental experience, whose effect will be wholesome or unwholesome. Kosambi refers the reader to other passages in V, whose contents shall now be summarized.

The 'uncausing' (*ahetuka*) is that which does not conduce in the event to the absence of 'greed, etc.' (*alobhādi*, where the *ādi* must refer to hatred, *dosa*, and delusion, *moha*). It is of eight kinds, viz., (1) the sense of sight (*cakkhuviññāna*), (2) of hearing (*sota*^{0}), (3) of smell (*ghāna*^{0}), (4) of taste (*jivhā*^{0}), (5) of touch (*kāyaviññāna*), (6) the mental realm whose function is mere acceptance (*sampaticchanakiccā manodhātu*), (7,8) the two realms of mental cognition whose functions are 'judgement and the other' (*santīranādikiccā dve manoviññānadhātuyo*), where the two realms are those accompanied by favourable disposition (*somanassasahagata*^{0}) and by equanimity (*upekkhāsahagataviññānadhātu*) (cf. Vd 108), and the 'other' is, presumably, decision or determination (*votthapana*). (cf. V 14.95.)

The 'mental realm' (*manodhātu*) following immediately upon sensory cognition, a realm that accepts the objective reality of the respective sensory cognition, that has the appearance of the respective object (? *tathābhāvapaccupatthānā*), takes place immediately after the departure of the respective sensory cognition. This realm of mental cognition is said to be 'without the fruition of cause' (*ahetukavipākā*, i.e., not conducing to the cessation of the three *kilesas*), to be characterized by the marks of the cognition of the six objects of sensory cognition (*salārammanavijānanalakkhanā*), to be of 'both kinds' (*duvidhā pi*), to be concerned with judgement, etc. (*santīranādikiccā*). Here, again, one has to do with judgement and determination, with favourable disposition and equanimity. (cf. V 14.97.)

Only what has no wholesome fruition is 'non-causal' (*kevalam hi akusalavipākam ahetukam eva*). Seven of the sort are specified, viz., the five sensory cognitions, the mental realm whose business is acceptance (*sampaticchanakiccā manodhātu*) and the realm of mental cognition whose business is judgement (and determination) with respect to five stations (presumably of sensory cognition, *santīranādikiccā pañcatthānā manoviññānadhātū ti*). In terms of its marks, it must be understood to be wholesome but causing no fruition (*kusalāhetukavipāka*, the latter again, in the same sense as above). (cf. V 14.101.)

There is a mental realm preceded by sensory cognition and marked by the respective cognitions, having the 'flavour of turning toward (the object', *āvajjanarasā*), giving the appearance of having the visible form (of the respective object of sensory perception) directly before one, following directly as a cause upon the severance of the subconscious) links of existence (? *bhavaṅgavicchedapadatthānā*). The said realm, finally, is said to be 'joined to equanimity'(*upekkhāyuttā*). Vd 108 says that this mental realm, which, as seen above, it characterizes as 'deed', is also called the 'direction (of the *manodhātu*) to the five (sensory) doorways' (*pañcadvārāvajjana*). (cf. V 14.107).

Here the two texts converge to speak of eight wholesome notions within the Sphere of Desire, twelve unwholesome ones (presumably within the same sphere) eleven notions having wholesome fruition within that sphere, two unwholesome (again, presumably, within the same), and eleven notions of deed (without the effect above mentioned), likewise within the same sphere, a total of forty-four, all different. On this level, there is absolutely no attention paid these various notions, no turning

toward them, no production of them in one's thought, no bringing together of them, no taking them into account (to combine the statements of both S and Vd). Again, Kosambi refers the reader to relevant passages in V 14, whose contents shall now be summarized.

There are eight varieties of cognition, which may be divided under headings of favourable disposition, equanimity, gnosis and effort (*somanassupekkhāñānasaṅkhārabhedato*). That is, there are two major divisions, depending on whether the cognition is accompanied by favourable disposition (*somanassasahagata*) or by equanimity (*upekkhāsahagata*). Each of these may be joined to gnosis *ñānasampayutta* or not (*ñānavippayutta*), thus producing four. Each of the four, again, may be with (*sasaṅkhāra*) or without (*asaṅkhāra*) effort, i.e., may or not require any prompting, whether from within or from without. (cf. V 14.83.)

'When, joyed, overjoyed at having found a receiver for a fitting gift, or at having any other cause to be favourably disposed, one exclaims, "Something has been given !", then draws all of the proper conclusions, beginning with right view, performing such meritorious deeds as giving to others, neither slackening nor requiring encouragement, then one's thought is accompanied by favourable disposition, bound to gnosis and free of effort. When, on the other hand, in spite of the joy and of the right view just mentioned, one holds back out of reluctance to part with one's possessions, or when one does the right thing only after prompting, then one's thought is one with effort. "Effort" may thus refer to deeds done whether by prompting oneself or through prompting on the part of someone else.' (cf. V 14.84, of which the above is a paraphrase, rather than a precise translation.)

A third thought is engendered when young and callow monks, favourably disposed by the appearance of a familiar face, directly give the old acquaintance whatever they have in hand, or greet him. When, on the other hand, they behave so only if urged on by friends, then yet a fourth thought is engendered. Finally, when in the absence of any of these conditions (i.e., in the absence of worthy recipients or of any other cause of favourably disposed feelings), they yet feel favourably disposed in any of the above ways, then the four thoughts produced are accompanied by equanimity. These, in sum, are the eight kinds of thought. (cf. V 14.85. It is noteworthy that *upekkhā* is here alleged to mean *somanassa* devoid of any particular cause. Vd 107 f. comments that the reluctance just mentioned is motivated by the donor's doubts as to the worthiness of the recipient.

As to the wholesome, in terms of its base, it is of one kind, i.e., belonging to the Sphere of Desire, while it has three sources ('roots', *mūlato tividham*), the familiar trio of greed (*lobha* rather than *rāga*, 'lust'), hatred and delusion. (cf. V 14.89.)

The unwholesome having its root in greed is to be viewed in terms of favourable disposition, of equanimity, of 'view' (which, unless specified, always means wrong view) and of effort, eight varieties in all. The major division is according to whether the thought is accompanied by favourable disposition (*somanassasahagata*) or by equanimity (*upekkhāsahagata*). Each of these may be either joined to views (*ditthigatasampayutta*) or separated from them (*ditthigatavippayutta*), thus making four, and any of the four may be either with (*sasaṅkhāra*) or without (*asaṅkhāra*) effort, thus making eight. (cf. V 14.90.)

If a person, proceeding from the false view that 'there is no misery (or "sin") in

desires', goes on to partake of sensual pleasures, if he occupies himself primarily with such things as sights and festivals (for which see below), his thought being keen in and of itself and requiring no external prompting, the said thought is the first of eight unwholesome ones. If the thought is slight and needs prompting, then it is the second. If, where false view is not at issue, a person (a monk must be meant) has sexual relations with a woman for the mere joy of it, or envies the success of others, or takes what belongs to another with a keen will and no encouragement from elsewhere, then the thought with which it is done is the third type. Again, if he needs prompting because he is weak of will, the thought is of the fourth type. In the absence of such favourable disposition, the thought is said to be characterized by equanimity; it too is of four kinds. (The commentary does not explain how, in the absence of both desire and false view, that is possible.)

'If he occupies himself primarily with such things as sights and festivals' renders *yadā . . . ditthamaṅgalādīni ... sārato pacceti*, whose meaning is not immediately obvious. Vd, if I have understood it correctly, takes it somewhat differently. It glosses *dittha* to mean *ditthasutamutavasena pavattitāni*, *maṅgalāni* to mean *vatakutūhalamaṅgalāni*, both to be modified by *paresam samanabrāhmanānam*. In other words, the commentary understands the expression to refer to the vows and festivals observed by othe (presumably heretical and/or non-Buddhist) monks and Brahmins on the basis of what they themselves have seen, heard or thought up, in preference to the proper practices of an orthodox Buddhist monk. It quotes *Aṅguttaranikāya* 3.230 in support: *kotūhamaṅgaliko hoti maṅgalam pacceti no kammam|*. (cf. V 14.91.)

Thought rooted in sin is of two kinds, with and without effort, i.e., prompted and unprompted, whether from within or from without. Both are accompanied by ill disposition and joined to malice (*domanassasahagatam patighasampayuttam*). It must be understood to arise when a thought, whether keen or dull, proceeds toward such objects as the taking of life. Vd says that 'keen' (*tikkha*) means 'effortless', while 'dull' (*manda*) means 'having (i.e., requiring) effort'. (cf. V 14.92.)

Thought rooted in delusion is likewise of two kinds, both accompanied by equanimity but bound in the one case to doubt (*vicikicchāsampayutta*), to agitation (*uddhacasampayutta*) in the other. It is to be understood as taking place in time of uncertainty or distraction. Here Vd identifies undertainty, *asannitthāna*, to doubt; distraction, *vikkhepa*, to agitation. (cf. V 14.93 ; review also V 14.97.)

Thought said to be 'causing' (*sahetuka*) is alleged to be of eight kinds, in terms of favourable disposition and the like, just as is the case with wholesome thought within the Sphere of Desire. The rest of this entry I simply do not understand. The brief comment in Vd is of no help, nor is Pe Maung Tin's English translation (p. 531), where one reads as follows :

> The conditioned consciousness is associated with such resultant conditions as non-greed. Like the moral of the realm of sense, it is of eight kinds through joy, and so on. But it does not, as does the moral, proceed in six objects by way of almsgiving, and so on. It proceeds in six objects included among the limited states by way of preconception, life-continuum, decease and registration. It should be understood as prompted and unprompted by way of the causal relation of arrival. Though there is no distinction among the associated states, the resultant is without potentiality like

the reflection of the face on the surface in a mirror, and so on. The moral should be understood to be possessed of potentiality like the face.[4] (cf. V 14.100 ; review also V 14.101, 107.)

There follows a passage of whose meaning I am not quite certain. It deals with the realm of mental cognition (*manoviññānadhātu*). A bit of explanation might be helpful. As has already been stated, the meeting of any of the five sense faculties, all of which are physical, with its respective object produces a cognition (*viññāna*), which, in the next moment (*khana*), constitutes the *manindriya*. The latter, unlike the other five *indriyas*, is not physical. Contact between *manindriya* and *dhamma* produces *manoviññāna*, one of the eighteen *dhātus*, and that is what we are dealing with here. As above, we render it with realm of mental cognition.

The said realm is here alleged to be of two kinds, common and uncommon (*sādhāranā asādhāranā ca*). The former is explained as follows : It has to do with deeds accompanied by equanimity and launching no effects, it is marked by a discerning cognition of the six objects (viz., the objects of the six senses, of which the last is (*manoviññāna*), it is 'flavoured' by determination of, and direction to, any of the doorways of the five senses or of the mind, and that as a matter of function ; it appears as what it is ; it originates immediately upon the departure of one of two things, viz., (1) mental consciousness/cognition that furnishes no cause of fruition or (2) a (subconscious) constituent of existence (? *ahetukavipākamanoviññānadhātubhavaṅgānam aññatarāpagamapadatthānā*). The 'uncommon realm' is said to be an uncausing deed accompanied by favourable disposition, marked by discerning cognition of the six objects, 'flavoured' by the production of laughter (or of 'mirth', *hasituppādanarasā*) at trifling affairs of *arhants* (for which see below), appearing as it is, having its origin in one corner of the heart (the heart as the seat of the intellect and of the emotions, not the physical heart). Thus, on the level of the Sphere of Desire, uncausing deeds are of three kinds (namely, one having to do with the mental realm, two with the realm of thought and activity, *cittacetasika*).

In the expression *arahatam anulāresu vatthusu hasituppādanarasā*, the word *anulāra*, here rendered with 'trifling', is glossed by Vd with *asādhārana* and *appanihita*, two words which seem to contradict each other, for the former means 'uncommon', i.e., extraordinary or distinguished, while the latter means, in this case, 'irrelevant'. (cf. V 14. 108.)

What is wholesome and does furnish a cause (sc. for the diminution of the *kilesas*) (*sahetukam . . . kusalam*) is also said, in terms of favourable disposition and the others, to be of eight varieties. The difference is that, whereas what is merely wholesome may arise in the case of ordinary folk and those still learning, what is wholesome and furnishes a cause arises only in the case of the *araham*.[5] In this way, deeds on the level of the Sphere of Desire are of eleven kinds, while those on the level of the Spheres of Form and Formlessness are, respectively, of five and of four kinds. The distinction between *arahantah* and lesser beings, mentioned above, applies in all cases. Thus, on all three stages there are twenty kinds of *kiriyaviññāna* (consciousness/cognition not conducing to the reduction of the *kilesas*).

To come back to our text(s), S 557 and V 275 say that the notions of form and resistance, mentioned above, are not present (lit., 'not seen', *na vijjante*) even when the

practitioner's existence on the level of *ākāsānañcāyatana* has been but barely produced, much less when the said practitioner is conducting himself with the said trance fully produced; that there is double reason for the absence of anything material once one has achieved this transcedence and this suppression. Since, on the other hand, as long as there are notions of variety, the 27 notions mentioned above (8 wholesome ones having to do with the Sphere of Desire, 9 notions of 'deed'—*kiriyasaññā*, 10 unwholesome ones) still exist, for this reason mention is made of 'paying them no attention'. For, as long as one does pay attention to them, the attainment of the said trance is impossible.

Vd 85 explains that the 'nine notions of deed' (*nava kiriyasaññā*) are those of 'eight motivating deeds within the realm of the Sphere of Desire' (where 'motivating' means 'furnishing a cause', sc. for the diminution of the *kilesas—attha kāmāvacarasahetukiriyā*) *plus* the 'one (thought ?) directed towards the doorway of the mind' (*ekam manodvārāvajjanam ca*). The eight, according to *Dhammasaṅgani* 122 f., correspond to V 14.83, if one will substitute 'deed' (*kiriyā*) for 'cognition' (*viññāna*). (I have a reference to pp. 58 f. and 187 in volume 4 of the Pāligranthamālā edition of the *Abhidhammatthasaṅgaha*, but the volume is not accessible.) As to the ninth, if I am not mistaken, it is the subject of V 14.107, quoted above. As to the 'ten unwholesome notions', the same commentary, *ibid.*, identifies them with the ones expounded in V 14.89-93 *minus* the two mentioned in V 14.92. (For all of these, see above)

> S and V both say, 'In summary, it is to be noted that by "outpassing notions of form" is meant the abandonment of all dhammas having to do With (the Sphere of Form ; that by "the banishment of notions of resistance" and by "paying no attention to notions of variety" are meant abandonment of, and (deliberate) inattention to, all thought and all of its concomitants within (the Sphere of) Desire.' Thus, according to both texts, both of the lower spheres are indicated, if not in so many words, yet unmistakeably.

The second sentence in the fourth proposition, it will be recalled, says, 'Free now of all notions of matter, or of any other notions, for that matter, as well as of any notion of resistance, the practitioner concludes that empty space is limitless.' (Paraphrase, not translation.) The first commentarial statement in both S and V says that 'limitless' indicates that no terminus is recognized, neither *terminus a quo* (*uppādanta*) nor *terminus ad quem* (*vayanta*) ; that the 'limitlessness' in question refers also to the thought of the practitioner, which brooks no obstacles. V adds a citation from *Vibhaṅga* 262, which says (somewhat tautologically) that *ākāsa* (open space) means 'open space', 'what is gone into open space' (*ākāsagata*), 'darkness' (*agha*), 'what is gone into darkness' (*aghagata*), an 'opening' (*vivara*), 'what is gone into an opening' (*vivaragata*). The practitioner, according to the same source, 'fixes his thought, fixes it firmly, spreads it limitlessly' (*tasmim ākāse cittam thapeti santhapeti anantam pharati*). This last is what V quotes *verbatim*. The *Vibhaṅga* concludes that the context is describing the thought, and the dhammas concomitant with thought, of one who has attained to, or been reborn in, the sphere of the infinity of space, or of one who conducts himself with joy in this very life' (i.e., without waiting for his next incarnation, *ākāsānañcāyatanam samāpannassa vā upapannassa vā ditthadhammasukhavihārissa vā*

cittacetasikā dhammā/). The final expression, *upasampajja viharati* (not translated above), is explained in S, *upasampajja* being glossed with *patvā*, 'reaching', and *nipphādetvā*, 'accomplishing, achieving', *viharati* with 'conducts himself in an appropriate attitude' (*tadanurūpena iriyāpathena viharati*). *Samāpatti* is said to be so called 'because it is the very thing to be attained' (*tad eva samāpajjitabbato* samāpatti).

V accounts in a somewhat different way for the word *ākāsānañcāyatana*: What has no limit is limitless (*nāssa anto ti anantam*). Space that is limitless is as limitless as space (*ākāsam anantam ākāsānantam*). What is as limitless as space is the limitlessness of space (*ākāsanantam eva ākāsānañcam*). For one who takes his stand in (the appropriate) power (? *adhitthānatthena*), the limitlessness of space is the region of this particular trance, as of all the dhammas connected with it, just as the region controlled by the gods is called a 'region of the gods' (*devānam devāyatanam iyāti*). *Upasampajja viharati* is explained in the same words as above.

4-5. S makes the transition to the next attainment, that of the infinity of consciousness/cognition (*viññānañcāyatana*), by repeating some of the above. It makes the point that the practitioner must abandon not only the former realm but its objects of contemplation as well. The infinity of space, becuase it is born together with the trance that takes place within it, is, for a person who takes his stand therein, the same as its region, which is why it is called the 'region of the infinity of space'. (This is likened to Cambodia, which is called 'a region of horses', but I fail to understand the likeness—*Kambojā assānam āyatanan ti ādīni viya*/)

5. The practitioner, now beyond a preoccupation with the infinity of space, concludes the infinity of conscious/cognition :

> *idha bhikkhu sabbaso ākāsānañcāyatanam samatikkamma anantam viññānam ti viññānañcāyatanam upasampajja viharati*/

S comments briefly, saying that the cognition that proceeds from spreading that of the infinity of space is one of the infinity of cognition itself. Or else, the commentary proceeds to say, it is limitless in terms of the attention paid it. It explains by saying that a person who pays unstinting attention to the cognition that has space as its object (thereby) pays it boundless attention (*so hi tam ākāsrammanaviññānam anavasesato manasi karonto anantam manasi karoti*/).

V 10.25-31 goes into the matter at greater length, but much of what it has to say is repetition. It begins with the statement that one who, being now at home in the realm of the infinity of space, wishes to progress to that of the infinity of consciousness/cognition finds that the former is, in a sense, the foe of the latter, appearing now in the guise not of tranquillity but of misery. With his new desire, the practitioner, looking on the new realm as on something tranquil, spreads his perception of space. From that is born a new cognition, one to which he must turn his attention again and again, observing it, taking note of it, reflecting upon it, making it the subject of calculation and deliberation (*punappunam āvajjitabbam manasi kātabbam paccavekkhitabbam takkāhatam vitakkāhatam kātabbam*. The infinity of it, however, is not to be the object of constant attention (*anantam anantan ti pana na manasi kātabbam*). S says that, since this cognition is directed towards infinite space, no further attention is to be directed at its infinity (? *yasmā idam viññānam anante ākāse pavattam tasmā*

puna anantam ti manasikāro na pavattetabbo).

For one who repeatedly directs his thought to the aforementioned object, all obstacles are demolished, mindfulness arises, thought is concentrated with the aid of its ancillaries. The practitioner attends to, realizes, makes much (again *āsevati bhāveti-bahulīkaroti*) of the said object again and again. Then, as in the case of the realm of infinite space, he applies his thought of the infinity of consciousness/congnition to a consciousness/cognition that is as vast as space itself. The manner of doing it as analogous to that of achieving its predecessor. (cf. V 26.)

The quotation given above, under 5., is traced to *Vibhaṅga* 245. (cf. V 27).

What was said above about the realm of the infinity of space is now said, *mutatis mutandis*, about this realm (cf. V 28-31). It is also pointed out (cf. V 31) that *viññānañca* is a conventional form of what should properly be *viññānānañca*, i.e., *viññāna & ānañca*.

6. The practitioner, now beyond his preoccupation with the infinity of consciousness/cognition, concludes that nothing whatsoever exists :

> *idha bhikkhu sabbaso viññānañcāvatanam samatikkamma natthi kiñcīti ākīcaññāyatanam upasampajja viharati|*

S comments, *mutatis mutandis*, as on the previous steps. The realm of nothingness (*akiñcaññāyatana*) takes up V 10.32-9. It too is a repetition, subject to the appropriate substitutions, of what preceded, but two paragraphs stand out, viz., 35 and 38. The former, having described the attainment of this realm in terms analogous to those seen above in connection with its predecessors, proceeds as follows :

> This, however, is the difference. When the thought of applying (the former attainments to this one) has arisen, that monk will behave as follows : Just as for example, a man, seeing a community of monks gathered in a pavilion, or some such place, for whatever purpose, goes somewhere, then, when the purpose of the meeting has been achieved, gets up and, when the monks have already left, approaches and, standing at the door, looks again at that place and sees it empty, sees it deserted, does not suppose that these so-and-so many monks are dead, or even that they are gone off in (any particular) direction, but sees the absence (of anything) as something empty, something deserted : just so (does this monk), looking at the cognition proceeding from space, as mentioned before, with the eye of gnosis of the realm of the infinity of consciousness/cognition and conducting himself accordingly, proceed by viewing the absence of the abovementioned cognition, an absence constituted by its departure once it has been concealed, by resort to the (appropriate) preparatory attention. such as telling himself, 'There is not ! There is not !'

The latter (V38) says virtually the same thing in different, even plainer language. 'By "there is nothing" (*natthi kiñci*) is meant that (the practitioner has in mind that) it "is not, is not" that it is "empty, empty, deserted, deserted".' *Vibhaṅga* 262 is then quoted : 'By "there is nothing" is meant that (the practitioner) annihilates *abhāveti*, demolishes (*vibhāveti*) conceals (*antaradhāpeti*) that very cognition, sees that there is

nothing there, which is why it is said that "there is nothing".' The text goes on to say that this is like total mastery to the point of total annihilation (? *tam kiñcāpi khayato sammasanam viya vuttam*. The three above-cited verbs *abhāveti vibhāveti antaradhāpeti* are glossed to mean that the practitioner annihilates, demolishes and conceals the said consciousness/cognition by not turning towards it, neither paying it any attention nor considering it, by paying attention only to its non-existence, to its emptiness, to the fact of its being deserted.

S, whose treatment of the issue is much briefer, says nothing not found in V. In fact, its treatment of this stage is the same, *mutatis mutandis*, as that of its predecessors. So, for that matter, is its treatment of the next stage, that of neither-perception-nor-non-perception.

7. On this last-named (*nevasaññānāsaññāyatana*), V has a good deal to say. On this stage the practitioner, now beyond even the notion that nothing exists, concludes that there is neither perception/notion nor its absence or opposite :

> *idha bhikkhu sabbaso ākiñcaññāyatanam samatikkamma nevasaññānāsaññāyatanam upasampajja viharati/*

The exposition begins in a manner already familiar. The practitioner goes on to conclude that 'perception/notion is a disease, a tumour, an arrow', whereas 'this is peaceful, excellent, this neither-perception-nor-non-perception'. He then draws further conclusions, and on them he bases actions in a manner analogous to what has been seen already.

To explain the term *nevasaññānāsaññāyatana*, V quotes *Vibhaṅga*, 263, which says that the practitioner 'has in mind the realm of nothingness as something calm, he realizes the attainment of the residue of his constituents, which is why he is called "neither perceptive nor--non-perceptive" (*tam yeva ākiñcaññāyatanam santato manasi karoti saṅkhārāvasesasamāpattim bhāveti tena vuccati nevasaññīnāsaññīti vuttam*).

The expression *santato manasi karoti* is said to mean that the practitioner regards this attainment as tranquil in the sense that the attainment is possible even by treating absence of anything as an object, 'tranquillity of object' in that sense. There follows a rhetorical question : In that case, how and why does transcendence take place? The answer is that it is due to the lack of desire for any attainment. Given the pre-occupation with tranquillity, the practitioner feels no inclination, no drive, to turn toward a certain goal, or to achieve it, or to acquire or to use it as a base, or even to reflect upon it. Why? Because the realm of neither-perception-nor-non-perception is both more tranquil than, and superior to, that of mere nothingness.

There follows a simile. A king, riding his choicest elephant along a city street, sees ivory workers and other craftsmen, one garment wrapped firmly about their bodies and another about their heads, their limbs covered with such things as ivory dust, using their skill to make ivory images and other things. He is overjoyed, saying to himself, 'What master craftsmen ! What exquisite objects they fashion !' He does not, however, entertain the thought of giving up his throne and joining them. Why? Because the glories of royalty are so far above those of craftsmanship. Thus, far from joining them, he rides right by them. The dweller in the realm of nothingness goes on in the same way to that of neither-perception-nor-non-perception. The 'attainment of the residue

of his constituents' (*saṅkhārāvasesasamāpatti*) refers to the attainment of the fourth formless trance (that of neither-perception-nor-non-perception), whose constituents have attained to extremely subtle being (? *accantasukhumabhāvappattasaṅkhāra*). (cf. V 45.)

To forestall misunderstanding of this (somewhat baffling) term, the last seven paragraphs occupy themselves with what it does, and does not, mean. First there is, to be sure, neither-perception-nor-non-perception of contemplation with its associated dhammas, but that indicates the absence merely of gross perception, while subtle perception rests present. 'Neither perception nor non-perception' refers to the mind (*mano*) and its objects (*dhamma*). (cf. V 49.)

Another possible interpretation. What perception there is cannot perform the functions of keen perception (*patusaññākicca*) : it is 'not perception' in that sense. On the other hand, because of the existence, however subtle, of the residual constituents, no more may one speak of 'non-perception'. The same applies to sensation, thought, contact and other associated dhammas ; 'perception' is merley a heading. (cf. V 50.) A simile is offered in explanation :

> A novice polished a bowl with oil and left it. When the time came to drink milk, an elder ordered him to bring a bowl. When he objected that there was oil in the bowl, the elder said,
> 'Good ! We can pour the oil into a tube.'
> The novice then objected that there was no oil. (cf. V 51.)

It is then asked what is the function of perception. The answer is acquaintance with the respective object and the engenderment of disgust once the nature of the object has been perceived. This acquaintance cannot, however, perform functions requiring keen skill, just as fire cannot burn in water, and just as, where the other attainments are concerned, nothing can perform this function so well as perception (? *sesasamāpattisu saññā viya vipassanāya visayabhavam upagantvā nibbidājananam pi kātum na sakkoti*|, cf. V 52).

Here is yet another simile :

> A novice and his master were walking , when the novice noticed some water and urged the master to take off his shoes (to wash his feet).
> 'If there is water, let us bathe,' said the master.
> 'There is no water for that, Sir,' replied the novice.

In the same way, there is no perception, but neither is there non-perception (cf. V 54).

8. *Saññāvedayitanirodhasamāpatti* is explained in a passage of S not available at the time of writing. The same commentary does say, however, that the attainments just described are *vimokkha* in the sense that they liberate their practitioners from their respective opposites.

The only other Pāli account that I have been able to find is *Pañcappakaraṇa' atthakathā* 155 f. According to the said commentary, and to the extent that I have under-

stood it, the attainment both of lack of perception and of suppression, a form of realization (i.e., meditation) proceeding from disenchantment with perceptions, goes by the name of the 'attainment of the suppression of both perceptions (or "notions") and sensations' (*tattha saññāvirāgavasena pavattabhāvanā asaññasamāpatti nāma*). It is of two kinds, viz., mundane and supramundane. The former is to be classed with the imperceptive trances of ordinary folk, the latter with that of superior beings, not to be identified with the trances of beings without perceptions. 'Imperceptive' or 'without perceptions' (*asaññā*) is closer to 'unconscious', as we might understand this term; there is a class of beings of that kind, not to be confused with those who have attained the suppression under discussion. (*iti dve saññāvedayitanirodhasamāpattiyo lokiyā ca lokuttarā ca/tattha lokiyā puthujjanassa asaññasattupikā hoti lokuttarā ariyānam sā ca nāsaññasattupikā/*).

Since, in spite of an attempt to present the above in an orderly fashion, it is less than crystal clear, an attempt shall now be made to restate its content in outline form.

A. A person who has attained to any of the four trances within the Sphere of Form sees the objects of the said trance. The viewer forms the notion that the subjective impression has the same reality as the object on which it is based. He contemplates this with respect first to himself (parts of the body are mentioned), then with respect to what is outside.
B. The practitioner sees no sign of form in himself, only outside.
C. Motivated by infinite good will, compassion, sympathetic joy and equanimity, he concentrates his attention on one person, then on one quarter, then on a larger area, until, in this way, he traverses the universe. (It is not said, however, whether this traversal is physical, or mental, or both at once.) In the process, he has no notion of 'self' or 'other'. According to one interpretation, he sees no 'form' in either.
D. He now passes on to the realm of the infinity of space.

1. 'Form' means here what it meant in the first sentence of A. It may also be a reference to the ten *kasinas*, devices preparatory to meditation, viz., contemplation of earth, water, fire, wind, blue, yellow, red, white, space and consciousness/cognition.
2. The practitioner transcends, that is, he suppresses, becomes disenchanted with, two kinds of notions of 'form'.

a. The first of these consists of fifteen *jhānas*.

(1) Five having reference to the wholesome.

(a) This limb of contemplation is bound to reflection, investigation, zest, joy and concentration.
(b) This limb has transcended reflection.
(c) This limb has transcended investigation.
(d) This limb is disillusioned with zest.
(e) This limb, from which joy has departed, is bound to equanimity and to concentration.

(2) Where the Sphere of Form is concerned, consciousness/cognition that leads to fruition (i.e., to the diminution of the *kilesas*) may be divided in five ways, as above.
(3) So may consciousness/cognition that produces no such effect.

b. The second group consists of the first nine of the ten *kasinas* (for which see D. 1. above).

(1) The realm of the infinity of space is attainable only to those who have transcended the above-described notions of 'form'.
(2) All contact between sense organs and their respective objects, as well as any notion of such contact, must be eliminated, something that cannot be achieved within the Sphere of Form.
(3) The elimination of what has just been mentioned must be followed by the elimination of all notions of variety, purely mental notions, to be sure, but directed at varied objects such as shape, sound, etc.

(a) The first of these mental realms is that of deeds without effect, which means without the wholesome effect of the elimination of greed, hatred and delusion. This, in turn, in of eight kinds :

(1) the sense of sight ;
(2) the sense of hearing ;
(3) the sense of smell ;
(4) the sense of taste ;
(5) the sense of touch ;
(6) the mental realm whose function is the mere acceptance of what impinges on the mind ;
(7), (8) the two realms of mental cognition whose function, are judgement and decision, the realms being accompanied by favourable disposition (*somanassasahagata*) and by equanimity (*upekkhāsahagata*).

(b) The second is the mental realm as conventionally understood, i.e., a sensory cognition that has just taken place. This too has to do with judgement and determination.
(c) This mental realm is wholesome in and of itself, but does not conduce to the abovementioned wholesome effect. (?)
(d) This mental realm is turned towards its respective object. (?)

3. Forty-four notions within the Sphere of Desire, to which, however, no attention is paid on this level.

(a) First are eight wholesome notions, connected, by way of illustration, with gift-giving. The giving may be accompanied by favourable disposition or by equanimity, either may be joined to gnosis, and any of the four may be with or without effort (i.e., prompting, whether on the part of oneself or of someone else).

(b) Second are twelve unwholesome notions. First are eight, motivated whether by greed, by hatred or by delusion. They involve surrender to the passions, whether by 'favourable disposition' (i.e., with a will) or with 'equanimity' (i.e., with an indifferent feeling). Either of these may be bound to false view (the view that there is nothing wrong with surrender to passion) or not. Any of these four may take place with or without effort (which, here too, refers to prompting, whether on one's own or on another's part). To these eight are added two, based on malice, whether requiring prompting or not. Murder is given as an example. Finally, there are two based on delusion, which in turn may be due either to uncertainty or to agitation.

(c) Next are eleven notions having wholesome fruition, i.e., diminution of the *kilesas*, within the Sphere of Desire. (?)

(d) Next are two notions having unwholesome fruition within the Sphere of Desire. (?)

(e) Last come eleven notions of deed without effect, i.e., without wholesome effect. Eight are as described above in D. 3. a.b. To them are to be added three kinds of deeds on the level of the Sphere of Desire, one having to do with the mental realm, two with thought and its concomitants. (?)

4. All notions of form and resistance must be abandoned if one is to attain to the realm of the infinity of space.

E. The next step is the realm of the infinity of consciousness/cognition.

1. The notion of the infinity of cognition is a result of applying one's cognition to the infinity of space.
2. One pays repeated, but not unending, attention to this new realm, regarding it as something that has liberated one from the former one.

F. From the infinity of consciousness/cognition, the practitioner proceeds to the realm in which nothing exists.

1. The emphasis is on the notion that 'there *is* nothing', not that 'there is *not* anything'.
2. The consciousness/cognition just mentioned is demolished by resolutely paying it no attention, except possibly to its emptiness.

G. Realizing now that any perception is a hindrance to salvation, the practitioner now rises above perception and even above non-perception, which latter is inconceivable except as the opposite of perception.

1. He moves to this quite naturally, given his preoccupation with tranquillity, but this is not to be misunderstood as the desire for any particular attainment
2. There is, to be sure, no gross perception, but there is subtle perception.
3. Another interpretation is that, while there is no keen perception, yet there is no total absence of perception.

H. Last comes the suppression not only of perception/notion but of all sensation as well.

The same issue is treated, needless to say, in the tradition that culminated in the *Abhidharmakośa*. The verses at issue, 8.32 ff., shall be given in Sanskrit, quoted from V.V. Gokhale, 'The Text of the *Abhidharmakośa* of Vasubandhu', *Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bombay*, New Series, vol. 22. (1946), p. 99. These shall be followed by the translation found in LVP 8.203-11. A paraphrase of the *bhāsya* shall then be given, based on the edition of P.V. Pradhan (to be referred to as 'PVP'), p. 454 ff., aided by Yaśomitra's commentary (*Sphutārthā nāmĀbhidharmakośavyakhyā*, ed. 'Unrai Wogihara', i.e., Ogiwara Unrai, to be referred to as 'W') by Hsüan-tsang's translation (ed. Saeki Kyokuga, to be referred to as 'K' under the tittle *Kandō Abidatsumakusha ron*). Both K and LVP refer to other material, the former most specifically to Hsüan-tsang's translation of the *Abhidharmamahāvibhāśā*. They shall be cited as the need is felt. There is, in fact, a great deal of information in the *Mahāvibhāsā*, but treatment of most of it must be reserved for later. The verses read as follows :

astau vimoksāh prathamāv aśubhā dhyānayor dvayoh/
trtīyo 'ntye sa cālobhah śubhārūpyāh samāhitāh//32//
nirodhas tu samāpattih sūksmasūksmād anantaram/
svaśuddhakādharāryena vyutthānam cetasā tatah//33//
kāmāptadrśyavisayāh prathamā ye tv arūpinah/
te nvayajñānapaksordhvasvabhūduhkhādigocarāḥ//34//

LVP translates the above as follows :

Les Vimoksas sont au nombre de huit. Les deux premiers sont méditation de l'horrible; dans deux *dhyānas*. Le troisiéme dans le dernier *dhyāna* ; il est non désir. Ārūpyas bons et de l'ordre du recueillement. La *nirodhasamāpatti*. A la suite d'une pensée subtile-subtile. Sortie dans une pensée "pure" de la terre de la dite *samāpatti*, ou dans une pensée *ārya* inférieure. Les premiers ont pour objet le visible du Kāma; quant à ceux qui sont "immatériels", tout ce qui appartient à l' *anvayajñāna*, la douleur de leur terre et d'une terre supérieure, etc.

The *bhāsya* begins by listing the eight deliverances. The *Vyākhyā* gives them in fuller form. They follow below in Sanskrit, accompanied by LVP's translation.

a. *rūpī rūpāni paśyati*/(For more on this, see below.)
b. *adhyātmam arūpsamjñī bahirdhā rūpāni paśyati*/ 'N'ayant pas la notion des

visibles intérieurs, il voit les visibles extérieurs.'

c. *śubham vimoksam kāyena sāksātkrtvopasampadya viharati*/ 'Se rendant présent le Vimoksa agréable, il demeure dans ce recueillement.'

d. *sarvaśo rūpasamjñānām samatikramāt pratighasamjñānām astamgamān nānātvasamjñānām amanasikārād anantam ākāśam anantam ākāśam ity ākāśānantyātanam upasampadya viharati tad yathā devā ākāśānantyāyatanopagāh*/

e. *punar aparam sarvaśa ākāśānantyātanam samatikramyānantam vijñānam anantam vijnānam iti vijñānānanātyātanam upasampadya viharati tad yathā devā vijnānānantyāyatanopagāh*/

f. *punar aparam sarvaśo vijñānānantyāyatanam samatikramya nāsti kim cid ity ākiñcanyāyatanam upasampadya viharati tad yathā devā ākiñcanyāyatanopagāh*/

g. *punar aparam sarvaśa ākiñcanyāyatanaṃ samatikramya naivasamjnānāsamjñāyatanam upasampadya viharati tad yathā devā naivasamjñānāsamjñāyatanopagāh*/

h. *punar aparaṃ sarvaśo naivasamjñānāsamjñayatanam samatikramya samjñāveditanirodhaṃ kāyena sāksātkrtvopasampadya viharaty ayam astama vimoksa iti*/ 'Les Vimoksas 4-7 sont les quatre recueillements d' Ārūpya; le huitiéme Vimoksa est la *samjñāveditanirodhasamāpatti*.'

The first two of these correspond to the contemplation of the uncleanness of the body, first of one's own, then of those of others, specifically the contemplation, in one's own imagination, of a discoloured body. (This is the initiation of the first of the Fou tations of Mindfulness.) Just as one counteracts the natural tendency toward attachment to physical life by contemplating physical filth, so one counteracts lust by cultivating non-greed, which latter is produced by human beings, with regard to the visible objects in the Sphere of Desire, in the said sphere itself and in all the trances of the Sphere of Form, as well as in their intermediate stages. The very first of the Eight Deliverances, as LVP himself says (8.204 f., n. 2), is 'difficile d'interpréter'. *Mahāvyutpatti* 70, supported by Paramārtha, Hsüan-tsang and Harivarman (albeit in Chinese only), gives *adhyātmam rūpasamjñī bahirdhā rūpāni paśyati*, while 688 reads *rūpīvrūpānīti*/ *svātmani rūpāṇi vibhāvya bahir api rūpāṇi paśyati*/ *vinīlakādyālambanatvāt*/ LVP interprets *vibhāvya*, by recourse to *Atthasālinī* 163, in the sense of 'faire disparaître' (*antaradhāpana*).

Apart from saying that the first two vimoksas are found only in the first two *dhyānas*, the *bhāsya* says little beyond what has been restated above. It is to be noted that the first two *vimoksas* are not considered independently of each other. In the first *dhyāna* they counteract the sensual attachment of the Sphere of Desire, while in the second *dhyāna* they counteract those of the first. The text specifies 'attachment to colour' (*kāmāvacaraprathamadhyānabhūmikayor varnarāgayoh pratipaksena yathāsaṃkhyam*/).

The third *vimoksa* operates only in the fourth *dhyāna*, while the next four, as already seen, correspond to the four contemplative states of the Sphere of Formlessness. The first three *vimokṣas* are characterized by lack of desire (*alobha*), but the third alone does not cultivate the view of uncleanness (*aśubhābhāvanā*), being pure by nature. The next four are pure and collected, unlike the moment of death (in which *samādhi* is impossible).

Hsüan-tsang (K29.4a) begins, as does the Sanskrit, by cataloguing the eight *vimoksas*. He proceeds to say that the first three have the nature of freedom from greed because they counteract greed at close quarters *pa chung ch'ien san wu t'an wei hsing chin ch'ih t'an ku*, which LVP 8.205, n. l, renders, *Les* deux *premiers sont de leur nature, non-désir parce qu'ils contrecarrent le désir*. The translator must have misread *san* as *erh*. K. 29.5, in a note, refers to *Mahāvibhāsā* 84 (T27.434b), which says the following :

. . . (A rather detailed statement of the eight *vimoksas* has just been made.) . . .

Q. What is the nature of these Eight Deliverances?

A. The first three have the wholesome root of freedom from greed as their nature, since they all counteract greed (*ch'u san chieh t'o yi wu t'an shan ken wei tzu hsing chieh tui ch'ih t'an ku, trayah prathamā vimoksā alobhakuśalamūlasvabhāvāh sarvalobhapratipaksatvāt*?). If one takes into account everything connected with, and everything resulting from (the Three Spheres?), then one must conclude that, on the level of the Sphere of Desire, the Eight Deliverances are of the nature of the four aggregates *yi ssu yün wei tzu hsing, catuhskandhasvabhāvāh*), of all five on the level of the Sphere of Form, of four again on that of the Sphere of Formlessness, of the *viprayuktasamskāraskandha* (*sic, pu hsiang ying hsing yün*) on the level of *samjñāveditanirodhasamāpatti*.

This is followed by several lines of explanation of the meaning of, and of the reasons for, the word 'deliverance' (*chieh t'o, vimoksa*). In the course of this latter is given what must be the reason for the statement that the *vimokṣas* within the Kāmadhātu have the nature of only four of the five *skandhas* : they are dominated by a lack of desire, presumably for material things, hence for *rūpa*, the first of the five. In the case of the Ārūpyadhātu, the absence of the first *skandha* is self-explanatory. In a passage found neither in the Sanskrit nor in Paramārtha's Chinese translation, Hsüan-tsang adds that, when the Scriptures say *hsiang kuan* (for *samjñī paśyati*) they do so only because 'notion' and 'view' predominate (i.e., are not present to the exclusion of other things).[6]

Hsüan-tsang proceeds to say that the first two *vimoksas* 'are present and functioning in the mark of impurity' (*san chung ch'u erh pu ching hsiang chuan*) because they 'produce aspects' such as blueness and festering,[7] while the third 'is present and functioning in the mark of purity' because it 'produces a bright, fresh aspect' (*ti san chieh t'o ch'ing ching hsiang chuan tso ching kuang hsien hsing hsiang chuan ku*). What is said next is close to the original: The first three *vimoksas*, together with their 'auxiliary companions' (*chu pan*), have the nature of the five *skandhas*. Of them, the first two are common to both the first and the second *dhyāna*, for it is by recourse to them that they can govern (*ch'ih*, i.e., counteract) the 'lust for colour' (*hsien se t'an, varnarāga*) on the level of the Kāmadhātu and of the first *dhyāna*. The third, says Hsüan-tsang in agreement with the Sanskrit, is based on the fourth *dhyāna*, but he proceeds to give the reason : on the said level, one's thought is purified of the eight *apaksālas*.[8] Furthermore, says Hsüan-tsang, 'other soils also have similar deliverances, but they are not specified (here), because they do not increase (or "develop", *yü ti yi yu hsiang ssu chieh t'o erh pu chien li fei tseng shang ku*)'. K's interlinear annotation says that the first two vimoksas are found in the third and fourth *dhyānas* as well as

in the Kāmadhātu, but the latter part of the statement is puzzling.

The next four *vimokṣas*, as already seen, are the four *dhyānas* of the Sphere of Formlessness.[9] The *Vyākhyā* describes them in terms already familiar from the Pāli :

(4) Once beyond notions of form, resistance and variety, the practitioner finds himself in the realm of the infinity of space, which is also the name of one of the god-worlds.

(5) Once beyond that, he concludes the same about cognition/consciousness, thus arriving in the realm of the infinity of this latter, likewise a god-world.

(6) Beyond this now, he concludes that there is nothing at all, thus arriving in the realm of nothingness, another god-world.

(7) Finally beyond this too, he reaches the stage at which there is neither notion (perception) nor the absence of it, still another god-world.

Omitting some other comments, before going on to the eighth *vimokSa* let us dwell on a fanciful etymology given for the word itself. The *vimuktimārga* is so called because it implies *vaimukhya*, turning one's face away from something.[10]

The last of the *vimoksas* is, as already indicated, *samjñāveditanirodhasamāpatti*. Once in it, one may fall back to (6) or (7), depending on whether one's thought of the moment is pure or impure.

Before going on to general remarks about the Eight Deliverances, one will pursue some of the references given by LVP (8.207, n. 2). The same source (5.203 f.) has a summary description of *nirodhasamāpatti* (much of it in contrast with *āsamjñisamāpatti*, which latter, however, we omit) in which the following points are made :

(1) It is practised by certain denizens of the Sphere of Formlessness because they regard it as a form of collected tranquillity, not because they regard it as a way out.

(2) It belongs to *bhavāgra*, i.e., to *naivasamjñānāsamjñāyatana*, the highest stage in the Sphere of Formlessness.

(3) It is good (*kuśala*), neither morally neutral (*avyākrta*) nor sullied (*klista*, *sāsrava*).

(4) It may be rewarded with *nirvāna* in this very life or, later, with another birth in *bhavāgra*.

(5) It is beyond the reach of the *prthagjana*, because of the latter's fear of the loss of his physical form and life.

(6) Mere detachment is not enough; exercise, effort is necessary for its attainment.

In the *Cūlavedallasutta* there is a conversation (*Majjhimanikāya* 1.301 f.) between the Buddha and the lay brother Visākha concerning *saññāvedayitanirodhasamāpatti*. In rough paraphrase, it is as follows :

Q. What is the meaning of *sa°* ?

A. The monk who achieves *sa°* never imagines that he is about to achieve it, or in the process of achieving, or that he has already achieved it. For he has already realized the thought that conveys one to Thusness.

Q. Which *dhammas* are first suppressed by one achieving *sa°* ? Is it the impulse to bodily action, to vocal action or to mental action ?

A. First is vocal action, then bodily, finally mental.

Q. How does one emerge from *sa°* ?

A. The monk, in emerging from *sa°*, does not imagine that he is about to emerge

from it, or in the process of emerging, or that he has already emerged. For he has already realized the thought that conveys one to Thusness.

Q. Which dhammas are first produced by one emerging from *sa°* ? Is it the impulse to bodily action, to vocal action or to mental action ?

A. First is mental action, then bodily, finally mental.

Q. When a monk has emerged from *sa°*, how many impacts touch him ?[11]

A. Three, those of emptiness, signlessness and wishlessness.

Q. When a monk has emerged from *sa°*, to what is his thought inclined ?

A. To seclusion.

In the *Māratajjanīyasutta*, there is an incident (*ibid.* 333 f.) in which Mahāmoggallāna (Mahāmaudgalyāyana) tells Māra of a certain Sañjīva who has achieved *sa°* under a tree, where he was seated so motionless that the cowherds, shephered, farmers and passers-by, taking him for dead, cremated him and went off. When night had passed, the monk Sanjīva got up and went about, as usual, with his alms-bowl seeking his daily nourishment, to the amazement of the very persons who had taken him for dead.[12]

The *Tapussasutta* describes the four *jhānas* of the Sphere of Formlessness. That of *Saññnavedayitanirodhasamāpatti*, found in *Aṅguttaranikāya* 4.447 f., has the following to say. The Buddha is speaking to Ānanda, describing His own attainment of the four Ārūpyas. He has just finished discussing *nevasaññānāsaññāyatana.*

> It then occurred to Me to leave *nevasaññānāsaññāyatana* for *saññāvedayitanirodhasamāpatti.* At that, however, My thought neither leapt forward eagerly nor was it particularly delighted, it neither took a stand nor was it delivered, as I looked at it as at something calm. I then realized that I had never seen any misery in *ne°* nor, on the other hand, frequented it, while I had never gained any advantage from, nor practised *sa°*, which accounted for My reactions (or, rather, My lack of them). It then occurred to Me that, should I frequent *ne°* in full awareness of its disadvantages, should I practise *sa°* in full awareness of its advantages, it was then indeed possible that My thought might, in fact, leap forward eagerly to the latter and be delighted thereby, take a stand therein and be delivered, as I viewed it as something calm. It is thus that, transcending *ne°*, I conducted Myself in the attainment of *sa°*, thus that, through a view by resort to Wisdom, My outflows reached extinction.

While there is room for more comment on the eighth *vimoksa*, we content ourselves with calling the reader's attention to LVP 8.207 f., where the translation and annotation contain much that is useful. The corresponding *vyākhyā* will be found in W 689.

The *bhāsya* proceeds to say, commenting on the first two words in *śloka* 34a, *kāmāvacaram esām rūpāyatanam ālambanam amanojñam manojñam ca yathāyogam*/ (PVP 456), which LVP 8.209 renders, 'Les trois premiers Vimoksas ont pour objet le *rūpa* du Kāmadhātu, *rūpa* déplaisant (*amanojña*) en ce qui concerne les deux premiers, *rūpa* plaisant en ce qui concerne le troisiéme.'

The remainder of the *śloka* is said by the *bhāsya* to mean that the objects of the *vimoksas* in the Sphere of Formlessness are (a) woe on the practitioner's own level or (b) above, the (c) cause and (d) suppression of that woe, (e) the totality of *anvaya-*

jñāna,[13] (f) the suppression of *dharmas* for want of a productive cause (*apratisamkhyā-nirodha*)[14] and (g) empty space (*ākāśa*).

It will be recalled that the *vimoksas* were said to be achieved within the first, second and fourth *dhyānas*. The *bhāsya* now asks why not within the third as well. There are two reasons. The first is the absence, within the second *dhyāna*, of the lust for colour. The second is that the said *dhyāna* is 'agitated by the mass of (its own) pleasure' (*dvitīyadhyānabhūmikavarnarāgābhāvāt sukhamandeñjitatvāc ca*). In that case, it is asked, how does the practitioner contrive to produce the pure (third) *vimokSa* ?[15] The purpose of doing so, it is said, is to give the practitioner respite ('joy', *pramodayitum*) from the weariness of the unclean, or else to let him know whether he has in fact achieved deliverance from the first two (unwholesome) *vimoksas*. He has been successful, the practitioner tells himself, if, when he is paying attention even to the unclean, no defilements arise within him.[16] For the achievement of such things as the *vimokṣas* have two motives : removal of the *kleśas* and the acquisition of power over the attainments (*kleśadūrīkaranārtham samāpattivaśitvārtham ca*).

The next passage in the *bhāsya* (PVP 456) reads *aranādiguṇābhinirhārāya āryāyāś ca rddheh/sā punar yayā vastuparināmādhisthānāyurutsargādīni kriyante/*, rendered by LVP (8.210), 'Cette maîtrise a pour effet la production des qualités, telles que l' Aranā, etc., et la production de la Ṛddhi des Āryas : le pouvoir surnaturel par lequel un saint transforme ou fait durer les choses, renonce à la vie, etc.' The *Vyākhyā* (W 690) says that the *ādi* in *utsargādīni* implies magical powers such as the ability to enclose Mount Sumeru in an atom of dust.

'Production' renders *abhinirhāra*, for which LVP 8.210, n. 2, refers the reader to a number of other works, notably Sylvain Lévi's translation of the *Mahāyānasūtrālamkāra*, where, in n. 1 to 4.12 (p. 36), the translator says,' . . . Mot bouddhique. Bohtlingk le donne dans son supplément final avec une référence à la *Jātakamālā* et propose comme traduction "*Anweisung*, indication". Le tibétain traduit régulièrement *sgrub pa*, qui sert aussi régulièrement à traduire *sādh*, *sidh*, "accomplir". En pāli, sous la forme *abhinīhāra*, Childers le rend par "sérieux désir, aspiration". Les éditeurs du *Divyāvadāna* . . . proposent comme traduction "obtenir". Mais le sens de "produire, réaliser" . . . est garanti par de trés nombreux passages ; . . .' In closing, M. Levi refers the reader to 18.53 of the *Mahāyānasūtrālamkāra* itself, where there is a list of six *abhinirhāras*, and where the Chinese version has *ch'eng chiu*, "accomplir".

Aranā is a problem all to itself. We content ourselves here with the principal passage in the *Kośa* and with passages dealing with *aranāsamādhi* in Abhidharma works available only in Chinese. To begin with the former, 7.35 f. reads as follows :

śisyasādhāranā anye dharmāh ke cit prthagjanaih /
aranāpranidhijñānapratisamvidgunādayah //35//
samvrtijñānam aranā dhyāne 'ntye 'kopyadharmanah /
nrjānutpannakāmāptasavastukleśagocarāh //36//

LVP's translation of the *ślokas* and the corresponding *bhāsya*, 7.85 ff., quoted selectively, is as follows :

Nous avons expliqué les qualités propres au Tathāgata.

35. 11 y a d'autres qualités du Bouddha qui lui sont communes avec les Śaiksas

et les Prthagjanas : l'*aranā*, le *pranidhijñāna*, les *pratisamvids*, les *abhijñās*, etc.

Bhagavat possède d'innombrables qualités qui lui sont communes soit avec les autres Āryas, soit avec les Pṛthagjanas aussi : *araṇāsamādhi*, *praṇidhijñāna*, quatre *pratisamvids*, *abhijñās*, huit *samāpattis*, trois *samādhis*, quatre *apramāṇas*, huit *vimoksas*, huit *abhibhvāyātanas*, dix *krtsnāyatanas*, etc.—Les trois premiers sont communs aux Bouddhas et aux Āryas ; les *abhijñās*, *dhyānas*, etc. peuvent aussi appartenir aux Prthagjanas.

En ce qui concerne l'Aranā, [c'est-à-dire "le pouvoir d'empêcher la naissance dea passion d'autrui"].[17]—Les Arhats savent que la souffrance des êtres est produite par leurs passions; ils savent qu'ils sont eux-mêmes le meilleur des champs de mérite ; ils craignent qu'autrui ne produise à leur endroit des passions [qui lui seraient particulièrement nocives]; ils rêalisent donc un savoir de telle nature qu'autrui ne produira pas à leur endroit attachement sensuel, haine, etc. Ce *samskāra* —ce savoir—met un terme, chez les etres, à ce *rana*—querelle, bataille, cause de souillure et tourment—qu'est la passion : il recoit donc le nom d'Aranā.

Quels sont les caractéres du recueillement qu'on nomme *araṇāsamādhi*?

36. L'Aranā est savoir d'ordre mondain ; du domaine du quatriéme *dhyāna*; produit par un homme qui est un Inébranlable. Elle porte sur les passions du domaine du Kāmadhātu, futures, ayant un objet réel.

Elle est uniquement savoir d'ordre mondain, *samvrtijñāna*—comme il résulte de son objet. Elle a pour point d'appui le quatrième *dhyāna*, qui est le meilleur des chemins aisés. Elle est produite par les Arhats inébranlables et non par les autres: car ceux-ci ne sont pas capables de supprimer radicalement leurs propres passions—ils sont en effet sujets à la chute—à plus forte raison ne peuvent-ils arrêter les passions d'autrui. Elle est produite par l'homme, car c'est seulement un être de destinée humaine qui peut la cultiver dans les trois *dvīpas*.

Elle porte sur les passions d'autrui, du Kāmadhātu, futures, "ayant un objet réel": "Puissent les passions d'autrui ne pas naître à mon sujet!" Les passions *savastuka* sont *rāga*, *dvesa*, etc., qui sont abandonnés par la méditation.

Les passions d'autrui *avastuka*, qui sont abandonnées par la vue, ne sont pas susceptibles d'être arrêtées, car les *kleśas* universels, portant sur l'ensemble de leur terre, portent aussi sur la série d'autrui.

Telle est l'Aranā.

The *akopyadharman* is an *arhant* capable of attaining to deliverance at will and not subject to backsliding. cf. LVP 6.251 f. For *avastuka*, cf. *ibid.* 257 :

Pourquoi ne tombe-t-on pas du premier fruit ?

Parce que les passions à abandonner par la vue n'ont pas de point d'appui (*avastuka-anadhisthāna*) : en effet, ayant pour racine la *satkāyadṛṣṭi*, elles existent avec, pour point d'appui l'*ātman* ; or il n'y a pas d' *ātman*.[18]

To terminate the discussion of *aranā*, it would be well to look at *Māhāvibhāsā* 179 (T27. 898a-900b). Though the Abhidharma in Chinese translation has much more to say on the subject, for reasons of relevance (and of space) we confine ourselves to this one passage, which, in paraphrase, has the following to say :

The topic is the meaning of 'action free of strife' (*wu cheng hsing*, i.e., *aranāvihāra*). Before the question proper is dealt with, however, another question is posed, namely, an inquiry, into the motive underlying the discussion itself. The purpose is then

stated to be that of clarifying the meaning of Scripture. For the Scripture says, without, however, explaining itself, 'Among My disciples, the *bhiksu* Good Appearance (*shan hsien*, i.e., *subhūti*) is the first of those who dwell in strifeless action.'[19] Since this is obviously a fundamental matter for the Scripture in question, and since the said Scripture does not say what is meant by 'strifeless action', the treatise takes up the question.

Q. What, then, is 'strifeless action'?

A. When an *arhant*, any *arhant*, arrives skilfully at the internal, but the external does not match it, as is usual, this is not what is meant. When, however, he arrives at the external as well, this is called 'strifeless action'. By 'internal' are meant the *kleśas* within oneself, while by 'external' are meant those within others. Severance of these *kleśas* is what is meant by '*skilful arrival*'. All *arhants* have severed the *kleśas* within themselves, but not necessarily those within others. If they can achieve the latter as well, this is called 'strifeless action'.

There are some who say that 'time' (implied in the word 'when', as it appears above) refers to the three periods into which daytime is divided, meaning that 'skilful arrival' suggests the severance of the *kleśas* in a single day. There are others who say that the reference is to the three periods into which the day is divided and the three watches into which the night is divided, i.e., to the severance of the *kleśas* in the space of a single day and night. The Venerable Fine Sound (*miao yin*, *ghoṣaka*) says that the term 'strifeless action' has no reference to the severance of one's own *kleśas*, but only to those of others, for strife is directed against others, not against oneself.

Q. Why is the severance ('obstruction', *che chih*) of the *kleśas* called 'skilful arrival' (*shan ta*)?

A. It is only when application and intuitive wisdom come to the fore (*yao yu fang pien chüeh hui hsien ch'ien, yadaiva prajñāprayogau prādurbhavatah ?*) that one can obstruct the *kleśas* ; this is the reason for the expression.

Q. What is meant, now, by 'strifeless action'?

A. It means causing others to have no issue of defilement (*tsa hui chuan, sambhinnapravrtti* ?) (toward oneself). This means that the *kleśas* befoul one in a variety of ways, as would spittle and urine, dust and pine tar, or any assortment of impurities. One who has attained to strifelessness is not befouled by these things in others. That is to say, he keeps them far from himself. There are some who hold that the text should say, in effect, that the gainer of strifelessness, just as he severs his own *kleśas* without residue, does so for others as well, i.e., universally, including the *kleśas* one might expect him to excite in others. There are still others who hold that the text should say, in effect, there is no issue of discrimination (*ch'a pieh chuan, viśesapravrtti* ?) where are others are concerned ; in other words, that, just as he can block *kleśas* in a close familiar, preventing them from coming into existence, so can he do for enemies and neutrals. In other words, in this respect, he treats all equally.

Q. What difference is there between 'skilful attainment of the interior' and 'no issue of defilement'?

A. The former refers to wisdom, while the latter signifies the non-arisal of the *kleśas*. Furthermore, the *arhant* does five things that keep *kleśas* from arising in others, namely, the following :

1. He purifies his postures and attitudes (*ching wei yi lu, īryāpathān viśodhayati*?). That is to say, the *arhant* sits still in one place. If anyone arrives, he examines the latter's thought, in order to determine how not to engender in him feelings that may bind him. If he concludes that what he is doing will in fact bind the other person, then he adopts a different posture or attitude ; if not, then he persists in the present one. This is true whatever the posture or attitude may be.

2. He speaks or keeps silent at the appropriate times. The *arhant* observes the mind of the newcomer, to determine whether he should talk to him or be quiet. If, upon observation, he sees that by speaking he will engender feelings that will bind that person, then, however much he may wish to speak, still he will remain silent. If he sees that silence will have that effect, then, however reluctant he may be to speak, still he will do so. If, instead of sitting, he is walking on a road on which he sees two persons approaching, he will observe immediately which of the two he is to address first. If, upon observation, he sees that by talking to the one he will engender in the other feelings that will bind him, then he will talk to the other one first, or *vice versa*. If talking to both at once will engender such feelings in both, then he talks to neither ; if he sees that silence will have the same undesirable effect, then he will speak. If he sees that he will engender feelings that bind whether he speaks or keeps silent, then he will avoid that road altogether.

3. He weighs carefully his goings and his stayings. Wherever he happens to be, the arhant asks himself, upon close examination, whether to stay or to leave. If he sees that by staying he will engender in others feelings that will bind them, then, however tranquil, however well-appointed and luxurious, however agreeable the place may be, he will abandon it and go off. If he sees that by leaving he will engender such feelings, then, however uncomfortable the place may be, however devoid of necessities, however disagreeable, he will force himself to stay there.

4. He discriminates between what to accept and what not to accept. If the *arhant* has a donor who provides him with things, then he examines the latter's thought to decide whether or not to accept them. If upon examination he sees that by accepting them he will engender in the donor feelings that will bind him, then, though the things may be necessities, still he will not accept them. If he sees that by refusing them he will engender such feelings, then, though he does not need them, he will go out of his way to accept them.

5. He observes the *pudgala*. When an *arhant* is about to enter a city, a town, a street, an alley or someone's house in order to beg for his food, he observes the men and women, the adults and children there, to be sure that none of them may give rise to *kleśas* with regard to him. If he knows that they will not, then he enters the house and begs for his food. If he knows that they will, then, however hungry he may be, he will not enter.

There is none so discriminating as the *arhant* (? *wu ju shih shih wei fen pieh ku*). For he says to himself, 'If all living beings, at the sight of me, should give rise to *kleśas*, then I should go to a place where there were no living beings, there to starve to death. At least I should never cause anyone on my account to give rise to feelings that would bind him.' If an *arhant* resorts to these five kinds of action, then he can obstruct *kleśas* in others and stop them coming to the fore.

Q. Why does the *arhant*, even after having attained deliverance, still bind himself to the practice of these *dharmas*?

A. The *arhant* is, before all else, a member of the *bodhisattvagotra*. As such, he cannot bear to have living beings bring suffering on themselves by doing evil. In order to save them from that, he keeps this thought constantly in mind : 'Since time without beginning, for these beings' sakes, I have been in mutual ties with them, spinning like a wheel in the five destinies, suffering violent pain. May I have the good fortune to escape, then to save them as well !' He also has this thought : 'Since time without beginning I have been now a singing and dancing girl, now a whore, then other such filthy, degraded persons, such that a hundred thousand multitudes of beings became attached to me. If even then (in spite of my *bodhisattvagotra*), I could suffer woe throughout the long night of time, how much the less, now that I am separated from lust (for the unwholesome), hatred (for the wholesome) and delusion (that blinds one to the difference between the two), now that I am a field of merit (*fu t'ien, punyakṣetra*) for the world, should they bring suffering on themselves even if they are attached to me ! I will not, then, once more become a cause or condition of *kleśas*!'[20]

Q. When you say that the arhant's purpose is to obstruct *kleśas* in others, are you referring to those of particular characteristics (*tzu hsiang, svalaksaṇa*) or to those of general characteristics?[21] (*Kung Hsiang, Sāmānyalakṣaṇa*)

A. Only those of particular characteristics, not those of general. The reason is that general *kleśas* may, according to circumstance, apply at one and the same time to a whole sphere,[22] a whole land, a whole place, or a whole person,[23] whether to the fact of clinging to 'I' and 'mine' (*wo wo so, ahamkāramamakāra*), or to permanence and impermanence (*tuan ch'ang, śāśvatoccheda*), or to the denial of cause and effect (*po wu*, which seems to be short for *po wu yin kuo*, i.e., *hetuvipākāpavāda*), to one's own rôle as a purifier (? *huo chih neng ching*), or whether it applies to the rise of hesitation (*yu yü saṃdeha*), of nescience (*wu ming, avidyā*) or to uncertainty (? *pu liao*, for *aniyama* ?). The fact remains that all beings act pretty much at will, and that it is impossible to control them all at once. This is why only particular *kleśas* are obstructed.

Q. What is the nature of 'strifeless action'? Is it concentration (*ting, samādhi*) *dhyāna* or is it wisdom (*hui, prajñā*)? For, whichever of the two it may be, there are difficulties. If it is concentration, how is one to understand one of the preceding passages, the one that reads, 'When . . . [the *arhant*] arrives at the external . . ., this is called "strifeless action".'? 'Arrive' surely implies wisdom. If, on the other hand, if it is wisdom, then how is one to interpret another statement, one that says that one must cultivate the strifelessness of calm concentration? [24]

A. It is wisdom.

Q. If so, then I come back to my previous question, the one concerning the cultivation of the strifelessness of calm concentration.

A. The expression was a proper one, indicating that the said action has something in common with concentration. Yet, in fact, it is wisdom. Indeed it might have been better to speak of the cultivation of the strifelessness of calm wisdom.[25]

Q. What is meant by 'strifeless action'?

A. It is called 'strifeless action' because of its ability to counter the strife produced by others' *kleśas*. 'Strife', however, is of three kinds, namely, that of the *kleśas*, that of the *skandhas* and that of contention (*tou cheng*). The 'strife of the *kleśas*' refers to the 108 *kleśas*.[26] The 'strife of the *skandhas*' refers to death.[27] The 'strife of contention' means that beings are constantly violating and insulting one another, their speech

being in discord. This, in sum, is what is meant by the 'strife of the *kleśas*'. The *arhant's* action is motivated by his wish to keep the beings from producing *kleśas*. There is another view as to the meaning of 'strifeless action', namely, that it is so called because of its ability to banish strife both from oneself and from others. It signifies, in other words, skill at the cultivation of selflessness. The following incident will illustrate it :

> One day, at dusk, Subhūti arrived at a *vihāra* (monastery), where he knocked at the gate and stood waiting.
> A *bhiksu* (monk) within asked, 'Who is it?'
> Subhūti, being a dweller of long standing in 'strifelessness' (*chu wu cheng, araṇāvihārin*), hence a cultivator of selflessness, kept silence, being unable to answer, 'I am Subhūti'. At length, he said, 'This is the one to whom the world has given the provisional name *Subhūti*.'

Another incident :

> The same venerable was once overtaken by rain in the course of his peregrinations. When he was approaching the gateway of a non-believer, he went out of his way to avoid it.
> The non-believer asked him, 'What is your name, Sir?'
> Subhūti, for the reason given above, could not bring himself to say, 'I am Subhūti,' and remained silent. When the question was repeated two or three times, he gave, with great reluctance, the same answer as above.

From this it is evident that one skilled at cultivating selflessness banishes strife both from himself and from others, which, after all, is the meaning of 'strifeless conduct'. Finally, there is another view, according to which the masters of *yoga*, thanks to this 'strifeless conduct', achieve complete freedom of contradiction between the desirable and the undesirable, the proper and the improper, the appealing and the unappealing, the profitable and the profitless, the painful and the pleasant. This, according to this last view, is the meaning of 'strifeless conduct'.

The spheres proper to strifelessness are those of Form and of Desire. The ground is that of the fourth *dhyāna*. The body on which the practitioner of strifelessness bases himself is that of a denizen of the Sphere of Desire. The aspect is unclear.[28] The object (*yüan, ālambana*) is the Sphere of Desire, within that the *kleśas*. The stage of mindfulness (*nien chu, smṛtyupasthāna*) is that of Dharma. The gnosis involved is mundane gnosis (*shih su chih, laukikam jñānam*?) . . .[29] As to ages, it may be in any of the three, but its object is the future. Of the three qualities—wholesome, unwholesome, neutral—,it is wholesome, but its object is unwholesome. On the other hand, there are those who say that its object, though usually unwholesome, may also be neutral. As to connection with the three spheres, it is itself connected to the Sphere of Form, but its objects are connected to the Sphere of Desire. As to its identity and to its relation to learners (*śaiksa*), non-learners (i.e., adepts, *aśaiksa*) and neither (*naivaśaiksanāśaiksa*), it is itself neither, and its objects are neither. As to whether it is to be severed by observation of the Four Noble Truths (*darśanaheya*), or by meditation ('realization',

bhāvanāheya), or not at all (*aprahātavya*), it is the second, as are its objects. There are, on the other hand, some who say that, while that is usually true, it happens that it also has as its object the first type. Of words ('names', *ming*, *nāman*) and their meanings (*yi*, *artha*), its object is only the meaning. Of own person (lit., 'own continuum', *tzu hsiang hsü svasamtāna*), other person (*t'a hsiang hsü*, *parasaṃtāna*) and non-person (*fei hsiang hsü*, *asaṃtāna*), its object is only the second. There are some who say that, though this is mostly true, its object is occasionally the first as well.

To the question as to where 'strifelessness' occurs, it must be answered that it occurs only within the Sphere of Desire, not the other two, and to human beings alone, to the exclusion of all other destinies. At that, it can happen only on three continents, to the exclusion of the northern one,[30] but without distinction of sex. The kind of person (*pudgala*) who achieves it must be a saint (*sheng*, *ārya*), not an ordinary person (*yi sheng*, *prthagjana*) ; an adept,[31] specifically an *asamayavimukta*, since he must be able to enter and leave states of concentration at will, while his person must not be subject to control by the *kleśas*.

Q. Do the Buddha, the individually enlightened and the voice-hearer who has reached perfection[32] also dwell in strifelessness, or do they not? In either case, what are the faults ? (They are as follows). If they all dwell in strifelessness, then they should be able to obstruct *kleśas* in other beings. What is it, then, that induces hundreds of thousands of beings to harbour *kleśas* with regard to them? If they do not dwell in strifelessness, how does one reconcile that with the passage in Scripture that says, 'The Venerable Subhūti is the first among those who dwell in strifelessness.'? If even he, with his inferior faculties and nature, can contrive to dwell in strifelessness, why should the Buddha and the individually enlightened, with their superior faculties, be unable to do the same thing?

A. It must be stated that the Buddha and the other two do dwell in strifelessness.

Q. In that case, I come back to my first question : What induces hundreds of thousands of beings to harbour *kleśas* with regard to these holy men?

A. The Buddha and the perfected voice-hearer, both of whom teach and convert others by preaching Dharma, all have acquired the gnosis resulting from a vow (*praṇidhijñāna*).[33] They observe the beings as follows : 'Am I now able or unable to cause them to plant roots of goodness without producing *kleśas* with regard to me?' If they know they can, then they go and convert. If they know that the beings cannot but produce the said bonds, and that all they can do themselves is to enable them to plant roots of goodness, then they think, 'Better to let them produce the undesirable bonds ! The important thing is to enable them to plant wholesome roots'. The reason is that, if the beings can plant but a hair's quantity of wholesome roots, they can then without fail smash *kleśas* and evil deeds the size of a mountain. If they (Buddha, etc.) know that neither is possible, neither the planting of wholesome roots nor the avoidance of *kleśas*, then they resort to whatever means are necessary in order to avoid the said beings. In these respects, their skill is a hundred thousand times that of Subhūti. On the other hand, there are those who say that the Buddha and the perfected voice-hearer cannot dwell in strifelessness.

Q. If Subhūti is able to dwell in strifelessness, how is it that the Buddha, with His superior faculties, is not?

A. The Venerable Subhūti craves strifelessness, he venerates it and is constantly

practising, cultivating it. The Buddha and the others mentioned above are not that way, for they evince no particular feelings of veneration towards strifelessness. It is not that they are *unable* to dwell in it. The adherents of this view hold that even the Buddha and the others dwell in strifelessness, but not very much, since their purpose is to convert the beings. The explanation for this is that, the beings having different faculties and natures, it is appropriate to encourage some, to reprove others, to praise still others, for it is only by these several means that the latter will enter into the midst of Dharma. Even if, in certain cases, the methods just mentioned produce craving, repugnance or pride, still he can plant wholesome roots by these means without fail. This is why the Buddha, Śāriputra and others, though able to dwell forever in strifeless action, do not do so for long, their purpose being to convert others.

Q. Is strifelessness gained by self-application (*chia hsing te, prayogaprāpta*) or by self-purification, (*li jan te vairāgyaprāpta*)[34] ?

A. There are cases of both. In fact, there is a conflict of views. According to one view, for the Buddha it is the latter, since He gets it through knowledge of extinction (sc. of His impurities, *chin chih, ksyajñāna*). According to that same view, for the voice-hearer and for the individually enlightened it is a matter of effort, for it appears before them only in response to self-exertion. According to another view, it is the latter for the first two, since both get it through knowledge of extinction, while for the voice-hearer it is a matter of effort, for the same reason as given above. Yet a third view holds that it is the latter for Buddha, individually enlightened and perfected voice-hearer, the former for all other voice-hearers, the reasons being the same, respectively, as above. According to the holders of these views, those whose attainments are certain (*chüeh ting k'o te che, niyataprāptayah*?) achieve them once their impurities are gone, since they do so thanks to the knowledge of the extinction of their impurities. The evidence of effort (*chia hsing hsien tsai ch'ien, prayogasammukhībhāva*?) comes later, if at all. For the Buddha makes no effort, the individually enlightened exerts himself only slightly, the voice-hearer either to a moderate degree or to a great degree. Yet there are cases in which strifelessness is acquired through the effort of extreme meditation (*pien chi ting chia hsing ku te, prāntakoṭkadhyānaprayogaprāpta?*), which is simply another form of self- application.[35]

Q. What is meant by 'self-application (for the purpose of achieving) strifelessness' (*wu cheng chia hsing, araṇāprayoga*?).

A. One uses all of the stages and extreme meditation as means of self-application. *yi yi ch'i ti chi pien chi ting wei chia hsing, sarvabhūmibhih prāntakotikadhyānena ca prayujyate*?) The Scriptures say, for instance, that the bhiksu Subhūti, by cultivating strifelessness, had a direct intuition of what it means to be a follower of Dharma.[36]

Q. 'Strifelessness cannot sever the *kleśas*,' as we all know. Why, then, did the Buddha make the above statement (about Subhūti) ?

A. The latter venerable worthy thirsted and longed for, cultivated and practised, strifelessness, which enabled him, by degrees, to achieve the Sainted Path (*sheng tao, āryamārga*), to sever the *kleśas* and to achieve *arhattva*. It is in this way that he was able to bring strifelessness to the fore (*ts'ung tz'u neng ch'i wu cheng hsien ch'ien, ato 'raṇām utpādya sāksād akārsīt*?). Keeping his real thoughts to himself, he declared outwardly that he did not mean that strifelessness can sever the *kleśas*. How is one to understand that ? I once heard the following : That venerable worthy took a vow

for the achievement of strifelessness, a vow based on two things, one being the experience of sight, the other being that of hearing. The former refers to a remote time in which he saw disciples of Buddhas[37] able, by abiding in strifelessness, to take such measures, whenever they ventured into a human settlement, as would prevent anyone from developing attachments to them. The latter refers to his hearing, in an equally remote time, of disciples of the Buddha who had done the same thing. Having seen and heard these things, he subjected himself to rigorous mental scrutiny, so as to divert to strifelessness all practices, all gifts,[38] all articles in the monastic code, all learning, all exertions, all brahman-conduct,[39] saying, 'May I, at some future time, having become a disciple of a Buddha, ever dwelling in strifelessness, protect the beings in accord with what I have seen and heard !' The Buddha's disciples, affected by the force of this vow with a sense of community (*kan chung t'ung fen*, where the last three syllables correspond to *sabhāgatā* or even to *nikāyasabhāgatā*), made him, of all within Śākyamunibuddha's *dharma*, the first disciple in strifelessness.[40] Thanks to this strifelessness, he quickly attained the fruit of *arhattva*, since strifelessness invariably occurs in the body of an adept ('one who has nothing more to learn', (*wu hsüeh, aśaiksa.* i.e., an *arhant*). The Scripture's reference to *dharmānusāridharma* must be interpreted in the light of this unexpressed intention.

Q. One speaks of 'strifeless conduct' (*wu cheng hsing, araṇāvihāra*). What, in fact, does the strifeless one do?

A. He performs the couduct of quietude (*chi ching, śānti*?), in order to quiet the *kleśas* of others.

As to 'superior magical powers' (*ārya rddhih, ariyā iddhi*), LVP 7.111, n. 2, gives a reference to *Dīghanikāya* 3.112, to a passage in the *Sampasādanīyasutta*, a scripture in which the Buddha is listing his own superiorities where preaching is concerned. One of these superiorities, says He, has to do with His division of magical powers into two kinds, the noble and the base. To be exact, the order is the reverse, the first set being described as 'having outflows' (*sāsavā*), 'having a basis' (sc. of attachment, (*sa'upadhikā*), 'not sublime' (*no ariyā*), the second as the opposite of these (*anāsavā, anupadhikā ariyā*). The former refer to 'magic' as the word is commonly understood, viz., such powers as walking on water as if it were earth, moving throgh earth as if it were water, sitting still in mid-air, etc., etc. The latter refer to the ability not to be perturbed by things that produce emotional reactions in the unenlightened. The ability to feel aversion toward the attractive and to resist horror of the repulsive are mentioned, but even these are said to be inferior to the capacity to be indifferent to both. There are Chinese analogues to this scripture, but the second of them (T1.255a-258a), in the corresponding passage, says something so different as to be irrelevant. The first, on the other hand, has a passage close enough to be of interest (T1.78c). After describing magical tricks as commonly understood, the Buddha says, in effect,' If a Brahman or *śramaṇa* calls this 'magic', then I am bound to admit that a person who can do these things is not without a certain magical power, but that these feats are mean and inferior, the sort of thing an ordinary fellow (*fan fu*, again *prthagjana*) would do, but not the practice of a saint or a sage. If on the other hand, a *bhikṣu*, in the very midst of the world, can remain untainted by desirable sights, if, in fact, he can reject them, as he should, *this* is what I call the magical power of saint and sage (*hsien sheng shen tsu, ārya rddhih*).' The opposite is then said about undesirable sights,

i.e., of the ability not to be repelled by them. Finally comes the statement about indifference or equanimity to both, an equanimity that must be constant, one of which the practitioner must be unrelentingly mindful.

The *Kośa's* treatment of the *vimoksas* ends with the question as to why, of the eight, it is only in connection with the third and eighth that the expression 'bearing personal witness' (*kāyena sāksāt krtvā*) is used. The reason as given is twofold : first, the two stand out from the rest ; second, each is situated at the final stage (*bhūmi*) of its own respective sphere (*dhātu*)[11].

In his commentary on this final passage, Kyokuga (29.6b) quotes from *Mahāvibhāṣā* 152 The complete passage, found in T27.776ab, reads more or less as follows :

Q. Of the eight deliverances, why did the Buddha declare that only the third and the eighth are 'personally experienced' (*shen tso cheng, kayena sākṣāt kriyete*), those two and no others? For instance, the Scriptures speak of the 'personal bearing' of witness to pure deliverance' and of the 'personal bearing of witness to the suppression of notions and of sensation'.[42]

A. There are other Scriptures in which the Buddha says the same thing about all eight deliverances. For instance, in the Great Scripture of Cause and Condition (*ta yin yüan ching, mahānidānasūtra*?), the Buddha, for each and every one of the eight deliverances, says that the practitioner 'dwells' therein, having 'perfected it by the bearing of direct witness' (*shen tso cheng chū tsu chü, kāyena sāksāt krtvosampadya viharati*).[43]

Q. It may well be that in a small number of Scriptures the expression is applied to all eight, but in the greater number it is applied only to those two. Why is this?

A. 1. Of all eight, these two are the most important, in terms both of name and of sense, which is why they are singled out.

2. There are some who say that they are singled out because their achievement requires special effort.

3. Again, there are those who say that each of the two is at the end of a sphere, the third being at the end of the Sphere of Form, the eighth being at the end of the Sphere of Formlessness.

4. Yet again, there are others who say that the two are, most importantly, at the end of two respective stages, the third being at the end of the fourth *dhyāna*, the eighth being at the end of the stage where there is neither perception nor non-perception (*naivasamjnānAsamjñāyatana*).[44]

5. There are those who say that the third deliverance is at the limit of the mass of visible matter (*se chü pien chi, rūpaskandhaprāntakoṭi*?), the eighth at the limit of the mass of thought and of the *dharmas* associated with it (*hsin hsin so fa chü pien chi, cittacaitasikadharmaskandhaprāntakoti*?).[45]

6. There are those who say that the third deliverance takes only 'pure' signs of visible form, thus producing no *kleśas* because of the superiority (*shu sheng*) of the said signs. According to the proponents of this view, the Buddha, taking His stand on a basis of direct personal (lit., 'bodily') bearing of witness (*an li shen tso cheng, kāyasāk sātkriyāyām pratisthitah*?), calls this 'liberation' through the extinction of notion and sensation' (*hsiang shou mieh chieh t'o, samjnāveditanirodhavimoksa*). Since there is no thought, it is situated in the body, not in thought, it is something produced by bodily power, not by the power of thought (*shen li so ch'i fei hsin li ch'i, kāyenotpādito na tu cittena*?). It is for this reason that the Buddha spoke of the bearing; of personal (lit.,

'bodily') witness.

7. There are others who say that, when the Scriptures speak of the bearing of personal witness to all eight deliverances, it is really on account of the third and eighth. For all of the above reasons, it is clear that the bearing of direct, personal witness applies only to two deliverances, the third and the eighth.

ABBREVIATIONS

'LVP' : L'*Abhidharmakaśa* de Vasubandhu, traduit et annoté par Louis de La Vallee-poussin
'P' : *PaTisambhidāmagga* (pagination of the Pali Text Society)
'S' : *Saddhammappakāsinī* (,,)
'V' : *Visuddhimagga* (edd. Kosambi & Warren)
'Vd' : *Visuddhimaggadīpikā* (ed. Kosambi)

NOTES

1. *kathaṁ tadā samudāgate dhamme passane paññā paccavekkhane ñāṇaṃ|* The loc. force of *passane* and *paccavekkhane* is too obvious for comment. As to *samudāgate dhamme*, it may be loc. abs., but it may be acc. pl., the latter in the sense that the two are the objects of the action implied in the verbal nouns *passana* and *paccavekkhana*. The overal meaning seems to be that wisdom, which is a potentiality, resides in the (intuitive) vision of the *dhammas*, while the gnosis, which is active, consists of active reflection on them. What follows in P is a list of states of mind, drawn from well-known categories, matched with the precondition for achieving them. As indicated below, it is only no. 33 that concerns us here.

2. The only reference that I can find is one in Vd 83 to *Aṅguttaranikāya* 5.134 which speaks of ten 'thorns', viz.,

a. life in a monastic community for one who prefers the eremitic life (*pavivekārāmassa saṅganikārāmatā*),
b. the attachment to (deceptively) pleasant signs for one who is committed to the unpleasantness of signs (*asubhanimittānuyogam anuyuttassa subhanimittānuyogo*),
c. the sight of a (professional dramatic) spectacle for one who keeps close watch over the doorways of his senses (*indriyesu guttadvārassa visūkadassanaṃ*),
d. the approach of a woman to a celibate (*brahamacariyassa mātugāmupacāro*),
e. Sound to the first jhāna (*pathamassa jhānassa saddo*),
f. reflection and investigation to the second *jhāna* (*dutiyassa jhānassa vitakkavicārā*),
g. zest or rapture to the third (*tatiyassa jhānassa pīti*),
h. inhalation and exhalation to the fourth (*catutthassa jhānassa assāsappassāsā*),
i. notion and
j. sensation to the attainment of their suppression (*saññāvedayitanirodhasamāpattiyā saññā ca vedanā ca*).

3. The annotation (V 274, n. 6) identifies the story as occurring in *Dīghanikāya* 2.130, but nowhere, at least not in the two commentaries available to me (*Sumaṇgalavilāsinī* and *Dīghanikāyatthakathātīkā*), is there a word about Ālāra Kālāma's being in the Sphere of Formlessness. In his study of the *Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra* (Berlin, 1951), Ernst Waldschmidt gives the story in Pāli, Sanskrit and Tibetan, as well as in his own translation of the Chinese (from the Vinaya, as is the Tibetan), but, again, no reference to the Sphere of Formlessness. The only other Chinese I have been able to find, Fa-hsien's (T1.197c) translation, likewise says nothing about the said sphere.

4. 'Potentiality' is accounted for, *ibid.*, n. 3, as follows : ' "*Ussāha*" is explained in the *Ṭīkā* as "potentiality for producing a result in a continuity not free from ignorance, craving and conceit." ' Partly because I am not familiar with the translator's equivalences, he is of very little help to me.

5. If this is a reference to one moving toward *arahatta*, then it seems to make sense. If not, it seems the opposite of what is commonly supposed, since the *arahaṃ* has presumably transcended the otherwise ineluctable pattern of cause and condition, this incarnation being his last.

6. The passage in question reads *jan ch'i ching chung shuo hsiang kuan che hsiang kuan tseng ku.* K, in his interlinear annotation, identifies the 'Scriptures' in question as *Dīrghāgama* 89 and *Madhyamāgama* 24.5. This must surely be a mistake on the part of the xylographer, for the former collection has only 22 rolls, while the T passage that would correspond to the latter has nothing resembling it. On the other hand, in a headnote on 29.5 there are references to both collections that seem to fit perfectly. They are in T 1.62b and 582a, respectively, but, unfortunately, they add nothing to the understanding of the issue. LVP 8.205, n. 1, surely misunderstands when he says, 'Le Sūtra (Madhyama, 24, 5) définit le Vimoksa en disant que l'ascète voit (*pāśyati*) : [il ne veut pas dire que le Vimoksa soit vision ; il s'exprime ainsi] parce que la vision accroit le Vimoksa.' First, LVP obviously did not verify K's reference, for he would surely not have found it. Second, *tseng*, which is undoubtedly intransitive in the present context, he understands as a transitive verb with an implied object. The rest of n. 1 is worthy of attention, for it succinctly sums up the discrepancies between the Skt. and Hsüan-tsang's Ch.

7. The Skt. is very close : *prathamau dvau vimoksāv aśubhāsvabhāvau vinīlakādyākāratvāt* (LVP 455).

8. This word, which on the surface would appear to mean 'washing away', or, less probably, 'dripping away', can certainly not be what it seems to be. Hsüan-tsang's equivalent, *tsai huan*, means calamity and the mental state induced thereby. In this passage, Paramārtha has nothing to correspond. The word does occur once before in 8.11, which reads as follows :

astāpaksālamuktatvād ānenjyam tu caturthakah /
vitarkacārau śvāsau ca sukhādi ca catustayah //11//

LVP 7.161 renders this as follows : 'Comme il est libéré des huit *apaksālas*, le quatrième (sc. *dhyāna*) est non-remué. (Quels sont les huit *apaksālas* ?) A savoir *vitarka* et *vicāra*, les deux souffles, les quatre dont *sukha* est le premier.' The *bhāsya*, in LVP's

translation, follows immediately : 'Les huit apaksālas sont *vitarka, vicāra, sukha, duhkha, saumanasya, daurmanasya, āśvāsa, praśvāsa.*' As so frequently, LVP does not translate. In the list of eight, all but the last two, inhalation and exhalation, have been met with already, but *apakṣāla* remains a problem. The Tib. gives *skyon,* 'fault', and the *Vyākhyā* repeats the word without explaining it. For further speculations, cf. Edgerton, *Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit Dictionary* 42 f., s.v.

9. After mentioning an alternate theory, on which we will not dwell, the *bhāsya* says *sāmantakavimuktimārgā api vimoksākhyāṃ labhante/ nāntaryamārgā adharālambanatvāt/* Hsüan-tsang renders this with *chin fen chieh t'o tao yi te chieh t'o ming wu chien pu jan yi yüan hsia ku.* This means that what, in the march to salvation, is called *vimukti* is also called *vimokṣa.* While this is true of *vimuktimārga,* it is not true of *ānantaryamārga.* In other words, each moment of progressive enlightenment is divided into two parts, of which the sum total of the first amounts to *ānantaryamārga* ; of the second, to *vimuktimārga.* In the former case, one severs the bond in question ; in the latter, one moves forword to the next step. (In Chinese, the word for 'deliverance' is even less of a problem, since both *vimukti* and *vimokṣa* are rendered, without distinction, as *chieh t'o.* LVP, probably accurately but without absolute proof, presumes this to refer to the approaches to the four *dhyānas* in the sphere of Formlessness. cf. 8.206.

10. cf. LVP 8.206, n. 4, for more information from the Chinese.

11. This is an uncertain rendition of *kati phassā phussantīti* / In the absence of a commentary, that is the best I can do. The scripture has a Chinese analogue (T 1.788 a-790b), but the resemblance is too tenuous to be of any value.

12. The Chinese analogue to this is in T 1.620c-621a, where, interestingly enough, the monk's name is given as *hsiang,* the usual equivalent of *samjñā.* Otherwise, the story is the same.

13. The intuition of the Four Noble Truths has a total of sixteen aspects, for each truth must be first accepted on faith (*dharmajñānaksānti*), then intuited (*dharmajñāna*), both of these on the level of the Sphere of Desire, then accepted by analogy for the two upper spheres, first on faith (*dharmānvayajñānaksānti*), then on intuitive understanding (*dharmānvayajñāna*). The *Vyākhyā* says that 'totality' refers to *anvayajnāna* for levels both higher and lower than that of the practitioner (*sarvaś cānvayajñānapaksa iti/ ūrdhvādhah svabhūmika ity arthah*), as well as his own actual level.

14. In the Sarvāstivāda system, there are three unconstituted (unconditioned, *asaṃskrta*) *dharmas,* of which this is one, the other two being *ākāśa,* immediately following, and *nirvāṇa,* which in this context is called *pratisaṃkhyānirodha.* The *Vyākhyā* (W 689) poses the rhetorical question as to which particular facet of *apratisaṃkhyānirodha* is meant. The answer is the one achieved by concentration on the signlessness of the signless (*ānimittānimittasamādhi*), since the *vimoksas* within the Sphere of Formlessness are all of the nature of that concentration.

The concentration on signlessness (*ānimittasamādhi*) is one of three, the objects of the first and third being, respectively, emptiness (*śūnyatā*°) and 'wishlessness' (*apranihitasamādhi*). Each of these is directed toward things in teneral, then towards itself, so that one concentrates on the emptiness of emptiness (*śūnyatāśūnyatā*), i.e., on the total lack of substantial entity in the very principle of lack of entity ; on the signlessness of signlessness (*ānimittānimitta,* what we are dealing with here), i.e., on the absence of distinguishing features in the very principle of their absence; and on the

'wishlessness of wishlessness' *apraṇihitāpranihita*), i.e., on the impossibility of premising anything even on the principle of the said impossibility itself.

The *Vyākhyā* say that the deliverances on the level of the Sphere of Formlessness (*ārūpyā vimoksāh*) have as their object the *apratisaṃkhyānirodha* due the concentration on signlessness on the part of an adept (? *aśaiksasyānimittasya samādher apratisamkhyānirodham ālambante/*). It goes on to say that their nature is that of concentra tion on the signlessness of signlessness characteristic of adepts, then proceeds to say about the said deliverances what the *Kośa* (LVP 8.191) says about all of the three abovementioned concentrations, viz., that they are found on eleven levels, to wit, the Sphere of Desire (*Kāmadhātu*), the preliminary (*anāgamya*) to the first *dhyāna*, in the interval between the first and second *dhyānas* (*dhyānāntara*) and in the eight trances of the two upper spheres. Strangely enough, the text says not *dhyānāntare* but *dhyānāntaresu*, although there is only one of them. In all likelihood, the *-su* was interpolated through a copyist's error.

As to *ākāśa*, the *Vyākhyā* says that it is the object of contemplation in *ākaśānantyāyatana*.

For a bird's-eye view of the *dhyānas*, cf. Fukaura Seibun, *Kusha gaku gairon* p. 273. LVP 8 *passim* will provide all the background information necessary for an understanding of this particular issue. Also, for more on the traditional understanding of *vimokṣa*, cf. K *ibid.* 5b f., where *Mahāvibhāsā* 84 is cited at some length.

15. PVP 456 reads *tasmāc chubhaṃ vimoksam utpādayati /*, but the *Vyākhyā* (W 689) and Hsüan-tsang (K 29.5a) leave no doubt that *tasmāt* should read *kasmāt*. 'Why', as a matter of fact, suits the latter word better than 'how'.

16. PVP 456 reads *evaṃ ca punas tau niSpannau bhavato yadi śubhato' pi manasi kurvatah kleśo notpadyata iti*/Hsüan-tsang (K29.5b) renders this *jo kuan ching hsiang fan nao puch'i pi fang ch'eng ku*, which leads one to suspect that his original had no *api*. K 29.6b, on the other hand, has a quotation from *Mahāvibhāsā* 84 which says *sui kuan pu ching hsiang pu ch'i fan nao*, a reading that on the very face of it makes much more sense. The *api* of the Skt. is difficult to construe unless one emends *yadi śubhato 'pi* to read *yady aśubhato 'pi*, thus agreeing with the *Mahāvibhāsā*. My own interpretation is premised on that. LVP 8.210, based on Hsüan-tsang, says, 'Si'dans la contemplation de l'objet agréable (troisième Vimoksa), le désir (*kleśa*) ne surgit point, c'est que les deux premiers Vimoksas sont réussis.' Ironically enough, *ibid.*, n. 1, LVP translates some of the latter quotation, saying, in part, ' . . . L'ascète pense : Quoique je contemple l'horrible (*aśubha*), je ne produis pas de passion, . . .' , but he appears never to have suspected any irregularity in Hsüan-tsang's text.

17. LVP 8.210, n. 1, contains a good deal of information, including many references. The following is, in our view, the most noteworthy :

b. La *Vibhāsā* énumère les cinq moyens par lesquels l'Arhat évite de produire la passion d'autrui: 1. pureté des attitudes (marche, etc.) ; 2. savoir ce qu'il faut dire et ne pas dire . . . 5. avant d'entrer dans le village pour mendier, il examine si homme ou femme pourrait, à cause de lui, produire passion.

d. L'*araṇā* du Śrāvaka et celle du Bouddha sont définies Abhisamayālamkāra, vi. 7:

śrāvakasyāraṇā draṣṭṛṇṛkleśaparihāritā/
tatkleśasrota'ucchittyai grāmādisu jināraṇā//

L'*aranāsamādhi* d'un Śrāvaka: "Qu'il "n'y ait pas naissance de passion de personne en me voyant! (*māsmaddarśanāt kasya cit kleśotpattih syāt*)". Mais, pour les Tathāgatas, "elle déracine, dans les villages, etc., le processus des passions de tous les hommes".

LVP 1.13, n. 4, says, 'Sur *raṇa, saraṇa, araṇā* . . . , voir Muséon 1914, p. 35; Walleser, Die Streitlosigkeit des Subhūti (Heidelberg, 1917); *Ibid.* 7.86, n. 1, has a reference to the 1891 volume of the *Journal of the Pali Text Society* and to an article (presumably by LVP himself) entitled "Maitrī et Aranā" in the April 1921 issue of *Séances Académiques de Belgique.* Of these, only the Walleser article is accessible at the time of writing. Interesting as the latter is, and in spite of a wealth of information and insightful speculation on a variety of subjects, it is of no relevance to the present issue.

18. LVP 7.86, n. 1, quotes *Mahāvibhāsā* 61 as follows: 'Pourquoi tombe-t-on des trois fruits supérieurs, non pas du fruit de Srota'āpanna?—Parce que les passions abandonnées par la vue se produisent au sujet de l'inexistant (*avastu*); on ne tombe pas de l'abandon de ces passions.—Comment peut-on dire qu'elles se produisent au sujet de l'inexistant?— . . . En outre le fruit de Srotaāpanna est établi par l'abandon des passions abandonnées par la vue des vérités dans leur totalité, portant sur les trois sphères.'

19. In *Aṅguttaranikāya* 1.24, the Buddha is depicted as saying *etad aggam bhikkhave mama sāvakānaṃ bhikkhūnaṃ araṇāvihārīnaṃ yad idaṃ Subhūti|*, 'This is the pinnacle, O mendicant monks, of My auditors, the mendicant monks, namely, Subhūti of those who conduct themselves in strifelessness.'

20. T27.899a, 11. 3-6, of whose meaning I am not certain, reads as follows:

The *arhant*, if I understand him correctly, is saying to himself, '*Bodhisattvagotra* and all, in view of the shapes I assumed, men had passionate feelings toward me, feelings which, as they must, brought woe in their wake. Now that I am myself free of the *kleśas*, a repetition of this is unthinkable.' If the Chinese seems not to be saying this, it is, in my view, because, in some expression such as *na mayi kleśān utpādya duhkham ākarseyuh*, the negation was wrongly understood to apply only to the second verb, not to both. If the secondary verb is not also negative, the passage seems to make little sense.

One would expect a person totally delivered to produce no acts whatever, not even 'strifeless' ones. The truly saved being, however, not content with the extinction of his own passions, wishes to assure himself that he is not the object of passionate attachment on the part of anyone else.

21. cf. LVP 5.48 f., where one reads as follows:

. . . les *anuśayas ou kleśas* sont de deux espèces: *kleśas* spéciaux (*svalaksaṇakleśa*), à savoir *rāga, pratigha, māna, kleśas* généraux (*sāmānyakleśa*), à savoir *dṛṣṭi, vicikitsā, avidyā*. . .

Lorsque les *kleśas* spéciaux ont été produits (*utpanna*) à l'endroit d'un certain objet--objet passé, présent ou futur, objet à abandonner par la vue, etc.—et se trouvent donc ou passés ou prèsents, lorsqu'ils n'ont pas été abandonnés, la personne en laquelle ils ont été produits est liée à cet objet par ces *kleśas* spéciaux. Car, étant spéciaux, ils ne se produisent pas nécessairement chez toute personne à l'égard de tout, mais bien chez une certaine personne à l'endroit d'une certaine chose. . . (49) . . .

Par les autres *kleśas*, *kleśas* généraux *dṛṣṭi*, *vicikitsā* et *avidyā*),—lesquels, ayant pour objet les cinq *upādānaskandhas*, se produisent chez tous et relativement à tout—on est lié à tous les objets des trois temps et des cinq catégories, d'après le cas, à quelque époque les dits *kleśas* appartiennent.

22. *Yi chieh*, where *chieh* renders *dhātu*, namely, one of the three, *kāmadhātu*, *rūpadhātu*, *ārūpyadhātu*.

23. *Yi so te shen*, which I take to refer, as do all of the others, to the various errors committed even by a single person. In other words, *sāmānyakleśa* is *sāmānya* whether in the sense that it applies to more than one *kleśa* in a single person, or to the same in more than one person, or, again, to many in many.

24. The former quotation will be found above, but the latter I cannot identify.

25. This is followed by a passage that I do not understand, dealing with the word *tzu hsing* which always renders *svabhāva*, 'own being' and which I have rendered above with 'nature'. The protagonist, who is still speaking, seems to be saying that the word has already been used, and will now be explained for that reason.(?)

26. The basic *anuśayas* are passion for the unwholesome (*rāga*, *t'an*), aversion to the wholesome (*pratigha*, *ch'en*), inability to distinguish between the two (*moha*, *ch'ih*), pride (*māna*, *man*), doubt as to the validity of the Buddha's teachings (*vicikitsā*, *i*), (it) the mistaken view of a substantial personality (*satkāyadrsti*, *shen chien*), the equally mistaken views of permanence and total annihilation (*antagrāhadrsti*, *pien chien*), the likewise mistaken view that the doctrine of dependent origination (*pratītya-asamutpāda*, *yüan ch'i*), is a false one (*mithyādrsti*, *hsieh chien*), the heretical notion that one may pick and choose one's views as one likes *drstiparāmarśa*, *chien ch'ü chien*), and the deluded attachment to non-Buddhist codes and rituals *śīlavrataparāmarśa*, *chieh chin ch'u chien*). Broadly speaking, they are of two kinds, those to be eliminated by a proper view of the Four Noble Truths *darśanaheya*, *chien huo*) and those to be eliminated by 'realization', i.e., meditation (*bhāvanāheya*, *hsiu huo*). The former are then related to each of the four truths in each of the three spheres : They will best be understood in the following way :

A. Sphere of Desire (*kāmadhātu*)	
1. Truth of woe (*duhkhasatya*)—all *anuśayas*	10
2. Truth of origin (*samudayasatya*)—all except *satkāyadrsti*, *antagrāhadrsti* and *śīlavrataparāmarśa*	7
3. Truth of suppression (*nirodhasatya*)—*ditto*	7
4. Truth of the Path (*mārgasatya*)—all except *satkāyadrsti* and *antagrāhadrsti*	8
B. Sphere of From (*rūpadhātu*)	
1. All except *pratigha*	9
2. All except *pratigha* and the three of A. 2.	6
3. *Ditto*	6
4. All except *pratigha* and the two of A. 4.	7
C. Sphere of Formlessness (*ārūpyadhātu*)—same as B.	28
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The *anuśayas* to be eliminated by realization are *rāga*, *pratigha*, *vicikitsā* and *māna*,

all four in the Kāmadhātu, all but the second in the other two spheres, a total of 10. To the above one adds the ten obsessions or pre-possessions (*daśa paryavasthānāni, shih ch'an*), viz.,

1. disrespect (*āhrīkya, wu ts'an*)
2. 'le *dharma* qui fait qu'un homme ne voit pas les conséquences facheuses du péché' (*anapatrāpya, wu kuei*)
3. 'envie' (*īrsyā, chi*)
4. avarice, meanness, jealousy (*mātsarya, ch'ien*)
5. dissipation, excitedness (*auddhatya, tiao chü*)
6. regret, remorse (*kaukrtya, o tso*)
7. sloth, 'torpeur' (*styāna, hun ch'en*)
8. 'langueur' (*middha, shui mien*)
9. wrath, anger, 'colère', (*krodha, fen*)
10. jealous disparagement, 'hypocrisie' (*mraksa, fou*)

(The Chinese equivalents are Hsüan-tsang's, as given in *Kusha gaku gairon* 180 ; the French, those of LVP 2.170, 5.90 ; the English, those of Mr. Edward Conze, as given in his *Materials for a Dictionary of the Prajñāpāramitā Literature*).

The above material, situated in different places in the *Kośa*, can best be found there by consulting LVP's Index. For a bird's-eye view, one is referred to the Japanese work just mentioned, *ibid.* and 169 ff. It is to be noted that the said work lists *paryavasthānas* 5,6,7,8 in the order 6,8,5,7.

27. I do not understand this, but there can be no question as to the literal meaning of the text, which is as I have given it.

28. The meaning of this is certainly unclear to me. The Chinese reads *hsing hsiang che shih pu fen ming hsing hsiang* which I presume to represent something like *ākāra iti ced aniyatākārah*, but this does not help. It may mean that the manner and appearance of one who has achieved *araṇāvihāra* may be of any sort. The difficulty is that *aniyata* is usually represented not by *pu fen ming* but by *pu ting*. In sum, I do not know what is meant.

29. The passage in the interval reads *san-mo-ti chü che fei san-mo-ti chü ken hsiang ying che she ken hsiang ying*. As Chinese it is so clumsy that it must represent literal translation. I suggest *samādhisahita iti cen na (samādhisahitah)/ indriyasamprayukta indriyasamprayuktim upeksate/*. On the face of it, it would seem to mean that *araṇāvihāra* is not accompanied by *samādhi*, a surprising proposition in as much as it is itself called *araṇāsamādhi*. The second sentence would seem to mean that *araṇāvihāra* associated with the sense faculties is yet indifferent to the sense faculties. Again, I simply do not know what is meant.

30. 'Continent' renders *chou*, which, in turn, stands for *dvīpa*, lit., 'island'. Mount Sumeru is imagined to have four *dvīpas* adjacent to it, one in each compass direction. To the north is Uttarakuru, where *araṇā* cannot take place; to the south is Jambudvīpa, the world occupied by us ; to the east is Videha ; to the west Aparagodānīya.

31. This certainly seems to conflict with what was said above about *araṇā's* being neither *śaiksa* nor *aśaiksa* and having objects that likewise are neither. It conflicts equally with the *Kośa* passage quoted above. It is possible that a person may be a *prthagjana* in the process of acquiring *araṇā*, but that, once acquired, the latter makes

an *ārya* of him.

32. The 'voice-hearer who has reached perfection' renders *tao chiu ching sheng wen*, which must represent something like *sampannaśrāvaka* or *nisthitaśrāvaka*. Unfortunately I cannot find any of these words. In the absence of supporting literature, I presume the term to refer to a *śrāvaka* just short of *arhattva*.

33. The *Kośa*'s treatment of *araṇā* is followed immediately by a discussion of *praṇidhijñāna*. cf. LVP 7.88, where one reads as follows :

> Comme l'Aranā, le Pranidhijñāna, "savoir résultant de résolution", est, de sa nature, savoir d'ordre mondain ; comme l'Aranā, il a pour point d'appui le quatrième *dhyāna*, il se produit dans la série d'un Inébranlable, il est médité par un être de destinée humaine. Mais, à la différence de l'Aranā, il porte sur tous les *dharmas*.

34. In other words, is *araṇā* the automatic result of purity, or is effort needed over and above that ?

35. As said above, *araṇā* is followed by *praṇidhijñāna*. That, in turn, is followed by the four *pratisaṃvids* (*dharma*, *artha*, *nirukti*, *pratibhāna*). The whole issue is stated succinctly in *Kośa* 7.37 f. :

> *tathaiva pranidhijñānam sarvālambaṃ tu tat tathā |*
> *dharmārthayor niruktau ca pratibhāne ca samvidah ||37||*
> *tisro nāmārthavāgjñānam avivartyam yathākramam |*
> *caturthī yuktamuktābhilāpamārgavaśitvayoh ||38||*

LVP 7.88-91 renders the above, 'Tel aussi est le Praṇidhijñāna ; mais il a tout pour objet. De même les Pratisaṃvids de *dharma*, *artha*, *nirukti*, *pratibhāna*, Les trois premières sont un "savoir non-empêché" portant, dans l'ordre, sur le nom, la chose, la voix. La quatrième est le savoir de l'expression exacte et facile, et de ja maitrise à l'endroit du chemin.' *Ibid.* 95 proceeds to say, 'Ces six sont *prāntakotika*. Parce qu'elles sont obtenues par la force du *dhyāna prāntakotika*, elles recoivent ce nom. Le *prāntakoṭika* est sextuple. Le quatrième *dhyāna* nommé *prāntakotika* est six choses ; il consiste : 1. en Araṇā, 2. en Pranidhijñāna, 3-5. en trois Pratisamvids (à l'exception de la *niruktipratisaṃvid*), 6. en *prāntakotika* tout court. Quele st le *dharma* qu'on nomme recueillement *prāntakotika*? Le dernier *dhyāna*, en série avec toutes les terres et porté à son maximum.'

36. *Shan hsien pi-ch'iu hsiu wu cheng hsing cheng fa sui fa*, which may represent something like *Subhūtibhikṣuṇāraṇavihāriṇā dharmānusāridharmaḥ sākṣāṭkṛtaḥ|*. The *dharmānusārin* is the practitioner whose religious career is launched by hearing and understanding the Dharma, rather than by mere faith in the authority of his teacher, which latter is the case of the *śraddhānusārin*.

37. The time period in this context involves a series of reincarnations.

38. 'Gifts' renders *shih*, the usual equivalent of *dāna*. Since the monk is characteristically the receiver, not the giver, of gifts, the reference must here be to *dharmadāna*, which consists of teaching and conversion, the training of novices, etc. The vow in this case is to apply all of the merit accruing from these holy acts to the acquisition of *araṇā*.

39. 'Brahman-conduct' renders *fan hsing*, which, in turn, is al iteral translaiton of

brahmacaryā, a word indicating strict celibacy.

40. This may as easily mean that they were affected, and that Subhūti became first, etc. *Wei* can be both transitive and intransitive.

41. LVP 8.211, n. 2, reproduces the text of both the *bhāṣya* and the *vyākhyā*, translating the latter as follows :

> Le Sūtra dit que l'ascète se rend présent le troisième Vimoksa parce que ce Vimokṣa l'emporte sur les deux premiers. II comporte l'abandon de tous les obstacles qui s'opposent aux Vimokṣas de *dhyāna* (*rūpivimoksa*) : une fois qu 'on la acquis, on possède la souplesse de pensée qui permet de réaliser sans effort les trois premiers Vimoksas. Et cela, parce qu'il comporte une *āśrayaparivrtti*, une certaine transformation de l'*āśraya* ou complexe physico-psychologique.

Āśraya is defined, *ibid.*, as *le corps muni d'organes*, one of the organs being the mind (*manas*) ; a synonym of *āśraya* is said to be *ātmabhāva*. LVP adds, 'La traduction "personnalité" n'est pas mauvaise, . . .' An example of *āśrayaparivṛtti* is said to be by resort to the Path of view. Other uses of *āśraya* and *parivṛtti* are cited in support of LVP's interpretation of the compound. Equally worthy of note are the following statements :

> . . . le huitième Vimoksa l'emporte sur les Vimoksas précédents parce qu'il comporte l'abandon de tous les obstacles aux Vimoksas du domaine de l'Ārūpya.
> Le troisème Vimokṣa est obtenu par un ascète qui pratique le quatrième *dhyāna*, terre extrême du Rūpadhātu; le huitième, par un ascète qui pratique le *bhavāgra*, terre extrême de l'Ārūpyadhātu.

42. It will be recalled that the third *vimoksa* reads *śubhaṃ vimoksaṃ kāyena sākṣāt kṛtvopasampadya viharati |*, 'se rendant présent le Vimokṣa agréable, il demeure dans ce recueillement'. 'Se rendant présent' corresponds to *sākṣāt krtṣā*, while 'bear witness' is my rendition of *cheng*, the ususl Ch. equivalent for *sākṣāt karoti*, but a word whose literal meaning is to 'testify'. The eighth *vimoksa*, it will also be recalled, is *saṃjñāveditanirodhasamāpatti* in a context which likewise contains the words *kāyena sākṣāt kṛtvā*.

43. The only Chinese version of this scripture containing the passage just quoted is, unfortunately, in the translation of Dānapāla, who arrived as a missionary from India in 980, more than three hundred years after the death of Hsüan-tsang (664), the translator of the *Mahāvibhāṣā*. It is 'unfortunate' in the sense that 'bearing of direct witness' (*shen cheng*) is mentioned only in connection with the third and eighth deliverances. Hsüan-tsang, or the author of the *Mahāvibhāṣā*, must have had a different text from the one translated by Dānapāla. *Dighānikāya* 2.71 does, to be sure, in a general recapitulatory statement, use the corresponding Pāli word, the expression being *āsavānaṃ ca khayā anāsavam cetovimuttim paññavimuttiṃ diṭṭheva dhamme sayaṃ abhiññā sacchikatvā upasampajja viharati |*.

44. I, for one, can see no difference between 3. and 4.

45. Again, this seems scarcely more than another way of saying what has already been said in 3. and 4.

Appendix

Glossary of Chinese (and Japanese) words appearing in text and notes, accompanied by the respective Chinese characters with which they are written. They are arranged in an alphabetical order

an li shen tso cheng	安立身作證
ch'a pieh chuan	差別轉
che chih	遮制
ch'en	瞋
chi	嫉
chi ching	寂靜
chia hsing hsien tsai chien	加行現在前
chia hsing te	加行得
chieh chin ch'ü chien	戒禁取見
chieh t'o	解脫
ch'ien	慳
chien ch'ü chien	見取見
chien huo	見惑
ch'ih (pratipakṣayati)	治
ch'ih (moha, avidyā)	癡
chin chih	盡智

chin fen chieh t'o tao yi te chieh t'o ming wuchien pu jan yi yaün h ia ku

ching wei yi lu

chu pan

ch'u san chieh t'o yi wu t'an shen ken wei tzu hsing chieh tui ch'ih t'an ku

chüeh ting k'o te che

fan fu

fan hsing

fei hsiang hsü

fen

fou

FUKAURA Seibun

°hsiang

hsiang kuan

hsiang shou mieh chieh t'o

hsien sheng shen tsu

hsien se t'an

hsin hsin so fa chü pien chi

心心所法聚遍際

hsing hsiang che shih pu fen ming hsing hsiang

行相者是不分明行相

hsiu huo

修惑

Hsüan-tsang

玄奘

hui

慧

hun ch'en

惛沉

huo chih neng ching

惑執能淨

jan ch'i ching chung shuo hsiang kuan che hsiang kuan tseng ku

無染經中說想觀者想觀增故

jo kuan ching hsiang fan nao pu ch'i pi fang ch'eng ku

若觀淨相煩惱不起彼方成故

kan chung t'ung fen

感衆同分

Kandō Abidatsumakusha ron

冠導阿毘達磨俱舍論

kung hsiang

共相

Kusha gaku gairon

俱舍學概論

li jan te

離染得

man 慢

miao yin 妙音

ming 名

o tso 惡作

OGIWARA Unrai 荻原雲來

pa chung ch'ien san wu t'an wei hsing chin ch'ih t'an ku 八中前三無貪善自性近住貪故

pien chi ting chia hsing ku te 邊際定加行故得

pien chien 邊見

pu hsiang ying hsing yün 不相應行蘊

pu hsiang ying yün 不相應蘊

pu liao 不了

pu ting 不定

SAEKI Kyokuga 佐伯旭雅

se chü pien chi 色聚邊際

Shan hsien pi-ch'u hsiu wu cheng hsing cheng fa sui fa	善現.若菩修無諍行證法隨法
shan ta	善達
(the one untranscribed passage)	尚由此故長夜苦況我今者離貪為癡為世福田於我起結而不起苦故我今者不應復作煩惱因緣
shen li so ch'i fei hsin li ch'i	神力所起非心力起
shen tso cheng	身作證
shen tso cheng chü tsu chu	身作證具足住
sheng	聖
°shih	施
shih	是
shih ch'an	十纏
shih su chih	世俗智
shu sheng	殊勝
sui kuan pu ching hsiang pu ch'i fan nao	隨觀不淨相不起煩惱
t'a hsiang hsü	他相續

t'an 貪

ti san chieh t'o ch'ing ching hsiang chuan tso ching kuang hsien hsing hsiang chuan ku 第三解脫清淨相轉作淨光顯行相轉故

tiao chü 掉舉

ting 定

tou cheng 鬪諍

tsa hui chuan 雜穢轉

ts'ung tz'u neng ch'i wu cheng hsien ch'ien 從此能起無諍現前

tuan ch'ang 斷常

tzu hsiang hsü 自相續

tzu hsing 自性

Unrai Wogihara, see OGIWARA Unrai

wo wo so 我我所

wu cheng chia hsing 無諍加行

wu cheng hsing 無諍行

wu chia hsing	無加行
wo hsüeh	無學
wu ju shih shih wei fen pieh ku	無如是等分別故
wu kuei	無愧
wu ming	無明
wu ts'an	無慚
yao yu fang pien chüeh hui hsien ch'ien	要由方便覺慧現前
yi (artha)	義
yi (vicikitsā)	疑
yi chieh	一界
yi so te shen	以所得身
yi ssu yün wei tzu hsing	以思蘊為自性
yi yi ch'i ti chi pien chi ting wei chia hsing	以一切地遍際為加行
yu yü	猶豫
yü ti yi yu hsiang ssu chieh t'o erh pu chien li fei tseng shang ku	餘地亦有相似人解脫二不建立非增上故

14

A Ninth-Century Chinese Classification of Indian Mahāyāna

JAN YUN-HUA

One of the difficulties of the historical study of Buddhism in India is the problem of dating. Though various researches have given some dates to events in the development, there are still undateable events. It is in this connection that the Chinese and Tibetan sources are extremely useful. As far as the Chinese sources are concerned, the dates of the translations of Indian Buddhist canons are helpful in determining the evolution of Indian Buddhist literature. The availability of the Chinese translation of the lost Sanskrit text often provides useful material, and hence helps our understanding of the tradition especially its fragmented documents. The other usefulness of Chinese sources for the study of Indian Buddhism concerns the Chinese acceptance of the Indian concepts. As most eminent Chinese Buddhist thinkers were well-recorded in historical or hagiographicaltexts, their understanding is also helpful in determining the Indian development.

The attempt of this paper is to enquire and assess how one Chinese monk understood Indian Mahāyāna Buddhist systems. Such an inquiry helps the understanding of Indian Mahāyāna and such an assessment may offer some hints to scholars in the field. The monk is Tsung-mi (780-841).[1] The reason for selecting this thinker is principally because he was one of very few Chinese who had a systematical understanding of Indian Mahāyāna, and his understanding is more philosophical than sectarian. Although the classification of Indian Buddhism had a long tradition before the time of this monk, the early classifications were focused on sectarian interest.[2] The problems and terminologies in those earlier classifications were Chinese rather than Indian. The contribution of Tsung-mi, as we shall see, though not entirely free from problems particular to Chinese Buddhism is nevertheless largely philosophical and closer to scholarly findings in our time.

His scholarly strength lies, first of all, in his extensive and profound studies of the *Tripitaka* in Chinese (*Ta-tsang-cháng*), which in many respects is still the most comprehensive collection of Buddhist literature. According to the biography Tsung-mi went to Ch'ang-an, the capital of the T'ang empire, "settled at Chih-chü monastery. . .and devoted three years time to reading the *Tripitaka*". This extensive and systematic study led him to write a number of books, and his frequent quotations from Buddhist *sūtras* and *śāstras* clearly indicate his familiarity with the canon. Without such a deep knowledge, it is impossible for any one to understand Indian Mahāyāna systematically.

Apart from the *Tripitaka*, Tsung-mi had other sources at his disposal. One of them is Fa-tsang (643-712),[3] the actual founder of the Hua-yen school and one of the patriarchs who had an overwhelming influence on Tsung-mi. Aside from scriptural knowledge, Fa-tsang had personal encounters with Indian Buddhist missionaries through his participation in the translations of Indian works. It was through this personal association with the Indian monks that he learned of the Indian development. One of his Indian brethren was Devākara (ca. 613-687 A.D.), who had informed his Chinese friend of the intellectual and sectarian development of Mahāyāna Buddhism in Nālandā. Fa-tsang himself acknowledged this :

> "At present, Devākara, the Master of *Tripitaka* from the Central Indian kingdom whom the Chinese called Jih-chao who translates [canons] in the monastery. He tells me on my request...."[4]

Though Fa-tsang did not inform us explicitly of the date and place of his conversations with Devākara, other sources supplied data on these events. Tsung-mi states that "fortunately Fa-tsang has met Devākara, the Master of *Tripitaka* from the Central Indian kingdom, during the reign of Wen-ming (684 A.D.)."[5] From this one knows the date. With regard to the place, the memoral inscription and the biography of Fa-tsang record that he resided at T'ai-yüan monastery between 670 695 A.D.[6] During the same period, Devākara resided at "les monastères de T'ai-yüan sse de l'Est et de l'Ouest et le Hong fou sse."[7] This indicates that Tai-yüan monastery was the place where Fa-tsang received the information.

Another source of Tsung-mi's understanding of Indian Mahāyāna are the reports written by the Chinese pilgrims. The works of Hsüan-tsang (ca. 596-664) and I-tsing (635-713) were of course known to and popular with the learned monks of the T'ang period, such as Tsung-mi. In addition, there is another pilgrim's work which seems important to Tsung-mi, i.e. *Wu-hsing ch'an-shih shu* or the 'Letter from Ch'an Master Wu-hsing'. Tsung-mi states that

> Furthermore, according to the Letter of Ch'an Master Wu-hsing, it also says there were two schools which simultaneously prevailed in the Western Region (i.e. India) : One of them respected Nāgārjuna and Āryadeva, and the other respected Asaṅga and Vasubandhu .."[8]

Wu-hsing, who was a philosophically-oriented monk, visited India toward the latter part of the 7th century. He was a friend of I-tsing and was highly respected by

the latter.[9] Wu-hsing translated three chapters from the *Āgamas* of the Sarvāstivādins while he was in India. After the completion of his study at Nālandā, he left for China but died in North India. The Sanskrit manuscripts collected by him from India were, however, taken to China and translated into Chinese by Śubhākarasiṃha (d. 735).[10] His letter from India was obviously an important document, as it has been quoted by Tsung-mi, noted by Hui-lin (flourished 788-820), and copied and brought back to Japan by Ennin (794-864).[11]

With these sources to work with, Tsung-mi classified Indian Buddhism into three systems. In each of these cases, he first of all gave a critical and classified title to the teaching ; secondly, he offered a summary of the principal doctrines ; and finally, he outlined the literature of the system. In most of the systematic work written by Tsung-mi, he did not indicate the tradition of the school. However, from the scriptures, especially from the *sāstras*, one would obtain some information on the history of the systems. The three Mahāyāna systems are as follows : (I) Esoteric Teachings on the Characteristics as Dependent on the Nature, (II) Esoteric Teaching revealing the Nature by the negation of the Characteristics; and, (III) Esoteric Teaching revealing that the True Mind itsel is the Nature.[12]

I

The system which our author calls the "Esoteric Teaching on the Characteristic as Dependent on the Nature" is composed of three schools of Buddhism. Two of them, viz., the Teaching of Man and *Deva*, and the Teaching of the Cessation of Delusion and the extinction of Sufferings belong to Hīnayāna tradition. It is therefore not necessary to bring them into this discussion. The third school, the Teaching of "the use of Consciousness to destory objective phenomena" is, of course, the Vijñānavādin school of Mahāyāna tradition.

Tsung-mi explains that the system is labeled as such because the Buddha saw that the six ways of sentient existence in the triple world are merely characteristics (*lakṣana*) of the true Nature itself. They arise from delusion and have no substance of their own. Therefore, it is described as Dependent (*paratantra*) on the Nature. As it is impossible to awaken, those who are endowed with dull capacity, the Buddha discoursed the Law according to the visible characteristics, so that they might be ferried over gradually, and therefore, it is called the Teaching of Characteristics. As the ultimate truth is not expressly revealed in this teaching, it is, therefore, described as esoteric or *mi-yi* (esoteric or hidden intention).

The principal doctrine of this school is the "use of consciousness to destroy objective phenomena". The author summarizes the teaching as follows :

> This is to say that birth and death (*utpādanirodha*) of *dharmas* are unrelated to *bhūtatathatā*, (but are related to) beginningless eight Consciousnesses of sentient beings. Of these eight Consciousnesses, the eighth (*ālayavijñāna*) is fundamental. It gives arising of seeds (*bījas*) to all phenomena, such asorgans (*indriya*), bodies and inanimate world (*bhājana-loka*), in a single instance. The other seven Consciousnesses themselves transform into phenomena according to their respective

conditioning factors. Apart from these eight Consciousnesses, there is no other real dharma whatsoever.[13]

These are the basic tenets of the Vijñānavādins. If one compares them with recent studies such as that of A.K. Chatterjee[14], the statements are almost identical. However, when one looks into the doctrine carefully, there are some points in the idealism which are problematic : how can consciousness trans form itself into external objects ? Tsung-mi explains :

Because of the influence from [the *karman*] of each individual *dharma*, Consciousness transformed into a *dharma* appears to be Self. And because the sixth (i.e. *manovijñāna*) and the seventh (i.e. *Klista manovijñāna*) Consciousnesses are hindered by ignorance, one takes the apparent Self and the *dharmas* as real.[15]

The author further compares the situation with the mental condition of a sick man. Though the man might have seen some vivid and strange phenomena under the influence of illness, once awakened, he will realize that all those phenomena were illusory. From that experience, one would understand that this body as well as the external objects are also like that, and that they are merely projections of the transformed consciousness. "When deluded, one grasps the Self and the objects as real ; when awakened, one realizes neither Self nor objects exist."[16]

However, the Buddhist doctrine is not an academic philosophy, nor is it interested in speculation on the physical world. It is a religious philosophy with salvation as its principal objective. A realization of the emptiness of the Self as well as the emptiness of *dharmas* is not the end but the start of a new career, an advanced religious career.

Thereupon one would cultivate the insight of *vijñāptimātratā*, the six Perfections (*pāramitās*) and the four all-embracing virtues (*saṁgrahavastu*). Thereafter, one would gradually subdue and then destroy the two hinderances : the veil of passions (*kleśāvarana*) and the veil of ignorance (*jñeyāvarana*). To realize *bhūtatathatā* through the wisdom of double emptiness, to attain the ten stages (*daśabhūmi*) fully, thus to transform the eight Consciousnesses into the four forms of Wisdom of a Buddha. When obstruction to *bhūtatathatā* is completely removed, the *dharmakāya*, the Nature or the *nirvāṇa* is attained.[17]

It is significant that Tsung-mi had very balanced views on religious philosophy and spiritual discipline, and the understanding of phenomena and religious attainment. This balanced and well-proportioned description seems to be more healthy than some recent trends in research. The latter often devote more attention and space to philosophical problems, hence making the school more or less an academic philosophy. One has to remember that, after all, the emergence of Vijñānavāda in Indian Buddhism was a corrective counter to the doctrine of Emptiness. Henceforth, its main emphasis was a moderate confirmation of religious attainment, *dharmakāya* through the insight of *vijñāptimātratā*. Its principal difference lies in its affirmation of religious truth and attainment, and thus it provides a firmer

ground for the adepts than the slippery doctrine of dialectical negation, which negates all positions while refusing to provide one of its own.

The literature of the Vijñānavādins as listed by Tsung-mi is as follows :

> "The tens of volumes of *Sandhinirmocana-sūtra* and hundreds of fascicles of *Yogācāryabhūmiśāstra* and *Vimśatika kārika* are exclusive explanations of this doctrine".[18]

The history of Yogācārin or Vijñānavādin literature is a very complicated subject. Students of Buddhism can easily attest to this complication when they read the research done by recent scholars.[19] Since most Mahāyāna *sūtras* were the common property of all Mahāyāna monks, it is almost impossible to determine precisely which *sūtra* belongs to which particular school. Nevertheless, some schools did claim certain literature as exclusive to themselves. The *Sukhāvatīvyūha* of the Pure Land Sect and the *Avataṁsaka-sūtra* of the Hua-yen school are good examples. As far as the Vijñānavādin is concerned, scholars often turned to Tibetan historical sources such as the work of Buston. However, the information given by our author is of an earlier date and probably contains some information that he might have drawn from Hsüan-tsang and Wu-hsing.

According to Kuei-chi (632-682), a disciple of Hsüan-tsang and a Chinese patriarch in Vijñānavādin tradition, the school had six *sūtras* and eleven *śāstras* as its canons. The *sūtras* are : *Avataṁsaka, Samdhinirmocana, Tathāgata-utpāda-guṇa-laṁkāra, Abhidharma, Laṅkāvatāra* and *Hou-yen-ching*.[20] Of these scriptures, there is no doubt that *Samdhinirmocana* is more exclusive to Vijñānavādin tradition. The subjects, such as *Buddhaguṇa, dharmalakṣaṇa, svabhāva trividhah*, etc., are all fundamental to Vijñānavādins.[21] It is not surprising that the great thinkers of the traditon, like Asaṅga, wrote commentaries on the sūtra.

The eleven śāstras mentioned by this source are : *Yogācāryābhūmi, Hsien-yang sheng-chiao lun, Mahāyānasūtralamkāra, Chi-liang lun, Mahāyānasangraha, Daśabhūmikasūtraśāstra, Fen-pieh Yü-chia lun, Ālambanaparīksa, Viṁśatika, Madhyāntavibhangaṭīkā* and *Abhidharmasamuccayavyākhyā*. Except for a few texts, most of them are extant and have been classified under the title of Yogācāra section in the *Taisho edition of Tripitaka in Chinese*.[22] This proves that Tsung-mi's understanding of the tradition is congruous with researches done in our time.

II

The second Indian Mahāyāna system, as understood by Tsung-mi, was called the "Esoteric Teaching Revealing the Nature by the negation of Characteristics". He explains that according to the ultimate meaning of truth, false tenets are originally empty, hence there is nothing to be negated. All *dharmas* are originally pure and are the true Nature. They are able to respond to circumstances. The functions therefore should not be negated as they are the functions of the Nature. However, there are sentient beings who cannot be enlightened, as their visions are obstructed by attachment to the empty Characteristics, so the Buddha negates all phenomenal Characteristics without distinction of good or evil, pure or

impure. Though the Buddha never considered the Nature and its function as non-existent, he did not explicitly express this, but only stated that the phenomenal characteristics are non-existent. This is the reason why it is described as "Esoteric".

Furthermore, the intention of the Teaching, though aimed at revealing the true Nature, is negative in its linguistic expression. As the intention is not explicitly expressed, it is called "Esoteric".

After this critical remark, our author pays attention to the doctrine of the system. He states :

> This teaching argues that if the transformed objects are false as taught by the other school, then how could the transformable Consciousness itself be real ? As the mind and the objects are dependent on each other, so they are empty, though they seemed to be existent. Moreover, the mind does not arise by itself alone and its manifestations are solely dependent on objects. The object cannot produce itself and its manifestations are due to the mind. When the mind is empty, the object will immediately cease to be. When the object disappears, the mind immediately becomes empty. Therefore, there is no mind which is not performed by the object nor an object which is not projected by the mind. It resembles what one sees in a dream: though there are various different objects, all of them are unreal and hence false. The Consciousness and objects are also like that, as they depend on cause-conditions to arise, and have no self-nature of their own. Therefore, [it is said] there would never be a single *dharma* which is produced without causes. Henceforth, all *dharmas* are empty. Whatever has Characteristics is unreal and false. For this reason, there are no eyes, ears, nose, tongue, body, and mind in emptiness ; no eighteen realms (*astādaśadhatu*), no twelve links in the chain of existence (*dvādaśāṅga-pratītya-samutpāda*), no four noble truths (*catvāri-ārya-satyāni*), no wisdom to attain, no Buddha Nature or enlightenment, no deed or retribution, no cultivation nor realization; *saṁsāra* and *nirvāṇa* are equally illusory. The only practice of Path is not to the abide by anything, without any clinging or interestedness (*abhiniveśa*).[23]

It is interesting to note that Tsung-mi began his summary of Mādhyamika doctrine with the argument against Vijñānavādins. This probably indicates that his understanding of Mādhyamika was largely influenced by a later development, i.e. Mādhyamika's polemics against the Vijñānavādins. Tsung-mi acknowledges that his understanding of the two Indian Mahāyāna schools was conditioned by his knowledge of the early tradition. He states that there were two ways to discuss the truth : one is concordant and the other is discordant. He says that "Nāgārjuna, Asaṅga and others have followed the method of the highest concord; that is why they are mutually complementary; Bhāvaviveka, Dharmapāla and others upheld the method of extreme discord, so they were mutually destructive".[24] Such an understanding was the well-accepted authority at the time of Tsung-mi, and his spiritual forerunner Fa-tsang has repeatedly referred to the point.[25] In any case, Tsung-mi's presentation of the Mādhyamikas is quite correct.

From the refutation of "Only Consciousness alone is real", Tsung-mi proceeds

to the tenets of Mādhyamika doctrine proper, the negation of all speculative views. He concludes that according to this philosophy, "not to abide by anything, without any clinging or interestedness" is the only possible practice in spiritual life.

Likewise, he also had a list of the literature of the school. The literature comprises "various collections of *Prajñāpāramitā-sūtras* and the three commentaries of *Mādhyamika-kārikā*, *Śataka-śāstra* and *Dvādaśanikāya-śāstra*."[26] He further noted that "the hundred chapters of *Prajñāpāramitā-śāstra* explain the same principle, yet the book advocates a universal understanding and does not urge any clinging. It contains all dharma-characteristics of both Mahāyāna and Hināyāna, and is silently identical with the school of Absolute Mind or Nature."[27] Here the Chinese monk represents a very interesting position. On the one hand, he differs from some modern scholars like A.K. Warder[28] and considers Mādhyamika literature, including the *Kārikā*, as belonging to *Prajñāpāramitā* literature; yet on the other hand, he excludes the *Śāstra* from the tradition. It seems clear that his statement is largely influenced by the Three Treatises School, the Chinese development of Mādhyamika doctrine.[29] The school persistently hammers upon the concept of emptiness, while the latter contains both the teaching of insubstantiality of phenomena and positive virtue of spiritual cultivation. It is this positive attitude towards religious life that makes the latter free from the danger of nihilism.

It is also obvious that the later development of the Mādhyamika and the Vijñānavāda, like Candrakīrti, Śāntideva and others, were unknown to the Chinese at that time.

III

The third system of Indian Mahāyāna as understood by the Chinese monk was the *Tathāgatagarbha* theory. Tsung-mi called the system "exoteric" because it has directly pointed out that one's Mind is the Nature, and that the teaching is imparted without the use of "Skillful means of esoterism".

This is the most affirmative teaching, and has a tremendous influence on East Asian Buddhism. The doctrines taught by the T'ien-t'ai, Hua-yen and Ch'an (Zen) Buddhist schools all based their tenets on the theory of Buddha-nature. At first glance, one might think that this is a Chinese misunderstanding of Indian Buddhism. That is so because the well-known middle position of Buddhism, and especially its long confrontation with the eternalist and nihilist philosophies in India, would make it impossible for it to be positive. However, recent research done by D.S. Ruegg, A. Wayman, and especially J. Takasaki[30] clearly has demonstrated that the system prevailed in India over a long period of time.

Though non-theistic and somewhat de emphasizing social activities in spiritual progress, nevertheless, the positive attitude of the Buddhists towards their religious goal and cultivation was never in doubt. Although some of its sects, such as Mādhyamika adopted negative terminologies at times to demonstrate the fallacy of philosophy in religious understanding, Buddhism never negated religious life itself. If the philosophy of Buddhism disregards religious life as a whole on the one hand and on the other thinks of a particular text or concept as universally repre-

sentative of Buddhism, then it would render the tradition partial and sectarian.

Tsung-mi summarizes the doctrine of this system as follows :

> This teaching argues that all sentient beings possess the empty and true Mind which is originally pure from the beginningless past. It is clear and bright without any obscurity, self-knowing clearly and distinctively, and remains forever and inextinguishable. It is named the Buddha Nature and is also known as the Womb of Tathāgata or the Mind.[31]

The author says that "the purity cannot be achieved by negating delusion, so it is called originally pure". He continues :

> Since the beginningless past, false thought has veiled the Mind, made it impossible to realize and to achieve [the wisdom of Nature], hence confined itself within and attached itself to *saṁsāra*.[32]

Should one stop at this point, man would have to live without hope and suffer forever. It is because of this thought, that the Buddha and his mission because meaningful :

> The great Enlightened one was sympathetic to the situation, so he appeared in the world, taught that all *dharmas* such as birth and death, are empty. He reveals that this Mind is completely identical with that of the Buddhas.[33]

However, if the Wisdom of Tathāgata is fully present in the body of every sentient being, and if the Wisdom is "clearly and distinctively" realized by him, then what is the necessity of the Buddhas to reveal it to him? The author explains that the "knowing" mentioned here is not the knowledge or wisdom that emanates from realization. It is merely pointed out that the true Nature differs from nihilism just as a piece of wood differs from a stone. It is knowable subjectively and this knowing cannot be described in terms of either existence or nonexistence. The sentient beings possess the Nature in themselves, but because their minds are deluded, they are unable to realize the situation by themselves. It is therefore required that the Enlightened One guide them. Because the supernatural power of knowing (*ling-chih*) is the true Mind or Nature itself, and is identical with that of the Buddhas, it is called "the teaching revealing that the true Mind itself is the Nature".

As he did in the case of the two other systems of teaching, so also in this case Tsung-mi provided a list of literature of the system. He lists more than forty *sūtras*, including the *Avataṁsaka*, the *Gaṇḍavyūha*, the *Perfect Enlightenment*, the *Śūraṅgama*, the *Śrīmālādevi*, the *Tathāgatagarbha*, the Mahāyāna version of *Mahāparinirvāṇa*, the *Saddharmapuṇḍarīka* etc.[34]

The *Avataṁsakasūtra* has been claimed by many schools. That claim itself is not a surprise. It is so because most sūtras are less sectarian in outlook when compared with commentarial literature. As far as the *Tathāgatagarbha* theory is concerned, two major sections of the *Avataṁsaka*, the *Gaṇḍvyūha* and the *Tathāgatotpattisaṁbhavanirdeśa*, contained germs of that important concept. Accord-

ing to Takasaki, the latter of the two sections mentioned above has been "regarded as the basic and direct source of the *Tathāgatagarbhasūtra*".[35]

The *Ghanavyūha*, the *Śūraṅgama*, the *Śrīmālādevi* and the *Tathāgatagarbha* are the principal scriptures of the system. The *Saddharmapuṇḍarīka* contains very positive teachings in the version translated by Kumārajīva, yet it does not directly belong to the school. My guess is that Tsung-mi's inclusion of the *Saddharmapuṇḍarīka* in the list was probably due to the influence of the *Saddharmapuṇḍarīkopadeśa* attributed to Vasubhandhu, which discusses the theory of Womb. The Mahāyāna version of *Nirvānasūtra*, translated into Chinese by Dharmakṣena in 421 A.D., is the most important scripture on the theory of Buddha Nature as well as that of *Tathāgatagarbha*.

Among the 50 commentaries, Tsung-mi has mentioned the titles of the *Mahāyānottarantantra*, the *Buddhagotraśāstra*, the *Awakening of Faith*, the *Mahāyānadharmadhātvaviśeṣa*, the *Daśabhūmika*, the *Nirvānasūtraśāstra*, etc.[36]

Of these titles, the first four are confirmed by the research done in recent years, which conclude that they are the core literature on *Tathāgatagarbha* theory.[37] The *Daśabhūmika* is mainly concerned with the Bodhisattva's spiritual progress, yet the illustration of by analogy to the purification process that gold has clearly implied essence or gold exists within the mine. The inclusion of the *Nirvānasūtraśāstra* is understandable because the doctrine implies that Buddha Nature is present in every being including those who had cut off the good roots by their evil deeds. (*icchantika*).[38]

CONCLUSION

The account of the ninth-century Chinese Buddhist thinker thus provides readers with a picture of Indian Mahāyāna. His exposition of Mādhyamika and Vijñānavāda confirms the traditional accounts of Indian Buddhism. His understanding of these two systems is lucidly correct. His statements on non-controversial positions of Nāgārjuna, Asaṅga and others on the one hand and heated disputation amongst their followers on the other are very significant to the followers of Indian Mahāyāna systems.

The problem of *Tathāgatagarbha* theory as understood by the Chinese thinker has been recognised by recent research. There is no doubt that the idea had originated and developed in India through a period of centuries. It is, therefore, an Indian Buddhist idea. This fact has been proved by a number of Indian Buddhist *sūtras* and *śāstras* preserved in Sanskrit and Chinese and Tibetan translations. However, the lineage of the tradition is difficult to trace clearly. Apart from scriptural evidence, we have no historical material to support the existence of an Indian Mahāyāna school with *Tathāgatagarbha* theory as its central doctrine. The problem here appears to be that in spite of the fact that they wished to have a positive attitude in their religious life, the Indian Buddhists hesitated to make it their principal philosophy, because of their confrontation with the eternalistic doctrine in India. Under such circumstances, any emphasis on a positive idea, such as *Tathāgatagarbha*, would make them look like eternalists. When, however, the idea was introduced into China, where the metaphysical confrontation with the eternalists was no longer a focal point, many Buddhists came out to extol the doctrine unhesitatingly.

With these points in mind, readers may find that many text books on Indian Mahāyāna probably have to be reconsidered, as most of them do not deal with the *Tathāgatagarbha* theory. Their presentation on Mādhyamika and Vijñānavada only represent later developments, when the controversy between the two became more clear-cut and conflicting sentiment ran higher.

ABBREVIATIONS

HTC *Hsü-tsang-ching* (Supplementary Tripitaka in Chinese), 151 volumes Taipei reprint, 1968-71.

T *Taishō Shinshū Daizōkyō* (Taishu edition of Chinese Tripitaka) 55 volumes, Tokyo, 1924-1929.

NOTES

1. For the life of this monk, see author's "Tsung-mi, His analysis of Ch'an Buddhism", *T'oung Pao*, LVIII (1972), pp. 1-54 ; also "Tsung-mi's Theory of the Comparative Investigation (*k'an-hui*) of Buddhism", the *Monchanin* (Montreal), No. 52 (1976), 3-15; "Conflict and Harmoney in Ch'an and Buddhism," *Journal of Chinese Philosophy* IV (1977), 287-302.

2. See Leon Hurvitz, Chih-i (538-595) : *An Introduction to the Life and Ideas of a Chinese Buddhist Monk* (Bruges, 1963), pp. 214-248; and Francis H. Cook, *Fa-tsang's Treatise on the Five Doctrines* (Doctoral Dissertation, Wisconsin, 1970).

3. About the life of this patriarch, see S. Kamata, *Chūgoku kegon shisho shi no kenkyu* (*A Historical Study of Hua-yen thought in China*, Tokyo, 1965), pp. 129-149.

4. Translated from *Ta-ch'eng ch'i-hsin lun i-chi*. T. 1846 vol. 44. pp. 242 a-b.

5. Translated from *Yüan-chüeh ching ta shu ch'ao*, ch. II-A, in the *HTC* vol. 14, p. 243b.

6. Both these sources are contained in *Fa-tsang hc-shang chuan*, T. 2054, pp. 280b & 282a.

7. P.C. Bagchi, *Le canon bouddhique en Chine*, II (1938), p. 504.

8. *Op. cit.* HTC 14, p. 243c.

9. See Ed. Chavannes, *Mémoire composé a l'époque de la grande dynastie T'ang sur les religieux éminents qui allèrent chercher la loi dans les pays d'occident*, being a French translation of I-tsing's record, (Paris, 1894) pp. 138-157.

10. Cf. Chou-Yi-liang, "Tantrism in China", *HJAS* vol. VIII (1944-45) p. 265.

11. Hui-lin, *Yi-ch'ieh-ching yin-yi* T. 2128, vol. 54, p. 447 : and Ennin, *Nīttōshingushōgyōmokuroku*, T. 2167, vol. 54.

12. Unless otherwise noted, the source of information is Tsung-mi's *Ch'an-yüan chu-ch' uan-chi Tu-hsü*, T. 2015. The references of pagination in this paper are to Shigeo Kamata's edition along with Japanese translation of the work, *Zen no goroku* No. 9 (Tōkyo, 1971). Hereafter it is referred to as *CYC*.

13. Translated from *CYC*, p. 104.

14. *The Yogacara Idealism* (Varanasi, 1962), p. 33.

15. Translated from *CYC* pp. 104-105.

16. Ibid., p. 106.

17. Ibid., p. 105.
18. Ibid.
19. See A.K. Chatterjee, *op. cit.* pp. 33ff., and M. Winternitz's *A History of Indian Literature*, vol. II (English transl. by S. Ketakr and H. Kohn, Calcutta, 1933), pp. 352ff, and A. Wayman, "The Yogācāra Idealism," *Philosophy East and West*, XV (1965), pp. 65-73.
20. See, *Ch'eng Wei-shih-lun shu-chi*, *HTC*, vol. 77, p. 1d.
21. The Saṃdhinirmocana has been translated by E. Lamotte (Louvain, 1935), and cf. A.K. Warder, *Indian Buddhism* (Delhi, 1970), pp. 430f.
22. All these works are contained in the vols. XXX and XXXI.
23. Translated from *CYC* p. 121.
24. Ibid., p. 126.
25. Cf. *op. cit.* T. 1846, p. 242. For the Mādhyamikas' critique of the Vijñānavādas, see T.R.V. Murti, *The Central Philosophy of Buddhism* (London : 1960), pp. 317ff.
26. *CYC* p. 121.
27. Ibid.
28. Warder was of the opinion that Nāgārjuna's thought was pre-Mahāyāna; see *op. cit.* pp. 375ff.
29. Cf. Kenneth Ch'en, *Buddhism in China* (Princeton, 1964), pp. 131-134.
30. Ruegg, *La théorie du Tathāgatagarbha et du gotra, études sur la sotériogie et la gnoséologie du Bouddhisme* (Paris, 1969). A. and H. Waymans, *The Lion's Roar of Queen Srīmālā* (New York, 1974), and Takasaki, *A Study on the Ratnagotavibhāga (Uttaratantra), Being a Treatise on the Tathāgatagarbha Theory of Mahāyāna Buddhism* (Roma, 1966) ; and Takasaki, *Yoraizō shisho no keisei* (The Formation of *Tathāgatagarbha Theory*, Tokyo, 1974).
31. Translated from *CYC*, p. 131.
32. Ibid.
33. Ibid.
34. Ibid., p. 132.
35. Takasaki, 1974 *op. cit.* p. 13 in English summary, and pp. 507ff in full discussion.
36. *CYC*, p. 132.
37. Takasaki, 1966 *op. cit.*, pp. 45ff., and H. Nakamura, *et al* (*ed.*) *Ajia Bukkho shi-Indo Hen* (History of Asian Buddhism—Indian section) vol. III, (Tokyo, 1973), pp. 226ff.
38. For the dispute on the *icchantika* as mentioned in the *Nirvāṇasūtra*, see W. Liebenthal, "A Biography of Chu Tao-sheng" *Monumenta Nipponica*, XI/3 (1955), pp. 83-88.

GLOSSARY OF CHINESE & JAPANESE CHARACTERS

Ajia Bukkyōshi Indo hen
アジア仏教史

Ch'an 禪

Ch'an-yüan chu-ch'uan-chi Tu-hsü
禪源諸詮集都序

Ch'eng-wei-shih-lun shu-chi
成唯識論述記

Chi-liang-lun
集量論

Chih-chü 智炬

Chih-i 智顗

Chou Yi-liang 周一良

Chugohu kegon shisho shi no kenkyu
中國華嚴思想史の研究

Ennin 圓仁

Fa-tsang 法藏

Fa-tsang ho-shang chuan
法藏和尚傳

Feng-pieh yü-chia lun
分別瑜伽論

Hou-yen-ching 厚嚴經

Hsien-yang sheng-chiao lun
顯揚聖教論

Hsü-tsang-ching 續藏經

Hsüan-tsang 玄奘

Hua-yen 華嚴

Hui-lin 慧琳

I-tsing 義淨

Jih-chao 日照

Kamata Shigeo 鎌田茂雄

ling-chih 靈知

mi-yi 密意

Nakamura Hajime 中村元

Nittoshingushogyomokuroku
入唐新求聖教目錄

Ta-ch'eng ch'i-hsin-lun i-chi
大乘起信論義記

Ta-tsang-ching 大藏經

Taisho shinshu daizokyo
大正新修大藏經

T'ai-yüan 太原

Takasaki Jikido 高崎直道

T'ang 唐

T'ien-t'ai 天台

Tsung-mi 宗密

Wu-hsing 無行

Wu-hsing ch'an-shih shu 無行禪師書

Yi-ch'ieh-ching yin-yi 一切經音義

Yoraizo shisho no keisei 如來藏思想の形成

Yüan-chüeh-ching ta-shu ch'ao
圓覺經大疏鈔

Zen no goroku
禪の語錄

15

On The Buddha Image

PADMANABH S. JAINI

I

In discussing the origin of the Buddha-image, art historians, Coomaraswamy and Rowland among others[1], have alluded to accounts of the Chinese travellers Fa-Hian and Hiuen-Tsiang pertaining to the existence of a sandal-wood image of the Buddha carved during the Buddha's lifetime. Both these accounts agree in substance but differ in certain minor details. Fa-Hian, for instance, reports that it was King Prasenajit of Kośala who commissioned this image, whereas Hieun-Tsiang credits it to King Udayana of Kośāmbi. Fa-Hian's account, since it predates that of Hiuen-Tsiang by at least 200 years, is probably more accurate. In his description of the Jetavanārāma in Śrāvastī, which he visited, Fa-Hian gives the following account of the origin of the Buddha-image :

> When Buddha ascended into the Trāyastriṃshas heavens to preach for the sake of his mother, after ninety day's absence, King Prasenajit desiring to see him again, carved out of the sandal-wood called Gośīrshachandana (*ox-head*) an image of the Buddha and placed it on Buddha's throne. When Buddha returned and entered the *vihāra*, the image, immediately quitting its place, went forward to meet him. On this Buddha addressed these words to it : 'Return, I pray you, to your seat. After my Nirvāṇa you will be the model from which my followers (four schools or classes) shall carve their images.' On this the figure returned to its seat. This image, as it was the very first made of all the figures of Buddha, is the one which all subsequent ages have followed as a model.[2]

Whereas Fa-Hian was only reporting a tradition about the origin of the Buddha's image, Hiuen-Tsiang claims to have seen such an image in a large *vihāra*, not in Śrāvastī but in Kauśāmbī, the capital city of King Udayana. Referring to the origins of this image, he narrates the following legend :

> When Tathāgata first arrived at complete enlightenment, he ascended up to heaven to preach the law for the benefit of his mother, and for three months remained absent. This king (i.e., Udayana), thinking of him with affection, desired to have an image of his person; therefore he asked Maudgalyāyanaputra, by his spiritual power, to transport an artist to the heavenly mansions to observe the excellent marks of Buddha's body, and carve a sandal-wood statue. When Tathāgata returned from the heavenly palace, the carved figure of sandal-wood rose and saluted the Lord of the World. The Lord then graciously addressed it and said, "The work expected from you is to toil in the conversion of heretics, and to lead in the way of religion future ages".[3]

Both accounts agree that the first image of the Buddha was made in his absence while he was preaching in the Trāyastriṃśat heaven to his mother. They agree further that the image was made of sandal-wood. Both maintain that the image became animated upon seeing the Buddha, and it was ordered by the Buddha to propagate his teachings upon his death.

While modern scholars have taken notice of this account, they have not given credence to this tradition of the alleged first image of the Buddha. This is primarily because no literary evidence supporting such a tradition has been attested to either in the Pali Tipiṭaka and its commentaries or in any other Buddhist literature originating in India, Sri Lanka or Southeast Asia. Spence Hardy reports in his *Eastern Monachism* that the legend of the first Buddha image commissioned by King Prasenajit of Kośala was known to the Buddhists of Sri Lanka, but that "It is rejected by the more intelligent of the priests, who regard it as an invention to attract worshippers to the temples".[4] In recent years U.P. Shah has published two articles pertaining to a sandal-wood image of the Jaina teacher Mahāvīra, which was carved in his lifetime and thus called "Jīvantasvāmi".[5] In these articles Dr. Shah has proposed the possibility that the Buddhist traditions were perhaps imitations of the older Jaina tradition. We have no means of knowing whether the sandal-wood image seen by Hiuen-Tsiang was indeed the first image of the Buddha, or whether it and other Buddha-images were, as suggested by Dr. Shah, modelled after an earlier image of the Jina. We have, however, come across a previously unnoticed piece of literary evidence in Pali, which for the first time lends some authenticity to the oral traditions reported by the Chinese travellers. We here refer to a certain Jātaka tale found in a collection known as the *Paññāsa Jātaka*, which probably originated in the 13th or 14th century in northern Chieng-Mai. These stories are known in Burma as "Chieng-Mai Fifty" (Burmese : *Zimmé Paṇṇāsa*).[6] The collection is "extra-canonical" and is unknown to Buddhist traditions anywhere outside of the countries of Southeast Asia.[7] Although the stories of this collection are modelled after those in the canonical Jātaka book, they were treated as apocryphal and were even reported to have been prescribed by the orthodox Buddhist

king Myndon of Mandalay (1853-1872)[8]. They have, however, remained popular in Burma, Thailand and Cambodia and thus constitute an important source for our knowledge of the local Buddhist tradition which developed independently of both India and Sri Lanka.

The 37th Jātaka of this collection, entitled Vaṭṭaṅgulirāja-jātaka,[9] is historically of great importance as it contains a reference to the first image of the Buddha. It is a long story, comprising 204 verses. Being a Jātaka, the story is put in the mouth of the Buddha himself, who narrates an incident which occured in one of his previous births as King Vaṭṭaṅguli. This king had once in a past life repaired the broken finger of a Buddha-image. As a consequence of this great deed, he was in his present life a king, and was able to subdue the army of his enemies literally by lifting and bending one of his fingers. (Hence the name "Vaṭṭaṅguli.") The story itself is not of great importance for our purpose, but the *nidāna*, or introductory, portion of the Jātaka introduces King Prasenajit (Pali : Passenadi) of Kośala and thus links the story with the tradition reported by Fa-Hian. The *nidāna-kathā* of this Jātaka may be briefly summarized as follows :

> Once upon a time the Lord journeyed from Sāvatthi to a distant place to preach the Law. At that time King Passenadi of Kośala, desirous of seeing the Enlightened One, went, surrounded by his large retinue, to the great monastery (*māhā-vihāra*) in Jetavana. Not seeing the Lord, his heart was filled with disappointment and, saying "Alas, alas, the Jetavana is empty without the Lord," he returned home greatly dejected. After some time, the Lord returned to Jetavana. The king heard the news and went with the citizens to pay his respects to the Buddha. Having worshipped the Master he said, "Lord, even while you are still alive, people feel extremely dejected when you are gone for a short time. How could they ever be happy and not feel extremely bereaved when indeed you will have entered *parinibbāna* ? Therefore, O Lord, please allow me to make an image of you to be worshipped by both men and gods." Having heard these words of the king, the Lord, for the sake of the welfare of all beings and to insure the continuity of his teachings, gave his consent.

He then narrated the Jātaka of Vaṭṭaṅgulirāja referred to above, and the following account summarizes the events that then took place :

> Having heard this story, King Passenadi went to his residence and, selecting a beautiful sandal-wood tree, had the image of the Buddha carved from it. Having covered the image with excellent robes, he placed it on an elevated seat in his palace. He then went to Jetavana and invited the Buddha to see the image. The Buddha consented by remaining silent. The next morning the Lord, accompanied by his chief disciples, entered the great pavilion in the palace of the king in order to see the Buddha-image. At that very moment, the sandal-wood image, immediately upon seeing the Buddha, became animated, as if by the power of the Buddha, and thought thus : "When the great Buddha is alive and comes here, it is not proper that I should be seated here on this high seat. Let me pay my respects to him." Thinking thus, the image lifted one foot from the pedestal in order to

rise and welcome the Buddha. Having seen this, the Lord raised his right hand and said the following words : "Be seated, oh nobel one. I shall be entering into *parinibbāna* in a short time. May you sustain my *sāsana* (in the sense of teachings and order) for five thousand years to come. . .Beginning today I hand over my *sāsana* to you. May you stay in this *sāsana* for the welfare and benefit of the whole world.

The Vaṭṭaṅgulirāja jātaka is of great interest on several accounts. It affirms the tradition reported by Fa-Hian, which predates that of Hiuen-Tsiang by 200 years, thereby giving credence to the earlier Buddhist tradition that an image of the Buddha was indeed commissioned by King Prasenajit of Kośala during the lifetime of the Buddha. Since this tradition is not attested to in any other literary work originating in South or Southeast Asia, one wonders about the source of the version found in the apocryphal Jātaka of a relatively later date. Is it possible that the writers of the *Paññāsa Jātaka* might have been aware of the accounts of the Chinese travellers? Such a possibility cannot be discounted. However, we have no evidence in support of such borrowing. Both Chinese accounts begin with a reference to the Buddha's visit to his mother in heaven, which necessitated the commissioning of the Buddha-image. It should be remembered that the Buddha's visit to heaven is a popular element of Buddhist belief in Burma and Thailand. Several architectural remains from the 14th century onwards portray this event by showing ladders which represent the Buddha's descent to earth from heaven. The omission of this popular motif in our version is therefore remarkable, and would tend to support the possibility that the *Paññāsa Jātaka* version had a source independent of that of the Chinese versions.[10]

Only through further research will the source of the *Vaṭṭaṅgulirāja Jātaka* be precisely identified. But the fact that the Buddhists of Southeast Asia preserved in their popular literature the story of the first image of the Buddha, should encourage art historians to give more credence to the accounts of the Chinese travellers which have been hitherto neglected for want of literary evidence.

II

Excerpts from the Vaṭṭaṅgulirājajātaka

. . .idaṃ Satthā Jetavane viharanto attano pubbakammavasena katabuddhabimbam ārabbha kathesi. ekadivasaṃ hi Satthā imasmiṃ loke veneyyapuggale disvā te vinetuṃ disācārikaṃ pakkāmi. tadā Passenadi Kosalarājā mahājanakāyehi parivuto Sammāsambuddhaṃ passitukāmo c' eva attano purise gandhamālādīni pūjābhaṇḍāni gahāpetvā sakanagarato nikkhamitvā Jetavananāmake ārāme ṭhitaṃ mahāvihāram upāgami. so ca rājā sapariso tatth' eva Sugatālaye Sambuddham apassanto saṃvegajātahadayo evam āha : idaṃ hi bhonto Jetavanaṃ Sammāsambuddhena ca vinā suññam eva hotī ti. ...atha sabbe pi rājādayo mahājanakāyā mahāsaṃvegajātahadayā domanassappattā attano attano vasanaṭṭhānaṃ pakkamiṃsu. tadā pana Satthā nānādisāsu veneyyajane attano dhammadesanāya maggaphalaṃ bodhetvā Jetavane mahāvihāram upāgami. atha tappavattiṃ sutvā Passenadi Kosalarājā atiparamatuṭṭhacitto hutvā. . .

Jetavanaṃ gantvā Bhagavantam upasaṅkamitvā taṃ vanditvā ekamantaṃ nisīditvā evam āha: hiyyo bhante Bhagavā, Sāvatthivāsino mahājanakāyā Sammāsambuddham apassantā atidukkhena yuttā attano attano vasanaṭṭhānaṃ gamissantī ti. evañ ca pana so rājā puna Bhagavantam evam āha : bhante Bhagavā, tava dharamāne aññasmiṃ ṭhāne gate cāyaṃ sattaloko tuyham rūpam apassanto anātho atidukkhito hoti ; tayi pana anupādisesāya nibbānadhātuyā parinibbute yeva kuto panāyaṃ sattaloko satāṇo sukhito ca bhaveyya ? tasmā pana mayham eva tumhe naradevapūjāsakkāratthāya ca tava seṭṭharūpaṃ kātum anujāneyyāthā ti. tass' eva rañño vacanaṃ sutvā Satthā sabbalokahitañ ca passanto niccakālam eva attano sāsanaṃ tiṭṭhanatthāya ca attano rūpaṃ kārāpetuṃ tass' eva rañño anujānamāno evam āha : mahārāja, yo koci naro saddhāya sampanno yathābalaṃ mattikādinā pi kenaci vatthuno khuddakaṃ vā mama rūpaṃ kareyyā ti. evaṃ ca pana vatvā Satthā pubbe pi mahārāja, porāṇakapaṇḍito ekass' eva buddharūpassa bhinnaṅguli ekasmiṃ nagare ṭhitapatitaṃ disvā tatth' eva pākaṭikam aṅguli sandhiyanto vipulasukham anubhuñjamāno mahātejānubhāvo c' eva ahosī ti vatvā tuṇhī ahosi. ten' eva yācito atītam āhari.

.. evañ ca pana Bhagavato dhammadesanaṃ suṇanto sapariso Kosalarājā pītisomanassajātacitto sakalalokahitasukhāya buddhabimbakataṃ patthayanto tatth' eva gandhapupphādīhi Bhagavantaṃ pūjetvā attano vasanaṭṭhānaṃ gantvā candanarukkhavanato candanarukkhasāraṃ ānayitvā samasamaṃ c' eva taṃ candanarukkhasāraṃ likkhāpetvā ten' eva candanarukkhasārena atimanoharaṃ buddhabimbaṃ kārāpeti. tadā so rājā silitthaṃ tam eva buddhabimbaṃ kārāpetvā punappunaṃ sena (?) rasena taṃ buddhabimbaṃ limpāpetvā lākhāra[sa]sadisena suravera (?) —cīvarayugena taṃ buddhabimbaṃ pārupetvā uccāsane nānāvidhe varavatthe taṃ buddhabimbaṃ nisīdāpesi. atha so rājā. . .tassa buddharūpassa pūjāsakkārañ ca katvā Jetavanārāme vasantaṃ Sammāsambuddhaṃ upasaṅkamitvā ekamantaṃ nisinno imaṃ gātham āha :

> tayā Bhante, anuññātaṃ tava bimbaṃ me sukāritaṃ;
> icchāmi gamanaṃ tuyhaṃ passituṃ tattha te rūpaṃ,
> svātanāya te gamanaṃ ruccati mama sammā ti.

tass' eva rañño vacanaṃ sutvā Satthā tuṇhibhāvena adhivāsesi. . .punadivase pana Satthā attano sāvakehi parivuto tass' eva rañño mahāgehaṃ gantvā attano rūpam eva taṃ bimbaṃ dassanatthāya mahāmaṇḍapaṃ pāvisi. taṃ khaṇañ eva so buddhabimbo ten' eva candanarukkhasārena kato tatth' eva mahāmaṇḍape āgataṃ Sammāsambuddhaṃ passanto tass' eva Sammāsambuddhassa tejānubhāvena sagāravacittako viya jīvamānasarīro viya cintesi : evaṃ dharamāne Buddhaseṭṭhe idh' eva āgate idāni panāhaṃ ati ucce āsane nisinno mayham ayutto hutvā (hoti) ; tass' eva ādaraṃ karomī ti. evañ ca pana cintento viya eso bimbo Sammāsambuddhass' eva gāravam karonto attano nisinnāsanā ekapādaṃ nikkhipitvā tatth' eva āgataṃ Sammāsambuddhaṃ paccuggamanākāraṃ dassesi. evañ ca katam eva buddhabimbaṃ disvā Satthā tatth' eva. . .attano cīvarato erāvaṇahatthino karākāraṃ viya atisobhanaṃ padakkhiṇahatthaṃ nīharitvā tam eva bimbaṃ nivārento gātham āha :

āvuso tvaṃ tiṭṭha, na ciren' evāhaṃ
nibbāyissāmi, 'nāgate pañcavassasahassāni
ciren' eva tvaṃ ca sabbadā tiṭṭheyyāsi sāsane mamā ti.

evañ ca vatvā Satthā tass' eva buddhabimbassa attano sāsanaṃ niyyādento imaṃ gātham āha :

ajj' evāhaṃ niyyādemi mayhaṃ te sāsanaṃ tuyhaṃ,
sabbalokahitatthāya tiṭṭha tvaṃ sāsane mamā ti.

. . .evañ ca pana. . .Passenadi Kosalarañño saddhiṃ kathaṃ niṭṭhāpetvā. . .anāgatakāle tuyhaṃ c' eva atiuḷārasukhavipākadāyakaṃ bhavissatī ti vatvā jātakaṃ samodhānento osānagātham āha. . .

NOTES

1. A.K. Coomaraswamy, *The Origin of the Buddha Image* (2nd edition, Delhi, 1972, p. 41) refers to Kern's opinion : "There is no lack of legends anent the origin of Buddha images, but it would be difficult to discover in those tales, which are wholly discordant, something like an historical nucleus." (*Manual of Indian Buddhism*, p. 94). See also, Benjamin Rowland, *The Evolution of the Buddha Image*, p. 5.
2. Samuel Beal, *Buddhist Records of the Western World*, Introduction xliv.
3. Ibid., vol. I, pp. 235-6.
4. Spence Hardy, *Eastern Monachism*, p. 199.
5. U.P. Shah, "A Unique Jaina Image of Jīvantasvāmi", *Journal of the Oriental Institute*, vol. I, i, pp. 71-79 ; "Sidelights on the Life-time Sandal-wood Image of Mahāvīra", Ibid., vol. I, iii, pp. 358-367.
6. *Zimmé Paṇṇāsa* (i.e. Chieng Mai 50) edited anonymously and published by the Hanthawaddy Press, Rangoon, 1911. A critical edition of the Burmese version of the *Paññāsa Jātaka* is being prepared by me and is soon to be published by the Pali Text Society, London.
7. See L. Feer, "Les Jātakas", *JA*, 7e Sér., v, 1875, pp. 417 ff.
8. See my article "The story of Sudhana and Manoharā : an analysis of the texts and the Borobudur reliefs", *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies*, University of London, vol. XXIX, Part 3, 1966, p. 534, n. 10.
9. *Zimmé Paṇṇāsa*, pp. 486-510.
10. As this article goes to the publishers, I learn from Professor H. Bechert that he is editing a volume entitled *Buddhism in Ceylon and Studies on Religious Syncretism in Buddhist Countries* which includes a paper by R.F. Gombrich on the Sinhalese *Kosalabimbavaṛṇanāva*. As this work originates from Sri Lanka it may have drawn on a source common to the *Vaṭṭaṅgulirājajātaka*.

16

The Meaning of Nirvāṇa

L. M. JOSHI

The problem of the meaning and nature of Nirvāṇa has been perhaps the most difficult in the history of ideas. Heroic efforts have been made by several modern Asian and European scholars to understand and explain the essential nature of this *summum bonum* of the Buddhists. Here we will not refer to these efforts[1]; our purpose at the present moment is to discuss and elucidate, as far as it is possible to do so, the meaning and nature of Nirvāṇa strictly on the basis of ancient Buddhist authorities. Our choice of Buddhist authorities, both canonical and commentarial, has to be restricted, for the time being, to those that are of Indian origin and available in Pali and Sanskrit languages. We believe that an understanding of the meaning of those Buddhological passages in the Sūtras and Śāstras that deal with Buddhahood not only clarifies the subtleties of the meaning of Nirvāṇa, but also provides answers to all questions concerning Buddhist religion and philosphy.

The Buddhist conception of Nirvāṇa is unlike any other non-Buddhist conceptions of Ultimate Truth known to the religious history of mankind before or after Śākyamuni. The Sūtras have indeed said that the holy Dharma revealed by Buddha is contrary to the ways of all the world (*sarvaloka vipratyanīka*).[2] It should be mentioned here that although the word *nirvāṇa* has been employed in a large number of sacred texts of medieval India, its meaning was completely transformed in devotional theologies of post-Buddhistic origin. Thus the word occurs in the literature of Śaivism, Śāktism, the Nātha school, the Kabīrapantha, and of Sikhism, but in a completely theistic framework of thought. Already in the *Bhagavadgītā* the Vaiṣṇavaite-Hindu theologians had identified *nirvāṇa* with *brahman* (11.72). The medieval theologians used this word for Divine state, the state of the Highest Bliss, of the Union of individual soul and God. Although sages like Kabīradāsa and

Teghbahādur have also used words such as the Fearless state (*nirbhai-pada*) and the Immortal state (*amṛta-pada*) as synonyms of *nirbāna-pada*, words which occur numerous times in the Buddhist canon, their understanding of the concept of Nirvāṇa was different from what we know from the Buddhist tradition.

It will be recalled that Bodhisattva Siddhārtha Gautama practised religious life for some time in the hermitages of two great non-Vedic sages (*śramaṇas*) named Ārāḍa Kālāma and Rudraka Rāmaputra. But he left their religion because it did not conduce to "release, dispassion, cessation, tranquillity, superknowledge, enlightenment, and *nirvāṇa*."[3] These seven terms indicate the nature of the ultimate goal the Bodhisattva had in mind. Their Sanskrit forms are *nirvṛti*, *virāga*, *nirodha*, *upaśama*, *abhijñā*, *sambodhi* and *nirvāṇa*. These terms are, more or less, synonymous. Let us try to understand the meaning of these terms.

I

Release or liberation is called not only *nirvṛti* but also *mukti* and *mokṣa*. These words mean the ultimate release from the cycle of becoming (*bhava-cakra*), the final liberation from all bonds of conditioned existence, and the destruction of suffering. The conception of *nirvṛti* presupposes the conception of *saṃsāra* or the course of repeated birth in different states (*gatis*) of existence. With the achievement of *nirvṛti* the saint goes beyond *saṃsāra*, having set aside the burden of embodied existence.

II

The word dispassion (*virāga*) connotes extinction of passions and defilements. It is the state of purification and emancipation. Passion or desire (*rāga*) is likened to a fire; he who has put down this fire is called a *vītarāga* or an *arhat*. The ascetic (*bhikṣu*, *śramaṇa*) is believed to be an embodiment of dispassionateness which is an attribute of Nirvāṇa. The Scripture says that the destruction of desire (*rāga*), hatred (*dveṣa*) and delusion (*moha*) leads to Immortality (*amṛta*).[4] The word *virāga* is a synonym of wantlessness; there are no wants or desires in Nirvāṇa.

III

Cessation (*nirodha*) is one of the most frequently used synonyms of Nirvāṇa. It means cessation of basic factors of conditioned existence and therefore of suffering. The stopping of suffering (*duḥkhanirodha*) is understood to mean the destruction of suffering for ever and attainment of bliss (*sukha*). In point of fact, *nirodha* implies the end of impurities or defilements (*kleśas*) and of rebirth. The classical list of six impurities consists of lustful desire (*rāga*), hostility (*pratigha*), conceit (*māna*), ignorance (*avidyā*), perverted view (*kudṛṣṭi*) and doubt (*vicikitsā*).[5] These impurities are eradicated in Nirvāṇa.

IV

Tranquillity (*upaśama*) means pacification. In Nirvāṇa there is no restlessness, no disturbance, and no activity of any kind whatsoever. It is the peace that passeth understanding; Nirvāṇa is the quiescence of speech and thought-construction. It is not the peace of grave, for it is called the Good (*śivam*). The meaning of *upaśama* is made clear in the following lines which represent the epitome of Buddhist philosophy :

anityā vata saṃskārā utpāda-vyaya-dharmiṇaḥ
utpadya hi nirudhyante teṣāṃ vyupaśamas sukham.[6]

'Impermanent certainly are conditioned things. It is their nature to originate and cease. Having been originated, they are stopped. Bliss lies in their pacification'. The Dhammapada (verse 368) uses peace (*santi*), bliss (*sukha*) and the pacification of conditioned things (*saṃkhārūpasamaṃ*) as interchangeable terms. Nāgārjuna also characterizes Nirvāṇa as the bliss which consists in the pacification of quiescence of phenomenal plurality (*prapañcopaśamaṃ śivam*).[7]

V

Superknowledge (*abhijñā*) is a fundamental feature of Enlightenment and the foundation of omniscience. This aspect of Nirvāṇa consists of certain intellectual and communicable ideas. The six kinds of superknowledge are (1) divine eye (*divya-cakṣu*), (2) divine ear (*divya-śrotra*), (3) knowledge of other's minds (*paracitta-jñāna*), (4) remembrance of former existences (*pūrvanivāsānusmṛti*), (5) supernormal yogic powers such as levitation, walking on water etc. (*ṛddhi*), and (6) annihilation of the cankers or outflows (*āsravakṣaya*). The first five *abhijñās* are mundane, while the sixth is supramundane; the first five are found among ordinary shamans and wizards also while the sixth is peculiar to *arhats*. These kinds of superknowledge are achieved by perfecting concentration (*dhyāna*). The annihilation of four *āsravas*, viz. sensual desire (*kāma*), desire for coming to be (*bhava*), false views (*dṛṣṭi*), and ignorance (*avidyā*), is achieved in Nirvāṇa, and this achievement leads to omniscience.

VI

Enlightenment (*sambodhi*) is closely related to superknowledges. The knowledge of Four Holy Truths is peculiar to a Buddha. The very epithet *buddha* means Knower, Wise, Awakened, Enlightened. In the scriptures the Tathāgata is described as Wisdom-Embodied (*ñāṇabhūta*) and is identified with the Transcendental Gnosis (*prajñāpāramitā jñānaṃ*).[8] The Buddha is called Sambuddha, the Perfectly Awakened; He is endowed with Knowledge (*vidyā*) and Righteous Conduct (*ācaraṇa*) which He manifests through supreme compassion (*mahākaruṇā*) directed towards the welfare of living beings.

The one word which sums up the meaning of Enlightenment is *pratītyasamutpāda*,

literally; 'conditioned coproduction'. The Buddha has the knowledge (*bodhi*) of this principle which reveals the mystery of the universe and the origin and end of all beings and things. The Buddhist scriptures identify Dharma with the principle of conditioned coproduction and declare that he who sees conditioned coproduction sees Dharma, and he who sees Dharma, sees Buddha.[9] It was the knowledge of this principle which transformed Gautama into a seer and knower of all that is to be seen and known. The twelve preconditions which He saw during the third watch of the night of Enlightenment constitute the principle of moral causality operating in the universe. Siddhārtha Gautama attained Nirvāṇa and became Buddha by discovering this principle. The ancient texts reporting the event of Gautama's Enlightenment tell us that the vision of this Dharma or Law burst upon Him with revelatory force and He saw this Law enacted in a cosmic panorama of doing, dying and rebirth. According to the Buddhacarita, the entire universe with all its beings appeared before Him as in a mirror.

The principle of conditioned coproduction (*pratītyasamutpāda*) has been viewed as a profound and unique discovery of the Buddha. In the scriptures it is described as "the Dharma which is profound, difficult to see, difficult to know, quiescent, transcendent, beyond the sphere of discursive reasoning, subtle, and to be known by the wise."[10] This principle does not merely explain the origin and cessation of suffering inherent in *saṃsāra* ; it also establishes the impermanence and substancelessness of all conditioned phenomena. It was on the basis of this principle that the shortest and most brilliant summary of the Buddha's teaching was produced by the Arhat Aśvajit in the following words : "the Transcendent One (*tathāgata*) has revealed the origin as well as the end of all those things that are produced by causes; this is the teaching of the Great Sage".[11] The Sūtras inform us that the knowledge of the origin and cessation of suffering was the kernel of the Buddha's *bodhi*. Attaining Nirvāṇa means attaining Enlightenment (*bodhi*), Vision (*cakṣu*), Knowledge (*jñāna*), Wisdom (*prajñā*), Understanding (*vidyā*), and Light (*āloka*). These terms are employed in the canonical texts as synonyms of Nirvāṇa.[12]

Śākyamuni did not owe His *bodhi* to any other higher being or power. According to the Buddhist doctrine, Buddha is the highest being and Dharma is the supreme power. Buddha is 'Self-Existent' (*svayambhū*). Not Gautama the man, but Gautma the Buddha is called Self-Existent and Self-Luminous (*svayamprabha*).[13] He is called *svayambhū* because He got the supreme Enlightenment by Himself, by His own efforts, without any external help, grace, instruction or revelation. The Reality (*tattva*) which the Buddha had realized is, therefore, called 'not dependent on other' (*aparapratyayaṃ*), 'independent' (*svatantra*) and 'to be realized only by oneself' (*svayameva-adhigantavyaṃ*).[14] This Reality is the Immaculate and Blissful Nirvāṇa (*nirvāṇam amalaṃ śivam*).[15] He who sees and knows it becomes an omniscient (*sarvajña*), the all-seeing (*sarvadarśin*), and attains transcendental perfection (*paramapāramitā*). Omniscience is another name of Buddhahood; there is no difference between Enlightenment (*bodhi*) and Omniscience (*sarvākārajñatā*).[16] Attainment of (*bodhi*) means entrance into the 'City of Omniscience' (*sarvajñatānagara*).[17] One of the most ancient canonical texts of Buddhism describes the nature and achievement of the Buddha in the following words :

'Master of everything, I am omniscient, and undefiled among all things. Having

destroyed craving, I am liberated ; having known by Myself, whom shall I point to (as a teacher) ? I have no teacher ; one like Me does not exist; in the world including the gods, none equals Me. In the world I am the perfected one and I am the incomparable teacher; I am the supreme enlightened one, I am the quiescent one, the released one.'[18] These are the words Śākyamuni uttered after He had attained Enlightenment at Buddhagayā.

The transcendentality and ineffability of Enlightenment is stressed in several texts. The Mahāyānian exposition of the concept of *sambodhi* shows that it is one of the names of the Absolute Truth or Ultimate Reality. Master Prajñākaramati for instance, says that 'Enlightenment (*bodhi*) means Buddhahood (*buddhatva*); it is devoid of unity, plurality, and own-nature, and it is free from origination, cessation, annihilation and eternality; it is free from all words and concepts and is like the sky; it is known as Dharmakāya and as Supreme Reality (*paramārthatattva*). This same Reality is indicated by such terms as Transcendental Gnosis (*prajñāpāramitā*), Emptiness (*śūnyatā*), Thatness (*tathatā*), Reality-Limit (*bhūtakoṭi*), and the Absolute Element (*dharmadhātu*), etc.'[19] These terms show that Buddhahood is the Buddhist alternative of Godhead;[20] all the powers and perfections attributed to God in theistic religious systems are attributed to Buddha in the non-theistic religion of the Buddhists. The Buddha, however, is no God-Creator; although He is regularly called a 'Teacher of gods and men' and often described as 'the God above gods' (*devātideva*). Buddhism teaches that there is no real creation and therefore there is no real creator of the world.

VII

Nirvāṇa is the last term in the list of seven quasi-synonyms of the ultimate goal in search of which Bodhisattva Gautama had rejected Rudraka's teaching. The term means Extinction (*nirvāṇa*, *nir* + *vā*), or that which is Extinquished (*nirvṛta*, *nir* + *vana*). Negative descriptions of Nirvāṇa are more numerous than positive ones. Nirvāṇa is the end of suffering, the extinction of desire, the destruction of greed, hate, delusion, and of the constituent factors (*skandhas*) and volitional forces (*saṃskāras*). Nirvāṇa destroys death and is therefore called Deathless or Immortality (*amṛta*). All possibilities of rebirth in any form are stopped in Nirvāṇa. He who attains Nirvāṇa goes beyond *saṃsāra* and does not return to it again. He attains to that unconditioned sphere which is beyond the reach of thought, speech and imagination.

Nirvāṇa is called incomparable (*anuttara*, *atulya*) because its likeness exists nowhere. It is called emptiness (*śūnya*) because it is devoid of plurality or duality and because it is free from all fantasies and thought-constructions. All conceptions of Nirvāṇa are misconceptions because it is by nature inconceivable. That which is unconditioned (*asaṃskṛta*) and limitless (*ananta*) cannot be conditioned and limited by intellectual and linguistic symbols.[21]

It is because of the utterly undefinable and unspeakable nature of Nirvāṇa that Nāgārjuna says that 'what neither is given up nor is it obtained, what neither is annihilation nor is it eternality, what neither is stopped nor is it produced, this is called Nirvāṇa.'[22] In Nirvāṇa there is neither existence (*bhāva*) nor non-existenc

(*abhāva*); the very thought of 'is' and 'is-not' is destroyed here. Liberation (*mokṣa*) is the destruction of impure activity (*karmakleśa*); impure activity is due to false imagination, and false imagination is due to phenomenal plurality which ceases in Emptiness (*śūnyatā*).[23] In other words, Nirvāṇa is Emptiness. This Emptiness is neither a thing nor a nothing ; it is undifferentiated and without any attribute. The Sūtra declares that Nirvāṇa is of the form of Peace (*śānti*), and it has only one characteristic, and that is, that it has no characteristic.[24] He describes it best who does not describe it ; here silence is eloquence. Nirvāṇa as Supreme Bliss (*paramasukha*)[25] has a meaning only when one knows and realizes it as it is (*yathābhūta*) by oneself. All thoughts about it are meaningless. For Nirvāṇa, the one and only Truth, has nothing to do with thoughts and concepts[26].

NOTES

1. Some idea of these efforts can be gained from G.C. Pande, *Studies in the Origins of Buddhism*, Allahabad, University of Allahabad, 1957, pp. 443-510 ; Guy Richard Welbon, *The Buddhist Nirvāṇa and Its Western Interpreters*, Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 1968 ; J.W.de Jong's review of Welbon's book in *Journal of Indian Philosophy*, vol. I, 1972, pp. 396-403, and J.W. de Jong, 'A Brief History of Buddhist Studies in Europe and America' in *The Eastern Buddhist*, New Series, vol. VII, nos. 1 & 2, 1974.
2. *Saddharmapuṇḍarīkasūtra*, ed. by P.L. Vaidya in B.S.T., no. 6, Darbhanga, 1961, p. 11.
3. *Lalitavistara*. ed. by P.L. Vaidya in B.S.T., no. 1, Darbhanga, 1958, p. 181.
4. *Saṃyuttanikāya*, vol. IV, ed. by Bhikkhu J. Kashyap, Nalanda, 1959, p. 9.
5. *Dharmasaṅgraha*, section 67.
6. *Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra*, ed. by E. Waldschmit, Berlin, 1951, p. 398; see *Mahāparinibbānasutta* in the *Dīghanikāya*, vol. II, ed. by Bhikkhu J. Kashyap, Nalanda, 1958, p. 120.
7. *Madhyamakaśāstra*, I. 1.
8. *Aṅguttaranikāya*, vol. IV, ed. by Bhikkhu J. Kashyap, Nalanda, 1960, p. 284; *Prajñāpāramitāpiṇḍārtha*, ed. by P.L. Vaidya in B.S.T., no. 17, Darbhanga, 1960, p. 263, verse 1.
9. *Śālistambasūtra*, ed. by P.L. Vaidya in B.S.T., no. 17, Darbhanga, 1961, p. 100.
10. *Mahāvagga*, ed. by Bhikkhu J. Kashyap, Nalanda, 1956, p. 6; *Lalitavistara*, p. 289.
11. *Mahāvagga*, p. 40.
12. *Saṃyuttanikāya*, vol. II, pp. 11-12.
13. *Saddharmapuṇḍarīkasūtra*, II. 60.
14. *Madhyamakaśāstra*, XVIII. 9; read with the *Prasannapadā* of Candrakīrti, ed. by P.L. Vaidya in B.S.T., no. 10, Darbhanga, 1960, p. 159.
15. *Saddharmapuṇḍarīkasūtra*, V. 63.
16. *Abhisamayālaṅkāra-vṛtti* of Āryavimuktiṣeṇa, ed. by C. Pensa, Rome, S.O.R., vol XXXVII, 1967, p. 37.
17. *Lalitavistara*, p. 254, line 5.

18. *Mahāvagga*, p. 11; *Lalitavistara*, p. 296; *Majjhimanikāya*, vol. I, ed. by Bhikkhu J. Kashyap, Nalanda, 1958, p. 221.

19. *Bodhicaryāvatāra-pañjikā*, ed. by P.L. Vaidya in B.S.T., no. 12, Darbhanga, 1960, p. 200.

20. This subject is discussed in detail in the author's forthcoming book, *God's Alternative*, to be published by Claude Stark & Co.

21. See *Suttanipāta*, verse 1148; *Aṅguttaranikāya*, vol. II. p. 84; *Madhyamakaśāstra*, XIII. 8; XXII. 15; *Vajracchedikā Prajñāpāramitā*, ed. by E. Conze, Rome, S.O.R., vol. XIII, 1957, sections 14-17; *Visuddhimagga*, ed. by Dharmananda Kosambi, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1950, XV. 42; *Abhisamayālaṅkārālokavyākhyā*, ed. by P.L. Vaidya, in B.S.T., no. 4, Darbhanga, 1960, p. 282.

22. *Madhyamakaśāstra*, XXV. 3.

23. Ibid., XVIII. 5.

24. *Aṣṭādaśasāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā*, ed. by E. Conze, Rome, S.O.R., vol. XXVI, 1962, p. 162.

25. *Dhammapada*, verses 203-204; *Therīgāthā*, verse 478; *Saṃyuttanikāya*, vol. II, p. 231.

26. *Saddharmalaṅkāvatāra-sūtra*, ed. by P. L. Vaidya, B.S.T., no. 3, Darbhanga, 1963, III. 18.

17

Mahāyāna Buddhism and the Philosophy of Prajñā

YUICHI-KAJIYAMA*

The Mahāyāna movement originated in India around the first century B.C. Over the succeeding few centuries it gradually developed, producing and disseminating one after another such major Mahāyāna sūtras as the *Prajñāpāramitā*, the *Vimalakīrti*, the *Saddharmapuṇḍarīka*, the *Daśabhūmika*, and the *Sukhāvatīvyūha*. Various factors contributed to this rise of the Mahāyāna. Beginning in the third and fourth centuries B.C. the civilization of the Indian sub-continent, which had long been an isolated society, came into contact with the cultures of Greece, Rome, Persia, Central Asia, and, through Central Asia, China. This opening up of Indian society, and the consequent major changes it effected in India's economic, cultural and social conditions, represent one important external cause of Mahāyāna's emergence. Within Buddhism itself the doctrines and practices of the various schools of the so-called Hīnayāna Buddhism had become highly specialized and cut off from the faith of the common people, and the monks living communally in the monasteries had tended to become unconcerned with the salvation of the ordinary lay believer. To the Mahāyāna Buddhists it seemed that the Hīnayāna had forgotten the true intent of Gautama Buddha's teaching ; and therefore, pointing out the contradictions in the Hīnayāna, they launched a "back to the Buddha" movement. It is not my intention here to discuss these historical circumstances surrounding the rise of the Mahāyāna movement. Rather, in what follows I should like to consider several of the fundamental teachings of the Mahāyāna sūtras as they contrast with the Hīnayāna doctrine.

*I express my heartfelt gratitude to Mr. Carl Bielefeldt for having translated this essay into English from the Japanese text.

The fact that the Mahāyāna movement advocated a return to the Buddha does not mean that its thought was identical with the doctrines of Gautama Buddha. The real concern of the Mahāyāna Buddhists was with the failings of the established philosophy of the Hīnayāna, and it was only in order to criticize that philosophy that they advocated a return to the Buddha. In fact, by the first century B.C. it had already become virtually impossible—as it is today—to separate out Gautama Buddha's own teachings from the later material which was gradually added to them. The thought and practice of Hīnayāna Buddhism, which had become generally fixed by the beginning of the Christian era, while it had inherited the Buddhism of Gautama, had also added new elements. In the same way, the Mahāyāna Buddhism which sought to transcend Hīnayāna, though it aimed at a return to the Buddha, in fact possessed a social and religious consciousness markedly different from that of Śākyamuni. But in traditional India, rather than boast of the originality of one's thought, one gave it authority by attributing its source to the ancients.

The word "Bodhisattva" means "one who seeks enlightenment." Originally, it was used in reference to Gautama Buddha in his countless previous lives, during which he spent a virtually infinite period in moral and religious practice. But the Buddha himself realized that he was walking the same path already trod by the ancient sages. Thus, there gradually arose the tradition that there had been Six Buddhas before Gautama; and also, perhaps under the influence of Iranian thought, that there would appear other Buddhas such as Maitreya in the future. But if there are numerous Buddhas of past and future, then there must also be countless Bodhisattvas in past, present and future, practicing over infinite periods of time to become these Buddhas. Moreover, just as Gautama Buddha in his previous lives had been sometimes a prince, sometimes a commoner, sometimes an animal, the Bodhisattva need not necessarily practice religion as a monk. Therefore, anyone in ordinary society has the possibility of being a Bodhisattva. My own neighbor may be a Bodhisattva. The fact, then, that Mahāyāna Buddhism is a religion of the Bodhisattva means that it is a religion, not just for monks, but for everyone in the society.

Once the meaning of the term "Bodhisattva" became fixed in the sense of "one who practices Mahāyāna Buddhism," it came to be contrasted with those who practice the Hīnayāna, the Śrāvaka and Pratyekabuddha. "Śrāvaka" means a disciple of the Buddha, but after the Buddha's death it gradually came to refer to those monks who lived communally in monasteries cooperating in a life of study and meditation. Pratyekabuddhas also occasionally stayed in monasteries, but for the most part they were men who wandered the countryside, practicing meditation, becoming enlightened alone, and dying without transmitting that enlightenment to anyone else. Both the Śrāvaka and the Pratyekabuddha led the lives of ascetics, free from the duties of family and society; and in that sense theirs was an asocial existence. Their goal was not to become a Buddha but to become an Arhat, a lesser grade of sage. Both this ideal and the study and meditation designed to reach it remained distant from the common man.

In contrast, the Bodhisattva is for the most part a householder, an object of respect and affection within his community, an educator teaching in the streets. Even when he is a monk the Bodhisattva always walks with the masses, always represents the common man. In his practice he aims at the perfection of the six virtues of charity,

morality, patience, vigour, meditation and wisdom. All of these virtues are perfected for the sake of others, and represent expressions of the Bodhisattva's altruistic spirit. So, for example, the virtue of charity, which in the Hīnayāna was focused on the giving of alms by the faithful to the saṅgha, in the Mahāyāna refers to the Bodhisattva's practice of giving everything, including his own life, for the sake of others.

The Mahāyāna Bodhisattva is often referred to as a "Bodhisattvamahāsattva" i.e., as a "great being who seeks enlightenment." On the basis of the traditional interpretation of the term (Haribhadra, *Abhisamayālaṃkārālokā Prajñāpāramitāvyākhyā*, Chap.1), the Bodhisattva as "one who aims at the attainment of his own personal enlightenment" cannot be distinguished from the Hīnayāna Śrāvaka. Therefore, it is said the term "Mahāsattva," "great being," is added to indicate that he is "one who aims at the perfection of great altruism." Since, however, there could also be Mahāsattvas—i.e., those who practice altruism—outside of Buddhism, he is called a "Boddhisattva" to indicate that he is a practitioner of Buddhism. Therefore, the term "Bodhisattva-Mahāsattva"—or its abbreviated form, "Bodhisattva"—means "the practitioner of Mahāyāna Buddhism who devotes himself to enlightenment both for himself and for others." The "enlightenment" referred to here is the *prajñā-pāramitā*—the perfection of wisdom, the omniscience of the Buddha—and not the limited enlightement of the Arhat.

There are a number of Buddhist technical terms expressing "enlightenment": *bodhi*, *anuttara-samyak-saṃbodhi*, *abhisamaya*, *abhisambodha*, etc. Here I should like to discuss the doctrine of enlightenment through the term "*sarvajñatā*," "omniscience" (*Ibid*, Chap. 1). The "enlightenment" referred to by this term is usually divided into three types. The first represents the wisdom of the Hīnayāna sages, the Śrāvaka and Pratyekabuddha, who analyze the phenomenal world and fully and correctly comprehend all the substances in that world. This is the wisdom which distinguishes that which really exists from that which does not. Its essence is to grasp the nature of the elements (*dharma*) which comprise both the individual and his environment, and thereby to know that beyond these elements there exists no substance corresponding to an ego or a soul. Thus, it is an enlightenment which realizes the unreality of the self (*pudgala-nairātmya*), but admits the reality of the elements which make up the phenomenal world.

The second type of "enlightenment" is that of the Bodhisattva practicing to become a Buddha. This is the wisdom which completely comprehends the objects and methods of the Bodhisattva's practice and the varieties of the paths for the conversion of sentient beings. This comprehension can be called the wisdom of skillful means (*upāya*), about which we will have more to say. "Skillful means" is used to refer to all the methods employed by the Bodhisattva for the salvation both of himself and of others, but it is primarily the means whereby he fully knows both that there exists no substantial self in the individual (*pudgala-nairātmya*) and that there exists no substance in any object in the world (*dharma-nairātmya*).

The third type of "enlightenment" is the peerless knowledge of the Buddha, which has immediate and simultaneous insight into both the absolute and the relative aspects of the world. This is the knowledge both of the essential emptiness of all things and of the illusory manifestation of all things. It is the perfection of wisdom, and is called "*prajñāpāramitā*"—or simply "*prajñā*." The primary sense of the term "*prajñāparamitā*"

is this omniscience which forms the essence of the Buddha. In a secondary sense the term is used to denote the texts or the path of practice leading to such omniscience.

In Mahāyāna Buddhism *prajñā* is regularly mentioned in conjunction with the two important concepts of compassion (*karuṇā*) and skillful means (*upāya*). Compassion, needless to say, is a major virtue both in early Buddhism and in the Hīnayāna; but in Mahāyāna, which emphasizes the spirit of sacrifice for the salvation of all sentient beings, compassion becomes the very essence of the religion. The *bodhicitta*, or "thought of enlightenment," which the Bodhisattva produces at the outset of his career, arises from his compassionate intention to save all sentient beings. The Mahāyāna sūtras and śastras repeatedly teach that without such compassion the thought of enlightenment would not arise. Similarly, wiihout *upāya*, or skillful means, the Bodhisattva's enlightenment would not be possible, nor could he approach the wisdom of a Buddha. Thus, in the Mahāyāna, *prajñā* is inseparable from *karuṇā* and *upāya*. But what, then, is the content of this *prajñā* ?

In discussing the notion of *prajñā* it will be necessary to consider at least briefly the concept of saṃsāra, or the wheel of birth and death. The ideal of the religion of Buddhism is, of course, nirvāṇa or *mokṣa* (liberation). This "liberation" means freedom from saṃsāra. In order to understand, therefore, how *prajñā* functions in Mahāyāna Buddhism it is essential to understand the Mahāyāna reaction to the Buddhist theory of saṃsāra and to the closely related doctrine of karma.

At the time of Gautama Buddha the Indian intelligentsia and nobility were tormented by an infernal vision of saṃsāra. Their Aryan ancestors had entered India with an optomistic view of life and death, in which after death one was born in the paradise of Yama, where one enjoyed eternal happiness. In India, however, they discovered the idea that after birth in paradise, one could die again there, be reborn elsewhere, and so continue in this way being born and dying endlessly. The development of this new idea was a traumatic blow to the Aryan consciousness, and when it became established within Indian society around the sixth century B.C., the solution to the problem of saṃsāra became the primary concern of philosophy and religion. To be sure, among the thinkers contemporaneous with the Buddha there were those who strongly denied the truth of saṃsāra from a materialistic or hedonistic position; but this denial itself reveals the extent to which the problem of saṃsāra was of primary concern even to them. Most of the thinkers of this period were groping for some solution to the problem through the practice of yoga and austerities. Among the children of the nobles and the rich there were many who realized the meaninglessness of luxury and pleasure, and who saw in them the cause of pain in the next life. In fear of that pain they abandoned their families, left home and became wandering *śramaṇas*, devoted to lives of celibacy, austerity and meditation. Indeed, the prince Siddhārtha was one such man.

The frightening consequences of the concept of saṃsāra can be seen in the theory of rebirth as it was gradually worked out within Buddhism. In accordance with the good or evil acts performed in this life, one is reborn in the next life into fortunate or unfortunate circumstances. There is no end to this process; the laws of karma doom one to wander forever through the six destinies : denizen of hell, hungry ghost, animal, titan, man and god. Even if, as recompense for good acts, one is born as a god in heaven, if one gives oneself over to idleness and pleasure one falls back

into hell or some other unfortunate state. The gods, while more fortunate than men, do not transcend saṃsāra. Unlike the followers of monotheistic religions, the Indians and other peoples who followed Buddhism had no absolute god as a savior. Hence, the concept of saṃsāra gave rise to a dark and hopeless view of life and death from which there was no means of escape.

Two things should be noted here. First, within the theory of saṃsāra itself there is no principle of salvation. To be sure, there is a strong ethical principle of individual responsibility, in which good acts lead to pleasant results and bad acts to unpleasant results, and in which the fruit of action is always obtained by the agent himself and not by his descendants or family. But, however many good acts one may accumulate, they will only insure a temporary happiness : they can never lead to escape from the cycle of birth and death itself. Thus, the Indians, being unable to rely on the grace of a god, were forced to seek the path to transcendence of saṃsāra in the mystical intuition obtained through yoga or, as in the case of Gautama Buddha, in the principle of "dependent origination."

The second point to be noted is that the theory of saṃsāra represented a statement about reality, and not merely an idle hypothesis. To the ancient Indian, saṃsāra was an actual fact of life and a source of real suffering. Buddhism tells the story of Yasa, who became one of Gautama's first disciples. He was the son of a wealthy family and led a life of extreme pleasure. Yet once after a party he awoke in the middle of the night, and, seeing around him the sprawled bodies of women sunk deep in sleep and the disarray of musical instruments, dishes and the like, he became fearful of the pain awaiting him in his next life, and weeping bitterly he fled from his home. Thus it is that he came to meet the Buddha. In later times the philosophers of the Hīnayāna Abhidharma, by applying contemporary concepts of embryology, attempted to understand the Buddha's teaching of the twelve-fold chain of conditioned origination as a scientific explanation of the individual's passage through past, present and future lives. Saṃsāra was not, then, merely a symbol of human suffering as we tend to understand it today; to the ancient Indians both theoretically and emotionally it was an extremely dark fact of life

This profound pessimism toward human life, originating before Gautama Buddha and continuing down through early Buddhism and the various schools of Hīnayāna, seems to suddenly disappear with the advent of the Mahāyāna scriptures. In these scriptures there reappears a world filled with light, purity and joy. It is said in the *Aṣtasāhasrikā-prajñā-pāramitā-sūtra* (Chapter 3), that the son or daughter of good family who seeks *prajñā-pāramitā* feels no physical, no mental fatigue. At ease he lies down, at ease he walks about. At ease he sleeps, at ease he awakes. His body, filled with energy, feels at ease and light. While sleeping he sees no evil dreams. And when he does see something in his dreams, he sees the fully enlightened Tathāgatas, he sees stūpas, he sees Bodhisattvas and disciples of the Tathāgata. The *Prajñā-pāramitā sūtras* describe the *prajñā-pāramitā* as pure and as bright, and they teach that if one believes in the great mantra of the *prajñā-pāramitā* he will be free from all calamities and can attain all worldly avantages. What was the secret of this remarkable optimism of the *prajñā-pāramitā* Sūtras?

The secret lay in the "wisdom of emptinesss," the wisdom which does not attach to, does not perceive, the transmigrating being or the world of saṃsāra as real.

Chapter 1 of the *Aṣṭa* says, "In perfect wisdom form is not appropriated ; and if form is not appropriated, then it is not form. The same is true of feelings, perceptions and impulses. And if consciousness is not appropriated then it is not consciousness. Perfect wisdom, too, cannot he appropriated." Or again, "World-Honored One, form is neither bound nor freed. The same is true of feelings, perceptions and impulses. And in the same way, World-Honored One, consciousness is neither bound nor freed." Or again, "The form of an illusory man is neither bound nor freed. The feelings, perceptions and impulses of an illusory man are the same. The consciousness of an illusory man is neither bound nor freed."

The form, feeling, preception, impulse and consciousness referred to here are the so-called "five *skandhas*," the five aspects into which Buddhists analyze human existence. "Form" refers to the physical body and to its environment, while the remaining four *skandhas* indicate four types of mental function. Taken together, the five *skandhas* approximate our notion of "body and mind". "O Subhūti, here the Bodhisattva, the great being, thinks thus : 'Countless beings should I lead to nirvāṇa, and yet there are none who should be led to nirvāṇa and none to lead them'.....It is just as if, Subhūti, a clever magician, or a magician's apprentice, were to conjure up at a large crossroads a great crowd of people, and then having conjured them up, made them vanish again. In that case, was anyone killed by anyone, or murdered, or destroyed, or made to vanish ?...Even so a Bodhisattva, a great being, leads countless beings to nirvāṇa, and yet there is not any being that has been led to nirvāṇa, nor that has led others to it."

The *Prajñā-pāramitā sūtra* is here saying that the bondage of life and death and transmigration is not real, is an illusion, a dream, and that therefore the transmigrating individual, as well as the individual liberated from transmigration, are also not real. If saṃsāra does not exist, then nirvāṇa, the liberation from saṃsāra, also does not exist. These two are one, indivisible and indistinguishable. Nāgārjuna, who in the second to third century developed the Mādhyamika philosophical system from the *prajñā-pāramitā*, says in his *Madhyamika-kārikā* (Chap. 25), "There is nothing which distinguishes saṃsāra from nirvāṇa. There is nothing which distinguishes nirvāṇa from saṃsāra. The (temporal) limit of nirvāṇa is the (temporal) limit of saṃsāra. Between the two there is not the slightest difference." The transformation of the real into the illusory, and the identification of the illusory with the real means that saṃsāra is transformed into nirvāṇa and nirvāṇa is identified with saṃsāra.

The early Buddhist sūtras generally describe Gautama Buddha's enlightenment somewhat as follows: He perceived the Four Noble Truths that existence is suffering ; that there is a cause of suffering, desire; that there is freedom from suffering, the stopping of desire; and that there is a way to the stopping of suffering. Thus, his practice brought to completion, he attained enlightenment highest among the gods, Brahmans and *śramaṇas*. He knew that his spiritual freedom was secure, and that this was his last life ; he would not be born again.

The early Buddhist monks as well, completing the meditation of the Four Dhyānas, recollected their past lives ; they directly perceived where and in what caste they had been born one life ago, two lives ago, 100 or 1000 lives ago ; they clearly intuited what they had perceived then, how they had acted and what the results of

that action were. They saw the process of others' transmigration ; how as a result of good acts or bad acts beings were born in heaven or in hell. And as they intuited one by one the Four Noble Truths their minds were freed from defilements and desires. They realized that their transmigration had come to an end, that they had completed the holy course and done what was to be done, and that they would not return to this world.

Existence in saṃsāra is suffering ; its cause is ignorance and desire. Enlightenment meant, therefore, freedom from ignorance and desire, and an end to transmigratory existence. The word "nirvāṇa," expressing the ideal of Buddhism, means "blown out," and is synonymous with "*nirodha*," "extinction." This early Buddhist ideal of the extinction of existence was not only retained by Hīnayāna philosophy; in still more extreme form it was elaborated into a theoretical system. Nirvāṇa, or extinction, was made an unconditioned substance (*asaṃskṛta-dharma*), attained through the extinction of the body and the defilements. Holy men were divided into four ranks : those who had entered the stream of the teaching (Stream-winner); those who would be enlightened after one birth in heaven and one more birth in this world (Once-returner); those who, having cut off the remaining delusions in this world, would not be born again into the realm of desire (Never-returner); and those who, having cut off all delusions, would enter nirvāṇa and never be reborn again (Arhat). This classification is clearly based on the number of times that the sage is reborn.

This "longing for extinction" characteristic of early Buddhism disappears in the Mahāyāna. Nirvāṇa itself is not denied ; but the Bodhisattva, even though he himself may be able to enter nirvāṇa, chooses not to enter but to remain in this world of birth and death. There are two reasons for this. First, the Bodhisattva makes a vow never to enjoy his own enlightenment until he has led all beings in this world to the realization of the truth. He sees others' suffering and the suffering of society itself as his own, and rejects the possibility of his own salvation independent of the salvation of others. He resolves to practice forever to save the countless beings in all times, places and circumstances. Therefore, he takes as his ideal "not abiding in nirvāṇa." This is the Bodhisattva's practice of compassion, his skillful means in the salvation of sentient beings.

"Not abiding in Nirvāṇa," however, is not simply the product of the Bodhisattva's compassion and skillful means; it is based on *prajñā*, the Bodhisattva's wisdom. According to the philosophy of the Hīnayāna Abhidharma, saṃsāra and nirvāṇa are fundamentally different, each possessing its own characteristic nature. Mahāyāna thought, however, rejects this notion of own-nature. Consequently, nirvāṇa does not exist subsequent to the extinction of saṃsāra : if one realizes that saṃsāra is empty and nothing but an illusion, then saṃsāra itself becomes nirvāṇa. Nirvāṇa is in the very midst of saṃsāra; it is not in another time or place.

The understanding of "saṃsāra as nirvāṇa" has as its corollary the concept of "the *kleśas* as *bodhi*." Mahāyāna rejects the Abhidharma view that desire, anger, ignorance and the other *kleśas*, or defilements, all have their own characteristic natures and cannot, therefore, transcend themselves. Love may be bondage to the unenlightened, but to the Buddhas and Bodhisattvas it is the compassion which seeks to save all sentient beings. It is less our desire itself that is at fault than the fact that we are bound by desire. If one realizes that desire has no real

nature as desire, one can use desire as a means for saving sentient beings. The *Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra* offers an interesting and apt simile : the silkworm wraps itself up in its own thread, until in the end it is trapped motionless within its cocoon. The spider stretches out its own thread around itself, and then runs freely about on it. The Bodhisattva does not imitate the foolish silkworm, but follows the way of the spider. To make the thread by which one is bound the very field of one's free activity is the way of *prajñā*, the wisdom of emptiness. For the Bodhisattva the defilements and saṃsāra are the very place where enlightenment and nirvāṇa are actually alive and functioning.

Earlier we touched upon the fact that the theory of karma, which provided an ethical basis for saṃsāra, required a strict doctrine of individual responsibility. In fact, the concept of karma actually believed in by the people of India did not alway conform to this strict understanding, but the doctrine as it was adopted and defined by Buddhism was based on the principle that the fruits of an individual's action always returned to that individual. There was no room here for notions such as inherited or family karma, in which the sins of the fathers are visited upon the children. The strictness of this doctrine of individual responsibility was maintained throughout early and Hīnayāna Buddhism.

The rise of Mahāyāna brings with it an extraordinary change ; for there now appears the concept of *pariṇāmanā*, the dedication of one's "good roots"—that is, the good actions which are the cause of happiness—to something other than one's own happiness. There are two stages in this dedication : one is the transference of the karmic good roots away from happiness toward one's own enlightenment or omniscience; the other is the transference of one's good roots away from one's own happiness toward the happiness and enlightenment of others. The first type of dedication is the more basic, the second type being both historically later than, and logically derivative from, the first. In any case, this concept of dedication clearly deviates from the principle of karma, which demands that an individual's good and evil actions bring about pleasant and unpleasant effects for that individual alone. This deviation is a necessary condition for the Mahāyāna teaching that the Bodhisattva benefits others; and without it there could certainly be no Pure Land of Buddhism, which presupposes that the Bodhisattva Dharmākara, having accumulated the merit of countless ages of practice, established the Buddha Land of Sukhāvatī in order to save all sentient beings.

The highest happiness is enlightenment, omniscience ; and, because enlightenment is impartial and common to both self and other, once the first type of dedication, in which one's own good roots are given over to omniscience, is established, the possibility of the second type, in which one's own good roots are given over to another's happiness and enlightenment, follows inevitably. How, then is this first type of dedication established? The *Aṣṭa* explaines this from two different angles. In Chapter Four it is said of the Six *Pāramitās*—i.e., the Bodhisattva's six virtues of practice: charity, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom—that they are called "*pāramitās*"—i.e., perfections or completions—because these virtues are not limited simply to ethics, but are dedicated to enlightenment, to omniscience. The first five *pāramitās* are called "*pāramitās*" only when they are guided by the sixth *pāramitā* of wisdom. Therefore, the dedication of good roots to enlightenment becomes

possible through the perfection of wisdom. And *prajñā* provides the basis for dedication : *prajñā* is the "wisdom of emptiness," which takes nothing as a fixed entity. Since, therefore, good roots are empty, without any nature as good roots, they can be converted from the realm of ethics to the realm of enlightenment. The wisdom which converts them is the *prajñāpāramitā*.

Chapter Six of the *Aṣta* explains dedication from another point of view. Here it is said that when one imagines the immeasurable good roots achieved by all the Buddhas of past, present and future and their disciples, and rejoices therein, if one then dedicates the imagined good roots accompanied by that rejoicing, this is of still greater value than the dedication of actual good roots. Here we have the concept that there is no difference in value between the real and the fancied. This is again the wisdom of emptiness, in which reality and illusion are seen as equal. Since reality is without any real substance it is one with illusion; since illusion is without substance it is one with reality.

This spirit of dedication as the transcedence of karma has, of course, a social background. The "purification of the Buddha Land" emphasized by the Mahāyāna sūtras was in fact concrete social service such as the establishing of dispensaries, the founding of orphanages or the building of bridges. This indicates not only that the Bodhisattva's compassion issued in sacrifice to society but that there was developing in India at this time a movement from individual moral and religious consciousness toward social awareness. But Mahāyāna Buddhism was less concerned with this general development of individual spirituality in the new society than it was with describing such a development in terms of the person of the Bodhisattva.

The doctrine of dedication fostered another idea of great importance to Mahāyāna Buddhism—the idea of "play." The first chapter of the *Aṣta* explains how it is that a Bodhisattva can, in order to save innumerable beings, perform difficult practice and endure numerous sufferings. One who, it is said, seeks the perfection of wisdom while thinking of difficult practice is not a Bodhisattva-mahāsattva. So long as one has the idea of difficult practice one cannot benefit beings ; rather, it is when one has the idea of ease that one can benefit beings. The reason for this the sūtra then goes on to explain in terms of the fact that beings are without any self, and that therefore the Bodhisattva, too, is empty.

The paradoxical doctrine that the pains of endless practice are to the Bodhisattva a pleasant, easy practice is given a more systematic explanation in the *Daśabhumika-sūtra*. This sūtra provides a detailed account of the Bodhisattva's practice by dividing it into ten stages. When the Bodhisattva enters the sixth stage of his practice he arrives at what are known as the "Three Gates of Liberation": the knowledge that all things are without substance (*śūnyatā*), the knowledge that all things are without sign (*ānimitta*), and the absence of any wish other than that for the salvation of beings (*apraṇihita*). On the seventh stage the Bodhisattva confirms that all beings are without birth and extinction (*anutpattikadharma-kṣānti*), but without remaining at this level, through his great compassion, he develops *upāya* to guide others.

On the subsequent stages all the Bodhisattva's actions occur naturally without requiring any effort (*anābhoga*). This means that his actions are an easy practice equivalent to play or sport (*vikrīḍita*), which, because they do not intend toward their own goals, are not bound by those goals. Here compassion becomes

disinterested, a compassion beyond compassion, with no attachment to its object. This means that the Bodhisattva's action is empty and is pure.

In the traditional doctrine of karma the fruits of an individual's actions—whether good or bad—had been borne by that individual himself. But the effortless action, or play, of the Bodhisattva, because that action is seen to be empty and is therefore performed without attachment, does not produce fruits for the Bodhisattva. Rather, the happiness produced by those actions can be dedicated to enlightenment or to others.

The idea of "play" has another side as well. The leader of a great caravan, prior to embarking on a journey to the desert, carefully investigates the geography, foresees all dangers and makes preparations for them, thoroughly understands the temperament and health of the caravan members and their families, and makes perfect and faultless plans. Once these plans have been made it is already assured that the caravan will arrive at the destined oasis, and that the members will prosper and rejoice. Just in the same way, the Bodhisattva at the beginning of his practice makes a vow to save all sentient beings. That vow, like the plans of the caravan leader, is detailed, perfect and faultless. Therefore, the subsequent practice is transformed into "play," carried out according to plan, naturally and without effort. Here the beginning has become one with the end.

In the past the Bodhisattva Dharmākara took a vow to establish the Buddha Land of Sukhāvatī and save all sentient beings. Practicing austerities over an *infinite* period of time, he has *now* already become the Buddha Amitābha and is saving beings. How is it that infinite time can be contained in the present? The Zen school has the saying, "practice after enlightenment." Why is it that enlightenment precedes practice? Because it is said, "sentient beings are originally the Buddha." How can the Buddha be lost in saṃsāra? Whether temporally or logically, what makes possible the transformation of before and after, the identity of beginning and end, is the spirit of play, the wisdom of emptiness.

18

Buddhism and the Non-Philosophical Brahmanical Literature

C. V. KHER

The rise of Buddhism marked a significant event in the history of Indian thought and in the course of a few centuries, it assumed a form and a force which could hardly be neglected by the followers of Brahmanism. In the initial stage, it was, however, watched and treated from a position of superiority, not unmixed with a feeling of awe and appreciation of the new movement which seemed to challenge matters of age-long conviction. As Buddhism developed further, it won adherents, not only from the lowly and the neglected, but also from the intellegensia of the upper-class Brahmins, who were in many respects responsible for a systematic formulation of certain doctrines of Buddhism. At this stage, the followers of Brahmanical philosophies and religion had to admit Buddhism as a system of thought equal in strength, and they had to devise ways and means to soften the edge of enmity by reconciliation on certain points. This can be seen both in philosophy and in that Brahmanical literature which had a religious aspect. In the third phase of the rivalry, followers of Brahmanism tried to pick up holes in Buddhism as manifested in the practices of its degenerate followers and to minimize its value in the eyes of the people by ridiculing and by criticizing it for those shortcomings which appeared to have evoked wide disapproval. It is true that throughout the period of the existence of Buddhism in India, the learned and the discerning appreciated its great merits and acknowledged its intrinsic strength. But, in case of the Brahmanical philosophers as well as the authors of the non-philosophical literature, their loyalties and affinities to the Brahmanical ideology and ways of life had an upper hand in determining their attitude towards Buddhism. Repercussions of this spirit of antagonism and the contest for supremacy can also be clearly seen in the non-philosophical Brahmanical literature, though here we see a much lighter side of the relations.

Here, in this paper, it is our aim to study Buddhism as reflected in the writings of the non-philosophical Brahmanical writers. The works under study are called non-philosophical literature in so far as a majority of them are works of art, whereas there is a group of other texts which are not strictly philosophical but religious or quasisecular. In the first group, we have Sanskrit plays, dramas, *Bhāṇas*, *Prahasanas* and allegorical dramas, and other varieties of poetical and historical narratives. To the second group belong chiefly the *Purāṇas* and the *Smṛtis*. The purpose inspiring the composition of the works from both the groups is not everywhere the same, and the time-span covered by these works extends approximately from the 4th century B.C. to the 18th century A.D.

In this literature, we come across many references to Buddhist monks and nuns, to Buddhist doctrines, and to the good and bad practices in which the followers of Buddhism engaged themselves. They throw light on the relation between Brahmanism and Buddhism that prevailed in those days and tell us how the adherents of Brahmanism and the authors of this literature looked upon the Buddha, Buddhism and the members of the Buddhist order. It may be true that all presentations are not replicas of reality and that there is every possibility of their being colored by personal likes and dislikes of the writers. But the view that "works of literature are not mere plays of imagination or of solitary caprices of the brain, but they may be said to be transcripts of contemporary manners or as representing types of certain kinds of mind" holds equally good. It is, therefore, highly interesting to have a short review of Buddhism as reflected in the non-philosophical Brahmanical literature.

At the outset, it may be stated as a general observation that in the case of the subject-matter of the various *kāvyas* and dramas, the plots are mostly derived by the Brahmanical authors from the two great epics—the *Rāmāyaṇa* and the *Mahābhārata*, the *Purāṇas*, the stories of great kings or religious and martial heroes. It is notable that with very few exceptions, Buddhist birth stories (*Jātakas*) and the *Avadānas* are seldom utilised by the Brahmanical writers. In the work of *Kṣemendra* and the *Kathāsaritsāgara* of Somadeva, many of these stories are to be found. King Harṣa's *Nāgānanda* is the only play where a *Jātaka* is used, though that too, in the latter half of the play.

Not only is the fund of Buddhist stories not utilised for a central theme, but in many dramas the Buddhist characters that occur have comparatively a secondary role to play. They are never heroes or heroines. On the other hand, we come across many reference in these works to the Buddha, to his many worthy qualities and to his outstanding achievements.

The play *Nāgānanda* attributed to King Harṣa (606-648 A. D.) presents a harmonious blending of Brahmanical and Buddhist notions. It was perhaps a reflection of the state of a society in which religious toleration had become natural. That was the state of affairs at the time of the revival of Brahmanism. Buddhism attained a dominant position in India in the third century B. C. and retained that position for some centuries. During the age of the Guptas in the 4th century A. D., there was a glorious revival of Brahmanism with an ascendency of its different sects like Śaivism and Vaiṣṇavism in the different parts of India. It was, however, accompanied by a worthy spirit of religious toleration among the kings and their subjects. During the following few centuries both Brahmanism and Buddhism were equal in

strength and there was a contest for supremacy between them. Buddhism was, however, slowly entering shadows of decline and did not fail to reveal its weaknesses in theory and degeneration in practice. This fact was not without its reflection in contemporary literature. Though cases of religious persecution are not often met with-in India, Buddhism had to undergo it occasionally; on the other hand, the above-mentioned sectarian rivalry sometimes decided the attitude of the followers of Brahmanism to Buddhism. Even at those times when Buddhism had acquired ascendency in India, worship of the Hindu gods and goddesses continued unabated and the Vaiṣṇavas and the Śaivas flourished side by side with Buddhism.

In the works of Sanskrit writers like Bhāsa (4th century. B. C. approx.), Śūdraka (5th or 6th century A.D.), King Harṣa, Bhavabhūti (8th century A D.), and Śrī Harṣa (12th century A. D.), Buddhist characters are introduced and treated from different angles, either because of the personal inclinations of a particular author, or because that which the writer sees in the society around him is mirrored in his writing. As a general observation, it is possible to say that there is nowhere an intentional glorification of Buddhist concepts and characters. The play *Nāgānanda* is clearly an outcome of the personal inclinations of its author. Because of the spirit of religious toleration, perhaps, *Nāgānanda*, though with a strong Buddhistic tinge, was favorably received.

It is the story of Jīmūtavāhana—a Bodhisattva and a Mahāsattva. He possesses all the noble qualities eulogised by the Mahāyāna, viz. the bodily marks of a cakravarti unique proficiency in arts, unequalled courage, kindness and generosity, aversion to worldly pleasures, devotion to parents, love and compassion towards the suffering, and a supreme spirit of self-sacrifice. *Nāgānanda* thus appears to sing the praises of the Bodhisattva ideal of the Mahāyāna. It also expresses high appreciation for the Buddhistic ideals of virtues such as abstention from killing living beings, pacification of passions and moral depravities (signified by the conquest of Māra), steadfast meditation, practice of universal compassion (*karuṇā*) and friendliness (*maitrī*), perfection of charity and forbearance (*dāna, kṣānti*) and the spirit of service to others. King Harṣa's inclination towards Buddhism, which is an historical fact, may explain the high regard with which Buddhism is presented here. The same is the case with Somadeva's *Kathāsaritsāgara*. The stories of Nāgārjuna, a royal minister and a successful man of medicine, of Jīmūtavāhana, the hero of *Nāgānanda*, the story of Vinītamati, the stories about the six perfections of *Dāna, Śīla, Kṣānti, Vīrya, Dhyāna* and *Prajñā*, all of them alike present Buddhism in shining colors and eulogise the importance of *Bodhisattvacaryā*, the Mahāyāna doctrine of the conduct directed to spiritual evolution and perfection. (cf. *Ratnaprabhālaṁbaka, Śaktiyaśolaṁbaka, Naravāhanadattajananalambaka, Vinītamatikathā*).

Śrī Harṣa, the author of *Naiṣadhacaritam*, also expresses at various places his profound regard for the wishfulfilling gem of Buddha's religion (IX.71). There the soldiers along with their horses, go around the caityas and monasteries as a mark of respect (I 71). Buddha is the conqueror of the senses as also of the world (IV.80). The merit acquired by Brahmā by offering Kasturi for Buddha's worship, is the foremost in the three worlds and refers to Tārā, the Buddhist deity of the Vajrayāna sect in that context (XXII.136).

Kalpavṛkṣa learns generosity from Indra's practice of the perfection of charity (V.11). Śrī Harṣa describes Saraswati in terms of the Mahāyāna doctrines of

Śūnyatā, pure consciousness, and *Sākārajñāna* (X.88). He tells us that the Buddha expounded the momentary character of the world through compassion for living beings, and with a view to disclosing the false core of the Vedas (XVII.37). To Śrī Harṣa is also attributed the authorship of a Vedānta text *Khaṇḍana khaṇḍa khādya* and his devotion to the 'Brahmavāda' is well-known. Otherwise, one would have been tempted to doubt whether Śrī Harṣa was a writer favorably inclined towards Buddhism. The references make explicit to us that the doctrines of Buddhism, especially the Mahāyāna, had fascinated this poet with a strong fervor for philosophy.

In Śūdraka's *Mṛcchakaṭika* also, Buddhism appears to flourish with its great panoply of monks and monasteries etc. The old and stinking Kaṣāya garments of the monks (*purāṇakulitthayusavarṇāni ugragundhīnicīvarāṇi*), their avoidance of all contact with women, the practice of addressing lay-devotees as 'Upāsaka', and their property of '*Daṇḍa kuṇḍikā-bhājana*—all these are accurately described. On the whole, *Mṛcchakaṭika* displays a spirit of ridicule in looking at the Buddhist monk, even though we can say that it is not a result of the author's own prejudices against Buddhism. Being an artist of outstanding merit, and gifted with a rare capacity to visualise the main events of the story taking place on the canvass of the varied social background, Śūdraka creates characters and describes incidents which are reflections of the state of society. To ridicule the Buddhists is not at all his aim. For instance, Saṁvāhaka, defeated in gambling and relieved of the debt by Vasantasenā, feels disgusted and becomes a Buddhist monk. That such things happened is corroborated by the very early Vinaya literature in Pāli. Saṁvāhakas' devotion to that life of renunciation is further enhanced by witnessing the play of destiny in the case of Cārudatta. He sings the praise of the *Dharma* and exhorts people to gather merit in a typically Buddhist manner. When Śūdraka refers to the ill-omen in the form of the sight of a '*Kṣapaṇaka*', he just records the belief of the people in general (VII.9). As an artist he looks at these things and utilizes them for humor.

In his play *Mālatimādhava*. Bhavabhūti introduces three Buddhist nuns, viz. Avalokitā, Buddharakṣitā and Kāmandakī, and makes Kāmandakī the 'thread-bearer' of the love-intrigue. It is observed that "it is rather strange that the poet should have chosen persons of a different faith and religious character from his own to bring about the main issue of the piece". But here also we may note two points. First, as a man of literature, the poet is free to choose any character as suits his purpose, or that of his theme. Secondly, as Buddhist nuns actually acted as go-betweens, or took interest in secular matters, there was nothing 'strange' as such in that What strikes us more is that these characters are depicted in such a way that they have a dignity of their own and are essentially attractive. Especially, in contrast with the Kāpālikas, a sect of Śaivism, they are presented in bright colours, which may perhaps be an indication of Bhavabhūti's own estimate of the two religious sects.

There is one more aspect from which the Buddha and Buddhism are looked upon by the Brahmanical writers. Buddha is looked upon and worshipped as an incarnation of Viṣṇu, the supreme god, who appeared in this world with a distinctive mission. The *Mahābhārata* (III. 2.7.73) refers to the Noble Eightfold path, and presents Nārada as piling upon Nārāyaṇa a whole string of names of Buddhist gods

(XII. 325). The particular section from the *Mahābhārata* appears to combine the spirit of devotion with a philosophical conviction about the identity and one-ness of the supreme principle which is immanent in every divine form as conceived by the various religious sects and thus seems to be prompted by a twofold intention; (1) to synthesize all the non-Vaiṣṇavite notions of gods and deities into the one notion of the supreme principle and (2) thereby prove the superiority of this notion to all other such notions. In *Bhāgavata Purāṇa* (I.3.24), Buddha appears as an incarnation of Viṣṇu. The *Nīlamata-purāṇa* (prior to the 12th century A.D.) enjoins the worship of the Buddha on the ceremonious occasion of his birth-day in the month of Vaiśākha. Buddha is described as the teacher of the world (*jagadguru*), the lord of the universe (*jagannātha*). It also recommends the worship, of and doing honour to, the Buddhist monks with cows, clothes, food and books (verses 809-816). The *Agnipurāṇa* tells us that the 'Lord' became the son of Śuddhodana and deluded the Daityas to give up the '*Vaidika Dharma*' so that they became Buddhists. The '*Daśāvatāracarita*' attributed to *Kṣemendra*, similarly regards the Buddha to be an incarnation of Viṣṇu and describes at length the events in Buddha's life and says, "He was Acyuta, who left his body of *Saddharma* (a clear reference to the concept of *Dharmakāya*) in this world in order to help people cross over the ocean of the world and then went back to his 'Vaiṣṇava abode' (ch.V.). According to Jayadeva, the author of *Gītagovinda* (11th century A.D.) it was Keśava, with a heart full of compassion, who denounced the scriptures that laid down the slaughter of animals in sacrifice. (*Nindasi yajña-vidher ahaha śrutijātam/ sadayarhdaya, darśita paśughātam*"(I.1.9). In all these works we see a long continuity of the tradition regarding Buddha as an incarnation of Viṣṇu, and it would be very interesting to study the stages in the process of including Buddha in the ten incarnations.

This step may be held to correspond with the second phase of relations of Brahmanism with Buddhism.

However, all writers do not show the same favor towards the Buddha, his followers and his religion. The *Kalki-purāṇa* describes the Buddhist religion as one completely different from Vedic religion, devoid of the worship of gods and manes, without considerations of family and caste, and of the distinctions of what is one's own and what belongs to others in matters of wealth, women, food and enjoyments. To the Buddhists are attributed views which are upheld by the Cārvākas and not by the Buddhists themselves, such as denial of the other-world, looking upon the body as the soul, '*Pratyakṣavādins*' and '*dharma-nindakas*' which only shows the feeling of utter dislike of the writer for this religion, which sees little difference between the two schools of thought. The *Kalki-Purāṇa* gives a fanciful description of the battle between Buddha and Kalki which ends in favor of the latter.

The *Smṛtis* unanimously class the Buddhists among the '*Nāstikas*' and express discontent with their views. However, as their chief aim is to define the details of the ideal behavior of the different sections of the Brahmanical society, they do not occupy themselves with a large-scale refutation of the Buddhist view of life.

On the other hand, there are very lively and interesting pen-pictures of Buddhist monks and nuns, who, occasionally forgetting their worthy heritage, bid farewell to lofty ideals and happily follow the dictates of passion. There are many writers who have noted the ridiculous aspect of this tendency and have presented it humourosly in their works.

A number of Buddhist nuns are seen acting as go-betweens figuring prominently in various love-affairs. In the *Kathāsaritsāgara* (32-126, 127) it is remarked that these hypocritical female ascetics, "creeping unforbidden into houses, skilled in deceptions, will stick at no deed whatever." Kāmandakī in Bhavabhūti's *Mālatimādhava*, Arhantikā and Dharmaraksitā in the *Daśakumāracarita* of Daṇḍin (6th century A.D.) (ch. 6), and the Buddhist nun in the *Narma-mālā* of Kṣemendra (end of 10th century A.D.) are such cases. In the literature of the *Kāmaśāstra* which systematically treats of the kinds of women who act as go-betweens (*Dūtīs*), the nun (*parivrājikā*) is mentioned quite regularly. It is, however, a question as to whether the introduction of nuns in love-affairs in literature was due to the influence of *Kāmaśāstra*, or whether it was a reflection of the actual state of affairs in the society. The latter alternative seems to be more probable, being based on literature and literary records. In the *Vinaya* acting as a 'go-between' by a monk or a nun is regarded as a *saṅghādisesa* offence requiring a formal meeting of the Saṁgha, and the *Vinaya* literature is full of references to real or supposed misbehavior of monks and nuns in respect of love and sex. When certain Brahmanical authors identify these monks and nuns as Buddhists, it is more or less a matter of personal prejudice.

In the case of monks, wine, women and food are the three vulnerable points selected for ridicule by the Brahmanical writers. Even as early as Bhāsa, in his *Pratijñāyaugandharāyaṇa* and *Cārudatta*—a Buddhist monk is ridiculed for these weaknesses.

In some *Bhāṇas*, *Prahasanas* and Sanskrit plays such as the *Padmaprābhṛtakam* of Śūdraka (5th or 6th century A.D.), the *Laṭakamelaka of* Śāṇkhadhara (12th century A.D.), the *Madanaketucarita* of Rāmapānivāda (18th century A.D.), the *Prabodhacandrodaya* (11th century A.D.) hypocritical Buddhist monks are depicted seeking amorous adventures with courtesans or from whatever quarter possible. The *Mattavilāsaprahasana* of Mahendravikram-avarman (620 A.D.) aims at humor by showing the contrast between Nāgasena's erudition in Buddhist precepts and doctrines and his actual behavior. Sometimes it is shown that the Buddhist and the Jain monks are attracted to the Somasiddhānta of the Kāpālikas by wine and women. Kalhaṇa records in *Rājataraṅgiṇī* (I. 199-200) that a certain Buddhist monk, through force of black magic, kidnapped the queen of King Kinnara which provoked the furious king to burn hundreds of Vihāras and confiscated their property. The *Pāda-tāḍitakam* of *Śyāmilaka*, a *Bhāṇa* (6th to 10th century A.D.) contains a reference to the Tāntric aspect of Buddhism. It is the Rādhikā, the *mudritā yoṣit*, a girl who is to be made *tāthāgatī bhāryā*, with whom one is to engage in spiritual practices for the desired end.

Food is also one of the points for which Buddhist monks are made fun of. In the *Bhagavadajjukīyam* Śāndilya becomes a *Śākya* for want of food seeing that it is easier to get good meals, when one is a member of the Buddhist *saṅgha*. That the monks were fortunate to have all sorts of luxuries is also repeatedly expressed in these works.

Some doctrines or rules of Buddhism also are referred to and criticised such as the doctrine of universal momentariness, the non-substantial character and hence unreality of external objects, the continuum of consciousness becoming manifest as points of external existence, the same continuum's freedom from '*vāsanās*' as constituting release all are mentioned (*Prabodhacandrodaya*). The *Mattavilasa* evinces a

bitter spirit of ridicule and criticism on the Buddhists' denial of *Śruti*, *Jāti* (caste) the permanence of things, external objects and the like. It brings to light the condition of different religions and sects such as Jainism, Buddhism, and Śaivism, the Kāpālikas and the Pāśupatas. In the place of religious toleration we come across a rivalry. Śaivism, with its two divisions, seems to be the predominent sect, though itself not in a very praiseworthy condition. The Śaivas do not seem to be on good terms with the Jainas and the Buddhists; this is a historical fact. Like the 'transgressers' in Buddhism, Śaivism had its own followers given to all sorts of sensuous enjoyments under the guise of religious practices. It was, perhaps, this universal degeneration of the various religious sects which inspired allegorical dramas like the *Prabodhacandrodaya* whose authors combined in themselves philosophical learning and partiality for a particular system of thought.

On the basis of the above data we may infer the following :

Throughout the long span of centuries Buddhism was a force to be felt and a phenomenon to be taken note of.

The Buddhist doctrines that are referred to are either the most well known and popular Mahāyāna doctrines, or such tenets of Buddhism which were basic to all its important schools. The two references to the Tāntric aspect of Buddhism may be taken to coincide with the popularity which that form of Buddhism enjoyed in India towards the end of eighth century A.D., although it was a current in Buddhist practice from the very earliest times, to which some of the *Paritta suttas* in Pāli may testify.

As for the attitude of the Brahmanical writers, they may be broadly classified into three categories :

(i) Authors, with either Brahmanical or Buddhistic bias, who display a favourable attitude of praise and pure appreciation, though they cannot be said to possess a definite aim of propaganda, e.g. King Harṣa or Śri Harṣa.

(ii) Authors, or works that have a totally antagonistic view of Buddhism and aim at pure criticism ; works like the *Smṛtis* and the *Kalki-purāṇa* belong to this category.

(iii) There is a third category of writers whose attitude towards Buddhism is of a mixed nature. They certainly had a high regard for whatever was good in the Buddha and Buddhism, but they could not neglect the bad points warranting criticism. They did criticize it in many ways, and some achieved the aim of humor through that. All of them were proud of Brahmanical culture and yet conscious of the merits and demerits of rival religions; that is why they disclose the hypocricy of the followers of Buddhism while at the same time paying a sincere and thoughtful tribute to its intrinsic worth, e.g. the *Bhāṇas*, the *Prahasanas* and the like. The following statements may be taken as the proper expressions of this attitude.

The author of *Pāda-tāḍitakam* derides the Buddhist monk, but in one remark brings out the greatness of Buddha's teaching.

"One must not have doubts about the (purity or greatness of) Buddha's doctrine. The doctrine is one thing, and human nature is quite another, since the followers are not absolutely passion-free." (p. 200).

And the author of *Padmaprābhṛtakam* observes, "How full of essence is the Buddha's doctrine ! Though it is suffering attacks at the hands of (some) false monks, it is yet being honored and worshipped every day : Or, (one should not look at it like that because) 'Tīrthajala' (water at a sacred place), though tasted by a crow, does not lose its purity because of that." Kalhaṇa's *Rāja-taraṅgiṇī* is a fine example of this sort of mixed attitude in which the author makes statements of the situation and supplements them with remarks based on his personal reflections and judgement.

The edge of opposition and the consequent severity of criticism seen in the purely philosophical texts is not to be found to that extent in non-philosophical literature, but it is much more muted. This is due to the basic difference between the purpose and nature of these two types of works. These observations in respect of Buddhism may hold good in respect of other similar phenomena in the philosophical and the non-philosophical literatures.

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19

Buddhist Challenge and Hindu Response

Y. KRISHAN

Buddhism posed a serious challenge to Vedic religion in matters of theology, metaphysics and ethics. Vedic Hinduism conceived its gods as possessing cosmic functions of creation and destruction. Gods such as Varuṇa, Indra and Agnī, were described as *dhātṛ* (creator); Varuṇa[1] was conceived as the creator and maintainer of the cosmic law (*ṛta*). The belief in one supreme, omnipotent creator such as Viśvakarmā (creator of the universe), and Prajāpati (Lord of Beings) came to dominate Vedic theology.

All the Brahmanical schools, including those which did not believe in a creator such as the Sāṃkhya, Vaiśeṣika and Pūrva Mīmāṃśa subscribed to the belief in an eternal soul or *ātman*, which may or may not be distinguished from God or *Parmātman*. Buddhism denied the existence of *ātman* as an enduring entity. But here the difference between Buddhist and Brahmanical metaphysics is thin and subtle. As the Buddhists believed in the doctrine of *karma*, they, a *priori*, believed in an entity which had to undergo the consequences of its past *karma* in future existence in the cycle of transmigration. The Buddhist doctrine of *anattā* only brought out that the discriminating and apprehending attributes of consciousness are not abiding in their nature; the constituents of the soul, *pudgala*, *ātmā*, are also in a state of flux, but nonetheless each soul has a distinctive entity of its own, like an individual who is subject to continuous change or growth in different stages of life : childhood, youth and old-age. Thus the Buddhist belief in the doctrine of *karma* made the doctrine of *anattā* an academic doctrine, subtly different from the doctrine of *ātman* of the rival schools. It was, however, the Buddhist ethics, the law of *karma*, that posed the greatest threat to Vedic Hinduism.

In pre-Buddhist Hinduism, the doctrine of *karma* was not developed. In Vedic

cosmology, the forces of good and evil were deemed to be inherent in the cosmos; thus evil had an independent and co-eval existence with the good. In fact, according to the Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa, both the *devas* (gods) and *asuras* (demons) were born of Prajāpati. It was, therefore, believed that there was perpetual struggle between the gods (*deva*) and demons (*asura*). Gods triumph over demons not through the performance of superior acts or by good conduct but through sacrifices. The ordinary mortals sought from the gods material benefits and protection against demons and evil spirits. This was to be achieved by propitiating gods with sacrifices performed in accordance with the prescribed rituals and by performing religious ceremonies. There was no concept of good and evil as it developed later. *Puṇya* (good deeds) and *pāpa* (evil deeds) were identified as conformity and non-conformity with sacrificial ritual practices and religious ceremonies. In the *Brāhamaṇas*, the notion of sin is associated almost entirely with ritual errors.[2] ".....sin did not imply an act against gods; it implied an error in ritual practice."[3]

The concept of moral law, truthfulness, honesty, avoidance of violence or injury to fellow creatures by destruction of life and unjust deprivation had not yet been evolved. In fact, even the conduct of Vedic gods could not always be deemed to be ethical. Retribution was not an automatic consequence of certain conduct. Hymns to gods seek remission from the consequences of erring actions. The prayers to Varuṇa[4] beseech him thus :—

"Move far from me
What sins I have committed." (*Ṛg.* II 28.9)

"If we, as gamesters cheat at play, have cheated, done wrong unwittingly or sinned of purpose,
Cast all these sins away like the loosened fetters, and, Varuṇa,
Let us be thine own beloved." (*Ṛg.* V 85.8)

"When through our want of thought we violate thy laws, punish us not,
O God, for that iniquity." (*Ṛg.* VII. 89.5)

Indra[5] is addressed thus :

"Oh ! let thy pitying soul,
Turn to us in compassion when we praise thee,
And slay us not for one sin or for many.
Deliver us today, tomorrow, every day."

Likewise, the prayer to Agni[5] invokes his mercy :

"Deliver, mighty lord, thy worshippers,
Purge us from the taint of sin, and when we die,
Deal mercifully with us on the pyre,
Burning our bodies with their load of guilt,....."

In the Atharvaveda, demons and evil spirits come to grip the minds of the people. They were driven away or supplicated with the help of *mantras* (incantations), charms, and spells.

It is significant that, even in later Hinduism[7] when the doctrine of *karma*, as ordinarily understood was widely accepted by the different schools of Hinduism, unwitting transgression of *dharma* was regarded as sin (*doṣa*), and lying, breaking an oath, killing a person of low caste, defiling the virginity of a low-caste maiden and adultery were considered minor sins (*upa-pātaka*), whereas murder of a brahmin

(*bramahatyā*), infanticide (*śiśu-hatyā*), drinking liquor, stealing of gold and sexual relations with one's *guru's* wife, are considered major sins (*mahā-pātaka*). In short, the whole scheme of ethics and gradation of offences is arbitrary.

Towards the later part of the Vedic period, the doctrine of *tapas*, penances, self-mortification, and *dhyāna yoga*, mental concentration, developed as means of acquiring super-normal powers and through such powers securing one's desired objectives from gods. *Tapas* or penance was a system of physical training by which one could develop the capacity to bear and ignore physical pain and suffering, which are manifestations of evil. It was a technique not for curing evil but of conditioning the body to bear it. According to Manu[8], XI 240,242, "Whatever sins (including mental sins) men commit by thoughts, words and deeds, that they speedily burn away by penance" (or austerities).i' Likewise. *dhyāna yoga* or mental concentration, was a technique for controlling the mind which could produce tranquility and develop will power to attain one's objectives. According to Vaśiṣṭha[9], XXVI 1-4, by *prāṇāyāma* (breath-control) "sins which we committed during the day and night (by deeds, thoughts or speech) are instantly destroyed."

The object of Vedic *mantras* and sacrifices was the attainment of long life and worldly prosperity. The Upaniṣads radically changed the goal of human endeavour; it become the attempt to find an escape from the endless chain of re-births in different forms in this world, to achieve *mokṣa*—merger of *ātman* (individual soul) with *Parmātman* (supreme spirit). Hence the Upaniṣads questioned the utility of sacrifices and *tapas* for attaining *mokṣa*, or liberation. But they were exclusively pre-occupied with the means to salvation, viz. *jñāna*, or knowledge. Thus, they did not develop any significant ethics, though they had within them a great potentiality to do so.

Buddhism had also attacked the validity of both the Vedic dogmas —the dogma of sacrifice and the dogma of *tapas*—as the means to overcome evil and attain happiness in life. It had emphasised the cosmic law of cause and effect—*pratītyasamutpāda* (dependent origination), the principle of universal causality. According to Buddhism, this law operates not only in the physical, chemical and biological realms, but also in the moral sphere; just as effects are produced from causes and in turn become the starting point of a new cause, likewise consequences arise from conduct. Good conduct (*puṇya*) produces good effects or results and evil conduct (*pāpa*) produces evil results : this is the *karmic* law of retribution. *Pratīyasamutpāda* is the generic law of cause and effect; in its specific application in the moral sphere, it is called the doctrine of *karma* : as you sow, so shall you reap; as you do, so shall you bear. It postulates that events which happen in our lives are not accidental or fortuitous but are governed by the law of causality. There are, however, certain significant differences between the operation of this law in the physical world and in the moral sphere. In the physical world, the causative factors produce their results immediately—almost simultaneously. But in the moral sphere, the consequences of actions in deed, word and thought, take time to ripen and manifest themselves. Consequently, it is not possible to relate retribution to specific acts, the consequences or fruits of actions to identifiable earlier actions or conducts of an individual. In other words, there is no objective verification of the law of *karma* as in the case of the physical laws of the universe. This makes the operation of the law of *karma* mysterious; it is *avijñapti* or *adṛṣta*. It also implies that there could be no specific means of countering

or neutralising the effects of *karma*. The law of *karma* is inexorable in its operation; there is no escape from it.

The operation of the law of *karma* also postulates the existence of an entity, *pudgala* or soul, which is liable to bear its consequences in future births or manifestations.

Here it is essential to distinguish between the ethics of Buddhism, based on *karma*, and the metaphysics of Buddhism. Metaphysics or more precisely, ontology, deals with the question of the ultimate nature of reality, the impermanence of matter and spirit, which are in a constant state of flux. Consequently, all sentient beings (and inanimate matter) are liable to decline and decay. *Tṛṣṇā* or desire for immortality or everlasting life is, however, at the root of the perpetuation of our existence. Suffering arises from the frustration of this desire due to the cosmic law of ageing and death. Consequently, suffering is inherent in human existence. But *tṛṣṇā* or desire, as such, is not unethical; it is amoral, it is inherent in nature. In fact, many of the desires spring from the most fundamental and natural instincts of all living species. Ontology, therefore, provides the framework of the Buddhist view of life and of the goal of human endeavour. It may have a bearing on Buddhist ethics but is not in itself ethical. In fact, ethical discipline is not an essential pre-requisite for the attainment of *nirvāṇa*, for bringing about a cessation of the life process and hence of transmigration; it is, however, essential for attaining a superior and happier existence in the *bhavasāgara*, occean of existence.

Thus Buddhism distinguishes between cosmic evil, the evil of flux, of decay and death inherent in human existence and the *karmic* evil which is the product of a man's volition. Thus, dishonest conduct like falsehood, theft and injury to life are evil acts which bring evil results to their doer. Perhaps for the first time, Buddhist ethics recognised the intimate relationship between ends and the means to achieve them, the quality of means being determined by the intent of the doer. Thus Buddhist ethics is essentially psychogenic—volitional. Ethics is, however, not the means of escape from the cosmic "evil", transitoriness and perpetual change, the cycle of births and deaths. It is *jñāna*, knowledge, detachment born of knowledge and suppression of *tṛṣṇā* (desire) and renunciation that provide escape.

Thus the Buddhist law of *karma* was, as already observed, inexorable and remorseless in its operation. There could be no escape from it. God as a Creator and Controller of the universe had no place or role in it. In fact, this law of *karma* was a serious challenge to the belief in an omnipotent and compassionate Creator. If God is considered to be omnipotent, he should be in a position to modify the operation of the law and exempt beings from the consequences of *karma*. Capacity to act on one's discretion is an essential quality of absolute sovereignty. Again, if God is the Creator of this universe, it follows that he is the author of both good and evil. This raises grave doubts about the moral responsibility of an individual for his acts and therefore for their consequences.

This law was also an attack on a culture based on sacrifices (*yajña*). Such sacrifices were useless in securing material benefits.

The Buddha warns the followers of the noble path against attending sacrifices involving slaughter of goats, sheep and cows[10] (Saṁyutta i, 75) and avers that worship of Agni (fire) for a hundred years is inferior to paying homage for one moment to a

pure or enlightened soul[11] (Dhammapada 106, 107).

Likewise, *tapas* or penance was futile in overcoming evil. In his First Sermon at Benares, while expounding the Middle Way, the Buddha had emphasised that self-mortification or austerities are "unworthy and unprofitable"[12] (*Saṁyutta* V, 420) and that the learned Brahmins might "ply ascetic practices for a century", yet they would not be able to attain liberation[13] (Saṁyutta i, 28). What mattered was self-control born of ethical discipline.

The Buddhist doctrine of *karma* was, comparatively speaking, the most rational and the most convincing explanation of the inequalities among men and of the problem of happiness and suffering they experience. Its rationality almost eclipised that of the teachings of other schools concering an individual's personal conduct in society. It found ready acceptance, especially because the teachings of the *Upaniṣads* had already prepared the ground for such an ethic.

But a doctrine that provided no escape to an erring individual would be unacceptable to the majority of mankind. The need for forgiveness, for atonement and escape, is deeply ingrained in human nature and became compelling once it came to be accepted that there is a moral order and any violation thereof is visited by punishment. In this context, the rival schools emphasised that performance of sacrifices (*yajña*) could neutralise and the practice of penances (*tapas*) could nullify sins. *Prāyaścitta* (expiation) and pilgrimages were only variants of these techniques to modify the operation of the law of *karma*.

More importantly, however, the non-Buddhist schools, for their sheer survival, cultivated and developed the doctrine of grace, of *avatāras* (incarnations) and of *bhakti* as a means of salvation. Through the grace of God or His *avatāra*, God could redeem his *bhaktas* (devotees). Through *bhakti* or surrender, one can invoke God's mercy to absolve a person from his sins and attain *mokṣa* or salvation. This was the Hindu response to the Buddhist challenge.

The Buddhist doctrine of *karma* for the same considerations, gave encouragement to the cult of expiatory rites as a means of escape from *karma*.

Thus, the Hindu schools, while accepting wholeheartedly the doctrine of *karma* and *ahiṁsā*, subtly modified *karma* by retaining the belief in sacrifices (without slaughter of animals), in the practice of *tapas* and above all by cultivating the doctrine of grace and *avatāras*. They thus saved the belief in God from being extinguished.

Literary records provide evidence of the radical difference between the Vedas and Epics on the one hand, and the Buddhist texts on the other. The theory of *karma* is heterogeneous in the former but homogeneous in the latter and the two are materially different in content.

As is well known, the doctrine of *karma* is not well-developed in the *Vedas*. Originally it meant 'ritual act'; only in the Upaniṣads does it come to connote 'moral act' and the result of action.[14] The Śatapatha Brāhamaṇa, XII 9.17, speaks of retribution for evil acts in later life. It should be noted that the doctrine of transmigration of soul, *punarjañma*, rebirth, is essential to the doctrine of *karma*; the soul which does an evil act must survive after bodily death to bear the consequences of its *karma*, acts. This doctrine of *punarjañma* is absent from the *Ṛigveda*[15]. It is only in Bṛhdāraṇyaka Upaniṣad IV. 4.5 that we find a statement that a man of good deeds is born in a good state and a man of evil deeds in an evil state. Again, in Chāndogya

Upaniṣad V. 10.7.8, it is said that those whose conduct has been good will quickly attain a good rebirth as a Brahmin, a Kṣatriya or Vaiśya. Those whose conduct has been evil will attain an evil birth either as a dog, or as a hog or as a *caṇḍāla*. Louis Renou[16], however, has pointed out that "There are isolated passages in the Upaniṣads in which the word *karma* is used in the sense of a good or bad action on the moral plane; but it is never used for the present effect of a past action or the foreseeable consequence of an action performed in the present, the conception which constitutes the essential meaning of the word in later usage." But in the Kauṣītaki Upaniṣad 11.15, a son is said to inherit the deeds or actions (and therefore the fate) of his father. In the Rāmāyaṇa[17], the evils that Lord Rāma and Sītā have to face and overcome—his unjust exclusion from the throne of Ayodhyā, his banishment to the forests for 14 years for no fault of his own, the abduction of Sītā and her second banishment—are nowhere explained as the consequences of evil acts done by them in their previous births. Likewise, in the Mahābhārata (Mbh) (B.C. 400-A.D. 400), the great conflict and the evils which the great heroes have to face are not explained as retributive justice. On the other hand, the ignoble or dishonourable acts of the heroes, including Krishṇa, are applauded as *dharmacchalam*.[18]

In fact, there are contradictions within the Mahābhārata on the doctrine of *karma*. Sometimes it maintains that each man is squarely responsible for his actions and that these are not shared by any one else, Mbh XII,29,22 ; that "what one does, that the doer alone enjoys" Mbh XII,153,4 ; that "there is no determining power in fate", Mbh XIII, 6,47. On the other hand Mbh XII 32.12 divides the responsibility among the Lord, man himself, luck and *karma*. Fate, as Time, undermines the theory of *karma*. In Mbh XII 224,16 and 226, 13 and 21, we have "The deed causes the deed, but the deed has another creator, Fate, Time, Fate or what will be is the cause." "Sorrow lies in thinking 'I am responsible', for I do that which ordainers ordained when I was born". "Whatever state one obtains, he must say '*havitavyam*' it was fated to be, that is independently of *karma*."

The theory of *karma* as postulated in the Gītā (B.C. 500-B.C. 200) is essentially philosophical in character. While it does speak of *puṇya* and *pāpa karma*, it classifies *karma* as *sāttvika* (devoid of attachment and without any thought of the fruits of action), *rājasika* (born of attachment and desire and intended for attainment of objectives), and *tāmasika* (born of attachment or passion and disregarding the consequences of action for self and others). The Gītā seeks to achieve freedom from the bondage of actions bearing both good and evil results by the *yoga* of renunciation. It recognises that we cannot attain liberation by renouncing activities (III.4). In fact, it accepts that no human being can stop doing acts even for a moment of time (III.5). That is why it says that we have the right to act, but not in expectation of the fruits of that act (*Karmaṇaiva adhikāraste mā phaleṣu kadācana*. Gītā II.47). In brief, it teaches the doctrine of *phalatṛṣṇāvairāgya*, renunciation of the fruits of action. It therefore maintains that those who perform action with attachment according to the Vedic injunctions and perform *yajñas* but avoid sinful activity (*pāpa*) go to heaven (IX,20), but are reborn in the mortal world when their stock of merit (*puṇya*) is exhausted; they are subject to rebirth and death (IX, 21) and thus do not attain liberation.

The Gītā also propounds the doctrine of salvation through the grace of God. In

XVIII, 14, the Gītā, *inter alia*, recognises *daiva*, the imponderable and divine factor, as influencing human destiny. This is not consistent with the classical doctrine of *karma*, which operates inexorably and which cannot accommodate any arbitrary interference by the Divine or the operation of an irrational force.

It also maintains that a person does act under the compulsion of *guṇas* born of *prakṛti*. Kṛṣṇa tells Arjuṇa, 'you are fettered by your *karma*, which is born of your own nature' (III.5) 'All actions, truly speaking, are born of the *guṇas* of *prakṛti*, though, due to delusion, a person thinks that he is their author.' (III.27). This denies free will and consequently moral responsibility.

Thus, the doctrine of *karma* in the Gītā is philosophical and religious but not essentially ethical. It precludes man's thinking of the fruits of action because these fruits are unpredictable and cannot be related to the quality of our acts: morally good acts do not necessarily produce materially good results. Nor is a man morally responsible for his acts, as he is not a free agent. Consequently, there is no validity of a moral or ethical relationship between cause and effect, between acts and their consequences.

Jainism, in common with other Indian religions, holds that *karma*, more precisely *sañcita karma*, or accumulated merits and demerits, condition a man's life in the present and future. But the Jaina doctrine of *karma* shows significant difference from the doctrine of other schools.

Jainism considers *karma* to be material in nature; its influx into a pure soul causes defilement. The consequences of *karma* are produced irrespective of the intent of the doer. In other words, intention or volition is not relevant to the ripening of the *karma*. Inadvertent transgressions are not sterile in producing their effects and new *karma*. Even if an act, such as injury or destruction of life, is accidental, its consequences must be borne. *Karma*, in Jainism, is thus indifferent to the morality of our volitions or desires leading to acts. The Jaina law of *karma* is thus more mechanical than ethical; unattached actions and attached actions are identical in the consequences they produce. "All actions produce *karma*, and in the majority of the cases entail on the doer the continuance of wordly existence."[19] Therefore, the highest goal is to get rid of all *karma*[20] (*nirjara*) and meanwhile to acquire no new *karma* by stopping the *āśravas* (in-flow) of *karma*.

This is in sharp contradistinction to the Buddhist dogma that "an act is essentially action that can be morally qualified.....Mental acts are acts *par excellence*, inasmuch as there is no act without mental action."[21] In the Majjhima Nikāya[22] i,373, the Buddha says that of the three kinds of acts of demerit, of deed, word, and mind, those of the mind are the most criminal in effecting and starting demerit, and the other two are less criminal. In the Anguttara Nikāya[23] ii,232, the Buddha states that planned (or intentional) harmful action of body, speech and thought is the source of dark deeds. Again in the Anguttara Nikāya[24] v,292 the Buddha avers :, "I declare..... that of intentional deeds done and accumulated there can be no wiping out without experiencing the result thereof and that too.....either in the same visible state or in some other state here-after....."

In Buddhist philosophy, however, *karma* or conduct is a causative factor in creation; this is called *vipākahetu*[25], or moral causation as distinct from causation in the inanimate and organic world. It is the operation of past deeds that influence and

mould automatically and involuntarily the destiny of an individual in this life and in the life thereafter.

In the Milindapañha[26] (1 century A.D.), 65.12, the inequalities among human beings are explained as being due to their respective *karma*:".....it is through a difference in their *karma* that men are not all alike, but some long-lived, and some short-lived, some healthy and some sickly, some handsome and some ugly, some powerful and some weak, some rich and some poor, some of high degree and some of low degree, some wise and some foolish.....*Karma* allots beings to meanness and greatness." In the doctrinal literature, the doctrine of *karma*, involving individual responsibility, is more clearly set out. In the Saṁyutta Nikāya[27] iii,1,4 it is said :

"His good deeds and his wickedness,
Whatever a mortal does while here,
'Tis this that he can call his own,
This with him take as he goes hence,
This is what follows after him,
And like a shadow never departs."

Again, the Anguttara Nikāya[28] v,288-291, states that "beings are responsible for their deeds, kinsmen of their deeds, to them their deeds come home again. Whatsoever deed they do.....of that thing they are the heirs".

The Dhammapada[29] makes a categorical statement on this point : "By oneself evil is done, by oneself one suffers. By oneself evil is undone, by oneself one is purified" (165). Again, "Not in the sky, not in the midst of the sea, nor anywhere else on earth is there a spot where a man may be freed from (the consequences) of an evil deed" (128). Milindapañha[30] II, 2,6 likewise explains that although the name and form which is born in the next existence is different from the name and form which is 'to end at death'. nevertheless it springs from it, and is therfore not freed from its evil deeds." Asvaghosa , in the Buddhacarita XX. 32 states that : *Yā kartā So hi bhoktā ; syatkarmanāstu phalam dhruvam* ; 'The doer indeed bears the fruit of his action ; and the result of action is unalterable.'

The doctrine of *karma* and the practice of *sīla* by householders is glorified in the metrical portion of the *Jātakas*[31] (3rd Century B.C.), which rank first in the chronology of the different parts of a *jātaka*. These stories served as incentives to good deeds. They deal with *saggakathā* (exposition of the way to heaven), *śīlakathā* (exposition of the norms of conduct) and *dānakathā* (exposition of charity). They emphasise the virtues of truthfulness and charity as the pathway to heaven.[32] The Buddhist doctrine of *karma* is also illustrated in the Avadānas (2nd Century A.D.). Avadāna śataka in 55 verses in different stories and Divyavadāna in verses 2,19;10,1;11,7;13,10;19,15;21,3;35,7;37,69, and 70 reiterate that *karmas* do not perish even after the elapse of a million of years. They fructify without fail when the time and environment are suitable. "These stories are, as a rule, intended to show that black deeds bear black fruits and white deeds white fruits; there are also stories which show how the actions of one existence are very closely connected with those of former or future existences"[33]. They illustrate "the paramount and coercive power"[34] of the law of *karma*.

As a reaction and counterpoise to the powerful exposition of the Buddhist doctrine of *karma* in the Jātakas and Avadānas, the Purāṇas[35] came into existence in Hinduism.

They accept the doctrine of *karma*, of sin and retribution therefor. The Mārkaṇḍeya Purāṇa[36], XIV, 17 (3rd century A.D.), states : ".....no human action, whether virtuous or sinful, quickly cleanses except by consumption. Diminution arises through consumption. .....". Śrimad Bhāgavatam[37] 3, XXXI (6th century A.D.), the supreme embodiment of the doctrine of grace, maintains that "the result of the acts done in former birth owes its form to the divine agency. As such, the body of the being in future birth is due to the results of the acts done in former birth.....". The Nārada Purāṇa[38], I. 29,18 (A.D. 875-1000), emphasises that one has to bear the consequences of one's action whether good or ill. The Garuḍa Purāṇa[39] (A.D. 800-1050), points out that "A man is the creator of his fate and even in the foetal life, he is afflicted by the dynamics of the works of his prior existence.....a man cannot fly from the effects of his prior deeds." The Padmapurāṇa[40], II.81.48 and II.94.17.18 (A.D. 900-1400), states that no one can set aside the bondage due to the *karma* of past lives.....no man in the world is able to annual the effects of actions done in previous existences.

Thus, the acceptance of the Buddhist doctrine of *karma* by Hinduism was total. But this did not mean that it discarded its beliefs in various expedients to mitigate the operation of this law. The Purāṇas modify its operation by extolling the benefits of penances, *prāyaścitta* or expiation, pilgrimages to *tīrthas* or sacred places, *vratas* (religious observances), *dāna* (charity) and *śrāddhas* (rites in honour of the manes). It is significant that these topics or themes form the bulk of the contents of the Purāṇas. It is also significant that unlike the Vedas, the Purāṇas are available to persons of low caste, viz. *śūdras*, and to women Hinduism thus faced the challenge of the Buddhist doctrine of *karma*, which it accepted without giving up its own theology and doctrine of expiation of sins, notwithstanding the apparent inconsistencies between them.

In Mahāyāna Buddhism, the doctrines of *puṇya parinamnā* (transference of merit) and of the *Bodhisattva mahāsattva*, who renounces *nirvāṇa* again and again to bring deliverance to suffering humanity, were patently inconsistent with the teachings of the Buddha. They necessarily implied a serious modification of the law of *karma*. These were the Buddhist versions of the Hindu doctrines of grace and *avatāras* (incarnations) and were in the nature a compromise the Buddhists were forced to make to meet the counter-attack of Hinduism.

NOTES

1. R.N. Dandekar : *Some Aspects of the History of Hinduism*. Poona, University of Poona, 1967, p. 38. Louis Renou : *Vedic India*. Calcutta, Susil Gupta, 1957§ 116 p. 58.
2. Renou: *ibid*§ 115, p. 58. The term prāyascitta meant 'expiations' provided in case of error concerning instrument, place or time, honorarium, officiant or wife, fault of inattention (omission, alteration, performance of acts or recitation of formulae in a wrong order), or accident (extinction of fire or breaking of a uteasil.....)" Renou : *ibid.*,§ 218 p. 111.
3. R.N. Dandekar : *ibid*, p.70 and p. 62.
4. R.T.H. Griffith : (tr) *The Hymns of the Rig Veda*, Vols. I & II, 4th edn, Varanasi, Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series Office, 1963.

5. Monier Williams : *Indian Wisdom*, 2nd edn, Varanasi Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series Office 1963, p. 17.
6. Monier Williams : *ibid.*, p. 18. *The Atharvaveda* VI, 15.1 repeats this :
   "From the sins which knowingly or
   unknowingly we have committed, do ye,
   all gods, of one accord, release us."
   M. Bloomfield : *Hymns of the Atharva-Veda, Sacred Books of the East* XLII, 2nd edn., Delhi, Motilal Banarsi Dass, 1967. See also *ibid.*, VI, 45,2 and 45,3.
7. Benjamin Walker (ed) : *Hindu World* Vol. II London, Allen & Unwin, 1968, 'Sins'.
8. Georg Bühler: *Laws of Manu, Sacred Books of the East* Vol, XXV, 2nd edn, Delhi, Motilal Banarsi Dass, reprint 1965.
9. Georg Bühler : *Sacred Laws of the Āryas, Sacred Books of the East*, Vol. XIV, Pt. II Delhi, Motilal Banarsi Dass, reprint 1965. See also Viṣṇū LV. 2. (tr) J. Jolly. *Sacred Books of the East* Vol. VII, Delhi, Moti Lal Banarsi Dass, Reprint 1965.
10. Mrs. C.A.F. Rhys Davids (tr): *The Book of Kindred Sayings*, Part I, London, Pali Text Society, 1917. Again the Buddha maintains that "any rites austere, aimed at the overthrow of death, belong to matters useless for our good". F.L. Woodward (tr) : *The Book of Kindred Sayings* Part II, 104; 1922.
11. Max Muller (tr) : *The Dhammapada, Sacred Books of the East* Vol. X : Moti Lal Banarsi Dass, Reprint 1965.
12. F.L. Woodward : *ibid.*, 1965, See also *ibid.*, i,12 and i, 31 where he says "Let him not work torment on self that is useless."
13. Mrs. Rhys Davids : *ibid.*
14. Renou : *ibid*, §. 177.
15. *The Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa* X. 4.3 (tr) Julius Eggeling, *Sacred Books of the East*, Vol. XLIII, Second edn, Delhi, Moti Lal Banarsi Dass, 1966, speaks of *punarmṛtyu*, re-death, which may be deemed to be a variant of the later doctrine *of punarjanma*, rebirth, but is not exactly the same. Jogiraj Basu : *India of the Age of the Brāhmaṇas*, Calcutta, Sanskrit Pustak Bhandar, 1969, pp. 232-33, points out that the term *punarmṛtyu* occurs several times in the *Brāhmaṇas*.
16. Louis Renou : *Religions of India*, New Delhi, Munshi Ram Manohar Lal, 2nd edn., 1972 pp. 28-29.
17. The banishment of Rāma is attributed to the accidental death of Śravaṇa Kumāra at the hands of Daśaratha, Rāma's father. He was cursed by the bereaved parents of the deceased to die from the pangs of separation of his son because he (Daśaratha) had made them childless.
18. Hopkins : *The Great Epic of India*, New York, Yale University, 1901, p.374-75.
19. J. Jolly, "Jainism" in *Encyclopaedia of Religion & Ethics*, Vol. VII., Edinburgh, T & T Clark, 1964, 470 (a).
20. Jolly, *ibid*, p. 470 (a).
21. L. De La Vallee Poussin, *Karma*, *ibid*, p. 674 (b).

22. R. Chalmers, *Further Dialogues of the Buddha*, Vol. I., *Sacred Books of the Buddhists*, London, Humphrey Milford, 1926.
23. Woodward, *The Book of Gradual Sayings*, Vol. II, London, Pali Text Society, Reprint, 1952.
24. Woodward, *ibid*, Vol. V, Reprint, 1955, p. 189-192.
25. Th. Stcherbatasky, *The Central Conception of Buddhism*, 3rd Edition, Calcutta, Susil Gapta, 1961, p. 27-28.
26. H.C. Warren, *Buddhism in Translations*, New York, Atheneum, 1963, p. 215.
27. Warren, *ibid*, p. 214. Again *ibid*, iii, 2, 10 it is said
"But every deed a man performs
.....
Tis this that he can call his own..."
Warren, *ibid* p. 228.
28. Woodward, *ibid*, V. p. 187-189.
29. Max Muller (tr), The *Dhammapada. The Sacred Books of the East* Vol. X. Delhi, Moti Lal Banarsi Dass, Reprint, 1965. The *Avadānaśataka*, 36, 22, repeats that there is no spot on earth where one can escape from *karma*.
30. T. W. Rhys David (tr), *The Questions of King Milinda. The Sacred Books of the East*, Vol. XXXV. Delhi, Moti Lal Banarsi Dass, Reprint, 1965.
31. Gokuldas De : *Significance and Importance of Jātakas*, Calcutta University, 1951, pp. 156-157.
We feel that De erroneously identifies the teachings of *Jātakas* with *Bhāgavatism*, which is a late phenomenon and the hallmark of which is the doctrine of self-surrender and expiation through *bhakti* and not necessarily through superior *karma*.
32. H. T. Francis and E.J. Thomas, *Jātaka Tales*, Bombay, Jaico, 1957, p. 11.
33. Winternitz. *A History of Sanskrit Literature*, Vol. II, Calcutta, University of Calcutta, 1933, p. 277-278.
34. J. S. Spyer (ed), *Avadānacataka*,
The Hague, Mouton & Co. 1958, Preface, p. II.
35. A. D. Pusalkar, *Studies in the Epics & Purāṇas*, Bombay, Bharatiya Vidya Bhawan, 1955, Introduction, liv, lvi, lxii.
36. F. E. Pargiter (tr), *The Mārkaṇḍeya Purāṇa*, Delhi, Indological Book House, 1969, p. 77.
37. *J. M. Sanyal* (tr), *Srimad Bhāgavatam*, Vol. 1. Delhi, Munshi Ram Manohar Lal, 2nd Edition, 1973, p. 269.
38. P. V. Kane, *History of Dharmasastras*, Vol. V, Pt. II, Poona, Bhandarkar Oriental Institute, 1962, footnote 2554.
39. Robert O. Bellon, (ed), *The World Pocket Bible*, London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1964, p. 68.
40. Madhava Chimanaji Apte (ed), *Padmapurāṇa*, Poona, Anandasrama, Vol. I, 1872.

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Buddhism in India : Residual and Resurgent

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This paper deals mainly with Buddhism in north-east India, but with some reference also to the wider context of Buddhism elsewhere in India. It falls into three parts; first, the extent of residual Buddhism is surveyed; second, the extent of *actual* resurgence is examined; and third, the *potential* for resurgence is cnsidered.

Buddhism in modern India

There were nearly four million Buddhists in India in 1971, according to the Census of that year.[1] The largest group, about 3.1/3 million, was in the state of Maharashtra and adjacent districts of Andhra Pradesh and Madhya Pradesh states. The rest of India's Buddhists were located in two main areas : (1) in the north-east, in the area lying east of a line drawn from Sikkim to Calcutta ; (2) in the north-west, in Jammu and Kashmir state and adjacent districts of Himachal Pradesh. The former of these contained about 350,000 (including Sikkim) and the latter about 93,000 Buddhists. The remaining 100,000 were distributed fairly widely but unevenly throughout the rest of India.[2]

The large group of 3.1/3 million in Maharashtra and neighbouring districts is of recent growth, that is mainly since the conversion in 1956 of Dr. Bhimrao Ramji Ambedkar. The actual number may be greater than the figure just mentioned, for, as Eleanor Zelliott commented, "Buddhists themselves claim that the census figures are not accurate because census takers prefer to minimise the extent of the conversion'.'[3] Whereas the Maharashtra zone now contains the majority of India's Buddhists, in 1931 the situation was very different. In that year the only notable Buddhist population to be found within the territory which now constitutes the Republic of India

(that is, excluding Pakistan and Bangladesh) was located in the north-west and the north-east. Roughly two thirds of the total lived in what is now West Bengal, Assam and Tripura, and about a quarter lived in the Jammu and Kashmir area.[4]

The neo-Buddhists of Maharashtra could perhaps be regarded as an example of *resurgent* Buddhism. Doubts have been expressed, however, as to the quality and possible permanence of the renewal of Buddhist life in that area. Even as early as the year of Dr. Ambedkar's official conversion, when many thousands of 'untouchables' followed him in taking refuge in the Buddha, the Dharma and the Sangha and in accepting the Five Precepts, Taya Zinkin writing from Bombay, was making sceptical observations. Ambedkar's followers would, in her view, "revert to their own Hindu gods very soon, no matter what pledge they may have taken at his insistence".

The untouchables, she wrote, "have yet to find out that Buddhism will not make them equal citizens, for they will remain untouchable to their caste fellows; they will have left a cosy god of their own for an abstract principle and they will have lost those many educational and economic privileges the caste Hindus are showering on backward people in the attempt to bring them to equality".[5] Twenty years later some observers seem to be confirming Taya Zinkin's prognostication. B.G. Gokhale has commented that although "conversions from among the untouchables continued it was clear that the movement had lost its momentum" after Ambedkar's death in 1956. "The new Buddhist community was left without leadership, intellectual as well as political, and soon the new Buddhists tended to become another 'untouchable' caste especially in the rural areas of Maharashtra. Buddhism had come and gone like a mighty hurricane that swept thousands off their feet only to deposit them, in a manner of speaking, a few yards away on the same level."[6]

There is other evidence, however, which suggests that it is a mistake to conclude that the Buddhist movement, when it does not take the form of a hurricane, is non-existent. The Report on the 1931 Census of india indicates that a quarter of a century before Ambedkar's conversion the movement which became sensational for a while in his life time, could already be detected in a quieter, steadier form. With regard to Cochin State it was recorded in 1931 that "most of the Buddhists there are educated Malayali Iruvas who have abandoned Hinduism on account of their social disabilities in that community."[7] Moreover, at a different social level, there were not lacking, among the sophisticated, those who were conventionally Hindu but who had become alienated from what they saw as caste-ridden obscurantism, and who, like Jawaharlal Nehru, were attracted to Buddhism. B.G. Gokhale records the fact that in the 20's and 30's "a knowledge of Buddhism and an awareness of its contributions to Indian philosophy and culture were gradually becoming a part of the new intellectual movement in Maharashtra", even although he regards this as different in kind from "a new living religious tradition".[8] It was Ambedkar's teacher, K.A. Keluskar, who initially aroused his interest by presenting him with a copy of a life of the Buddha when he graduated from high school at the age of 17. It is difficult to make watertight divisions between "intellectual movements" and "living religious traditions". This is point which will be raised again in connection with the situation in north-eastern India, and to an examination of Buddhism in that area we now turn.

Buddhism in North-East India : Tibetan

First, it is necessary to consider the character of the Buddhist presence in the north-east India. This might be regarded as an area where such Buddhist life as there is represents a residue merely of what was once a thriving, living tradition reaching back to the days of Śākyamuni himself. In Bengal and Assam, Buddhism survived longer than almost anywhere else in India (except possibly in parts of the South) until its very rapid decline from about the eleventh century onwards, since when it shrank virtually to nothing. What is left in the remote fringe areas, it might be thought, are the last vestiges of a practically extinct tradition. In order to test this theory it is necessary to look more closely at the distribution of the Buddhist population of the north-east.

In the state of West Bengal in 1971 there were 121,000 Buddhists. Of these, 107,000 were found in two of the state's sixteen districts, namely Darjeeling and Jalpaiguri. These two districts comprise part of the Himalayan foothills and the adjacent strip of the plains immediately below Sikkim and Bhutan. The Buddhists here are predominantly rural dwellers (82 per cent) and consist mainly of Lepchas (the original inhabitants of the Darjeeling area), Bhutias, Sherpas, Tamangs, and Tibetans.

When the hill tract of 138 square miles, which was the nucleus of Darjeeling District, was acquired by the East India Company from the Raja of Sikkim in 1835 it was "almost entirely under forest and practically uninhabited".[9] The only inhabitants of these hills and forests were Lepchas, who were possibly about 100 in number. As soon as Darjeeling began to be developed as a hill resort and sanatorium an influx of population began, mainly from neighbouring Nepal, with some also from Sikkim. The eastern portion of Darjeeling District, the Kalimpong Sub-division, was annexed as a consequence of the British war with the neighbouring state of Bhutan in 1865. The annexed area had a native population at that time of about 3,500, mostly Bhutias; this nucleus, like that of the original portion, was subsequently increased by in-migration from Nepal.

Thus, the three original ethnic groups were Lepcha, Bhutia and Nepali. The question with which we are concerned is whether any of these can claim to be Buddhists in a continuing tradition reaching back to the time before the virtual disappearance of Buddhism from the rest of India.

The Lepchas of the Darjeeling area, according to one account of their origins, were driven southwards out of the higher Himalayas in the 17th century by the Tibetans and were again displaced from the western part of what is now Bhutan and Kalimpong by the Bhutanese in the early eighteenth century. They are primarily people of the forests, and have tended also to move away from the neighbourhood of Darjeeling as it became more developed. In Sir James Hooker's account of them (1854) they appear as having only relatively recently become Buddhists : "The earliest traditions which they have of their history date no further back than some three hundred years, when they describe themselves is having been long-haired, half-clad savages. At about that period they were visited by Tibetans, who introduced Buddha-worship, the plaiting of hair into pigtails and many other of their own customs."[10] Dalton quotes Dr. A. Campbell's note of 1840 to the effect that "The Lepchas are Buddhists," and that some of their Lamas "are educated at home" while others "go for their edu-

cation to the great monastic establishments beyond the snows (i.e. in Tibet)", and that they have also some Tibetan Lamas.[11] J.A.H. Louis, who travelled in North Bengal and Sikkim in the 1890's, described the Lepchas as "partially converted to Buddhism" but still clinging "to old superstitions and old forms of fetishism or demonolatry". He adds that "many of the ceremonies of Sikkim Buddhism for the propitiation or subjugation of evil spirits are no doubt of Lepcha origin".[12] These comments are in the usual style of English Protestant colonial writers ; others of the same period would describe Burmese Buddhism as a gross degeneration from the "pure Buddhism" of the Pali texts. According to another account of their origins, the Lepchas "are supposed to have come from the East along the foothills from the direction of Assam and Upper Burma". However, even on this view of their origins, it is agreed that so far as their religion was concerned this was introduced "from Tibet by Lamas from different monasteries who travelled south and converted the people".[13]

The Bhutias are a community in a cultural and religious sense; they have been described as "Mongoloid populations of Buddhist faith and Tibetan speech".[14] Geographically they are found in the higher ranges of the Himalayas both within Tibet, defined politically, and in the border areas to the south which politically are contained within the states of Nepal, Sikkim and Bhutan. The name 'Bhot' or 'Bhut' indicates Tibet, in the cultural sense. Bhutan is so called because it was considered the *anta* or 'end' of Bhut or Tibet (*Bhut-anta*), that is, the extreme eastern end. The term Bhutiā, or Tibetan people, can thus mean either those who belong to the land of Tibet as it is now known or those who are of Tibetan religion and culture, but having a homeland in one of the states to the south which have just been mentioned. Thus, they have become known severally as 'Tibetans' or 'Bhutanese' or 'Sikkim Bhutias' or Sherpas. This last term refers to the Bhutias of Nepal; it means 'easterners' and indicates that they live in the eastern part of Nepal, not far from the border with the Darjeeling District of India.

Buddhist beliefs and practices may have been introduced to the Bhutias of Bhutan as early as the eighth century, when the Indian Buddhist teacher Padma Sambhava is said to have visited the country at the invitation of the King of Bhutan, Sindhu Raja, himself an Indian. The tradition is that Guru Padma Sambhava travelled extensively throughout Bhutan, teaching the Dharma and founding *gompas*.[15] It is possible, therefore, that the Bhutias of Bhutan represent a continuous, direct tradition of Indian Buddhism. But it is not more than a possibility; no firm evidence in support of a direct Indian tradition is known, and it is generally held that Bhutan received its Buddhism from Tibet.[16] The Bhutias of Sikkim also claim Guru Padma Sambhava as the founder of Buddhism in their country, but its establishment there in the form in which it is now known, as a powerful hierarchical institution, dates only from the mid-seventeenth century (about 1647), when it was introduced from Tibet. It was from this time that many *gompas* began to be built in Sikkim. And it was at about this time that Buddhism began to be established among the Sherpas of Nepal; again it was from Tibet that it came. *The Nepalis* of North Bengal are predominantly Hindu, but among the non-Hindu tribes there are two, apart from the Sherpas, who are Buddhist or partly Buddhist. These are the Tamangs, and the Newars.

Of these the Tamangs are numerically the largest in Darjeeling District; they are referred to in some of the older literature as Murmis. Whereas some of the present

inhabitants of Nepal are descended from Hindus who moved into the area at the time of Muslim expansion in north India, these three tribes, together with some others, are of Mongolian origin, and have a much longer history in the territory now comprised within the Kingdom of Nepal. The Tamangs may at some very early period have moved here from Tibet; their physical characteristics and the names of their exogamous divisions are said to support this.[17] However, a recent study of Tamang traditions, preserved in a recently published work in Nepalese, reveals that in the Tamang view of the matter they did not originate in Tibet. It is accepted that Buddhism (*lāmā dharma*) entered their country from Tibet in the eighth century, at the time of its conquest by the Tibetan King Svāngsan Gempo.[18] In Darjeeling District, as also in Jalpaiguri District and Sikkim, where also they are now found, the Tamangs form part of the general Nepali movement into adjacent territories as a result of population explosion and land hunger. In these districts of India they constitute one of the largest Buddhist groups, and provide a centre of Buddhist solidarity for other smaller groups. This is particularly noticeable, for example in the Darjeeling town area, where the Tamang *gompa* is a well known centre of Buddhist life; it was built in 1926 and has received several additions since, and is now used not only by the Tamangs themselves but also by Newar merchants and shopkeepers, by Sherpas and by Bengalis. When I visited it in 1976 it had two resident lamas and three novices, who were living in quarters adjoining the temple, where also there is a primary school. The lamas are supported by the regular contributions of the Tamang Buddhist Association, among whose members are Newars and Sherpas also.

In the District of Darjeeling there are approximately 60,000 Tamangs, of whom 90 per cent are Buddhists ; those who live in more remote areas from the town are served by some twenty smaller *gompas*. The three novices who were trainees in the Darjeeling town monastery, in 1976, would later go to outlying places, such, for example, as the monastery at Ging (Lebong) where the lama at that time was an old man of 80. The Tamang *gompa* in Darjeeling is of the Nyingmapa sect, but Buddhists of other sects also come there for *puja*.[19]

The Newars, who in Darjeeling are known by the surname 'Pradhan' are divided religiously; some are Buddhists; others have become Hinduised; the former are known as *Buddha-margis* and the latter as *Siva-margis*. They come from the central valley area of Nepal around Kathmandu, and were the dominant group there until the fourteenth century. Their original culture appears to have been Buddhist, and it is possible that the Newars have some claim to represent a surviving tradition of Indian Buddhism. It is only with great difficulty that the Buddha-margis among them have preserved this tradition in Nepal, however, as the English Buddhist, Sangharakshita, who spent some time among them about thirty years ago, has recorded.[20] In Darjeeling, where they work as traders and cultivators, they are able to maintain their Buddhist practices through their association with other Buddhists from Nepal, (Tamangs and Sherpas), as we have just noted.

The other notable Bhutia community in North Bengal today are the Tibetans. Some of these came to India as traders before the Chinese invasion of Tibet; many more have come since as refugees. In Darjeeling town their common life has a focal point in the Bhutia Basti area, where there is a *gompa* of some years standing, a large newly built school for Tibetan refugee children, and a Tibetan refugees self-help centre

where Tibetan arts and crafts are practised and an income derived from the sale of the goods produced.

Bhutias are found, beyond Darjeeling District, to the east of Bhutan, in the Kameng Division of Arunachal Pradesh. They are also found in the valley districts of Assam, north of the Brahmoputra, especially in Darang, which borders Kameng, and in Lakhimpur. In general the Buddhist peopling of this area has been due to a gradual movement of Bhutanese, before and after the British period. Buddhism's introduction and growth in Bhutan is roughly parallel to that of Sikkim.

Tibetan Buddhism : slow growth

If we now consider the Buddhism of the Himalayan and sub-Himalayan parts of north-east India in general perspective, it is clear that very little, if any, of it can fairly be regarded as a surviving continuous tradition from the days before the decline of Indian Buddhism. Some is due to the influx of Tibetan refugees in the 1950's and 1960's; this is true mainly of Darjeeling District, but even there the Tibetan refugees can have formed only a relatively small proportion of the 91,358 Buddhists enumerated in the District in the 1971 Census. The question therefore arises whether the fact that Buddhists are found in somewhat greater numbers in Himalayan north-east India than elsewhere (except Maharashtra) can be attributed in some sense to Buddhist *resurgence*. The answer, as I see it, must be equivocal.

In the first place, the presence of Buddhists here is due mainly to migration into the region from the higher Himalayas and from Nepal; it is thus a tradition of Buddhism which comes mainly from Tibet, except in the case of the Newars; but they form only a very small part of the total. In any case the presence of Newars does not affect the general principle which is demonstrated here—namely, that Buddhism has shown its ability to *re-establish* itself on Indian soil in the modern period, once it is reintroduced. This is a principle of some significance, to which we shall return.

Meanwhile, some account has to be taken of the fact that in Himalayan north-east India the Buddhist population is declining in proportion to the rest of the population. Between 1931 and 1951 the total population of Darjeeling District grew by 27 per cent but the Buddhist population by only 5.4 per cent. Between 1951 and 1961 the District population growth rate was 41.0 per cent, but the Buddhist growth rate was only 32.2 per cent. This was slightly better than the previous 20 years, and was probably due partly to the influx of Tibetan refugees. The rise in the substantive numbers of Buddhists in the District was most steep in the decade 1951-61, as the following table shows :

No. of Buddhists in Darjeeling District

1931	58,934
1951	62,150
1961	82,304
1971	91,358

In the twenty years from 1931 to 1951 the increase in numbers was 3,216. In the

ten years 1951-61 it was as high as 20,150, but in the following ten years, 1961-71, start only 9,054. Moreover, from 1931 at least, the rate of growth of the Buddhist population has been lower than the general rate of growth for the total population, as we have seen. That is to say, the Buddhist community has not even been maintaining its relative position. Thus we have to reckon with the fact that although in this part of India, Buddhism, mainly of a Tibetan form, has succeeded in re-establishing itself by means of migrants who, for a certain period, have been able to maintain a Buddhist presence in India, nevertheless the percentage of Buddhists to the total population, at least since 1931, has declined. In 1931 they formed 18.44 per cent; in 1951, 13.96 per cent; in 1961, 13.0 percent; and in 1971 only 11.68 per cent.[21] This 'decline' is however, only relative to the rates of growth of other religious groups in the population. There has been no substantive decline in numbers, as the table given earlier shows. The fact that Buddhists have grown less rapidly than the adherents of other religions may be accounted for in various ways. In general, growth of population is the result of one or both of two factors. The first is an excess of immigration over emigration. The second is an excess of births over death. Hindus, Muslims and Christians in Darjeeling District all have higher population growth rates than Buddhists. This could mean that the adherents of these religions have been moving into the District in greater numbers relative to the size of the existing communities than has been the case with the Buddhists. Or it could mean that they have had a greater excess of births over deaths. The cause of such an excess is either higher fertility, (more children per couple) or a lower death rate, or both. The data available from the Census Reports do not enable us to investigate the extent of inter-religious contrasts of this kind. But elsewhere also, Buddhist populations have been characterised by slower growth, mainly due to lower fertility, and the same could be the case here. Moreover, it is not unlikely that the Catholic Christian population of Darjeeling District would have had a higher fertility rate than the Buddhist. The fertility rate among Hindus and Muslims is also, in general, likely to be higher than among Buddhists, not for directly religious reasons, but owing to the importance, in these two religions, of male progeny, a feature that is generally characteristic of patriarchy and patrilineal systems.[22] Until field work in Darjeeling District on religious differentials in immigration, in mortality and fertility rates has been carried out it is obviously not possible to go beyond *a priori* assumptions of this kind. The significant fact which remains, therefore, is that *Buddhism has shown itself capable of re-establishing itself in Indian society, of maintaining its life, and of growing in numbers, albeit more slowly than other religious communities.*

Buddhism in North-east India : Burmese

It is not only in the Himalayan area, however, that Buddhists are found in north-east India. Almost as many are contained within the valley and hill regions of Assam and the hill states of Tripura, Mizoram, and the eastern part of Arunachal Pradesh. These are the adherents of a tradition of Buddhism which in general is more akin to that of Burma, although in some parts it is the tradition of Tibet, introduced by Nepali immigrants (even as in a few places in Burma itself where Nepalis have penetrated). In certain districts of Assam the growth rate of the

Buddhist population for the decade 1961-71 was higher than that of the general population, notably in Lakhimpur (39.44 per cent as against 35.74 per cent), Darrang (89.37 per cent against 34.62 per cent), and North Cachar Hills (84.75 per cent against 40 per cent). In the new state of Meghalaya it was 85.76 per cent as against 31.5 per cent; and in the West Tripura district of Tripura State it was 44.36 per cent as against 30.94 per cent. The total number of Buddhists in the area covered by the State of Assam grew from the tiny figure of 1,621 given by W.W. Hunter in 1881[23] to about 15,000 in 1931, and since then had grown to more than 90,000 by 1971. This is a much more rapid growth than in the Himalayan region : 500 per cent in 40 years here, compared with only 55 per cent for the same period in Darjeeling District. So far as Assam Valley is concerned much of the growth is due to immigration. Even in 1931 there was still vacant land waiting to be taken, and immigrants from East Bengal and from Nepal were still moving into the upper parts of the valley, Buddhists among them. In the extreme east of Arunachal the Buddhist community consists of Khamtis, a Shan-Kachin people who came across the border from Burma in the eighteenth century; in Tripura and Mizoram also, the origins of the Buddhists culture of the hill people are to be found in neighbouring Burma. So once again we find that any Buddhist tradition which can be identified as residual is almost if not entirely nil; living Buddhism here consists in some places of Burmese tradition re-introduced into India after many centuries, and in others of a Nepalese or Tibetan tradition, similarly re-introduced.

The Potential for Buddhist Resurgence in India

Having examined the extent of the *actual* resurgence of Buddhism in India it is possible now to move on to consider the important subject of Buddhism's *potential* for resurgence.

Taken at face value this may not seem very great. Buddhists are a tiny fraction of the total population of India. This survey of the north-east seems to suggest that Buddhist growth in the modern period has been the result mainly of immigration, with perhaps some additional increment of numbers which the local community is able to attract from among neighbouring groups. Sometimes, as in Maharashtra, immediate social or political conditions may favour a sudden rapid growth of adherents, given that a single individual or small group is present and can communicate Buddhist values, attitudes, and practices in a way that is relevant to the local mood or need. In this kind of case there are two requirements : one is the receptive local situation, and the other is the presence of a significant and effective agent of Buddhism. These need to be related to each other in just the right sort of way, for potential growth to become actual. There has to be a sufficient amount of predisposition, and Buddhism has to be seen to provide a sufficiently attractive alternative to the present condition.

A theoretical discussion of what might constitute favourable predispositions for Buddhist growth in India today would need much more space than is available in a short paper like this. There may be some value, however, in mentioning two features of the contemporary situation which could be regarded as providing favourable conditions. Both are associated with the general spread of education. One is the potential which is present among those whose education has enabled them to

think critically about Indian traditional Society and traditional ideas. The second is a special case of the first, namely, those who have received such education and whose cultural origins are in a tribal, non-Hindu society.

Significant examples of the first kind have already been mentioned in passing : Jawaharlal Nehru and Dr. B.R. Ambedkar. The first found himself disenchanted with the Hindu caste society to which he belonged by birth ; the second found himself disenchanted with the Hindu caste society from which he was debarred by birth. Both, in different ways, from the position of educated, secularised intellectuals, were attracted by Buddhism. Most significantly, perhaps, one was satisfied with a personal devotion to Buddhist ideas and values without any institutional commitment; while the other committed himself to active involvement in a Buddhist community and encouraged others to do the same. These may possibly be seen as two distinct types of modern resurgent Buddhism. For Buddhism now as always, caters for both. The existence of what may be called the 'Nehru' type will not be apparent from the data provided in Census Reports; these will provide information only concerning the second type, and may even then understate the case. The membership of the Maha Bodhi Society of India will furnish examples of the 'Nehru' type; not all those who are listed as members of the Society and take part in the activities will necessarily be returned as Buddhists when it comes to Census enumeration. But that is not to say that Buddhist values are not being diffused through the agency of such people. The nature and effect of social action are not inhibited by what is entered on a Census list concerning the social factor.

With regard to the second kind of potential for the resurgence of Buddhism it has to be admitted that this is somewhat more speculative. It may also be more specially relevant to north-eastern India. For this region is characterised by some relatively high rates of literacy among tribal peoples. Whereas the all-India average rate of literacy among scheduled tribes in 1961 was 8.5 per cent, among the Lushais of Mizoram it was more than 40 per cent, and in Manipur state it was 27 per cent.[24] With the greater ease of access to education, and especially higher education, which young people from tribal areas now have, through the attention which is being given to this by the central government and by state government, there will come the possibility of greater freedom with regard to personal beliefs and attitudes for these young people. It is true that there are conditioning factors other than education to be taken into account but education will rank fairly high in the scale of importance.

Verrier Elwin pointed out that it is not necessary to assume that as tribal people become educated they must abandon their traditional belief and become Hindu or Christian; while they are at liberty to do so if they desire, it is not an inescapable necessity. A deeper study of tribal religions, claims Elwin, 'shows that they have many elements that satisfy the heart, even though, like other religions, they have other elements which do not satisfy the mind'.[25] In a recent study by the Deputy Registrar-General of India of modernisation among tribal people, the impact of education is seen to be a key factor. Among other effects, such as opening up possibilities of new occupations associated with a western way of life, is the new intellectual awareness it brings : 'young men and women become sceptical about tribal myths and legends and associated world-views; this, he says, causes 'a search for new horizons". In the wake of this experience 'some give up their religion and either become Christians or devotees

of Vivekananda or some other such world teacher'. Others take to what he calls revivalism and similar movements which derive their inspiration from the past.[26] Whereas tribal people in India live mostly in areas where they form the majority of the population and are unaware of the fact that they are minorities in the wider context the effect of education is to produce an awareness of this fact. 'By a clean sweep education displaces the tribals from their secure primitive world', and 'they begin to feel themselves an insignificant minority'.[27]

This kind of social and psychological transition is strikingly similar to the transition which was being experienced by the tribal republics who inhabited the sub-Himalayan foothills and plains at the time of Śākyamuni. The growth of large new political units of a monarchical kind into which the tribal republics or *sangha* were being absorbed was producing a similar sense of loss of security and of being adrift in a strange sea where there were no moorings. The growth of an urban style of life at the cities where monarchs had their courts and capitals was effecting great changes in intellectual and moral attitudes, and new questions concerning life's meaning and destiny were being asked.[28] The movement we now call early Buddhism emerged as a way by means of which people who were caught up in such an experience could adjust to new perspectives, and could explore with confidence a universe of new horizons, while preserving in the life of the new Sangha 'of the four winds', the most valuable aspects of the old, local *sangha*.

Young people from tribal backgrounds, especially those who have undergone higher education, are likely to be in a very similar situation today. Possibilities of re-orientation envisaged by Verrier Elwin and by Roy-Burman are mainly in terms of Hindu or Christian religion, or complete secularism for those young people to whom ideas about gods no longer make sense. But with regard to Hinduism, as Verrier Elwin points out, there are obstacles. One is the cow; to have to learn to venerate this animal is not easy for people who have never done so and are now moving into a world of thought where such a requirement seems bizarre. The other is caste; after the egalitarianism of tribal life it will be hard for a young person to accept the ritual and social inequalities of the *jāti* system. With regard to Christianity also there are difficulties. They arise out of the form of Christianity which is preached by evangelical missionaries. As Verrier Elwin points out, a doctrine 'that traces the sharpest of distinctions between the convert and the "heathen", between the saved and the damned, and that insists that Christians should keep themselves apart from non-Christians, results in an essentially separatist, a xenophobic psychology, which has in many places manifested itself both in social life and politics'. It has the political effect, says Elwin, of diminishing the convert's enthusiasm for India and its culture;[29] one might almost add, of demeaning India in his eyes.

These obstacles and difficulties do not present themselves to the followers of the Buddhist way. From the earliest days both the veneration of the cow and the observance of caste inequalities have been successfully dispensed with. Neither does the Buddhist have to alienate himself from India and her culture, since Buddhism has itself contributed very significantly to that culture; nor need he feel any obligation to despise the 'pagan' culture of his own people. For, also from the earliest days Buddhism has maintained what I have called an open frontier between the Dharma and local folk belief and practice. It is not necessary here to multiply examples of

this : they are abundant in the literature dealing with Burmese, Thai, and Sri Lanka Buddhism, for example. From this area Verrier Elwin quotes the case of the Sherdukpen tribe, in Arunachal Pradesh, "who have developed an interesting synthesis of Buddhist and tribal ideas".[30]

These considerations are offered not in any commendatory sense, but in order to make possible a fair assessment of the *potential* which exists for Buddhist resurgence in this part of India. Against these assets one will have to set the liabilities. Two, which seem to me most important, will be mentioned here, in conclusion.

The first concerns the agent by means of whom Buddhism is to be communicated. Sangharakshita, records how, in Kerala, he met a men who had a deep interest in Buddhism. 'Twenty years earlier, he told us, when a Malayalam translation of *The Light of Asia* had aroused the interest of many Eazhavas, he had founded a Buddhist organisation and brought a bhikkhu from Ceylon to preach the Dharma. Unfortunately, the bhikkhu had shown more concern for his own creature comforts than enthusiasm for his pastoral duties, and his demands eventually became so unreasonable that he had to be sent back to Ceylon.'

Sangharakshita comments ruefully on the opportunity that was thus lost, which, if the right kind of Buddhist had been able to use, could have led to the full actualisation of what was clearly the potential for Buddhism in Kerala at that time. He adds that this was not the only case of its kind; he subsequently heard of others in different parts of India and 'eventually concluded that bhikkhus from South-east Asia often did more harm than good in the cause of Buddhism in India'.[31] Clearly it is not enough that a potential exists in the form of an intellectual interest; if it is to become a living religious tradition the presence of the right kind of individual or group to provide a Buddhist presence and to introduce Buddhist teaching and practice, is essential.

The other liability which Buddhism has to face in India is that in neighbouring countries it has traditionally been closely associated with the state, and in more than one case has enjoyed the privileged position of being the state religion. In the cases of Burma and Sri Lanka it lost its place as the established religion of the state during the British colonial period but soon after independence, in both countries, movements began which aimed at having it re-instated in its former favoured position. Both in Burma and Sri Lanka these movements aroused the opposition of other religious communities, and in Burma the attempt by Prime Minister U Nu to make Buddhism the state religion was a principal factor in his downfall. In the case of Thailand, the traditional role of Buddhism as the official religion of the state has never effectively been interrupted, and today the slogan "King, Religion and Country" indicates the way in which Buddhism is made to serve as a symbol of patriotism, and to play a supportive role for a non-democratic military government.

This association of Buddhism in South-east Asia with the state is, however, not of the essence of Buddhism; it has much more to do with historical development of these states. In Burma, some of the opposition to the proposal to Burmese state Buddhism came from Buddhists from the Shan and Kachin states, since they saw it as a vehicle of Burmese ethnic domination and a threat to the freedom and rights of ethnic minorities.[32] Heinz Bechert has cited the example of the Chittagong Hill Tracts, where communities of Buddhists have maintained their existence successfully without benefit of state patronage or political influence and without large land-owning interests of the

kind the bhikkhus of Sri Lanka had.[33]

The Buddhists of Chittagong Hill Tracts and the Kachin/Shan Buddhists of Northern Burma are, as it happens, neighbours to the Buddhist communities just across the borders in North-East India, and indeed it is from these Chittagonian, Kachin and Shan areas that the Buddhists of the eastern hill and valley areas of Assam, Mizoram, Tripura and parts of Arunachal Pradesh originally came. Political and security considerations now make ease of social and cultural communication across the frontiers difficult, but the fact that Buddhism of this type is already present in North-east India, a type which is not politically ambitious and which has shown itself capable of existing without official state patronage, may be sufficient to offset the disadvantage which Buddhism might otherwise be seen in India to possess, from the historical examples of its somewhat state-oriented character in South-east Asia.

NOTES

1. Exact figure given : 3,812,325. (*Census of India 1971. Series I, India, Paper 2 : Religion.*)

2. The largest concentrations outside the North-east and the North-west were in Uttar Pradesh (39,500), mostly in Meerut and Agra Districts; and Delhi (9,000). The only other states with more than even 3,000 were Mysore (14,000), Orissa (8,500), Gujarat (5,500), Bihar (5,000) and Rajasthan (3,500). Figures given are correct to the nearest 500.

3. Eleanor Zelliott, "Buddhism and Politics in Maharashtra", in *South Asian Politics and Religion*, ed. by D.E. Smith, 1966 p. 191 n.1.

4. Figures (correct to the nearest 500) are as follows :
the North-eastern area 101,000; the North-western area 38,500; the rest of India 17,500. (Sources : *Census of India 1931. Vol. I—India. Part two*, by J.H. Hutton, Delhi 1933, p.517 and *Vol. V. part II* by A.E. Porter, Calcutta, 1932, Tables p.221.)

5. *Manchester Guardian*, 18th October, 1956.

6. Balkrishna Govind Gokhale, *Buddhism in Maharashtra : A History*, Bombay, 1976, p.158.

7. *Census of India 1931, Vol. I India, Part One—Report* by J.H. Hutton, Delhi, 1933, p.389.

8. Gokhale, *op. cit.* p. 158f.

9. *Bengal District Gazetteers : Darjeeling*, by L S.S. O'Malley Calcutta, 1907 p.35.

10. J.D. Hooker, *Himalayan Journals*, 1854, Vol. I p. 127.

11. E.T. Dalton, *Descriptive Ethnology of Bengal*, Calcutta, 1872 p.101.

12. J.A.H. Louis, *The Gates of Thibet*, 1895 pp. 95 and 112.

13. J. Claude White, *Sikkim and Bhutan*, 1909 (repr. 1971) pp. 7 and 14.

14. C. von Fürer-Hairnendorf, *The Sherpas of Nepal*, London, 1964, p.1.

15. Nirmala Das, *The Dragon Country : The General History of Bhutan*, 1974 p. 5.

16. D.L. Snellgrove, *Buddhist Himalaya*, 1957, p.212f.

17. C.J. Morris, *et. al, Nepal and the Gurkhas*, London, 1965 p.112.

18. Alexander W. Macdonald, "The Tamang as seen by one of themselves" in

Essays on the Ethnology of Nepal and South Asia, Kathmandu, 1975 pp. 132-33.

19. Information from an interview with Sri Gising Tamang in Darjeeling, 14th April, 1976.

20. Sangharakshita, *The Thousand Petalled Lotus*, London, 1976, pp. 270-284.

21. By calculation from Census of India Reports for 1931, 1951 and 1971.

22. See, *e.g.* K.K. Siddh, *Family Planning* : *The Religious Factor*, New Delhi, 1974. On Buddhist population growth see : T. Ling. "Buddhist Factors in Population Growth and Control : A Survey based on Thailand and Ceylon," in *Population Studies*, Vol. 23, Part one, March 1969.

23. *Imperial Gazetteer of India* by W.W. Hunter, Vol. I, 1881, p.247.

24. B.K. Roy-Burman, "Modernization among Tribal people on India's Borders", in *Studies in Social Change*, ed. by K.S. Mathur, *et. al.*, Lucknow, 1973 p.109.

25. Verrier Elwin, *A Philosophy for N.E.F.A.*, Shillong, 1959 p.216.

26. Roy-Burman, *op. cit.*, p.125f.

27. *ibid.*, p.127.

28. See Trevor Ling, *The Buddha* : *Buddhist Civilisation in India and Ceylon.* London 1973, Part 2.

29. Elwin, *op. cit.*, p.219.

30. *ibid.*, p.211.

31. Sangharakshita, *op. cit.*, p.121.

32. D.E. Smith, *Religion and Politics in Burma*, Princeton, New Jersey, 1965, p.251.

33. Heinz Bechert, "Theravāda Buddhist Sangha : Some General Observations on Historical and Political Factors in its Development" in *Journal of Asian Studies*, Vol. 29, No. 4, 1970, pp. 770-72 and 778.

21

A Tibetan Guide to Some of the Holy Places of the Dhaulagiri-Muktināth area of Nepal

ALEXANDER W. MACDONALD

A certain number of Tibetan-language *Guides* for the use of Buddhist pilgrims in Holy Places have been made available in recent years. Reference was made to several of these by Luciano Petech in his Preface to Alfonsa Ferrari, *Mk'yen brtse's Guide to the Holy Places of Central Tibet*, Rome, Is. M.E.O., 1958, p. XXI. A general view of the role of pilgrimage in the Tibetan tradition was given by A.M. Large-Blondeau, *Les pèlerinages tibétains* in *Les Pèlerinages*, Paris, Les Editions du Seuil, 1960, p. 203-245.[1] On the Indian side of the Himālaya, a useful, primarily geographical, study on *Hindu Places of Pilgrimage* was published in 1973 by Surinder Mohan Bhardwaj at the University of California Press.[2] However, for the border areas between India and Tibet, relatively few *Guides* have been published, an early exception being J. Schubert's *Der Tibetische Māhātmya des wallfahrtsplatzes Triloknāth* in *Artibus Asiae*, vol. V, p. 76-78, 127-136. We do possess Tibetan-language *Guides* to the Holy Places of the Kathmandu Valley[3]; and the *Nepāla-māhātmya* concerning Hindu pilgrimage in that area has been edited and translated into German by H. Uebach[4]. *Guides* dealing with outlying areas of Nepal are, however, rare. I recently drew attention to the Roṅ-phu *gnas-yig*[5]; and Michael Aris has given information about works of a similar type concerning Skyid-mo luṅ in his "Report on the University of California Expedition to Kutang and Nubri in Northern Nepal in Autumn, 1973."[6] To my knowledge, no western study has yet been devoted to the two Tibetan *Guides* of the Mt. Kailāsa area, to which I drew attention in *Essays on the Ethnology of Nepal and South Asia*, Kathmandu, Ratna Pustak Bhandar, 1975, p. 160, note 187.

In April, 1974, I visited at Thini-gaon, near Jomosom in the upper Kāli Gandaki region of Nepal, the "small p'ön-po temple void and deserted except for two large images of the 'Composite Conqueror' and Wäl-sa" which is mentioned by David

Snellgrove in his book *Himalayan Pilgrimage*, Oxford, 1961, p.186. There I was shown the "metal casket" containing the *sku-tshab gter-lňa* which Snellgrove had seen in the nearby Rñiń-ma-pa monastery of that name.[7] I was also shown and was able to copy the *gnas-yig* of which the transliteration is to be found below. It was written in a clear hand, but with very indifferent spelling, on yellowish, apparently modern, Tibetan paper; the title seemed to have been added after the text was copied. This *gnas-yig* seems to be substantially the same as that mentioned by Professor G. Tucci in his *Preliminary Report on Two Scientific Expeditions to Nepal*, Rome, Is. M.E.O., 1956, p.10. While Professor Tucci made use in his book of some of the contents of the *gnas-yig*, he did not reproduce the text. As this type of manuscript *Guide* is fast disappearing, and as this particular one is not likely to be re-copied[8] due to the present decline of Buddhist culture throughout the area, I have thought it worthwhile to make it available.

As its title indicates, our text deals first (fol. 2b-6b) with Muktināth (Chu-mig brgya-rtsa). This is a famous Hindu place of pilgrimage, although remarkably little seems to be known about its history. Our Buddhist author links it to the Eighty Great Siddhas, to Mount Kailāsa and to Lake Manasoravar. Muktināth was described by Snellgrove on p.199-202 of the above-quoted work. It has been described briefly again recently and photographed by Chr. Kleinert in his *Haus-und Siedlungsformen im Nepal Himālaya*, Innsbruck-München, Universitätsverlag Wagner, 1973, plate 72, p. 106. Gcoń-gzhi (Snellgrove, *op. cit.*, p. 189-190) is described briefly on fol. 6 b-7b; and some remarks on Grum-pa lha-khaṅ, the site of the present-day Rñiń-ma-pa monastery, which previously housed the *sku-tshab gter-lňa* and which is situated on a small hillock previously known as 'Od-gsal gaṅs, follow on fol. 7b-8a. The rest of the text gives an account of Mt. Dhaulagiri (Mu-le gaṅs rin-chen) and the Secret Cave of Padmasambhava (Gu-ru'i gsaṅ-phug). The latter was described by Professor Tucci in *Tra Giunglee Pagode*, Rome, 1953, p.79. Although the end of the Dhaulagiri-Padmasambhava's Cave section is marked on fol. 25a, one has the impression that the prophecy concerning the country of Thag, which begins on fol. 23b has been interpolated and is moreover incomplete.

Mňa'-ris is nowhere throughout the manuscript spelt correctly, and the copyist hesitates often between Mu-li and Mu-le; *gzhi*, *zhi* and *bzhi*. The indication in the final sentence that the text (*chos*) was corrected in the monastery in the tiger-year is no help to dating it, nor is the mention of the tenth day of the fifth month of *lcags-pho spres-lo* on fol. 8b, as we do not know the *rab-byuṅ*. As it exists at present, the text gives the impression of having been assembled from various local traditions and legends which were noted down, perhaps not always at the same date, and then grouped together. The reference to Jumla (fol. 22b) is unfortunately historically vague. One should perhaps not pay too much literal attention to the passage in which the narrator refers to himself as a liar (fol. 20b) and where he recounts the vision which came to him in his sleep of an armed man, dressed in white and mounted on a white horse, who disappeared like a rainbow in the sky. It is a fairly common habit of Siddhas to refer to themselves thus in their writings.

The text has been composed with the usual clichés common to *gnas-yig* : the imposition of the 4/8 directions and their centre on to the local geography, the distribution of the *aṣṭamaṅgala* in particular spatial directions, the insistence on the abundance of

miraculous waters, and so on. Indeed the gap between the physical reality of these sites, and their glorification in our text is as great as that to be found in Hindu *māhātmya*. Such texts are not so much descriptions or guide-books as stereotyped literary projections of an inner vision of spiritual reality, destined to transport the pilgrim on to a supernatural plane.

The northward thrust of Frontier Brahmins, and the consequent sankritisation of the northern areas of Nepal has often been commented on. Here we see the southward thrust of Frontier Bon-pos and Lamas into the same areas, and the transformation of local mountain, earth and water spirits into Keepers of the Buddhist Law.

Despite the recent progress in the cartography of the area in question, many geographical features can still not be determined with certainty under their local names. I intend shortly to publish another text from Marpha, which concerns boundary disputes between villages in the area, and on that occasion I shall return to the translation of significant passages in this *gnas-yig*.

NOTES

1. To the materials concerning Padma bkod quoted in this article can now be added *Sbas-yul padma bkod kyi lam-yig ma-'oṅs luṅ- bstan sna-tshogs phyogs-gcig tu bsdus-pa'i gsuṅ-pod* published by Tseten Dorji at the Tibetan Nyingmapa Monastery, Camp 5, Arunachal Pradesh, 1974.

2. One wonders whether the Śalagrama of p. 51 and the Śalagrāma of pp. 73-74 of this work can be definitely located in the upper Kāli Gandaki area where black quartzose containing impressions of ammonites are still much sought after and found. See the interesting entry under Śalagrāma in Vettam Mani, *Purāṇic Encyclopaedia, A Comprehensive Dictionary with Special Reference to the Epic and Purāṇic Literature*, Delhi, Motilal Banarsidass, 1975, pp. 672-673, and for some western writings: H. Yule and A.C. Burnell, *Hobson-Jobson*, London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1969, pp. 785-786.

3. See T.V. Wylie, *A Tibetan Religious Geography of Nepal*, Rome, Is. M.E.O., 1970, and my article "A little-read Guide to the Holy Places of Nepal, Part I" in *Kailash*, vol. III, no. 2, Kathmandu, 1975, pp. 89-144.

4. *Das Nepāla-Māhātmyam des Skanda-pūrāṇaṃ, Legenden um die hinduistischen Heiligtumer Nepals*, Munich, W. Fink, 1970.

5. In my article "The Lama and the General" in *Kailash*, vol. I, no. 3, Kathmandu, 1973, p. 225, note I.

6. *Contributions to Nepalese Studies*, vol. 2, no. 2, Kathmandu, 1975, pp. 45-87: see, in particular, the Appendix, pp. 85-87.

7. Information about the *sku-tshab* at Junbesi, in the Sherpa area, is to be found in F.W. Funke, *Religiöses Leben der Sherpa*, Innsbruck-München, 1969, pp. 110-112 and plates 49 and 51.

8. Another copy of this text has since become available in Tashi Dorji (editor), *Rare Tibetan Texts from Nepal*, Dolanji, 1976, p. 61-80. For *guides* concerning Kailasa, see Tashi Dorji's *Snaṅ srid mdzod phug gi rtsa-ba daṅ pyi don sgyi gsuṅ-pod*, Ochgat, 1973.

TEXT

1a chu-mig brgya-rtsa gcoṅ-gzhi sku-tshab gter-lṅa mu-li rin-chen gaṅs ghu-ru'i gsaṅ-phug rna-ri jo-bo sogs ṅo-mtshar can gyi gnas-yig rnams bzhugs-so

b na-mo gu-ru lo keśva-ra ya / sṅon yaṅ dag-par rdzogs-pa'i saṅs-rgyas śākya thub-pa'i bstan-pa la / ṅo-mtshar smad du byuṅ-ba'i nub-phyogs o-rgyan yul du / pad-sdoṅ las sku 'khruṅs-śiṅ / 'jig-rten gyi khams 'dir rigs bzaṅ-po za-hor rgyal-po'i sras bka' mdzad / rgya-gar yul du yoṅ dog ma-lus bcad / bsil ba'i tshal du dṅos-grub rnam gñis thob / wa-ra ṇa-

2a si chos kyi 'khor-lo bskor / sku-tshe sṅa-ma'i las 'bras smon-lam kyis / bod kyi rgyal-po khri-sroṅ lde'u-btsan gyis sṅon bod yul du spyan draṅs-nas / dbus kyi bsam-yas chen-po'i sa 'dul mdzad / gzhan yaṅ jam-gliṅ phyogs-bzhi dbus lṅa la / ri brag gaṅs mtsho thams-cad byin-brlabs mdzad / ma'oṅs sems-can don du gter-kha maṅ du sbas / bod kyi lha srin dam la btags

b kha-ba-can du bstan-pa rgyas-par mdzad / lho-nub mtshams-su srin-po'i kha gnon mdzad / mya ṅan mi 'da' 'gro-ba yoṅs kyi mgon / sku-gsum dbyer-med pad-'byuṅ zhabs la 'dud / de yaṅ gnas-chen chu-mig brgya-rtsa'i gnas-yig gsal-ba'i me-loṅ / rgyas-par bstan-pa ni // namo-gu-ru / rgya-gar skad du / dmu-ghu bhadra zer / bod-skad du / chu-mig brgya-rtsa zhes bya-ba lags-te / sum-cu rtsa-gsum dga'-ldan lha yi yul daṅ mtshuṅs-pa 'di-ñid kyi 'byuṅ-khuṅ lo-rgyus mdor-bsdus rtsam zig cuṅ-zad bśad-pa ni / sṅon skal-pa daṅ-po'i dus-su o-rgyan chen-po padma byuṅ-gnas kyi

3a byin-gyis brlabs-pa'i gnas chen po / rgya-gar gyi grub-thob brgyad-cu'i byin-gyis brlabs-zhiṅ / grub-chen de-rnams kyi 'gro-ba sems-can kyi don la dgoṅs-nas / rgya-gar gyi brag ral-pa-can de-ñid phyag sor-mo'i rtse la spyan draṅs-nas / bod kyi yul du spyan-draṅs ste / de-ñid dug-mtsho 'khol-mo'i kha-gnon du bzhag-ciṅ / de nas grub-thob rnams kyis / gaṅs-dkar gyi rgyal po ti-se la / phyag daṅ bskor-ba mdzad-do / mtsho ma-spaṅ la khrus mdzad-nas / chu ku ba bsnams-nas / de nas gnas-chen chu-mig brgya-rtsa ru bzhag-nas / rdo-rje'i pho-braṅ gi steṅ

b du bzhugs-nas / gzim-pa'i rmi-lam du / dbus kyi ri-rgyal chen-po de bdun-bcu rtsa-bzhi'i dkyil-'khor du zhal gzigs-so / yum-mchog rdo-rje rnal 'byor-ma la snaṅ-ba stoṅ-pa yum / snaṅ-stoṅ dbyer-med sñam-par sbyor / śar kyi *ri-bo gser mdog* de rje-btsun byams-pa mgon po bzhugs-tshul yin / de'i bar gyi dkar ser-dmar ljaṅ de / sgrol-ma ñi-śu rtsa gcig yin / lho-phyogs *ri-bo ser-po* de bcom-ldan 'das śakya thub-pa'i bzugs-tshul yin / rin-chen khyuṅ-chen 'dra-ba'i gnas-mchog tu / chu-bo ltār rṅa tsam zhig 'byuṅ / de'i gnas-su pad-'byuṅ gis / tshes-pa bcu la

4a mchod phul mdzad / gnas-mchog mkha'-'gro'i gliṅ du grags / de'i rjes grub-thob brgya-cu yis phebs-pas ñams-rtogs goṅ du 'phel / bro brduṅs rjes stoṅ-phrag byuṅ / de-ltar zhabs-rjes ñi-śu gter du sbas / gñis ni 'gro-ba'i don la bzhags / bskal-ldan rnams kyi spyod-pa'i gnas / bskal-med rnams kyi spyod-yul miṅ / lho'i chu-sgra

rol-mo 'di / dga' bo 'jog-pos yon-tshab phul / bskal-ldan yod-na bskor-ba mdzad / pho 'doms bco-brgyad kyi sa yod-pas / de nas lho-phyogs phyin-pa na / rin-chen chu-mig me-'bar 'di /

b bde-mchog yum-gyis gsaṅ-gnas las / rjes-chags me-yis 'bar-tshul yin / rin-chen rdo la me 'bar 'di di / snaṅ gsal mar-me'i tshul du bzhugs / skal-ldan yod-na dṅos-grub zhu / chu-mig brgya daṅ brgyad-cu de / grub-chen brgyad-cu'i de ñid kyis / sa ni skyoṅ-ba re re mdzad / ma-spaṅ g-yu mtsho ma-dros nas / chu-ni ku-ba re-re bsnams / ma 'oṅs sñigs-ma'ı skabs 'di-ru / sems-can mnar-med 'dren-pa'i phyir chu-mig brgya daṅ brgyad cu-po / rin-chen gter du sbas-pa las / de-ltar chu-mig brgya-rtsa 'byuṅ / sdoṅ-po brgya daṅ brgyad-cu skyes / grub-chen re-re'i bzhugs-sa yin

5a gnas-mchog khyad-par can 'di la / phyag-'tshal mchod-'bul mjad-mkhan rnams / che-'dir sdig-pa ma-lus sbyaṅs / phyi-ma saṅs-rgyas thob-par gsuṅs / gnas-mchog 'di yi nub-byaṅ na / byin-rlabs can gyi zhabs-rjes yod / gnas-mchog 'di yi lho-nub na / o-rgyan padma 'byuṅ-gnas kyis / khyad-par 'phags-pa'i zhabs-rjes bzhag/gnas-mchog 'di yi byaṅ-phyogs na / btad zhes-bya-ba'i luṅ-pa'i phu / chva-yi gter-kha zad-med yod / slob-dpon padma 'byuṅ-gnas kyis / sgrub-khaṅ dbu-rjes zhabs-rjes pad-zhva raṅ-

b byon daṅ bcas-pa / mkha' 'gro'i tshogs-khaṅ śel gyi ka-ba daṅ / gser kyi ka-ba la sogs maṅ yod / de-ltar gnas-chen chu-mig 'di la / mos-pas bsgom bzlas 'bad nus-na / ṅan soṅ sdug-bsṅal kun las grol / dar-chen brtsugs-pa'i phan yon ni / stoṅ 'khor-los sgyur-ba'i rgyal-por skye / dril-bu g-yer-ga phul gyur-na / dge-bśes yon-tan tshad-mar skyes / khrus byas chu-chab 'thuṅ-ba yis / mtshams-med lṅa yi sdig-srib sbyaṅs / thig-tshag sku-dkar byas gyur-na / stag-gzig dom dred dug-sbrul sogs / gdug-pa'i sems-

6a can kun las sgrol // yaṅ rje-btsun sgrol-ma'i luṅ-bstan las / klu gñan maṅ-po 'dug-pa'i gnas / bde-mchog yab-yum bzhugs-pa'i zhiṅ / gnas 'brel zhag-gcig byas-pas kyaṅ / phyir mi ldog-pa'i sa chen thob ces gsuṅs-so / byuṅ-khuṅs lo-rgyus maṅ yod kyaṅ / skabs-'dir mdor-bsdus tsam zhig bris / zhes gnas-chen chu-mig brgya-rtsa'i dkar-chags 'di-ñid ni / dam-pa rgya gar-ba daṅ / ro sñom-pa spyod-khrid chen- po daṅ / gu-ru padma 'byuṅ-gnas kyis kyaṅ / luṅ maṅ-po bstan-zhiṅ

b rgya-gar gyi grub-thob brgyad-cu'i byin-gyis brlabs-pa'o / zhes mkha'-'gro 'du ba'i gnas chen-po / skal-ldan bsod-nams gsog-pa'i zhiṅ / gnas-chen chu-mig brgya-rtsa'i dkar-chags gsal-ba'i me-loṅ rdzogs-so // gnas-chen chu-mig brgya-rtsa'i byaṅ-phyogs su / ñin-lam gcig tu bgrod-pa'i sa *gcoṅ-zhi* zhes-bya-ba slob-dpon padmas kyaṅ zhabs bcags-pa'i sa / grub-thob brgyad-cus kyaṅ byin-gyis brlabs-pa'i gnas chen-po / skabs brgyad bla-ma rin-po-che mi-pham yoṅs-'dus / grub-thob chen-po stag rtse-ba'i gzigs snaṅ la / gcoṅ-zhi 'bur du thon-

7a pa'i 'di-nid ni / bde-mchog lhan-skyes yab-yum du gzigs-śiṅ / gzhan yaṅ raṅ-byon chen-po 'di-ltar bzhugs-śiṅ / nor-bu ka-ma-ru las grub-pa'i ye-śes raṅ-rig gsal-ba'i

jo-bo kha-sar pa-ṇi raṅ-byon sku-mched lṅa gsal-bar bzhugs-śin / rje-btsun sgrol-ma raṅ-byon gcig daṅ / o-rgyan gtso-'khor gsum / gzhan yaṅ sku-rjes phyag rjes zhabs-rjes sogs maṅ-po daṅ / citta'i dkyil-'khor tshe-bum raṅ-byon daṅ / bde-mchog g-yas na gu-ru'i zhabs-rjes bzhugs / bde-mchog g-yon na pad-sdoṅ raṅ-byon bzhugs

7b mkha'-'gro'i tshogs-khaṅ naṅ-na mgon-po phyag-drug 'bur-rdo bzhugs / de'i gdoṅ-na klu gan-rgyal yod / phug-pa'i sgo na ṅan soṅ sgo mo yod / de'i sgo na rta-mgrin raṅ-byon bzhugs / de'i stcd na bya-khyuṅ raṅ-byon bzhugs / gzhan yaṅ raṅ-byon bsam-gyis mi-khyab-pa bzhugs-śiṅ / bde-ba can daṅ zaṅs-mdog dpal-ri sogs khyad par med-pa yin-no / gnas-chen gcoṅ-zhi'i dkar-chags rdzogs-so // gnas-chen chu-mig brgya-rtsa'i lho-phyogs su ñin-lam gcig phyin-pa'i sa na / sṅon gyi dus 'od-gsal gaṅs zhes-su grags / da-lta grum-

8a pa lha-khaṅ yaṅ zer / zhes-pa o-rgyan padma'i zhabs-rjes daṅ zhabs kyi pus-mo'i rjes / phyag gñis-ka'i rjes gsal-bar bcas bzhugs yod / lhag-par gu-ru'i padma daṅ dbyer-med-pa sku-tshab gter-lṅa chen-po de-ñid byin-brlabs can gzi 'od-'bar-ba mthoṅ thos dran reg 'gro-ba rnams thar-pa thob-pa'i mchoḡ la 'god zhiṅ bzhugs-pa'i byin-brlabs śin-tu che-'o // o // slob-dpon chen-po padma 'byuṅ gnas ṅo-mtshar bsam-gyis mi-khyab brdzod kyi mi laṅs-pa zhig yod kyaṅ / de'i naṅ nas mchog du gyur-pa ni / gaṅs-chen bzhi / mtshar bsam-gyis

b yod-do / 'dir mu-le gaṅs rin-chen daṅ / gsaṅ-phug gñis la phyag mchod 'bul-ba dge-ba rgya che-ba brgya 'gyur thob-pa'i gnas yin-ciṅ / tshogs-'khor byas tshad ṅan soṅ skyes sgo gcod / gu-ru ṅa yi zhabs kyi bcags- pa'i sa / gnas-chen 'di-ñid la sgrub- pa byas-na mi-'grub-pa gaṅ-yaṅ med / sgyu lus bor-nas myur-du saṅs-rgyas thob-par gyur zhes gsuṅs-so / lcags-pho spres-lo'i zla-ba lṅa-pa'i tshes-bcu'i nub mo / bdag yon-bdag mtshan chen *sṅags-'chaṅ tshe- riṅ* zhes bya-ba / raṅ ñid gu-ru gsaṅ-phug la rtse-gcig gsol-ba btab-

9a nas /bsgom sñams-par bzhag-nas bzhugs-pa'i rmi-lam daṅ 'od-gsal 'dres-pa'i nam-tho raṅ na / mdun-gyis nam-mkha' la 'ja' 'od gur-khaṅ gi sprin 'khrigs-nas / saṅs-rgyas kyi sprul pa'i mkha'- 'gro-ma yi / sku yi cha-lugs can maṅ-po mthoṅ-zhiṅ / gtso-mo daṅ 'dra-ba'i bud-med yid-du 'oṅ-ba zhig gi gnas-bcad luṅ-bstan 'di-ltar gsuṅs-so // e-ma-ho / gaṅs-chen mtho-ba mu-le rin-chen 'di yi gnas-mchog 'di-la dpa'o ṭākkī bsam-gyis mi-khyab-pa'i gnas yin-ciṅ / de yaṅ mu-li rin-chen 'di-ñid śel-dkar gyi mchod-

b rten 'dra-ba yin-ciṅ / gaṅs-dkar śel-dkar mchod-rten 'di-ñid la / bskal-bzaṅ gi saṅs-rgyas stoṅ-rtsa gñis kyi byin-gyis brlabs-pa'i gnas yin-ciṅ / mtsho-gter brgya daṅ brgyad kyi gter-kha yod gsuṅs-so / / 'di-ñid 'jig-rten dbul bsel-bar 'gyur-ba'i zhiṅ / gaṅs-chen g-yas g-yon nor-bu kha sbyor 'dra / 'dod dgu'i loṅs-spyod gter la spyod-pa'i rtags / mu-li'i rtse-mo bde-bar gśegs-pa'i zhiṅ / 'das-pa'i saṅs-rgyas rnams kyi byin-gyis brlabs / 'jambu-gliṅ du dṅos-grub thob-pa'i rtags rtse mo duṅ-dkar g-yas-khyil bzhugs-pa de / rnam

10 a dag sku-gsum kyi 'bras-bu smin-pa'i rtags / mu-li gaṅs-dkar phyogs-bzhi mtshams-brgyad la/gnas-mchog chen-po brgyad kyis bskor-nas yod / gnas-chuṅ graṅs ni sum-cu rtsa-bdun yod / de ni 'jig- rten loṅs-spyod thob-pa'i rtags / sked-pa sna-tshogs rdo-rje bzhugs 'dra ste / bar-chad bgegs rnams ma-lus 'joms-pa'i rtags / phyi-ni gaṅs-dkar naṅ-na gser gyi gña' śiṅ yod / de-yi naṅ-na gser gyi ka-ba spun-bdun yod / de gser gyi gter-kha'o / 'di ni 'jig-rten bde-skyid lo-phyugs legs-par 'gyur / phyi-ni gaṅs-dkar śel-gyis

b mchod-rten 'dra-ba la / naṅ-na yid-bzhin nor-bu ka-ma-ru'i gnas / rdzogs-pa'i saṅsrgyas kun gyi byin-gyis brlabs / mu-li gaṅs ni ri-bo mchog-rab yin / yid-bzhin nor-bu ka-ma-ru las sgrub / nor-bu lṅa-brgya gaṅs la bskor-nas yod-do gsuṅs / 'di ni 'jig-rten bdul-ba sel-bar 'gyur / phyogs-bzhi mi-'gyur-ba'i mchod-rten bzhi yod / 'di-ni 'gro-ba'i bsod-nams gsog-pa'i zhiṅ naṅ rten ston-pa'i zhabs-rjes la dgra bcom lṅa-brgya'i zhabs-rjes kyi bskor-nas yod gsuṅs / de ni 'gro-

11a drug sgrib-pa spyod-pa'i rten yin gsuṅs / slob-dpon padma'i dgoṅs-pa'i sgrub-phug daṅ / sgrub-chu phyag-rjes zhabs-rjes yod gsuṅs / khyad-par 'phags-pa'i mu-li gaṅs-dkar la / phyogs-bcu'i saṅs-rgyas kun gyi zhiṅ-khams tshaṅs rgyal-ba rigs-lṅa'i dbaṅ-bskur mdzad-pa'i gnas / saṅs rgyas *rnams par gzigs* daṅ / *gtsug-tor can* daṅ / *'khor-ba 'jigs* daṅ / *gser-thub* daṅ / *śā-kya thub-pa* rnams kyi byin-gyis brlabs / śar-phyogs bkra-śis duṅ daṅ / 'khor-lo gsal-

b bar yod / lho-phyogs ña daṅ bum-pa gsal-bar yod / nub-phyogs gdugs daṅ rgyal mtshan gsal-bar yod / byaṅ-phyogs padma dpal-dpe'i ri-mo gsal-bar yod / bkra-sis rtags-brgyad chaṅs-ba'i mu-li gaṅs-chen gnas/ 'di-ṅid byin-brlabs thugs rjes 'gro-ba yoṅs la khyab / 'jam-bu gliṅ da bde-skyid 'di las 'byuṅ-ṅo gsuṅs / śar gyi phyogs-na *rigs-gsum mgon-po* daṅ / *'jam-ser 'jam-nag* rnams kyi pho-braṅ yod / lho-phyogs *saṅs-rgyas sman-bla* daṅ *sgrol-ma'i* pho-braṅ yod / nub-phyogs

12a *rdo-rje phag-mo* daṅ *dpa'- bo mkha'-'gro'i* pho-braṅ yod / byaṅ-phyogs na *dpal 'khor-lo sdom-pa* daṅ *dpal mgon bdun-bcu rtsa-gñis* kyi pho-braṅ yod / rgya-gar grub thob thams-cad kyis byin gyis rlabs-pa'i gnas gsaṅ-ba'i brag-phug brgya-daṅ-brgyad yod / gsuṅ—khyad-par can 'phags-pa dpa'-bo mkha'-'gro'i tshogs-'khor bskor-bar yod / rtsa-ba lha-sruṅ kun gyi 'khor-lo bskor-ba yod/spaṅ-ri mtshams na rin-chen sna-lṅa tshaṅs pa'i g-yu mtsho sṅon mo yod / kha-ba ri'i mtshams-na ri wa mo chu-'thuṅ 'dra-ba bzhi

b la saṅs-rgyas rnams-kyis riṅs-srel daṅ / gaṅs-thig de'i naṅ na yod gsuṅs / de'i g-yon na saṅs-rgyas kyi khrus kyi rjiṅ-bu daṅ sgrub-chu yod / gaṅs-chen gyi 'gram-na mtsho dkar nag yod / mtsho dkar lug gi kho-mo skyal nas ñal 'dra yod-do / mtsho-nag g-yag chen rog-po ña lba 'dra de'i gnas-bdag chu-bya sṅon-po yod / de'i phu-na rgya-gar grub-thob rnams-kyis sgrub-chu yod / lho'i-phyogs na rin-chen gser gyi gter-kha yod / nub-phyogs na zaṅs kyi gter-kha yod / byaṅ-phyogs na gu-ru padmas sgrub-pa mdzad-pa'i guru gsaṅ-phug yod / gsaṅ-ba'i

13a sbas-luṅ yod / sku gsum (*sic*) thugs kyi gnas-gsum mu-li'i gaṅs 'dir tshaṅs yod /

ma-'oṅs sems-can skyabs-mgon thub-pa'i gnas / sprul-pa'i skyes-bu dam-pas gnas sgo 'byed / śar-phyogs nor-bu kha-sbyor 'dra-ba'i bar / 'bru-sna sna-tshogs lo-thog 'bras-bu smin / śiṅ sna-kun skyes me-tog sna tshogs 'khruṅs / gaṅs-chen mtho-ba mu-li rin-chen mdun / khyad-par 'phags-pa'i gu-ru gsaṅ-phug-can / brag ri rin-chen 'khyil 'dra'i gnas-chen la / sṅon-dus o-rgyan chen-pos sgrub-khaṅ du-mar mdzad

b ri-brag gaṅs mtsho'i gnas kun byin-gyis brlabs/yid-bzhin nor-bu gcoṅ-zhi raṅ-byon 'khruṅs / goṅ-mas byin rlabs khyad-du 'phags-pa'i gnas / gu-ru gsaṅ-phug gnas-chen de'i naṅ na / yid-bẓhin nor-bu rin-chen las grub-pa'i / rdo ka-ma-ru las grub pa'i ka-ba chen-po gcig btsugs-nas yod gsuṅs / de'i naṅ nas o-rgyan gu-ru mtshan-brgyad kyi dkyil-'khor brag la raṅ-byon sñam-par yod gsuṅs / de'i sgo la rdo-rje gya-gram gyi rgyas btab-pa yod-do gsuṅs / 'di la phyag-mchod 'bul-ba daṅ dkyil-'khor 'di la skor-ba lan-gcig rgyab daṅ zhal mjal-ba tsam gyi skal-

14a pa khri-khrag gcig gi sdig-sgrib dag-go gsuṅs-so / sdig-pa'i ñes ltuṅ sgrib-pa dag nas kyaṅ bcu-gsum rdo-rje 'dzin-pa'i sa thob gsuṅs / yar-ṅo'i tshes-pa 10 mar ṅo'i 25 la / sprul-pa'i skyes-mchog padma 'byuṅ-gnas dṅos-su 'byon / 'ja' mtshon sna-lṅa'i gur-khaṅ phug-pa 'dra / padma 'byuṅ-gnas dṅos-su bzhugs-pa'i gnas / de'i steṅ na g-yu 'brug sṅon-mo yod / glog-ltar 'khyugs-ciṅ 'brug ltar ldir-ldir bsgrogs / de'i g-yon-na khyuṅ nag raṅ-byon yod / sa-bdag klu gñan kha-gnon mdzad-zhiṅ du / de'i g-yas g-yon *sgrol ma'i* pho-braṅ yod /

b sñiṅ-nas gsol-ba 'debs nus-na / bsams-pa'i don-rnams ma-lus 'grub-po gsuṅs / de'i naṅ na *bde-mchog dkyil-'khor* raṅ-byon yod / de'i bar na *thugs-rje chen-po'i* pho-braṅ yod / de'i steṅ na *saṅs-rgyas sman-bla'i* pho-braṅ yod / de'i log la *zhi-khro'i* pho-braṅ yod / dus-gsum saṅs-rgyas kun gyi byin-gyis brlabs-pa'i gnas / gu-ru padma'i sgrub-chu bdud-rtsi yod / 'das-pa'i saṅs-rgyas *thugs-rje'i* byin-rlabs kyis / 'ja' 'od 'khyil-zhiṅ bdud-rtsi'i khrus-chu 'bab / chu 'di' thuṅ-ba tsam gyi tshe-rabs bsags-pa'i sdig-sgrib dag-par gsuṅs / gsaṅ-phug

15a chen-po'i sgo'i phyi-rol du / *rgyal-chen bzhi* ni sgo-bsruṅs bka' ñan mdzad / sgo 'grams g-yas-su mkha'- 'gro rme-brtsegs kyi khrus-chu 'babs / grib daṅ mi-gtsaṅ las ñon dag-par gsuṅs / sgo 'grams g-yon na khro-bo bdud-tsi 'khyil-ba'i khrus-chu babs / ñams grib skyon gyi phog-tshad dag-par gsuṅs / chos-skyoṅ *tshogs-bdag* 'jigs-pa'i tshul-du bzhugs / sgo 'grams g-yas na *rta-mgrin* me 'bar daṅ / phyogs-skyoṅ gnod-sbyin *khro-bo lcam sriṅ* yod / bar-chad bgegs-rnams ma-lus 'joms-par gsuṅs / de'i naṅ na chos-duṅ g-yas khyil

b raṅ-byon yod / dus-gsum bde-gśegs rnams-kyis mchod-duṅ yin / de'i phyi la chu-mig huṃ-sgra'i skad rgyun-chad med-par thos-pa cig yod/huṃ gi chu-sgra thos-pa rtsam gyi kyaṅ byaṅ-chub thob-par gsuṅs / phyi naṅ gsaṅ gsum gnas-chen thams-cad la / phyogs-bcu'i saṅs-rgyas kun gyi rab-gnas mdzad / o-rgyan gu-ru'i sgrub gnas gsaṅ-ba'i gsaṅ-phug gsaṅ-chen la / rgyal-ba rigs-lṅa'i dbaṅ-bskur rgyun chad med / rdo ka-ma-ru'i nor-bu kha-sbyor yod / de'i naṅ na bram-ze skye-ba bdun-pa'i sgrub-chu rgyun-du babs / bdud-rtsi'i chu-'di lan-cig 'thuṅ-bas kyaṅ / tshe-gcig

16a lus gcig la saṅs-rgyas thob-par gsuṅs-so / de'i g-yas na dkar-gsal ma'i nu-ma 'dra-bu la / de'i naṅ-na chu-mig byaṅ-chub bdud rtsi'i chu rgyun-du babs-pa yod gsuṅs / bdud-rtsi'i chu hub-gcig 'thuṅ-pas kyaṅ sñiṅ-rje byaṅ-chub sems mchog skye-bar 'gyur-ro gsuṅs / de'i steṅ-na seṅ-ge 'dra-ba'i pha-boṅ yod / de'i naṅ na saṅs-rgyas sman-bla'i sgrub-chu rgyun-du 'babs / rluṅ mkhris bad-kan 'dus-pa'i nad-rnams zhig gyur gsuṅs / de'i g-yon na mgon-po *tshe dpag med* kyi tshe-bum 'dra-ba yod / tshe-bum naṅ na tshe-chu—

b rgyun-du babs / bdud-rtsi lan-cig 'thuṅ-bas kyaṅ 'chi med tshe'i rig-' dzin thob-par gsuṅs / de'i steṅ-du rdo pha-boṅ dkar nag dmar gsum yod gsuṅs / de la *rigs-gsum mgon-po'i* sgrub-chu rgyun-du babs / bdud-rtsi chu-rgyun lan-cig 'thuṅ-bas kyaṅ shes-rab daṅ sñiṅ-rje'i mthu-stobs can du 'gyur / de'i g-yon na *bya-khyuṅ* 'dra-ba yod-do gsuṅs / de'i naṅ-na *rje-btsun sgrol-ma* ñer-gcig gi bdud-rtsi'i sgrub-chu byin-rlabs rgyun-du babs / sgrub-chu lan-cig 'thuṅ-ba cam kyis kyaṅ rkyen-ṅan bar-chad mi mthun bzlog-pa yin / bsam don lhun gyi 'grub-

17a po gsuṅs / de'i naṅ na yid-bzhin nor-bu rdo ka-ma-ru'i *maṇḍala* lṅa rtsam yod gsuṅs / de'i naṅ na gsaṅ-ba'i brag-phug lṅa tsam yod gsuṅs / de'i naṅ na saṅs-rgyas *rnam-par gzigs* daṅ / *gtsug-gtor can* daṅ / *'khor-ba 'jig* gsum gyi riṅ-bsrel sku-gduṅs daṅ gaṅs-thig byin-rlabs can daṅ / srаṅ gaṅ las mi ñuṅ ba re gaṅs-chen bzhi la yod-do gsuṅs / de'i naṅ na gsaṅ-ba'i brag-phug lṅa tsam yod-pa nas / gsaṅ-phug gcig gi naṅ na mda' rgyaṅ-gaṅ tsam 'gro-ba na / rdo ka-ma-ru'i ka-ba-brgyad kyi stegs-pa'i

b gsaṅ-phug chen-po yod gsuṅs / de'i naṅ na saṅs-rgyas kyi sprul-pa sku stoṅ-rtsa gñis-ma bzheṅs lhun-gyi grub-pa raṅ-byon byin-rlabs can gyi rten yod gsuṅs / de na mchod-pa'i lha-mo rnams kyis phyag daṅ mchod-pa rgyun mi-chad-par yod gsuṅs / dus-bzaṅ tshes-bzaṅ zhag-bzaṅ rnams la duṅ daṅ rol-mo'i sgra skad 'don-pa sems-can kun gyi rna-bar thos des yod gsuṅs-so / *rdo-rje phag-mos* byin-gyis brlabs-pa'i gnas dus-gsum bde-gśegs saṅs-rgyas kun-gyi yum / *rdo-rje phag-mo'i* gsaṅ-ba'i bha-gā nas bdud-rtsi char-ltar

18a 'babs-pa'i gnas / 'das-pa'i saṅs-rgyas rnams daṅ goṅ-ma kun gyi byin gyis brlabs-pa'i gnas khyad-par 'phags pa'i gsaṅ-ba'i phug gnas-chen bdag-sogs mkha' sñams pha-ma sems-can kun-gyi sñiṅ-nas dad-mos gus-pas gsol-ba btab-na 'od-zer sna-lṅas 'khrig-pa'i khrus-chu babs / de la khrus gsol yaṅ yaṅ sus byed kyaṅ tshe-rabs bsags-pa'i sdig-sgrib dag-go gsuṅs / de'i g-yon na dpa'-bo mkha'- 'gro-ma'i khrus-chu dṅos-su yod / mkha'-' gro'i sgrub-chu la

b lus khrus sus byed-kyaṅ / ñams grib skyon gyis phog-pa dag-go gsuṅs / phyi naṅ g-yu'i ka-ba 'dra-ba yod naṅ ni śel-kyi bum-pa'i naṅ du *rdo-rje rnam 'joms* kyis khrus su dṅos-su 'babs / bdud-rtsi chu'i khrus gsol sus mdzad-pa / mi-gcaṅ grib daṅ ñon moṅs dag-par gsuṅs / gu-ru'i gsaṅ phug khrus-chu bsam-gyis mi-khyab ñi-ma śar khar 'ja'-'od me-'bar 'khruṅs / 'od-zer sna-lṅa'i 'ja' 'od gur-khaṅ phubs-pa 'dra-ba yod padma 'byuṅ-gnas dṅos-su bzhugs-pa'i gnas ye-śes lha-tshogs ye-śes dṅos-su bzhugs / sems-can

19a rnams kyis las-ṅan sdig-sgrib sbyoṅs phyir-du / dad-ldan mos gus-can rnams kyis phyag daṅ mchod-pa 'bul-ba'i rten yin-no / gnas khyad-par 'phags-pa'i gu-ru gsaṅ-phug dben-pa'i gnas / 'di la sgrub-pa sus mdzad-pa rnams rtogs-pa goṅ-du 'phel-lo gsuṅs / gu-ru gsaṅ-phug la bsgom kyi ñams-rtogs sems-kyis raṅ-zhal mthoṅ / raṅ-zhal mthoṅ-bas sñiṅ rje'i 'od-gsal 'khruṅs sems ñid stoṅ gsal raṅ-'byuṅ ye-śes mthoṅ / sgom-pa'i 'od-gsal rgyun chad med-par yoṅs gsuṅs

b zhes gsuṅs-so / gaṅs-chen gsaṅ-phug 'di la phyag-mchod bkur-bsti sus 'bul-ba / phan yon bsam-gyi mi khyab brjod-kyi mi ldaṅ graṅs kyi mi chod-pa yin gsuṅs-so / gu-ru gsaṅ-phug sus mjal-ba-daṅ mchod-pa 'bul-ba thams-cad tshe-rabs bsags-pa'i sdig-sgrib dag nas byaṅ-chub thob-par gsuṅs-so / maṇḍala sus 'bul-ba phyi-ma saṅs-rgyas kyis 'bras-bu thob / tshogs-'khor sus 'bul-ba thams-cad / ṅan soṅ 'khor-ba'i sgo bcad-par gyur-ro / sñiṅ nas gsol-'debs smon-lam

20a sus btab-pa / gu-ru ṅa la mjal-ba daṅ dbyer-med gsuṅs / o-rgyan gu-ru'i byin-gyis brlabs-pa'i gnas / dad-ldan gus-pas gsol-ba sus 'debs-pa / sdig-pa'i las-rnams myur-du dag-nas kyaṅ saṅs-mdog-dpal kyi ri-bor skye-bar the-tshom med-par gsuṅs-so / gaṅs rin-chen 'khyil-ba'i gsaṅ-phug goṅ-mas byin-gyis brlabs-pa'i thugs-rje kyi / ñi-ma śar-ba sṅa la khams bsaṅ-ba'i gnas / śiṅ-sna sna-tshogs 'joms-pa'i me-tog 'khruṅs / bya-skad bsñan-pa'i gsuṅ bsñan sna-tshogs sgrog / g-yas g-yon

b g-yu mdog spaṅ-ri sman-sna 'jom / mdun-na mtsho-mo g-yu yi maṇḍal la / klu'i rgyal po *gtsug-na rin-chen* bzhugs / 'khor-du klu-phran gsum-brgya bskor-ba'i gnas / de'i naṅ-na sems-can duṅ daṅ ña mo la-sogs pa yod / chu-rta chu-g-yag chu-glaṅ 'dus-pa'i mtsho nags-tshal lcags-ri-mo khyul tshul du bskor / *bśos gaṅs mtsho na* klu'i pho-braṅ gnas / gaṅs-chen gu-ru gsaṅ-phug 'di-ñid la / rgyun chad med-pa-i yon-tshab 'di mtsho daṅ gtsaṅ-chu gñis kyi phul / gu-ru gsaṅ phug la bdag (brjun can-pa) nub-gcig ñal-ba'i rmi lam

21a du / mi rta-dkar gcig la chibs-te / ras-dkar dri-ma med-pa'i gos gyon-pa dar-dkar gyi thod bciṅs-pa rgyan daṅ ldan-pa phyag g-yas mduṅ-dar bsnams-pa / 'khor maṅ-pos bskor-ba-zhig yoṅs-nas bdag laph yag-'chal du byas-nas / khyed kyi bdag la gtor-ma re rgyun-du gnaṅ-rog mdzod / ṅes kyaṅ zhabs-tog du gaṅ-'grub byed-do zer / mi de nam-mkhar 'ja' yal-ba ltar soṅ-ṅo / ṅes sems-pa la gaṅ yin-nam sñam-pa ci-byuṅ zhiṅ / 'jug-du de ni gaṅs daṅ gsaṅ-phug gñis kyi lha btsan gzhi-bdag yin-par 'dug-pas / de'i rten- 'brel yin-nam / thag-yul du de tsam sdaṅ kyaṅ na-tsha med-ciṅ mthun rkyen 'joms-pa

b byuṅ-ṅo / gaṅs-chen daṅ gu-ru gsaṅ-phug gñis nas gdaṅ draṅs-pa'i / sna-ri jo-bo zhes-bya-ba yid-bzhin nor bu'i rdo ka-ma-ru las 'khruṅs-śiṅ / rdo la ma-bzheṅs raṅ-byuṅ lhun-grub yin / ṅo-bo raṅ-'byuṅ 'phags-pa *spyan-ras-gzigs* sñiṅ-rjes 'gro-ba rigs-drug kun la gzigs / ma-'oṅs sems-can rnams kyi sdig-sgrib sbyor-ba'i rten-cig yin-no / de la sus phyag daṅ mchod-pa phul-ba daṅ / zhal mjal-ba'i mi-rnams ṅan-soṅ gnas-su skye gyur-na / na-rag-kan gsuṅs-ba mkha' 'gro'i luṅ bstan-pa'o / gaṅs-chen daṅ gsaṅ-phug jo-bo 'di gsum la 'jam-bu-gliṅ

22a gis gnas-kun 'di la chaṅs / gnas- 'di gsum thugs-rje'i byin-rlabs ṅo-mtshar 'phags-pa'i gnas / śiṅ-sna kun skyes 'bru sna-tshogs-par smin / mu-ge mi yoṅs loṅs-spyod phun-sum-tshogs / bdud-rtsi chaṅ gi loṅs-spyod mi-chad gsuṅs / '*bum-gter* gaṅs zhes-bya-ba la / gu-ru'i zhabs-rjes bzhag-pa'i rdo yod gsuṅs / 'gro-drug sems-can sdig-sgrib sbyaṅs-pa'i rten yin gsuṅs /k!u-yul rgya-mtsho'i gtiṅ nas skyes pa'i yid-bzhin nor-bu'i rdo yod gsuṅs / 'di

b la gsol-ba btab nas mjal-ba tsam-gyis kyaṅ / sde-brgyad kyi gnod-pa kun las grol bar gsuṅs so / raṅ 'byuṅ gzhi'i-lha yin mdor-bsdus-tsam zhig bstan pa ni / gaṅs-chen 'di'i nub phyogs na *śiṅ-rtsa-spa-ti* zhes bya-ba la / '*jum glaṅ* chos-rgyal rin-po-che'i pho braṅ gi śar-phyogs na / tsandan dkar dmar kyi sdoṅ-po gñis yod-pa'i sa na / steṅ dga'-ldan lha'i yul nas lha'i *dbaṅ-po rgya-byin* daṅ / lha *chaṅs-pa chen-po* gñis gyis mi-yul du sems-can gyi 'gro don byed-dgos thugs la dgoṅs-nas su / 'byuṅ-ba zhi-ba'i lha-rnams

23a 'od-gsal lha'i yul nas / nam-mkha'i dbyiṅs-nas phebs-ste nub *śiṅ-rtsa-spa-ti*'i tsandan dkar dmar gyi sdoṅ-po gñis ye-śes-pa'i lha-rnams thim-nas / sṅar yoṅs-pa'i 'o-ma da-lta mi-' oṅs-ba 'dug-pa / gaṅ yin-nam sñam-pa byuṅ-ba ni / 'o-ma yaṅ-na mi'i brkus-pa yin-nam byas pas / ba-mo rnams kyi rjes-su mi su soṅ blta-ru phyin-pas / ba-mo rnams ni tsandan gyi sdoṅ-po gñis kyi rtsa-ba la / lan gñis gsum rtsam phyin-pa mthoṅ-zhiṅ / 'o-na mi-yi 'o-ma brkus-pa ma-yin-pas / tsandan kyi sdoṅ-po gñis la sbyin

b pa yin-pas / de-yi sdoṅ-po gñis la gaṅ yod-pa yin-nam sñam-nas / tsandan kyi sdoṅ-po gñis-kar bcad-tsa na / lha-mo maṅ-po yod-pa las / la la 'od nam mkha'i dbyiṅs-su gśegs / la la tsandan gyi sdoṅ-po gñis la ye-śes kyi-lha-rnams thim-nas bzhugs-so / nub-mo gñid kyi rmi-lam la 'byuṅ-ba zhi-ba'i lha-rnams dṅos-su mjal-nas / gsol-ba btab-pa'i mi-rnams kyis / bsam-pa'i don-rnams lhun gyi 'grub-bar 'gyur-ro gsuṅs-so / lha la mchod-pa phul-ba'i bkod-gñer zhig yod pa las / de'i rmi-lam du lhas luṅ

24a bstan-nas / śar-phyogs thag zhes-bya-ba'i luṅ-pa cig yod gsuṅs / de la ṅa'i gdul-bya 'gro don yod gsuṅs / de na ṅa'i 'dul-bskal yod gsuṅs / bkod-gñer gyi rmi-lam du luṅ bstan-nas / bka' bgros byas-nas mtshams-pa'o / 'o-na śar-phyogs thag zhes-bya-bar 'gro-na 'byuṅ-ba bzhi'i lha-rnams gdan 'dren bya-dgos gsuṅs-so / de-nas lam btsal das 'oṅ-tsa na / śar-phyogs thag zhes-bya-ba'i luṅ-pa la phebs / sgrub-pa'i tshe thag zhes-bya-ba'i yul kyi dbyibs ni /

b nor-bu kha-sbyor 'dra-ba 'dug / de'i naṅ-na śiṅ sna kun gyi nags tshal bsam-gyis mi-khyab pa 'dug / nags-tshal de'i naṅ-na mi dred daṅ stag-gzig dom daṅ dug-sbrul la-sogs-pa maṅ-du yod kyaṅ 'dir bsdus-nas zaṅs-yig du bris yod-pas / kun-gyi gzigs-par zhu lags-so / gnas-gzhan rnams mjal-nas gaṅs-chen gsaṅ-phug jo-bo gsum ma-mjal-ba / 'og rta'i rkaṅ-pa chag-pa daṅ 'dra ste / gzhan yaṅ gos la go-ṅa med-pa daṅ rkaṅ-zlum rgya-yul 'gro-ba daṅ 'dra-bas byin-rlabs mi 'dug-go

25a gnas-chen de-gsum la gsol-ba sñiṅ-nas btab-nas mjal-ba gal che'o / gaṅs-chen gsaṅ-phug gñis kyi gnas-yig rdzogs-so // zhu-dag chos-'di stag-lo dgon-par bzhugs-so / /

22

Dharmapadas of Various Buddhist Schools

KŌGEN MIZUNO

1. dhammapada and Dhammapada

What does the word dhammapada of the *Dhammapada* mean?
The Pāli Dictionary by PTS says :

a line of stanza of the Dhamma
a sentence containing an ethical aphorism

In the *Pāli Nikāya* the word "dhammapada" is used more than ten times in the singular and plural numbers. The "dhammapada" is thought to have been the general term before the *Dhammapada* was completed. Such dhammapada seems, therefore to have had the more broad and general meaning than that of the *Dhammapada.*

Now what does the word "dhammapada" of the *Dhammapada* mean? We can realize some of the Western thoughts about this through the English or German translation of the *Dhammapada.*

English translation;

Path of Virtue
Way of Virtue
Hymns of the Faith.

German translation;

Worte der Wahrheit
Der Wahrheitsphad

Der Phad der Wahrheit
Der Phad der Lehre
Das hohe Lied der Wahrheit.

The right translation of *dhamma* here is, I think, virtue, faith, truth, and doctrine. And *pada* is path, way, worte, hymn and lied. "path" and "way" are the literal translation of *pada*; "Worte" means "Word and phrase"; "hymn" and "lied" may be the liberal translation of *pada*. It will be improper to take the *pada* of *dhammapada* for "path" or "way". This *pada* means "word and phrase" or "passage" in a broad sense; and in a narrow each line of the *gāthā* (verse) of the four or six lines. In prose, we can safely say, this *pada* means "Worte"; in verse, "hymn" and "lied".

The *Dhammapada* was collaborately translated into Chinese by Chih-ch'ien (-223-), Wei-ch'i-nan and Chu-chiang-yen about 1,750 years ago—the first half of the third century. Its introduction, whose writer is unknown but probably Chih-ch'ien, gives a detailed explanation about how the *Dhammapada* was translated and says that *Dhammapada* comes from dhamma-words—*sūtras* expounded by the Buddha Śākya-muni. It also says at its beginning that the *Dhammapada* is the versified dhamma-phrase, which shows the key essence of *sūtras*.

It is unclear when the *Dhammapadas* were completed. But seeing that they were handed down, as I will mention later, by various Buddhist schools, they stemmed, I think, from the primitive Buddhist age before the Buddhist schools were divided, though their contents varied with the Buddhist schools.

The above introduction of the *Dhammapada* by Chih-ch'ien says in the first half: *Dhammapada-gāthā* is the key essence of *sūtras*. *Dhamma* is the Law; *Pada* is phrases [gāthās, or verses]—There are several *Dhammapadas* which contain 500, 700 and 900 verses. They were sometimes versified, when affairs occurred, by the Buddha Śākyamuni, not made at a time. The affairs which explain in what circumstance each verse is expressed are found in several *sūtras*."

"The Buddha is endowed with the universal wisdom and a great merciful heart for all the world. He appears in this world and expounds them the essence of the way, leading them to enlightenment. The essence of his teachings is classified as *dvādaśa-aṅga-śāsana* (twelve parts of scripture), besides the four kinds of *Āgamas*. After the Buddha's death Ānanda transmitted *sūtras*, large and small, by describing '*Evam mayā śrutam*' (Thus by me heard) and the Buddha's whereabouts and his teachings."

"Hereafter, monks of the five schools each took the verses of the four or six lines out of *sūtras* and classified its essence into *varga* (chapter). They considered the name of this 'collection of verses' compared with *dvādaśa-aṅga-śāsana*. However, unable to find there the fitting name, they called it *Dhammapada*."—*Taishō*, vol. 4 (210) p. 566b; vol. 55, p. 49c.

This shows that the verses of the *Dhammapada* were a collection of the Buddha's occasional sermons in *sūtras*. Collected by monks of the five schools, *Dhammapada* had contained verses of different numbers—namely 500, 700 or 900 verses—according to schools. The five schools are: I) Sarvāstivāda, 2) Mahāsaṁghika (Lokottaravāda), 3) Mahīśāsaka, 4) Dharmaguptaka and 5) Kāśyapīya which were in the north-

western district of India (now Pakistan). They are often used as the representatives of Buddhist schools. Chih-ch'ien says that the *Dhammapada* was compiled after the five schools were divided. Indeed, the existing *Dhammapada* may have been finally compiled by each of the five schools, but the original was perhaps formed in the primitive Buddhist age before they appeared, for many other schools than Sarvāstivāda transmitted the *Dhammapadas* in the same name. Chih-ch'ien justly says that the use of a general term "*Dhammapada*" (Skt. *Dharmapada*) is due to lack of its fitting name.

In any case, it is true that the *Dhammapada* was compiled and called after *dvādaśa-aṅga-śāsana* and the four kinds of *Āgamas* were completed. The names and classifications of the nine or twelve parts of scripture and the four kinds of *Āgamas* seem to have been transmitted by all the Buddhist schools. It is unclear, however, whether the *Dhammapadas* were transmitted and preserved by them all. Sarvāstivāda alone, as I mentioned before, never named the *Dhammapada* (*Dharmapada*), but transmitted one equivalent to the *Dhammapada* of other schools by the name of *Udāna* or *Udāna-varga*.

It is not clear why the Sarvāstivādins did so. Probably because they intended to identify the *Dhammapada* with *Udāna* in the twelve parts of scripture. In Pāli Buddhism, however, the *Udāna* is separated from the *Dhammapada*. Really the second of the 15 works of the *Khuddaka-nikāya* in Pāli contains the *Dhammapada*, and the third, the *Udāna*. The *Udānavarga* of Sarvāstivāda, however, corresponds to the *Udāna* in Pāli, the *Dhammapada* and many other gāthās. We can, therefore, safely call the *Udānavarga* the *Udāna* or the *Dhammapada*.

The *Ta-chih-tu-lun* (Mahāprajñāpāramitā-nirdeśa) defines the *Udāna* in the twelve parts of scripture as follows :

"After the Buddha's death his disciples collected important gāthās, making 'the gāthās of transience' into the *Anityavarga* and so on or making 'the gāthās of Brāhmaṇa' into the *Brāhmaṇavarga*. They called the vargas the *Udāna*."—*Taishō*, vol. 25 (1509) p. 307 af.

This statement seemingly means the *Udānavarga* of Sarvāstivāda. This also corresponds to the next explanation of the *Udāna* of the twelve parts of scripture in the *Ch'u-yao-ching* :

"*Ch'u-yao*" (*udāna*) comes from the fact that they took the essence of the sūtras from the *Anityavarga* to the *Brāhmaṇavarga* and expounded it for people in future."—*Taishō*, vol. 4 (212) p. 643c.

And also the above corresponds to the next passage of the *Udānavarga* of Sarvāstivāda which the Venerable Dharmatrāta is said to have compiled in the *Ta-p'i-p'o-so-lun* (*Mahāvibhāṣa-śāstra*).

"The Buddha-bhagavat gave occasional sermons to various people in several places. After his death the Venerable Dharmatrāta, hearing of his teachings here and there, gradually compiled them and gave various names of *vargas* : collecting the verses of transience, named them *Anitya-varga*—and so on; verses of Brāhmaṇa, named *Brāhmaṇa-varga*."—*Taishō*, vol. 27(1545) p.1b.

Here Dharmatrāta (2ct. A.D.) is one of the four Ābhidharmikas in the *Ta-p'i-p'o-so-lun*. He is thought to have compiled the *Udānavarga* of Sarvāstivāda consisting of 33 chapters over 900 gāthās. We can suppose, however, that its original existed and

was transmitted in some form before him. Before and after him the *Udānavarga* was altered. It is known by the fact that the existing *Udānavargas* are various in kinds and different in detailed parts.

In any case, the Buddhist schools except Sarvāstivāda had transmitted the gāthās by the name of the *Dharmapada*. Where did they collect the above from? As Chih-ch'ien, the *Ch'u-yao-ching* and the *Ta-p'i-p'o-so-lun* stated, they selected the golden gāthās from various sūtras. In the existing sūtras, however, we cannot find about half of the gāthās which the *Dharmapada* contains. To make this point more clear, let me see how many of 423 gāthās in the Pāli *Dhammapada* are found in the five kinds of *Nikāyas* and *Vinaya-piṭaka* of the existing Pāli canon. Here allow me to show the conclusion alone.

First, among the 423 gāthās of the Pāli *Dhammapada*, the next, excluding doubled ones, are found in the existing primitive scripture, such as the four kinds of *Āgamas*, *Khuddaka-nikāya* or *Vinaya-piṭaka*.

1. 55 gāthās in the four kinds of *Nikāyas* in Pāli.
2. 31 in the *Suttanipāta* (except the above, about doubled ones, the same is also the case with the below).
3. 27 in the *Theragāthā*.
4. 24 in the other scriptures (*Itivuttaka*, *Udāna*, *Apadāna*, *Niddesa*, *Petavatthu* and *Vinaya*)

They are 137 in all, less than one-third of 423 gāthās. The other over two-thirds seems to have been collected from losing sūtras.

Now for reference, let me select the number of other gāthās of the *Dhammapada* than the above 137 out of Pāli records except the three *Piṭakas*.

5. 17 gāthās in the works (*Peṭakopadesa*, *Nettipakaraṇa*, *Milindapañha*) previous to commentary books.
6. 27 in the *Jātaka-aṭṭhakaṭhā*.
7. 15 in the other commentary books (with *Visuddhi-magga*).

They are 59 in all. Perhaps some of them were quoted from the *Dhammapada* itself, but others seem to have been independently transmitted.

Further, in the primitive scriptures—*Āgamas* and *Vinaya-piṭaka* in Chinese—which other Buddhist schools transmitted, I found 20 other gāthās than the above 196 (137+59), equivalent to those of the *Dhammapada* in Pāli, and 9 ones common with commentary books. At least, the 20 gāthās are not found in Pāli records, but correspond to those of the *Dhammapada* in Pāli. The primitive scriptures of other schools contain considerably new sources which will be ranked to the Pāli commentary books. They are *Ekottaraāgama* or *Mūlasarvāstivāda-vinaya* in Chinese.

In commentary books and the earlier works *Peṭakopadesa*, *Nettipakaraṇa*, *Milinda-pañha* outside of *Tipiṭaka*, there are statements and articles which we cannot find in the primitive sūtras, such as the four kinds of *Nikāyas* in Pāli. So I think some of them were transmitted somewhere from ancient times.

It may be said in this connection that the *Milindapañha* quotes 47 gāthās as the teachings of the Buddha or his disciples which we can not find in the existing *Nikāyas* in Pāli. And we have other gāthās quoted in the *Milindapañha*, which are not found

in the primitive sūtras, but found in commentary books in Pāli; we can find 14 gāthàs in the *Jātaka-aṭṭhakathā* and 4 in the *Dhammapada-aṭṭhakathā*. The above 65 (47+14+4) gāthās cannot be found in the existing canon in Pāli, but they must have been transmitted in some form somewhere as the teachings of the Buddha or his disciples.

The considerable number of these gāthās is now probably lost, except a few left in records outside of *Tripiṭaka* or in commentary books in Pāli. In any case, the above 196 gāthās which are found in the existing Pāli text and 20 gāthās corresponding to the Pāli *Dhammapada-gāthās* which are found in Chinese version amount to 216 gāthās. They are about half of the Pāli *Dhammapada* 423 gāthās. We can suppose, therefore, that some of the Buddha's teachings are now left in the primitive sūtras and others are considerably lost.

On the other hand, however, many of the gāthās in the Pāli *Dhammapada* which are not traced to the present canon are often found in the existing *Dharmapadas* of other Buddhist schools. This shows that the *Dharmapadas* of various Buddhist schools are commonly the collection of gāthās extracted from the existing and losing sūtras or teachings.

2. The Dharmapadas in Buddhist Literature

That the *Dharmapadas* were transmitted by the Buddhist schools is known not only by their existing *Dharmapadas* but also by their names and gāthās quoted in the existing Buddhist literature. In this section, therefore, let me think about the names and gāthās of the *Dharmapadas* which I have hitherto found, apart from those which I have overlooked.

[Theravāda] First, Theravāda has the perfect *Dhammapada* in Pāli. Indeed the name and gāthās of it are very often quoted, but there is no need of telling about this. Nevertheless, in Pāli Buddhism the *Dhammapada* is collected in the 15 works of the *Khuddaka-nikāya*; even in other Buddhist schools it seems to have been gleaned in the *Kṣudraka-āgama* or *Kṣudraka-piṭaka*.

[Dharmaguptaka]. As for Dharmaguptaka, the *Ssū-fèn-lü* (*Vinayapiṭaka* of this Buddhist school), Fasc. 54 says in explanation of *Kṣudraka-piṭaka*:

1. *Jātaka*. 2. *Itivṛttaka*, 3. *Nidāna*, 4. *Vaipulya*, 5. *Adbhutadharma*, 6. *Avadāna*, 7. *Upadeśa*, 8. *Arthavargīya*, 9. *Dharmapada*, 10. *Pārāyaṇa*, 11. *Nānā-praśnā ?* 12. *Muni-gāthā* or *Sthavira-gāthā*. They are all *Kṣudraka-piṭaka—Taishō*, vol. 22(1428) p. 968b. It shows the *Dharmapada* as the 9th of the 12 works of *Kṣudraka-piṭaka*. The first 7 belong to the twelve parts of scripture. As for the twelve parts of scripture in Dharmaguptaka, the *Ssū-fèn-lü*, Fasc. I says :

1. *Sūtra*, 2. *Geya*; 3. *Vyākaraṇa*, 4. *Gāthā*, 5. *Udāna*, 6. *Nidāna* (3), 7. *Jātaka* (1), 8. *Itivṛttaka* (2), 9. *Vaipulya* (4), 10. *Adbhutadharma* (5) 11. *Avadāna* (6), 12. *Upadeśa* (7)—*Taishō*, Ibid. p. 569b.

Among them, seven parts shown by parentheses correspond to those of *Kṣudraka-piṭaka*. Five works after the 8th are beyond the twelve parts of scripture.

Among them, 8. *Arthavargīya* corresponds to the *Aṭṭhakavagga*, Chap. 4 of *Suttanipāta*; 10. *Pārāyaṇa*, to the *Pārāyaṇavagga* of *Suttanipāta*, Chap. 5; 11. *Nānā-praśnā* (various questions), the first three chapters of *Suttanipāta* have 16 sūtras in question and

answer. *Nānā-praśnā* may be equivalent to any of these questioning sūtras. If so, it follows that the above 8, 10, 11 works correspond to some of *Suttanipāta*. And if 12 means *Muni-gāthā*, it is equivalent to some of *Suttanipāta*; if *Sthaviragāthā*, to 8. *Theragāthā* of the Pāli *Khuddakanikāya*. Furthermore, 9 *Dharmapada* is added. This is about the *Dharmapada* in the *Ssū-fên-lü*.

The *Dharmapada* in Dharmaguptaka, besides the *Ssū-fên-lü*, is expounded also in the *P'i-ni-mu-ching* (*Vinayamātṛkā*), Fasc. 3 to explain *Kṣudraka-piṭaka* :

"*Dharmapada*, *Arthavargīya* and *Pārāyaṇa*, etc., compose the *Kṣudraka-piṭaka*."—*Taishō*, vol. 24 (1463) p. 818a.

It shows only three works and omits others. This seems to be similar to the *Ssū-fên-lü*. This tells us that Dharmaguptakās transmitted the *Dharmapada* as one of the *Kṣudraka-piṭaka*.

Next, also in the *Pieh-i-tsa-a-han-ching* (another version of *Samyukta-āgama*), vol. 15 (sūtra 320) belonging to *Dharmaguptaka* or *Mahīśāsaka* we can find the name of the *Dharmapada*, along with *Pārāyaṇa* and *Sthavira-gāthā*. This sūtra 320 says that in the *Kuei-tsū-mu-kung* of Magadha state when Anuruddha got up early at midnight and chanted the gāthās of the *Dharmapada*, *Pārāyaṇa* and *Sthavira-gāthā*, sitting upright, a yakṣiṇī expounded the gāthās for her son. Thereafter we can find the phrase "I hear a monk chant the gāthās of *Dharmapada*" repeated thrice.—*Taishō*, vol. 2 (100) p. 480cf.

However, this corresponds to sūtras of the Pāli *Saṁyuttanikāya* and the Chinese *Tsa-a-ham* (*Samyukta-āgama*). The former is the sūtra 6 "*Piyaṅkara*" (S.i, p. 209) of X. *Yakkha-saṁyutta*. There Anuruddha is noted as being in the Jetavana Anāthapiṇḍikassa ārāma of Sāvatthī, different from the *Kuei-tsū-mu-kung* of Magadha stated in the *Pieh-i-tsa-a-han-ching* and the *Tsa-a-ham-ching*. And also yakkhinī's *gāthā* is expressed "*bhikkhu dhammapadāni bhāsati*". This *dhammapadāni* means, I think, the general name of *dhammapada*, not the proper name of the *Dhammapada*. From a historical viewpoint, there cannot have been the *Dhammapada* in the Buddha's lifetime. Accordingly, it was impossible that Anuruddha chanted the *Dhammapada*. We should think, therefore, that a yakkhinī's *dhammapadāni* are the general words and that the gāthās of *Dharmapada* in the above *Pieh-i-tsa-a-han-ching* originally never means the *Dharmapada*.

We cannot, therefore, think, from the historical view-point, that the gāthās of *Dharmapada*, *Pārāyaṇa* and *Sthaviragāthā* in the *Pieh-i-tsa-a-han-ching* were completed when this *Dharmapada* was expounded. The source of this sūtra seems to have been only considered *dharmapadāni* as in the *Saṁyutta-nikāya*.

Also in the *Pieh-i-tsa-han-ching* (sūtra 184), Fasc. 9 we find a story expounded by the Buddha : a faithful Buddhist merchant got up early in the morning and loudly chanted the *Dharmapada*, *Pārāyaṇa* and various sūtra-gāthās, sitting upright.—*Taishō*, vol. 2 (100) p. 439c. Here the *Dharmapada* and *Pārāyaṇa* are the same as in the previous sūtra 320, but 'various sūtra-gāthās' are different from *Sthavira-gāthā* in the sūtra 320. Perhaps the two Sūtras were well known as famous in the Mahīśasaka and Dharmaguptaka—of course, not in the Buddha's lifetime, but in the time of Buddhist Schools after his death. In any case, the *Pieh-i-tsa-a-han-ching* seems to have been kin to the *Ssū-fên-lü* or *P'i-ni-mu-ching* of the above Dharmaguptaka in that it contained the *Dharmapada* among the *Kṣudraka-piṭaka*.

[Sarvāstivāda]. The Chinese *Samyukta-āgama*, Fasc. 49 (sūtra 321) corresponds to the previous sūtras of the *Pieh-i-tsa-a-han-ching* (sūtra 320) and the *Saṁyutta-nikāya* (X, 6). It says that Anuruddha chanted the next sūtras in the Yakṣiṇī abode :

1. *Udāna*,
2. *Pārāyaṇa*,
3. *Satyadṛśa*,
4. *Sthavira-gāthā*,
5. *Sthavirī-gāthā*,
6. *Śaila-gāthā*,
7. *Arthavargīya*,
8. *Muni-gātha*.—*Taishō*, vol. 2 (99) p. 362c.

There cannot have been those sūtras in the Buddha's life-time. As in case of the *Pieh-i-tsa-a-han-ching*, Sarvāstivāda which transmitted the *Tsa-a-ham* (*Samyukta-āgama*) must have arrayed sūtras known well as *Kṣudraka-piṭaka* in the time of Buddhist schools. The famous sūtras of Sarvāstivāda mostly belonged to *Kṣudraka-piṭaka*. For example, the *Mūlasarvāstivāda-vinaya Bhaiṣajya-vastu*, Fasc. 3 says :

1. *Udāna*,
2. *Sthavira-gāthā*,
3. *Śaila-gāthā*,
4. *Muni-gāthō*,
5. *Arthavargīya*—*Taishō*, vol. 24 (1448) p. 11b.

And also *Divyāvadāna*, p. 34f. (Cowell ed.) says :

1. *Udānāt*,
2. *Pārāyaṇāt*,
3. *Satyadṛśaḥ*,
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6. *Arthavargīyāṇi ca* sūtrāṇi.

They are all six, less than the above five in 4. *Muni-gāthā* and more in 2. *Pārāyaṇa* and 3. *Satyadṛśa*.

And the same work, p. 20 says :

1. *Udānāt*,
2. *Pārāyaṇāt*,
3. *Satyadṛṣṭaḥ*,
4. *Śaila-gāthā*,
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answer. *Nānā-praśnā* may be equivalent to any of these questioning sūtras. If so, it follows that the above 8, 10, 11 works correspond to some of *Suttanipāta*. And if 12 means *Muni-gāthā*, it is equivalent to some of *Suttanipāta*; if *Sthaviragāthā*, to 8. *Theragāthā* of the Pāli *Khuddakanikāya*. Furthermore, 9 *Dharmapada* is added. This is about the *Dharmapada* in the *Ssū-fên-lü*.

The *Dharmapada* in Dharmaguptaka, besides the *Ssū-fên-lü*, is expounded also in the *P'i-ni-mu-ching* (*Vinayamātṛkā*), Fasc. 3 to explain *Kṣudraka-piṭaka* :

"*Dharmapada*, *Arthavargīya* and *Pārāyaṇa*, etc., compose the *Kṣudraka-piṭaka*."—*Taishō*, vol. 24 (1463) p. 818a.

It shows only three works and omits others. This seems to be similar to the *Ssū-fên-lü*. This tells us that Dharmaguptakās transmitted the *Dharmapada* as one of the *Kṣudraka-piṭaka*.

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However, this corresponds to sūtras of the Pāli *Saṁyuttanikāya* and the Chinese *Tsa-a-ham* (*Samyukta-āgama*). The former is the sūtra 6 "*Piyaṅkara*" (S.i, p. 209) of X. *Yakkha-saṁyutta*. There Anuruddha is noted as being in the Jetavana Anāthapiṇḍikassa ārāma of Sāvatthī, different from the *Kuei-tsū-mu-kung* of Magadha stated in the *Pieh-i-tsa-a-han-ching* and the *Tsa-a-ham-ching*. And also yakkhinī's *gāthā* is expressed "*bhikkhu dhammapadāni bhāsati*". This *dhammapadāni* means, I think, the general name of *dhammapada*, not the proper name of the *Dhammapada*. From a historical viewpoint, there cannot have been the *Dhammapada* in the Buddha's lifetime. Accordingly, it was impossible that Anuruddha chanted the *Dhammapada*. We should think, therefore, that a yakkhinī's *dhammapadāni* are the general words and that the gāthās of *Dharmapada* in the above *Pieh-i-tsa-a-han-ching* originally never means the *Dharmapada*.

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[Sarvāstivāda]. The Chinese *Samyukta-āgama*, Fasc. 49 (sūtra 321) corresponds to the previous sūtras of the *Pieh-i-tsa-a-han-ching* (sūtra 320) and the *Saṁyutta-nikāya* (X, 6). It says that Anuruddha chanted the next sūtras in the Yakṣiṇī abode :

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7. *Arthavargīya,*
8. *Muni-gātha.—Taishō*, vol. 2 (99) p. 362c.

There cannot have been those sūtras in the Buddha's life-time. As in case of the *Pieh-i-tsa-a-han-ching*, Sarvāstivāda which transmitted the *Tsa-a-ham* (*Samyukta-āgama*) must have arrayed sūtras known well as *Kṣudraka-piṭaka* in the time of Buddhist schools. The famous sūtras of Sarvāstivāda mostly belonged to *Kṣudraka-piṭaka*. For example, the *Mūlasarvāstivāda-vinaya Bhaiṣajya-vastu*, Fasc. 3 says :

1. *Udāna,*
2. *Sthavira-gāthā,*
3. *Śaila-gāthā,*
4. *Muni-gāthō,*
5. *Arthavargīya—Taishō*, vol. 24 (1448) p. 11b.

And also *Divyāvadāna*, p. 34f. (Cowell ed.) says :

1. *Udānāt,*
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They are all six, less than the above five in 4. *Muni-gāthā* and more in 2. *Pārāyaṇa* and 3. *Satyadṛśa.*

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1. *Udānāt,*
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3. *Satyadṛṣṭaḥ,*
4. *Śaila-gāthā,*
5. *Muni-gāthā,*
6. *Arthavargīyāṇi ca* sūtrāṇi.

They are less than the above six in *Sthavira-gāthā* and more in *Muni-gāthā* —Seven in all and less in *Sthavirī-gāthā* alone than the above eight sūtras of the *Samyukta-āgama.*

As for Sarvāstivāda, the above sūtras, including the *Udāna,* are gleaned in *Kṣudraka-piṭaka.* This *Udāna,* as I mentioned before, means the *Udānavarga* as the *Dharmapada* of Sarvāstivāda.

[Mahāsaṁghika]. Next, we can find the name of *Dharmapada* in the *Mo-ho-sêng-ch'i-lü* (*Mahāsaṁghika-vinaya*), Fasc. 27. It says that when a robber breaks into the uposatha (repentance ceremony) and the chanting of *Prātimokṣa-sūtra* is interrupted monks should read other sūtras :

1. *Pārāyaṇa,*
2. *Aṣṭakavarga* (*Arthavargīyāṇi*),
3. *Muni-gāthā,*
4. *Dharmapada.*—*Taishō*, vol. 22 (1425) p. 447b.

Also in this case, there cannot, historically, have been all these sūtras in the Buddha's life-time. Perhaps they picked up famous sūtras which the Mahāsaṁghikas collected as *Kṣudraka-piṭaka* in the era of the Buddhist schools. Among these sūtras we can find the *Dharmapada*, so we can realize that the Mahāsaṁghika transmitted and preserved it.

Another name of the *Dharmapada* of Mahāsaṁghika is quoted four times in *Mahāvastu avadāna—Vinaya-piṭaka* of Lokottaravāda of Mahāsaṁghika. The first and the third of them are the same quotations, so really there are three quotations.

The first quotation (II. P. 212) is :

Yathoktaṁ bhagavatā Dharmapade,
gati mṛgānāṁ pavanaṁ
ākāśaṁ pakṣiṇāṁ gatiḥ,
dharmo gatir vibhāgīyānāṁ
nirvāṇam arhatāṁ gatir iti.

The third one (III, p. 156) is the same, but rather different in spelling and words :

Yathoktaṁ bhagavatā Dharmapadeṣu,
gatir mṛgānāṁ plavanaṁ
ākāśaṁ pakṣiṇāṁ gatiḥ,
dharmo gatir dvijātīnāṁ
nirvāṇaṁ mahatī gatī ti.

It is unclear whether these like gāthās were severally transmitted in the *Dharmapada* of Mahāsaṁghika. We can find none of them in the Pāli *Dhammapada.* The *Udānavarga* XXVI *Nirvāṇavarga* 10 of Sarvāstivāda is very near to the above first quotation. In Pāli a gāthā of *Parivāra* VIII (*Vinaya* V, p. 149) corresponds to the

first quotation. But the third line of it is a little different. After all, in the third quotation the third and fourth lines are a little different from those of *Udānavarga* and *Parivāra*, but originally these gāthās also changed from the same source.

Next, the second quotation (III, p. 91f.) consists of two gāthās.

Bhagavān etasmiṁ vastusmiṁ etasmiṁ nidāne etasmiṁ prakaraṇe tāye velāye-imāṁ Dharmapadāṁ bhāṣati,

yasya jitaṁ natha jīvati
jitaṁ asya ua jināti antako,
taṁ buddham anantagocaraṁ
apadaṁ kena padena neṣyatha.
yasya jālinī samūhatā
tṛṣṇā nāsya kahiṁ pi netrikā.
taṁ buddham anantavikramam
apadaṁ kena padena neṣyatha.

Here we may regard *Dharmapadāṁ* as the general word before the *Dharmapada*, but the two gāthās correspond to those of the Pāli *Dhammapada* 179 and 180 and also of the *Udānavarga* XXIX *Yugavarga* 52 and 53. The three kinds of gāthās are a little different from each other, but that of the Pāli *Dhammapada* is nearer to that of the *Udānavarga*; that of this *Mahāvastu* is a litttle distant from the other two. Of the three the gāthās of the Pāli *Dhammapada* appear to be most genuine and old-fashioned.

The fourth quotation (III, pp. 434-436) comes from 24 gāthās in the *Sahasravarga* of the *Dharmapada*. The first passage is :

teṣāṁ bhagavāṁ Jaṭilānāṁ *Dharmpadeṣu Sahasra-vargaṁ* bhāṣati (The Bhagavat expounded the *Sahasravarga* of the *Dharmapada* for ascetic Jaṭilas)

This shows that the *Dharmapada* of Mahāsaṁghika has *Sahasravarga* containing 24 gāthās. The Pāli *Dhammapada* VIII and the *Udānavarga* XXIV have the *Sahassa-vagga* (*Peyālavarga*). The former varga contains 16 gāthās; the latter, 30. The three kinds of gāthās are different from each other, but there is no room for giving detailed explanation here. Seeing that 16 gāthās of the Pāli *Dhammapada* are changed into 24 in the *Mahāvastu-avadāna* and into 30 in the *Udānavarga*, and that the name of the chapter is changed into *Peyālavarga*, we can think that the *Udānavarga* is the last compilation and that the Pāli *Dhammapada* is the oldest. And the *Sahasravarga* of the *Gāndhārī Dharmapada* consists of 17 gāthās, one less than in that of the Pāli *Dhammapada*, but far less than in case of *Mahāvastu-avadāna* and *Udānavarga*.

[Chinese Version]. Now I have surveyed the quotations of the *Dharmapada* of various Buddhist schools. Moreover, we can find them in Chinese versions :

1. *Ch'eng-shih-lun* (*Satyasiddhi-Śāstra*), 2. *Ta-chih-tu-lun* (*Mahāprajñāpāramitā-nirdeśa*) 3. *Shih-chu-p'i-p'o-so-lun* (*Daśabhūmika-vibhāṣa*), 4. *Tso-ch'an-san-mei-ching* —all translated by Kumārajīva (350-409).

and

5. *Mahāyāna Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra* by Dharmakṣema (385-433). and

6. *Shê-ta shêng-lun-shih-lun* (*Mahāyānasaṁgraha-bhāṣya*) by Paramārtha (499-569)

Among them *Ch'eng-shih-lun*, *Ta-chih-tu-lun*, *Shih-chu-p'i-p'o-so-lun*, *Tso-ch'an-san-mei-ching* and *Shê-ta-shêng-lun-shih-lun*, are thought to have been fairly affected by Sarvāstivāda. And the *Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra* seems to have been influenced by some Buddhist school, different from Pāli or Sarvāstivāda, but we cannot know the exact name of the school. After all, even in sūtras and abhidharmas of Mahāyāna they seem to have used the *Dharmapadas* of some Buddhist schools. Let me examine, therefore, the quotations of the above six books in regular order.

1.The *Ch'eng-shih-lun* has the four quotations of the *Dharmapada*. The first is in the 6th fascicle:

"Mind is made of volition, as the *Dharmapada* says that a person is rewarded with suffering when he makes evil mind and speaks with it and that the reverse is the case when he makes good mind." —*Taishō*, vol. 32 (1646) p.286c.

This corresponds to the Pāli *Dhammapada* 1-2 and the *Udānavarga* XXXI *Citta-varga* 23-24.

The second quotation is also in the same fascicle :

"An Arhat is beyond belief, as the *Dharmapada* says that a man beyond belief and gratitude is named the highest supreme one."—*Taishō*, Ibid., p.288a.

Here the *Dharmapada* corresponds to the Pāli *Dhammapada* 97 and the *Udānavarga* XXIX *Yugavarga* 23.

The third quotation is in the 7th fascicle as three gāthās :

"As the *Dharmapada* says:
Enlightened persons regard the Law as longevity
And lead [deluded] people with this Law.
The inferior have the wrong view
And go against such words.
As a bamboo disfigures itself
When it grows up enough,
So they go to hell head over heals.
Those who malignantly slander the Bodhisattvas
Go to 100,000 Nirarbuda-nirayas
36 and 5 Arbuda-nirayas."—*Taishō*, Ibid., p.291b.

The above are not found in the Pāli *Dhammapada* but are a little similar to before and after the *Udānavarga* VIII *Vācavarga* 5, and the Pāli *Suttanipāta* 660. In short, this quotation seems to have more relation to the *Udānavarga* of Sarvāstivāda than the Pāli *Dhammapada*.

Next, the fourth quotation is in the 15th fascicle :

"As the *Dharmapada* says :
Attached to the worldly viewpoint,
We regard emptiness as eternal being.
Indeed, cursed with such a view,
We find it false with the right view." *Taishō*, Ibid. p. 363b.

This gāthā is neither found in the Pāli *Dhammapada* nor in the *Udānavarga*. But the gāthā of the same meaning is quoted in the *Ch'eng-shih-lun*, Fasc. 12 :

"As some gāthā states,"—*Taishō*, Ibid., p. 333b.

All this is my survey about the quotation of the *Dharmapada* in the *Ch'eng-shih-lun*. Its content seems different from those of the Pāli *Dhammapada* and the *Udānavarga* of Sarvāstivāda. It seems, however, rather akin to this than that. Originally, the *Ch'eng-shih-lun* has a great tendency to Sautrāntika. Though the latter is the school separated from Sarvāstivāda yet its canons are greatly affected by Sarvāstivāda. Nevertheless, the *Ch'eng-shih-lun* never regarded the *Dharmapada* as the *Udānavarga*. This shows that it had transmitted its own *Dharmapada* different from the *Udānavarga* of Sarvāstivāda.

2. The *Dharmapada* is quoted twice in the *Ta-chih-tu-lun*. The first is in the fascicle 30 :

"As the gāthā of the *Dharmapada* says,"—*Taishō*, vol. 25 (1509) p. 278b.

This gāthā corresponds to the Pāli *Dhammapada* 129 and the *Udānavarga* V *Priyavarga* 19, but it is nearer to the former. And the gāthā of the same meaning but nearer that of the *Udānavarga* is quoted in the 24th fascicle :

"As the Buddha expounded,"—*Taishō*, Ibid., p. 235b. There the words "the quotation from the *Dharmapada*" are not clearly noted.

The second quotation is in the *Ta-chih-tu-lun*, Fasc. 35 :

"As the *Dharmapada** says,"—*Taishō*, Ibid., p. 316a.

This gāthā corresponds to the Pali *Dhammapada* 321 and the *Udānavarga* XIX *Aśvavarga* 6. There the gāthā of the *Dhammapada* is nearer that of the *Udānavarga*. And the above one is a little different from the two. Here** should be noted as*** in the *Udānavarga*. In case of the Pāli *Dhammapada* this gāthā is found in the**** (*Nāgavagga*). The name of the chapter, therefore, is the same with that of the *Udānavarga*; but the name of sūtra is not, the for it is the *Dharmapada* as in the Pāli *sūtra*.

From the two quotations, we can realize that the *Dharmapada* in the *Ta-chih-tu-lun* is different from those of the Pāli *Dhammapada* and the *Udānavarga*. But if the *Udānavarga* were called the *Dharmapada*, the latter can be said to have been near the former.

3. The *Dharmapada* is quoted twice in the *Shih-chu-p'i-p'o-so-lun*. The first is quoted in the Ist fascicle :

"As the gāthā of the *Dharmapada* says,"—*Taishō*, vol. 26 (1521) p. 24b.

This seems to correspond to the Pāli *Dhammapada* 158 and the *Udānavarga* XXII *Ātmavarga* 7.

The second is in the 13th fascicle :

"As the *Dharmapada* says,"—*Taishō*, Ibid. p. 92a.

This is a famous gāthā, and corresponds to the Pāli *Dhammapada* 183 and the *Udānavarga* XXVIII *Pāpavarga* 1. It is unclear, therefore, what *Dharmapada* they were quoted from.

* 罵品　　** 罵品　　*** 炙品　　**** 馬品

4. The *Dharmapada* is quoted twice in the *Tso-ch'an-san-mei-ching*. The first quotation contains two gāthās, they are in the second fascicle :

"As the *Dharmapada* says,"—*Taishō* vol. 15 (614) p. 279c.

They correspond to the *Udānavarga* XIII *Satkāravarga* 1-2. The Pāli *Dhammapada* has no gāthā equivalent to the first. The first gāthā is often found in the Pāli *Nikāya*, but not collected in the *Dhammapada*. The second gāthā corresponds to the *Dhammapada* 72. Hereupon, the two gāthās seem to have been quoted from the *Udānavarga* or the like *Dharmapada*, only supposing that the *Udānavarga* was also called the *Dharmapada*. We should think, too, that Hīnayāna-dhyāna theory in the *Tso-ch'an-san-mei-ching* is that of Sarvāstivāda.

The second quotation occurs directly after the first :

"As the Buddha says in the *Dharmapada*,"—*Taishō*, Ibid., p. 280a.

There is no such gāthā in the Pāli *Dhammapada*, but this is visible, though a little different, in the *Udānavarga* IV *Apramādavarga* 9, perhaps owing to poor or wrong Chinese translation.

In short, the *Dharmapadas* of three gāthās that the *Tso-ch'an-san-mei-ching* quoted are all visible in the *Udānavarga*, but only one in the Pāli *Dhammapada*. Nominally they were the *Dharmapada*, but substantially they were near the *Udānavarga* or the *Udānavarga* itself.

Now we have realized that the *Dharmapada* quoted in the *Ch'eng-shih-lun*, *Ta-chih-tu-lun*, *Shih-chu-p'i-p'o-so-lun* and *Tso-ch'an-san-mei-ching* translated by Kumārajīva were different from the Pāli *Dhammapada* and near the *Udānavarga* and that all the quoted gāthās corresponded to those of the *Udānavarga*.

5. The name of the *Dharmapada* is once quoted in the 29th fascicle of the *Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra*—the Northern Book (375) [the Southern, Fasc. 27 (376)]:

"As the *Dharmapada* says,"—*Taishō*, vol. 12 (375) p. 537c.

In the Southern Book there is a quotation "As the *Dharmapada* says,"—*Taishō*, vol. 12 (376) p. 781c.

This gāthā corresponds to the Pāli *Dhammapada* 121 and the *Udānavarga* VII *Udaka-varga* 5. In the above quotation two lines (e.f.) are omitted from the corresponding gāthās (of six lines) of the Pāli *Dhammapada* or the *Udānavarga*. In the *Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra* this like gāthā is quoted in another place as "expounding the gāthās." [Northern Book, Fasc. 15 ; *Taishō*. vol. 12 (374) p. 451c; Southern Book, Fasc. 14 ; *Taishō*, vol. 12 (375) p. 693c] In the *Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra* the gāthās equivalent to those of the Pāli *Dhammapada* are very often quoted, not naming the *Dharmapada*. Nevertheless, it is unclear what Buddhist school transmitted the *Dharmapada* in the *Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra*.

6. Lastly, let me see the quotation of the *Dharmapada* in Vasubandhu's *Shê-ta-shêng-lun-shih-lun* translated by Paramārtha. Only once it is quoted in the 5th fascicle as the *Fa-tsu-ching**—*Taishō*, vol. 31 (1595) p. 185b.

This gāthā corresponds to the Pāli *Dhammapada* 37 and in different words to the *Udānavarga* XXXI *Cittavarga* 8A and ibid. XXXIII *Brāhmaṇa-varga* 55. All of them

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are a little different from the quotation of the *Shê-ta-shêng-lun-shih-lun*, but the nearest to the Pāli *Dhammapada*. For reference, let me see how the quotation of *Shê-ta-shêng lun-shih-lun* is translated by Dharmagupta (—619) and Hsüan-tsang (600-664). Dharmagupta's is *Āgamagāthā*, not the *Dharmapada*.—[*Taishō*, vol. 31 (1590) p. 286c]; so is Hsüan-tsang's.—[*Taishō*, vol. 31 (1597) p. 340a]

Their gāthās mostly correspond to the *Udānavarga* XXXIII *Brāhmaṇa-varga* 55. Hereupon, their original quotes *Āgamagāthā* from the *Udānavarga;* Paramārtha's seems to have quoted from the *Dharmapada* different from the *Udānavarga* or the *Udānavarga* different from the existing Sanskrit one. I suppose that the original itself of the *Shê-ta-shêng lun shih-lun* by Paramārtha was a little different from that of this book by Dharmagupta or Hsüan-tsang.

3. The Existing Dharmapadas

From this viewpoint of Buddhist records, we can safely say that there existed many kinds of *Dharmapadas* of various Buddhist schools. The existing *Dharmapadas* are only three or four kinds in several schools. In this section I would like to see them by the linguistic division rather than by several schools :

A. The *Dhammapada* in Pāli
B. The *Dharmapada* in Gāndhāri
C. The *Dharmapada* in Sanskrit
D. The *Dharmapada* in Chinese
E. The *Dharmapadas* in Tibetan

The number of the *Dharmapadas* translated in several languages would be still more. But seeing that either of the above five kinds of *Dharmapadas* was translated, there is no need of further discussion.

23

A Process of the Origination of Buddhist Meditations in Connection with the life of the Buddha

HAJIME NAKAMURA

1. Visit to the Hermit *Āḷāra*

According to the *Buddhacarita*, Gotama in search of teaching, first went to call upon the hermit Āḷāra Kālāma (Skt. Arāḍa Kālāma),[1] who lived in the mountains of Vindhyakoṣṭha.[2] On his way the Buddha met King Bimbisāra at Rājagaha and then after visiting Āḷāra, he travelled to the hut of Uddaka,[3] the location of which is not recorded.

However, a quite divergent geographical description is found in the *Fang-Kuang-ta-chuang-yen-ching*[4], according to which, Āḷāra resided on the outskirts of the city of Vaisali with three hundred disciples, and it is reported that after visiting him, Gotama went to Rājagaha of Magadha and met King Bimbisāra, and then proceeded on to meet the Hermit Uddaka, who was living in that area with seven hundred disciples. The older Pāli canon makes no mention of the geographical locations, but the circumstances of the visit to Āḷāra are depicted in the form of a later recollection of Śākyamuni as follows[5] :

> Thus I became a monk and in search of goodness and the supremely wondrous state, visited Āḷāra Kālāma speaking to him thus :— 'O Āḷāra Kālāma, I wish to practice pure deeds in accords with your Dharma and Vinaya.' When I had said this, Āḷāra Kālāma spoke : 'Wise one, remain here, if you stay here this Dharma will make you a man of wisdom soon capable of attaining and realizing knowledge equal to your master.' There in a short while, I was swiftly able to attain that Dharma. And I reached the point of moving my lips and uttering the words of knowledge in mere talk, and was able to repeat the words of the elders, reaching the point of recognizing that - 'I myself, as well as others, know and see.'

At that time, the thought occurred to me : 'Truly Āḷāra Kālāma does not merely out of faith in this Dharma proclaim that he knows, has attained, has realized, truly Āḷāra Kālāma must know and see this Dharma.' Thus I went to where Āḷāra Kālāma resided and having arrived, asked him as follows : 'O venerable Kālāma, to what degree have you yourself known, attained and realized this Dharma and proclaimed it to us ?' Having asked that, Āḷāra Kālāma preached the state of non-existence. At that time the following thoughts occurred : "Āḷāra Kālāma alone does not possess faith, I also have faith. Āḷāra Kālāma alone does not make endeavour, I also make endeavour. Āḷāra Kālāma alone does not possess thought, I also have thought. Āḷāra Kālāma alone does not possess concentration, I also have concentration. Āḷāra Kālāma alone does not possess wisdom, I also have wisdom. Thus, I shall endeavour to attain the Dharma which Āḷāra Kālāma himself claims he has known, attained and realized. And in a short time I swiftly come to know, attain and realize the Dharma.

Then I went to where Āḷāra Kālāma resided, and having arrived, asked him : "O venerable Kālāma do you proclaim the Dharma by personally knowing, attaining and realizing it to *this* degree." Kālāma replied: "O venerable one, I am proclaiming the Dharma by personally knowing, attaining and realizing it to *this* degree." I then said : 'O' venerable one, actually, I personally know, attain and realize the Dharma to *this* degree.' Kālāma then said : 'O' venerable one, I am fortunate and happy to recognize such a worthy one as a colleague with whom I can share the practice (*sabrahmacārin*). The very Dharma I proclaim by personally knowing., attaining and realizing, you yourself also have known, attained and realized. The very Dharma you yourself have known, attained and realized. I myself am proclaiming by knowing, attaining and realizing it. The Dharma I know is the Dharma you know, the Dharma you know is the Dharma I know. Thus, as I am so are you; as you are so am I. 'O' venerable one, please come and let the two of us together lead this congregation.' Thus despite the fact that Āḷāra Kālāma was actually my master, he set me, his disciple, upon an equal level and paid me elaborate respect and honour. At that time I thought : 'This Dharma does not lead to avoidance, to separation from desire, to extinction, to peace, to wisdom, to true Enlightenment, to serenity, it merely makes us attain the state of non-existence.' Thus, I ceased to value that Dharma and dissatisfied with that Dharma, I departed.

2. Visit to the Hermit Uddaka

The biographies of the Buddha of even later periods recognize that Uddaka Rāmaputta Udraka Rāmaputra) advocated the state of thoughtless thought.[7] (Rāmaputta denotes the 'son of Rāma'). The *Fang-kuang-ta-chuang-yen-ching*[3] does not explain the nature of this state and in response to Śākyamuni's question, Uddaka merely answered 'Without having any master, I naturally awakened.' In the Pāli canon, the circumstances of Śākyamuni's visit to him are described in the form of a later recollection as follows :

> Thus in search of goodness, for the supremely wonderous state, I went to Uddaka, son of Rāma. Having arrived, I spoke to Uddaka, Rāma's son, as follows : 'O' venerable One, I wish to practice pure deeds in accord with your Dharma and Vinaya.' Having spoken thus, Uddaka, Rāma's son replied : :Wise one, remain here, if you stay here, the wise one will in a short time, know, attain and realize

this Dharma equal to the master.' Then in a short while, I was swiftly able to attain that Dharma. Thus, I came to recognize that I myself as well as others, know and see...(repetition of the realization with Āḷāra Kālāma). Thus, I went to the place where Uddaka, son of Rāma, resided, having arrived, I asked Uddaka, son of Rāma as follows : 'Venerable Rāma, to what degree have you yourself known, attained and realized this Dharma ?' Having asked this, Uddaka, son of Rāma preached the state of thoughtless thought. (*nevasaññānāsaññāyatana*) At that time I thought as follows : Rāma alone does not possess faith, I also have faith, Rāma alone does not make endeavour, I also make endeavour...(repetition of the realization with Āḷāra Kālāma). Then I went to the place where Uddaka, son of Rāma resided, having gone there, I spoke to Uddaka, son of Rāma as follows : 'O' venerable Rāma, do you proclaim the Dharma by personally knowing, attaining and realizing it to *this* degree ?' The son of Rāma answered : 'O' venerable one, I am proclaiming the Dharma by personally knowing attaining and realizing it to *this* degree.' I then said : 'O' venerable one, actually I personally have known, attained and realized the Dharma to *this* degree.'

The son of Rāma said : 'O' venerable one, we are fortunate and happy to recognize such a venerable one as a colleague to share the practice. The very Dharma which I proclaim by personally knowing, attaining and realizing, you yourself also have known attained and realized...The Dharma Rāma knows you know, the Dharma you know, Rāma knows. In this manner, you are like Rāma and Rāma is like you. O' venerable one, please come and lead this congregation.' Thus despite the fact that Uddaka, son of Rāma, was a colleague to share the practice, he placed me in the position of master and paid elaborate respect and honour. At that time, I thought as follows : 'This Dharma does not lead to avoidance, it does not lead to separation from desire, it does not lead to extinction... serenity, it merely makes us attain the state of thoughtless thought (neither thought nor non-thought ?).' Thus, I ceased to value that Dharma, dissatisfied with that Dharma I departed.[9]

3. The State of Non-Existence

The goal Āḷāra Kālāma sought was *wu-so-yu-ch'u* (the state of non-existence) and this is the translation used by individuals such as Hsüang Tsang. In the *Chung-a-han-ching*, the Chinese equivalent of the *Majjhima Nikaya*, it is related that Śākyamuni (under Āḷāra Kālāma) attained *yüan-li-k'ung-an-ching-ch'u* (emancipation, emptiness and peace). According to Āḷāra Kālāma, it was possible to reach non-existence by first passing through the state of immeasurable consciousness. And Uddaka Rāmaputta further added that his father Rāma taught that it was possible to attain the state of thoughtless thought by passing through the state of total non-existence. This indicates that in the original text from which the Chinese translation of the *Chung-a-han-ching* was made, the four states of *Arūpa Dhātu* (the non-material world) consisting of Limitless space, Limitless Consciousness, Non-Existence and Thoughtless Thought existed (even though the concept of *Arūpa Dhātu* was not yet formulated) were applied to the story.

During the early Buddhist period this so-called non-existence (*ākiñcañña*), was a

state sought by religious people outside of Buddhism. "A Brahmin well-versed in the Vedas, in the hope of attaining the state of non-existence from the beautiful city of the Kosala tribe came to the southern region."[10] Contemporary Brahmins were no exception and the Jains also frequently sought non-existence (*akiṃcaṇa*) as their ideal.[11]

The goal also appears in the *Pārāyana*, the oldest section of the *Sutta-nipāta*, the most ancient Buddhist text, where a Brahmin student named Upasīva was taught the following:[12]

> 'O' Śākyamuni, alone I cannot cross the greater river of ignorance without assistance, the venerable Upasīva said : Please teach me the means to cross this river, O' man with all-seeing eyes.'
> The Bhagavat replied : 'O Upasīva, be attentive and by thinking with the anticipation of non-existence, and by reflecting that nothing exists, cross the river of ignorance. Abandon all desires, separate from doubts, meditate day and night upon the extinction of thirst.'
> The venerable Upasīva said : 'Separated from clinging to all desires, based upon the notion of non-existence, those who accomplish emancipation by abandoning all else and attain the ultimate emancipation by thought (*saññāvimokkha*),[13] will they remain in that state without falling back?'
> 'O Upasīva Bhagavat replied, 'separated from clinging to all desires, based upon the notion of non-existence, those who accomplish emancipation by abandoning all else and attain the ultimate emancipation by thought, will not move away but will abide there safely.'

According to the *Commentary*,[14] the meditation level of non-existence is obviously meant in this instance. However, by the time the *Commentary* was written, the four states of *Arūpa Dhātu* meditation were already in existence. Thus, it further explains that the Bhagavat proceeded from the state of non-existence to the state of Thoughtless Thought and transcended beyond that. Such an explanation obviously goes beyond what the original text had indicated. Similar ideas are expressed in other verses of the *sutra* in the following manner : "He for whom nothing in the world exists, he who does not grieve over non-existence, he who will not become involved with various things, he is called a sage."[15] In this instance, 'nothing exists' refers to the fact that nothing belongs to oneself. Such views lead us to theorize that in the primitive Buddhism non-Buddhist thought was adopted and the state of non-existence was a goal. For the purpose of realizing that state *dhyāna* (meditation) was practised but by the time the Pali *Nikāya sutras* were formulated, that goal was abandoned and attributed to the non-Buddhist Āḷāra Kālāma.

4. The State of Thoughtless Thought and the Four *Arūpa Dhātu* Meditations

The so-called 'Thoughtless Thought' believed to have been advocated by Uddaka, son of Rāma, also appears in extremely early stages of Buddhism. We can find this presented as a teaching of Śākyamuni in the *Aṭṭhaka* section of the *Sutta-nipāta*, the oldest Buddhist scripture, as follows :

What kind of practice leads to the disappearance of form and how do joy and suffering disappear ? Please tell me the condition of their disappearance. I would like to know that, this was the thought I held.

To this question, Śākyamuni presented the following reply :

For neither those who hold the thought of as-it-isness, nor those who hold the thought of error, nor those who hold no thought, nor those who eliminate their thought will form disappear. This is because the consciousness of the expanse of the world rises as a result of thought.[16]

The original text of this quotation clearly refers to 'thoughtless thought'. Uddaka was aiming to attain the unique state of 'thoughtless thought' through meditation. In the *Aṭṭhaka* quotation, it is achieved by first eliminating *Papañca saṃkhā* (the consciousness of the expanse of the world) through meditation in order to eliminate *saññā* (thought). In other words, the theory advocated during the initial stage of Buddhism (*Aṭṭhakavagga*) was later attributed to Uddaka in the *Majjhima Nikāya*. The reversal of this hypothesis is also possible, namely that Āḷāra Kālāma and Uddaka, the son of Rāma, truly held the forementioned theories and that these were adopted by Early Buddhists and reflected in the *Sutta-nipāta* (especially in the *Aṭṭhaka* and *Pārāyana* sections). However in such a case it would not be possible to present the thought of the two religious leaders which were ultimately rejected by Buddhism as the teachings of Śākyamuni after his Enlightenment. Since the *Sutta-nipāta* is the oldest scripture, we have to draw following conclusions :

In the initial stage of Early Buddhism. . . .

A. (the period represented by the oldest scriptures in the section of the *Pārāyana*) as the logical conclusion of the teaching advocating freedom from clinging, the state of non-existence was a goal and for that purpose meditation was practised. The Jains also posited this ideal goal. This stage was known as *saññā vimokkha* (deliverance from thought).

However, when Buddhism evolved and entered into a second period of Early Buddhism :

B. (represented by the *Aṭṭhaka* section) they advanced one step further and began to consider the ultimate state as neither the existence nor non-existence of thought. This is probably due to the fact that if they were to advocate views such as 'there is no thought' or 'nothing exists' they would be mistaken as nihilists, which they sought to avoid.

When Buddhism underwent dramatic evolution (in the post-Aśoka period, or possibly after the reign of King Nanda), the concepts of the periods A and B were no longer acceptable to the contemporary people and new ideas became necessary. As a result, the concept of non-existence was attributed to Āḷāra Kālāma and the theory of thoughtless-thought attributed to Uddaka, son of Rāma, while Buddhism itself set

forth new views. This situation was quite similar to the time when Mahāyāna Buddhism rose as a contrast to Hīnayāna. In this manner, the development was formalized in the *Majjhima Nikāya* and despite the fact that the theories of non-existence and thoughtless-thought were originally Buddhist, they were now considered non-Buddhist and applied to the framework of the four *Arūpa Dhātu* meditations, placed respectively at the third and fourth *deva* heavens of the *Arūpa Dhātu*.

The second stage in the evolution or *Arūpa Dhātu*, the state of Immeasurable Consciousness, can also be viewed in its early buds in one of the oldest Buddhist scriptures. It is generally considered that to observe the existence of no-thing is to observe the condition of all consciousness, which is expressed in the following :[17]

> Posala asked : 'I am inquiring about the wisdom of the man who is free from the thought of material form and abandons the physical body and observes that there exists nothing either internally or externally. O' Sakka, how can such a man be further led ?'
> 'O' Posala', the Bhagavat replied : 'the Tathagata who thoroughly understands the manner of all consciousness (*viññāṇatthitiyo*) knows the manner of his existence. In other words, he is emancipated and he knows where he stands.'
> 'The reason for the foundation of non-existence (*akiñcañña*) he realizes, is that pleasure (*nandī*) is binding, knowing such he calmly observes it. The established Brahmin possesses such wisdom in accordance with truth.'

Judging from these sentences, it appears that 'the manner of all consciousness' corresponds to 'the reasons for the foundation of non-existence'. Therefore, to observe the manner of consciousness is naturally considered to be the first stage of non-existence. This type of thought laid the foundation of the concept of Immeasurable Consciousness. And in later periods the Three World theory was formulated, and this 'manner of all consciousness' came to be taught in the form of seven consciousnesses. The spiritual concentration of observing the infinity of mind and consciousness (state of the *samādhi* of Limitless Consciousness) does not appear in Early Buddhist verses. However, the explanation that is frequently offered is that ultimate emancipation is the cessation of the function of consciousness :

> How does the consciousness of the man who practices attentively become extinct ? I came here to inquire about this to the teacher and would like to hear your words. For he who practices attentively, taking no joy in sensual perception either internally or externally, consciousness becomes extinct.[18]
> Whatever sufferings arise, are all caused by consciousness, if consciousness becomes extinct, suffering cannot arise. Realizing the impediment (that suffering is caused by consciousness) the man who calms his consciousness without clinging to comfort resides in tranquility.[19]

Regarding the first state of *Arūpa Dhātu* known as Limitless Space, we find that the terminology such as 'spiritual concentration meditation on limitless space' does not appear in the verses of the Early Buddhist canon, though such thought is present as the following indicates :

Always being attentive by destroying the view of clinging to oneself, observe the world as empty space (*suññā*), then one may be able to overcome death. For those who observe the world in this manner, the King of death will not see.[20]

Mahāyāna scriptures often speak of 'observing existents as though they are empty space' (*ākāśa*) in order to observe all existents as *śūnya* (emptiness). In this case, *ākāśa* (voidness) refers to the principal of the natural world which has the dual meaning of both 'space' and 'ether'. Similarly in the foregoing quotation, viewing the world as emptiness (*suññā*) is regarded as equivalent to viewing it as empty space (*ākāśa*). Thus, as we examine each of the four *Arūpa Dhātu* meditations we can discover the process of their development during the Early Buddhist thought. A portion of this thought was attributed to the non-Buddhist hermits (the systematization of the various *deva* heavens of the *Rūpa* and *Arūpadhātu* took place in Buddhism during the later periods after Gotama Buddha).[21]

Even during the later periods the practice of stating heretical views as the opinion of *Āḷāra Kālāma* continued. In the *Buddhacarita*, *Āḷāra Kālāma* is found to voice Saṃkhya philosophy.[22] Since this technique was deliberately used later, it is understandable that similar practices can be found the early Pāli scriptures as well. The Pāli canon describes Uddaka's thought in the following manner :

Uddaka, the son of Rāma (Uddaka Rāmaputta) spoke these words : 'Here is a man of true knowledge, here is man victorious over all. He has dug out the knotty root which has not been removed before.'

This means that Uddaka, the son of Rāma, who was not a man of complete knowledge proclaimed : 'I am the man of true knowledge.' Even though he was not a man victorious over all, he claimed : 'I am victorious over all.' Even though he had not removed the knotty root, he claimed : 'I have dug out the knotty root.

A religious monk could properly speak : 'Here is a man of true knowledge, here is a man victorious over all. He has dug out the knotty root which has not been removed before.'

How is a religious monk a man of true knowledge ? Since a religious monk truly knows the rising, extinction, attachment, hindrance and deliverance from the realm of the six senses (*phassāyatana*), he is a man of true knowledge. How is a religious monk victorious over all? Since a religious monk truly knows the rising, extinction attachment, hindrance and deliverance from the realm of the six senses and he is emancipated without clinging, he is victorious over all. How has a religious monk dug out the knotty root which has not been removed before ? Knots are another name for the physical body composed of the four elements, born of parents, an accumulation of food, having the characteristics of impermanence, fragility, subject to wear, breakable and crushable. 'Knotty roots' are another name for clinging (*taṇhā*). The clinging of the religious monk is cut down and the root is torn out, just as a palm tree is pulled out by the root, thus it submits to force and ceases to grow back in future. In this manner the root of the religious monk which was not previously removed is removed.[23]

This description is historically reliable and Uddaka must have been an extremely proud man full of self-confidence. 'The one who is victorious over all' was considered to be the ideal of the religious men who had completed all practices even in Jain teachings. This was adopted in Buddhism, and probably represented a contemporary religious ideal. Śākyamuni further preached to the novice (*samaṇuddessa*) Cunda in the following manner :

> O' Cunda, truly Uddaka, son of Rāma said : 'Seeing one sees not. What does one see and see not ? One looks at a well-sharpened razor but does see the blade.' This is what is meant by seeing, one sees not.
> What Uddaka, the son of Rāma said is inferior and base, a matter for common man. It is not noble, of no significance and said merely because he was thinking of a razor blade. If there is a man who properly speaks of seeing but seeing not, he should explain : 'seeing and seeing not.' Then what does one see and see not ? One should truly see : 'in such a manner all characteristics of the pure deeds (*Brahmacariya*) are possessed and fulfilled and the complete pure practice which is explained skillfully without overamplification or underamplification but he does not see : 'this should be removed and that should be further purified.' Also he does not see : 'this should be added and that should be completed.' This is what is meant by seeing and seeing not.[24]

In this instance 'Uddaka's words and expressions were modified to suit Śākyamuni's thought. Since such an expression as 'seeing and seeing not' was extremely unique and does not appear in the general Buddhist canon; we can assume that Uddaka actually preached in such a manner.

Unfortunately the thought of the Hermits Āḷāra Kālāma and Uddaka Rāmaputta are almost unidentifiable today. However, judging from the fact that none of the Buddha's biographers could eliminate these two men, there is no doubt that prior to his Enlightenment, Gotama Buddha visited them and was profoundly influenced by them.

NOTES

1. Kālāma was his gotra.
2. *Buddhacarita* VII, 54.
3. *Udrakasyāśramaṃ yayau. Buddhacarita* XII, 84.
4. T. vol. 3 p. 578-80.
5. *Ariyapariyesana-sutta, MN* I. p. 163 f.; *Chung-a-han-ching* 56 (T. vol. 1 p. 776).
6. In the Chinese translation of the *Majjhima Nikāya* known as the *Chung-a han-ching*, the term *āyusmā* is translated as *Hsien-che* (wise one).
7. *Buddhacarita* XII, 83.
8. T. vol. 3 p. 580.
9. These quotations concerning Āḷāra and Uddaka also appear in texts such as the *Mahāsaccaka sutta MN* no. 36 vol. I, p. 240 ff.
10. *Sn* 976.
11. *Uttarajjhāyā* XXV, 28 etc.

12. *Sn* 1069 ff.
13. In this case the Commentator considered *saññā vimokkha* as equivalent to the state of Non-existence.
14. *Culla niddeṣsa*, *Nanden Daizokyo* vol. 44, *Shōbu-kyoten* 22, 15 ff. In the Chalmers translation it is rendered as the 'Plane of Naught" p. 23 v. 976. Ina verse 41, of the Chinese translation of the Prajñāpāramitā-piṇḍārtha-saṃgraha, Dānapāla translated the original *na . . . . . kathaṃcana asa* cf. Hakuja Ui's *Jinna Chosaku no Kenkyū* (Tokyo : Iwanami, 1958) p. 309.
15. *Sn* 861.
16. *na saññasaññī, na visaññasuññī, no pi asaññī, na vibhūtasaññi, ... evaṃsame tassa vibhoti rūaṃ; saññānidānā hi papañcasaṃkhā* (*Sn* 874).
17. *Sn* 1113-1115.
18. *Sn* 1110 ff.
19. *Sn* 734-735.
20. *Sn* 1119.
21. See H. Nakamura : *Genshi Bukkyō no Shisō*, vol. II (Tokyo, Shunjnsha, 1971), pp. 183-243.
22. *Buddhacarita* XII, 15 ff.
23. *Sn* IV, pp. 83-4.
24. *DN* III, pp. 126-7.

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24

Māgadhisms in the Kathāvatthu

K.R. NORMAN

1. Introduction[1]

1.1. The starting point for any examination of the so-called Māgadhisms[2] in Pāli must be the analysis of the nominative (and vocative) singular masculine and neuter forms in *-e* given by the editors of the *Critical Pāli Dictionary*.[3]

1.2. They analysed them as follows :

(a) dialect forms, borrowed from dialects where the nominative singular was in *-e*, *e.g.* M II 254, 24[1] and the logical framework of Kv, and including, in the case of the commentaries, borrowings from the (*Sīhala-*) *Aṭṭhakathā* (Proto-Sinhalese being an *e*-dialect).

(b) heretic tenets.

(c) proverbially, or as a characteristic of persons of base extract or behaviour.

(d) vocatives of feminine nicknames.

1.3. I have examined elsewhere the *-e* forms in the heretic tenets.[5] In this article offered in memory of Tipitakacharya Mahathero Jagdish Kashyap, whose editions in the Nālandā Devanāgarī Pāli Series have put the Pāli Canon in easy (and inexpensive) reach of all, I wish to examine the *-e* forms in the Pāli *aṭṭhakathā*-s and in the framework of Kv.

2. *-e* forms in the *Pāli aṭṭhakathā*-s

2.1. CPD quotes only two examples of *-e* forms in the Pāli *aṭṭhakathā*-s :

(a) *paramatthato pana ovādo ti vā anusāsanī ti vā ese eke ekaṭṭhe same samabhāge tajjāte tañ ñevā ti* (Mp I 71, 13).

(b) *tena vuttaṃ Aṭṭhakathāya: samanuyuñjatī ti vā samanugāhatī ti vā samanubhāsatī ti vā ese eke ekaṭṭhe same sabhāge tajjāte tañ ñevā ti* (Mp II 273, 16-17).

2.2. Although only the second of these two quotations states that the comment is found in the [*Sīhala-*] *Aṭṭhakathā*, there is nevertheless no need to doubt that the first was also found there; for if the phrase had been Buddhaghosa's own invention he would doubtless have employed it when he made a similar statement in Spk that *ovāda* and *anusāsanī* had the same meaning : *api ca ovādo ti anusāsanī ti vā atthato ekam eva* (Spk II 250,7). The absence of the phrase in this latter passage indicates that it was not included in the *Sīhala-Aṭṭhakathā* which Buddhaghosa used when he was writing Spk, and confirms that as a general rule he included in his commentaries only the material which he found in the *Sīhala-Aṭṭhakathā*-s.

2.3. I would suggest that Buddhaghosa's reason for stating specifically the source of his phrase when he used it the second time was that when he commented on the same three words *samanuyuñjati*, *samanugāhati*, and *samanubhāsati* earlier in the same cty he gave them three different meanings : *samanuyuñjatī ti anuyogavattaṃ āropento pucchati, laddhiṃ patiṭṭhāpento pana samanugāhati nāma, kāraṇaṃ pucchanto samanubhāsati* (Mp II 228, 12-14). He probably wished to make quite clear his authority for giving a different interpretation on the second occasion.

2.4. CPD points out that a comparable phrase occurs in Kv 26, 20-21. This statement gives the impression that Kv also borrowed it from the *Sīhala-Aṭṭhakathā*. Since the phrase is, however, quite common in Kv, occurring some thirty times in four separate passages,[6] we should have to conclude that all these occurrences were similarly borrowed. It would then become difficult to refute a suggestion that all the *-e* forms in Kv were based upon the Sinhalese Pkt, which would mean that the greater part, and perhaps the whole, of Kv was of late origin, composed in Ceylon. The Theravāda tradition, however, is that Kv was recited by Tissa Moggaliputta at the Third Council in Pāṭaliputra during the reign of Aśoka,[7] and we should need very strong evidence to reject this belief. Even the Vitaṇḍins, who rejected Kv as a non-canonical text, based their objection on the fact that it was ascribed to Tissa.[8] If there had been any hint that Kv was produced in Ceylon at a later date they would surely have referred to this as the reason for their rejection. If we accept the Theravādin tradition, then we must conclude that Kv is older than the *Sīhala-Aṭṭhakathā*-s, and the latter were more likely to have borrowed from the former.

2.5. The phrase as it occurs in Kv is not identical with the form in Mp, in that it reads *ese se*[9] for *ese eke* and excludes *tañ ñeva*, which is of course not a Māgadhism. There is, however, just as in Mp a variation of reading between *sama-bhāge* and *sabhāge*.[10] If these slight variations of reading between Kv and Mp have any significance,[11] then it presumably means that one text did not borrow directly from the other. Since the frequency of its occurrence indicates that the phrase was a stock one, mean-

ing 'completely identical', we could assume that it was a common phrase in the early Buddhist tradition in Magadha, and was introduced from that tradition into Kv by Tissa, and also carried to Ceylon in the early commentarial tradition by Mahinda and the other missionaries from Magadha. It was then retained in the *Sīhala-aṭṭhakathā* tradition, where it was found by Buddhaghosa.

3. **Buddhaghosa and the *Sīhala-Aṭṭhakathā*-s.**

3.1. We are told by Buddhaghosa that Mahinda brought cties with him which were translated into the Sinhalese language, *i.e.* Sinhalese Pkt :

Sīhaḷa-dīpaṃ pana ābhatā 'tha vasinā Mahā-Mahindena
ṭhapitā Sīhaḷa-bhāsāya dīpavāsīnaṃ atthāya (Ps I 1, 23-24).

3.2. We know that additions were made to the cties in Ceylon because Buddhaghosa quotes the names of individual Sinhalese theras whose views he was discussing, *e.g.* Mahāsummatthera and Mahāpadumatthera (Sp 538, 4, 13). It is logical to assume that their contributions were also in Sinhalese Pkt.

3.3. Buddhaghosa tells us that he translated the *Sīhala-Aṭṭhakathā*-s into a language in keeping with the language of the canon, *i.e.* Pāli, removing the Sinhalese Pkt forms :

apanetvāna tato 'haṃ Sīhaḷabhāsaṃ manoramaṃ bhāsaṃ
tantinayānucchavikaṃ āropento vigatadosaṃ (Ps I 1,25-26).

We must therefore assume that any non-Pali *-e* forms which Buddhaghosa wrote in his 'translation' were either written because he recognised that *-e* was the correct form, *i.e.*, they were intentional, or retained in error, *i.e.* unintentional reproductions of the *-e* forms which he found in the *Sīhala-Aṭṭhakathā*-s.

3.4. There are very few other non-Pāli forms in *-e* in the Pāli cties. I can quote only :

(a) *sukhe dukhe jīve* (Pj I 192,5) which is quoted (from M I 517,23 etc.) as an example of a nominative singular form in *-e* when such forms in Khp are being discussed.
(b) *atthi savitakkasavicāre, atthi avitakkaavicāramatte* (Pj I 192,4) which is also quoted as an example of a nominative singular in *-e.* This resembles, but is not identical with, Kv 413, 20-21.
(c) *tena vata re vattabbe* (Ps II 218,21) in a quotation from Kv 335, 11-15.
(d) *na h' eva vattabbe* (As 4, 11, 15) quoted from Kv 1,4-9, and named as occurring in Kv.

3.5. Since quotations (c) and (d) occur in Kv, Buddhaghosa[12] would presumably have no difficulty in recognizing their source, and would therefore retain the *-e* forms which are appropriate to Kv. Quotations (a) and (b) are given to justify the formsi n *-e* in Khp, and it is, therefore, clear that their *-e* forms must be retained when the

passages are translated into Pāli.

3.6. Why did Buddhaghosa retain the *-e* forms in the two passages in Mp? If we are to believe that he unthinkingly reproduced phrases which he found in the Sinhalese cties, then we have to face the two coincidences :

(a) that his two failures to translate into Pāli were, by chance, two occurrences of the same phrase.

(b) that that phrase happened to be one with a very close parallel in a canonical text which, as we have just seen, Buddhaghosa was quite capable of recognizing. When the problem is put in this form, it is clear that any suggestion of Buddhaghosa taking the phrases blindly from the absurd. We must therefore conclude that Buddhaghosa kept the *-e* forms deliberately, which must mean that he realised that *-e* was the appropriate nominative singular ending for the phrase.

3.7. It may be objected that there is no evidence that quotations (a)—(d) in §3.4. were taken from the Sinhalese cties and therefore their treatment by Buddhaghosa cannot be used as evidence for the way in which he would handle *-e* forms when translating into Pāli. This may be true of quotations (a), (c), and (d), but with regard to (b) it should be pointed out that the quotation is not traceable in the Pāli canon as we have it today, and it seems unlikely that Buddhaghosa would, on his own authority, have put forward a non-canonical form in *-e* to justify a canonical form in *-e*, when there are so many canonical *-e* forms he could have quoted had he wished to. Although quotation (b) has been compared with Kv 413, 20-21, that text has *-o* forms at that point, not *-e*, and even allowing for this the verbal parallelism is not exact. It would therefore seem likely that Buddhaghosa found the quotation in the *Sīhala-Aṭṭhakathā*, into which it had been introduced from a Māgadhī source brought to Ceylon by the missionaries from North India. The words *avicāra* and *savicāra* are reminiscent of a passage at D II 278-79 which includes the words *avicāraṃ* and *savicaraṃ*, but is concluded by the phrase *ye avitakke avicāre se paṇītatare*, showing *-e* forms. This phrase shows all the signs of being a quotation from a source written in an *-e* dialect, probably Māgadhī. It is possible that a phrase from the same or a similar source in the same dialect had been included in the cty material taken to Ceylon, and was consequently used to provide an example of a nominative singular form in *-e* by the author(s) of the *Sīhala-Aṭṭhakathā* on Khp.

4. The language of the *Kathāvatthu*

4.1. Although, as stated in §2.4, the Theravāda tradition states that Kv was composed in North India in the third century B.C., the Sinhalese origin of the text might be thought to be supported by a statement by Helmer Smith[13] that there are certain agreements between the language of Kv and Sinhalese :

(a) *hevaṃ* with emphatic *h-*, cf. *hē.*

(b) *ese, vattabbe*, nominatives in *-e*, cf. *-e, -i.*

(c) *-aṭṭha*, cf. the dative morpheme *-aṭa.*

(d) *dakkha* as an imperative, cf. *daku.*

4.2. Smith calls these features 'pre-Sinhalese'. This could be taken as meaning 'Sinhalese Pkt', thus supporting a belief that the *-e* forms were introduced into Kv in

Ceylon. A closer examination of Smith's words, however, and the context in which he wrote them makes it clear that he was suggesting no such thing. He was in fact commenting upon the statement made in the introduction to the Dictionary of the Sinhalese Language[14] that Sinhalese is descended from Ardha-Māgadhī. He noted that if this is so, then the Ardha-Māgadhī concerned is not the Old Ardha-Māgadhī of Lüders, nor the Ardha-Māgadhī of the Śvetāmbara canon. There are, however, the resemblances between Sinhalese and the language of Kv mentioned in §4.1.

4.3. Although Smith did not say so, all these features are traceable in the Aśokan inscriptions, in the Eastern versions.[15] When we add another Aśokan feature, *viz. paṭijānantaṃ* in agreement with *tava*[16] in the phrase *tena tava tattha h' etāya paṭiññāya h' evaṃ paṭijānantaṃ h' evaṃ nigahetabbe* (Kv 2, 24-25), it becomes very clear that these features of Kv are mainland (North Indian) dialect features, and their presence in Kv is consistent with the tradition that the text originated in Magadha. The fact that the same features are found in Sinhalese is consistent with the theory that colonists from Magadha went to Ceylon, although some Western features in Sinhalese indicate that some colonists came from Western parts of India too.[17]

4.4. The use of *dakkh-* as a present stem in the imperative form *dakkha*,[18] mentioned in §4.1, is not confined to Kv but is also found in the Niddesa.[19] The use of the stem is further exemplified in Kv in the present active participle *dakkhanto*.[20] This is also found in the Niddesa,[21] as is the middle participle *dakkhamāno*.[22] The same stem *dakkh* is also found in the Aśokan inscriptions,[23] which might be held to support the Eastern origin of Niddesa, but since forms from the present stem *dakkh-*are also found in the Vinaya, Dīgha-nikāya and Jātakas,[24] we may assume that the use of the stem was not as narrowly limited as Helmer Smith suggested.

5. *-e* forms in the *Kathāvatthu*

5.1. Kv consists of a discussion of certain statements, of which 500 were orthodox and 500 unorthodox according to the cty,[25] set in a frame-work of question and answer. The *-e* forms occur in both the statements and the framework, and are found on all but about 33 pages of the 628 pages of the PTS edition. It so happens that on those 33 pages the form of the dialogue does not require the use of the usual stock phrases which, as we shall see, make up the majority of the occurrences of the *-e* forms. It is noteworthy that the cty seems to recognise that there is a difference between the statements and the framework, because the very numerous *-e* forms in the latter are not commented upon, whereas the *-e* forms in the former are glossed by *-o* forms.

5.2. The *-e* forms in the statements are restricted to the repetitions of the stock phrase *ese se ekaṭṭhe same samabhāge* (or *sabhāge*) *tajjāte* discussed in §2.4, and another example which, although recognised by the cty as such, is probably to be taken otherwise : *upalabbhati kehici puggalo, kehici na puggalo* (Kv 24, 27), and *puggalo kehici upalabbhati, kehici na upalabbhati* (Kv 24, 29 and 25, 17), translated, "Of that which is known some is 'person', some is not 'person'."[26] This translation is based upon the cty, which states : *atha kho ke hi ci puggalo ke hi ci na puggalo. tattha kokāraṭṭhe kekāro, hikāro ca nipātamatto. koci puggalo koci na puggalo ti, ayaṃ pan' ettha attho*,[27] *i.e. kehici* is taken not as the instrumental plural of the indefinite pronoun (made by adding *ci* to

the interrogative pronoun), but as a Māgadhī version of the nominative singular of the indefinite, with the particle *hi* being inserted between *ke* (the Māgadhī form of *ko*) and *ci*.

5.3. Such a division of *ke/ko* and *ci* cannot, to my knowledge, be paralleled elsewhere in the Pāli canon, and it seems clear that the commentator, or the earlier cty he was following, was mistaken here. There seems to be no reason for seeing here anything other than an instrumental plural (or possibly a locative plural, which was in *-ehi* in Māgadhī). We should, therefore, translate, "A person exists in some respects; he does not exist in other respects."

5.4. Many of the occurrences of *-e* forms in the framework of Kv are merely repetitions. In particular, the statement made by the second speaker (hereafter=SP 2) when he disagrees with a statement made by the first speaker (=SP 1),[28] viz. *na h' evaṃ* (probably to be read as *hevaṃ*[29] (see §4.1)) *vattabbe*, occurs some hundreds of times.[30] Similarly, the conclusion of SP 1 that if a certain admission is made then something is, or is not, the case: *hañci...*, *tenta vata re vattabbe*, or *no vata re vattabbe* also occurs many times.[31] A variant of this, where *hañci* does not occur, is found less frequently: *no ce pana vattabbe . . .*, *no ca vata re vattabbe*.[32] In this phrase *-e* forms occur in both the protasis and the apodosis, whereas in the *hañci* phrase *-e* forms occur only in the apodosis.

5.5. When SP 2 agrees with SP 1 he replies "*āmantā*",[33] which presumably stands for "*āmantā, hevaṃ vattabbe*", for when SP 1 is repeating SP 2's words he says: *yaṃ tattha vadesi "vattabbe kho '. . .' no ca vattabbe '. . .' "*, *micchā*.[34] Except in the phrases mentioned in §5.4, and these repetitions of SP 2's words, SP 1 does not use the word *vattabbe* but says *vattabbaṃ*, *e.g.* in his frequent question "*na vattabbaṃ?*",[35] and his conclusion "*tena hi na vattabbaṃ*".[36]

5.6. The contrast between SP 1's dialect with its *vattabbaṃ* forms, followed immediately by SP 2's dialect with *vattabbe*, is very marked and gives the impression that the difference is intentional, and is meant to distinguish the two speakers. If this was the intention, however, it is clear that the distinction had become rather blurred by the time the text was fixed in its present form, since, as stated in §5.4, certain *-e* forms are illogically but consistently found in SP 1's language.

5.7. The fact that the use of both *-e* and *-o* forms by SP 1 in the framework had already been standardised by the time that the form of the text had been fixed, whereas the statements are all in an *-o* dialect, with the exception of the stock phrase discussed in §5.2, suggests that Tissa made use of an already-existing dialogue framework when he refuted the heresies at the Third Council. There is, therefore, at least the possibility that he also made use of earlier statements, *e.g.* the *Puggalakathā*. This would help to explain why Kv, despite its apparently late origin, was accepted as canonical, and would account for the fact that Kv is attributed to the Buddha although Tissa is said to have uttered it.[37]

5.8. The other *-e* forms in the framework of Kv are:

(a) *niggahetabbe* (Kv 2,25; 4,1; 7, 13)
(b) *ese dunniggahīte* (Kv 3,10; 6, 23)
(c) *ye kate niggahe se niggahe dukkate, sukate paṭikamme* (Kv 4, 16-17; 7, 28-29). These are found only in the *Puggalakathā*.

5.9. Outside the *Puggalakathā*, *i.e.* from p. 69 to p. 628, the only *-e* forms in the framework, with two exceptions, are SP 1's *hañci . . ., tena vata re vattabbe* or *no vata re vattabbe*, and SP 2's *na hevaṃ vattabbe pe* (where *pe* refers to the repetition of SP 2's words by SP 1, as described in § 5.5). The exceptions are two passages in *vagga* I.6 and *vagga* III. 10, where the repetition of SP 2's words is given in full, as well as (in the latter passage) a clause introduced by *no ce pana* with an *-e* form in the protasis, as mentioned in § 5.4.

5.10. In the latter *vagga*-s of Kv the framework of the dialogue has become so stereotyped and abbreviated that it would have been a simple matter for additional statements to be added to the text in a manner entirely consistent with the earlier portions, right up to the time when the number of statements in the text was fixed by reference to them in Buddhaghosa's cty, or rather the cty upon which his was based.

5.11. Law was of the opinion that the cty upon the *Puggalakathā* and a few following *kathā*-s was really important, while the rest was a gradual accretion to the text itself.[38] This probably represents the state of affairs with Kv also, the *Puggalakathā* being the nucleus, with additional chapters being added to deal with new heresies, as Winternitz suggested.[39] The smaller number of *-e* forms in the later *vagga-s* would suggest that they were not composed at the same time as *Puggalakathā*. If we accept the suggestion that this *kathā* is the earliest in time, then we must conclude that since this shows more *-e* forms than *vagga*-s composed after it, such forms cannot be due to the influence of the Sinhalese Pkt, but must result from an earlier contact with an *-e* dialect. which could have been Māgadhī or some other Eastern dialect.

6. Conclusions

6.1. The *-e* forms quoted from the (*Sīhala-*) *Aṭṭhakathā* by Buddhaghosa in Mp were quoted in that form because he recognised them as quotations from Kv or some other text which included *-e* forms.

6.2. One of the *-e* forms quoted by the author of Pj I was taken from an unknown text which contained *-e* forms, and was perhaps the source of the *-e* forms in D II 278-79.

6.3. There are clear affinities between the language of Kv and that of the Eastern Aśokan inscriptions, supporting the view that Kv was first uttered in Magadha.

6.4. The affinities between the language of Kv and Sinhalese arise from the colonisation of Ceylon by settlers from Eastern India.

6.5. All the statements in Kv, heretical or otherwise, are in Pāli, except for the repeated stock phrase *ese se ekaṭṭhe same samabhāge tajjāte.* which was probably borrowed from Māgadhī.

6.6. The framework of Kv shows two speakers using dialects which were probably completely differentiated at some earlier date, but which by the time of the fixing of the text in its present form had become mixed, but in a very consistent way.

6.7. The fact that the framework seems to show a history of development perhaps means that Tissa adopted an already-existing pattern of dialogue for Kv.

6.8. The structure of Kv is such that new sections could be added in a style consis-

tent with the earlier portions at any time up to the composition of Rv-a, or the *Sīhalaraṭṭhkathā* upon which it is based.

6.9. The wider range of *-e* forms in the framework to the *Puggalokathā* support the view that it was composed at a different time from the remainder of Kv.

6.10. If the *Puggalakathā* is the nucleus of Kv then the *-e* forms are due to the influence of Māgadhī, not of Sinhalese Pkt.

NOTES

1. *Abbreviations* : CPD = Critical Pāli Dictionary; PTC = Pali Tipiṭaka Concordance; (J) PTS = (Journal of the) Pali Text Society; Pkt = Prakrit; cty/cties = Commentary/Commentaries; s. v (v). = under the entry/entries. Kv = Kathāvatthu, Mp. etc. see note 4.

2. Nominative singular forms in *-e* in Pāli were recognised as borrowings from Māgadhī by E.W.A. Kuhn (*Beiträge zur Pali Grammatik*, Berlin 1875, p. 9) and V. Trenckner (*Notes to the Milinda-pañha*, London 1879, p. 75 = *JPTS* 1908, p. 128).

3. CPD, Vol. I, p. 471, s. v. *avitakka.*

4. Text abbreviations are as in CPD. References are to PTS editions.

5. K. R. Norman, 'Pāli and the language of the heretics', *Acta Orientalia*, vol. XXXVII, pp. 117-26.

6. The phrase occurs Kv 26-28 (15 times); 119-20 (4 times); 159-62 (10 times); 358 (once).

7. Dīp VII 56; Mhv V 278.

8. As 3, 25-28.

9. The reading *ese se* in Kv is confirmed by the gloss : *ese se ti eso so yevā ti. eso so ti pi pāṭho. eso so yevā ti* (Kv-a 21, 32-22, 1).

10. The reading *sa-bhāge* occurs at Kv 358, 5 and is a variant reading at Kv 119, 37 (see foot note).

11. There is the occasional discrepancy in the citations of canonical texts in Kv (Shwe Zan Aung and Mrs. Rhys Davids, *Points of Controversy* being a translation of Kathāvatthu, London 1915, p. xxx note 3). It is therefore possible that the difference here between Kv and Mp arises from a mistake on the part of the author of Kv.

12. Buddhaghosa's authorship of Pj I has been disputed (see Ñāṇamoli, *Minor Readings and Illustrator*, London 1960, pp. x-xv). For the purposes of this present study it does not matter whether it was composed by him or not, since the same translation technique may be assumed in either case.

13. Helmer Smith, 'Wilhelm Geiger et le vocabulaire du sinhalais classique', *JAs* 1950, p. 184.

14. pp. xix-xx.

15. See E. Hultzsch, *Inscriptions of Asoka*, Oxford 1925, Index s. vv. *hevaṃ, ese, vataviye, aṭhaṃ, dakhatha.*

16. For the agreement between the accusative present participle *paṭi-jānantaṃ* and the genitive *tava* see the analysis of accusative absolute forms in K. R. Norman, 'Aśoka and Capital Punishment', *JRAS* 1975, pp. 22-24.

17. See Wilhelm Geiger, *A Grammar of the Sinhalese language*, Colombo 1938, p. 2,

18. Kv 3, 11; 6, 24.
19. Nidd II 204, 15.
20. Kv 216, 31-218, 2.
21. Nidd I 308, 6; II 99, 12.
22. Nidd II 211, 26.
23. See Hultzsch, *op. cit.*, Index s. vv. *dakhati*, etc.
24. See PTC, vol. II. pp. 285 and 288, s. vv. *dakkhati*, *dakkhitāya*, and *dakkhitu*.
25. Buddhaghosa states : *sakavāde pañca suttasatāni paravāde pañca* (Kv-a 7, 3-4). He repeats this statement at As 4, 27-28, but according to W. Gèiger (*Pāli Literatur und Sprache*, Strassburg 1916, p. 6), Kv contains the refutation of 252 heretical statements.
26. Shwe Zan Aung and Mrs. Rhys Davids, *op. cit.*, p. 22.
27. Kv-a 20, 11-13.
28. SP 1 is sometimes the Theravādin and sometimes the opponent. As Shwe Zan Aung and Mrs. Rhys Davids point out (*op. cit.*, pp. lii-liii), the cty usually, but not always, indicates who is speaking, but it is not always possible to be certain of the speaker's identity.
29. Where *hevaṃ* occurs as second word in a clause, particularly after *na*, it may stand for *h (i) evaṃ*. Where it occurs as first word in a clause, it must be *hevaṃ*, *e.g. hevam eva tattha dakkha* (Kv 3,11); *hevaṃ paṭijānantā*, *hevaṃ niggahetabbā* (Kv 3, 15-16).
30. Kv 1, 8 *et passsim.*
31. Kv 1, 10 *et passim.*
32. Kv 1, 12 *et passim.*
33. Kv 1, 5 *et passim.*
34. Kv 1, 13 *et passim.*
35. Kv 29, 9 *et passim.*
36. Kv 64, 14 *et passim.*
37. As 4, 3-35.
38. B. C. Law, *The Debates Commentary*, London 1940, p. vi.
39. Maurice Winternitz, *A History of Indian Literature*, vol. II, Calcutta, 1933, p. 170.

25

Meat-Eating and the Rule of—Tikoṭiparisuddha

CHANDRA SHEKHAR PRASAD

Eating meat and fish is a common practice among the monks of Theravāda Buddhist community. In the Pali scriptures and also in the corresponding Sanskrit and Chinese scriptures of early Buddhist schools,[1] there are ample references, direct and indirect, to show that the practice had come down from the time of Buddha. At the time of the Buddha people were non-vegetarian, and flesh and fish were regarded as wholesome food. The Buddha and his monk disciples went daily from house to house begging alms and accepted whatever was offered in alms by the householders.

The Buddha turned down the suggestion of making the prohibition of meat and fish hard and fast for the monks.[2] As listed by the Buddha, the abstinence from meat and fish comes under the austere practices (*ku hsing fa*) observed by certain *samaṇas* and *brāhmaṇas*.[3] It is said on the basis of the accounts of Mahāparinibbāna sutta of *Dīgha Nikāya* that the Buddha died as a result of eating pork offered by Cunda with a view to helping him recoup from illness. The term used for pork there is *sukaramaddava*. There is a controversy regarding this meaning of the term. In his commentary, *Sumaṅgalavilāsinī*, Buddhaghosa explains the term as the meat of a not-so-young and not-so-old but grown-up pig. At the same place he adds that some think it to be a rice and milk preparation, while others hold it to be medically treated food.[4] Some of the modern scholars agree with the latter interpretation on the ground that such a food was more suitable to the physical condition of the Buddha, though it made him suffer from dysentery.[5] In the corresponding Chinese *Sūtra* there is the story of Cunda serving the Buddha and Saṅgha with food which included a special preparation of fungus grown on sandal trees (ears of the sandal-wood tree) for Buddha.[6]

Whatever the term *sukaramaddava* may signify, the fact remains that the Buddha and his monk disciples accepted meat and fish in alms. However, the Buddha asked the

monks to be sure of its "blamelessness" in three ways in accordance with the rule of *tikoṭiparisuddha*. Meat and fish, "blameworthy" in three ways, were not suitable for the monks. In this paper we shall discuss on the basis of scriptural accounts available in the Pali, Sanskrit and Chinese versions of *Sūtra* and *Vinaya* of the early Buddhist schools the raison *d'etre* of promulgating the rule, the scriptural meaning of the terms, the limitations of the rule and the attitude towards eating meat and fish in the time of Buddha and after.

How did the rule come to be promulgated?

The rule of *tikoṭiparisuddha*—blameless in three ways—was promulgated after the episode of Sīha. We find this episode in the different versions of *Sūtra* and *Vinaya* in full or with some omissions. According to the Pali *Vinaya*, Sīha, the general, was a lay devotee of Niganṭhanātaputta. Hearing about the praises bestowed upon the Buddha he became anxious to see him. When he told his teacher about his resolve, the latter tried unsuccessfully to dissuade him on the ground that the Buddha was preaching the doctrine of inaction (*akiriyavāda*). He went to the Buddha and listened to him. He was so convinced by his arguments against the charge of being a believer in the doctrine of inaction that he offered himself to be a lay devotee and was readily accepted. He then invited the Buddha and his company of monks for a meal in his house next day. When they went to his house he served them with good rich food which included meat. In fact, the meat was procured from market (*pavattamaṃsa*) and cooked in the house but the followers of Niganṭhānātaputta spread the rumour that Sīha had a big animal (*thūla pasu*) killed specially for the sake of the Buddha and his company of monks and the Buddha ate the meat knowing that it was prepared by killing an animal specially brought for the occasion (*uddissakataṃ maṃsaṃ*) and thereby he committed the offence of motivated action (*paṭiccakammaṃ*). When this was reported to Sīha he accused them of being in the habit of falsely accusing the Buddha. And the Buddha, after going back from his house, convened a gathering of the monks on that pretext and enjoined on them that a monk 'should not eat such meat about which he has any inkling that it has been prepared by killing a being specially for his sake; whosoever eats it will be guilty of unedifying act (*dukkaṭa*). He allowed the monks to eat meat and fish blameless in three ways—not seen, not heard and not suspected (*na bhikkhave jānaṃ uddissakataṃ maṃsaṃ paribhuñjitabbaṃ. Yo paribhuñjeyya āppatti dukkaṭassa. Anujānāmi bhikkhave tikoṭiparisuddhaṃ macchamaṃsaṃ adiṭṭhaṃ asutaṃ aparisaṅkitan'ti*).[7]

Except the Mahāsāṅghika *Vinaya*, the other versions of *Vinaya* have also incorporated the above episode of Sīha ending with the promulgation of rule. In the Sanskrit version of Mūla Sarvāstivāda *Vinaya*, the wording of the rule is slightly different—allow, O monks, to eat three types of suitable meat (*bhikśava strīṇi kalpikāni māṃsāni paribhoktavyānīti vadāmi*). What are three? These are not seen, not heard and not suspected (*adṛṣṭaṃ, aśrutaṃ aparivitarkaṃ*).[8] The Chinese versions of *Vinaya* present the rule in the form—allow to eat (should eat/there are) three types of blameless meat. What are three ? (If) not seen (from eyes), (if) not heard (from ears) and (if) not suspected (in mind).[9]

In the *Sūtra* also we come across the rule in the *Aṅguttara Nikāya* but it ends there with the Buddha's return from Siha's house and there is no reference to the promul-

gation of the rule.[10] A parellel to this we find in the *Madhyamāgama* (Chinese). The episode comes to an end with Siha's conversion and it does not even tell about his invitation to the Buddha for a meal next day and so on.[11] In the *Majjhima Nikāya*, although there is no explicit reference to the followers of Niganṭhanātaputta, the above allegation against the Buddha was reported to him and a clarification was sought from him by Jīvaka, the royal physician of Magadha. The Buddha told him that whosoever spread the rumour did it mischeviously and posed a question as to how those who practice indiscriminately towards all beings *mettā* (friendship), *karuṇā* (compassion), *muditā* (joy) and *upekkhā* (equanimity) with no limit to their extent would be instrumental in inflicting harms on them. He also told him that he allowed the monks to accept meat and fish blameless in three ways. If a layman serves monks with meat blameworthy in three ways, he would incur bad consequences.[12] In the *Āgamas* the above portion is lacking.

Scriptural meaning of the terms

The rule in different versions, as it stands by itself, is quite clear. However, by a comparative study we come to some significant differences. For *tikoṭiparisuddhaṃ macchamaṃsaṃ*, the Sanskrit version of *Vinaya*, has *trīṇi kalpikāni māṃsāni*. The Chinese version of *Vinaya* refers to three types of blameless meat (*san chung ching rou*). The difference in the expressions lies in the fact that in the first, three terms—*adiṭṭham asutam aparisaṅkitaṃ*—together refer to a type of blameless meat acceptable to monks, whereas in the other two, each of the three separately makes such a type. And that is why, it is *maṃsaṃ* in singular in the first and *trīṇi māmsāni* in plural or three types of meat in the others. However, this difference, which is one of defining and classifying the same thing, does not bring in any material difference in the meaning and scope of the rule.

Further, the Sanskrit version has *kalpikāni* in place of *parisuddhaṃ* or *ching*—blameless. The Pali equivalent, *kappiya* in the context of *maṃsa* stands for meat other than that of the ten prohibited beings.[13] But *kalpika* does not have such a sense in this particular context.

Turning to the three terms—*adiṭṭhaṃ*, *asutaṃ*, *aparisaṅkitaṃ*, we find that the Sanskrit and Chinese versions of *Vinaya* have also elaborated them. The lacunae in the Pali *Vinaya* has been filled up by its commentary, *Samantapāsādikā*. The Sanskrit version explains *adṛṣṭaṃ* as 'not seen myself that meat has been prepared (by killing a being) for my sake' (*mīmuddiśya kṛtamiti sanmukhamadṛṣṭaṃ*). And *aśrutaṃ* as not heard the same as in the case of *adṛṣṭaṃ* (*aśrutaṃ tvāmuddiśya kṛtamiti*).[14] In the Chinese version of *Vinaya pu chien* (not seen) is explained slightly differently as 'not seeing oneself that a being (or an animal) has been deprived of life for my (or your, one's) sake' and *pu t'ing* (not heard) as 'not hearing from a reliable person (or lay devotee) that a being (or an animal) has been killed for my (or your, one's) sake'.[15] The commentary explains the two terms identically with the difference that it has specific words, deer and fish (*migamaccha*) for being (or animal) but the portion, 'from a reliable person (or lay devotee)' is wanting in it.[16]

Unlike the first two terms, the last one *aparisaṅkitaṃ* (not suspected) has different but complementary materials in its details. The Sanskrit version of Mūla Sarvāstivāda

Vinaya states that *parivitarka*, the term used for *parisaṅkitaṃ* (suspected), arises on its own account that the meat has been prepared (by killing a being) specially for my sake (*svayamevamākāra parivitarka utpanno bhavati, māmuddiśya kṛtamiti*). When *parivitarka* does not arise on its own account, it is called *aparivitarka*.[17] According to some Chinese versions of *Vinaya*, *i che* (suspected) is to have pretexts to give rise to suspicion such as there being no butcher (or a butcher's house) there, there being no natural death in the house, the person (or host) being so evil that he can deprive being (or animal) of life for my sake. And *pu i* (not suspected) is the absence of pretexts to give rise to suspicion in mind, that is to say, there being a butcher (or a butcher's house) there, their being natural death of a being (or an animal) in the house, the person (or host) being so righteous that he cannot deprive being (or animal) of life.[18]

The Chinese version of Dharmagupta *Vinaya* has the pretexts further enumerated. According to this version, the suspicion arises if one sees the head, skin, fur, legs and blood of an animal in the house and further the man commits ten wrong deeds. One used to killing can kill for my sake. And if one does not see a head, etc. and further the man has ten virtues, he cannot take the life of a being at all for my sake. This is not suspected.[19]

The commentary has categorised *parisaṅkitaṃ* (suspected) into three, viz., *diṭṭhaparisaṅkitaṃ* (suspected after seeing), *sutaparisaṅkitaṃ* (suspected after hearing) and *ubhayavimuttaparisaṅkitaṃ* (suspected without seeing or hearing). The *diṭṭha-parisaṅkitaṃ* arises when one sees villagers going out with net, etc. and wandering about in the forest and next day when he goes to that village for alms, he gets meat and fish for his food. Dharmagupta's description comes under this category of *parisaṅkitaṃ*. And *sutaparisaṅkitaṃ* arises when one hears that (which he sees above). In the case of *ubhayavimuttaparisaṅkitaṃ*, the suspicion arises by itself (and not by seeing or hearing) when one goes to a village for alms and receives meat and fish for his food. Mūla Sarvāstivāda's description falls under this category of *parisankitaṃ*. When suspicion does not arise by seeing or by hearing or by itself, there will be no *diṭṭhaparisaṅkitaṃ*, no *sutaparisaṅkitaṃ* and no *ubhayavimuttaparisaṅkitaṃ* respectively.[20]

In China the Hanīyāna monks were allowed to eat meat of animals which died a natural death and also of animals killed by birds of prey or other savage creatures. These two types together with three types of blameless meat make five types of meat, but as the three types of blameless meat were treated there as one, the expression 'three types of blameless meat' remained valid and applicable and Yuan Chwang seems to have used it in its wider meaning and scope. Some other types of meat were also allowed and the number reached nine including five.[21]

It is also to be noted that the Chinese versions of *Vinaya* have included in 'the absence of pretexts' 'there being natural death of a being (or an animal) in the house'. The permission to eat meat of dead animals, therefore, appears to be an addition to the original in the Chinese version. The Pali accounts are not explicit about meat of dead animals. In a famine stricken area, the monks lived on meat of dead animals like elephant, horse, etc. When it was reported to the Buddha he asked the monks to refrain from taking meat of such animals[22] but not from meat of dead animals in general.

In the text of the rule there occurs only the word *bhikkhave* (monks). But there it

is a representative word and stands for persons, other than *bhikkhu, bhikkhunī* (nun), *sāmaṇera* (novice), *sāmaṇerī* (female novice) and sikhamānā (female novice on probation leading to her higher ordination).[23]

Limitations of the rule

Tikoṭiparisuddhaṃ (blameless in three ways) does not make meat unconditionally worth-eating. As the allegation, although false, against the Buddha was that he knowingly ate meat prepared by killing an animal specially for him (*uddissakataṃ maṃsaṃ*), he framed the rule to debar monks from eating such meat and thereby to restrain them from becoming instrumental in some way or other in the act of killing for eating meat. In its scope, there is no reference to ten kinds of being including human being whose meat was prohibited by the Buddha. The meat of such beings was called *akappiya* (unsuitable) and was also socially disapproved. While receiving meat, a monk has to ascertain from its colour and form (*rūpaṃ*) that it is not one of those prohibited animals. And also, as the flesh of prohibited animals resembles exactly that of other animals, (for example, meat of bear (*acchamaṃsaṃ*) resembles pork (*sūkaramaṃsaṃ*) it is desirable on his part to ask while receiving whether it is not the meat of one of those prohibited animals. His ignorance provided him no immunity against being censured even if he unknowingly ate meat of such animals.[24]

It is not always possible to know whether meat or fish is not prepared specially for him as there is no tradition to enquire about it. In case, a monk unknowingly eats meat prepared specially for him, his deed is not subject to censure because of his ignorance. A monk is censured for eating such meat only when he eats knowingly. The rule is that one who knows should not eat such meat.

Attitude towards meat in the time of Buddha and after

In the scriptures there is no reference to any case in which the Buddha or his disciples in the Saṅgha were criticised for eating meat. Even the allegation of the followers of Niganṭhanātaputta was not against eating meat as such but against eating meat prepared by killing an animal specially for him (*uddissakaṭaṃ maṃsaṃ*). Eating of meat and fish was social sanction in Lord Buddha's time. In fact, meat and fish were regarded as sumptuous food (*paṇīta bhojanaṃ*). Meat of beings prohibited for monks was not eaten except by the lower classes of people. The Buddha also prohibited it in order to avoid the criticism of people.

Opposition to eating meat and fish was first voiced inside the Saṅgha by Devadatta, when he sought the Buddha's consent to his five precepts including strict prohibition of meat and fish for monks.[25] He might have been inspired by the total prohibition observed among some *samaṇas* and *brahmaṇas*, but he in his favour did not point out to social appreciation for total prohibition or adverse criticism against eating. He simply reasoned that it would help monks develop content and so on of which the Buddha himself spoke very highly. However, from the fact that he had supporters who broke away, though for a short interval, from the Saṅgha under his leadership

on that issue, we come to the conclusion that there was a section in the Saṅgha in favour of prohibition of meat and fish diet.

The support to prohibition of meat and fish remained latent as long as the Saṅgha remained united and new tenets and ideals of Mahāyāna Buddhism did not creep in. But prior to it, the King Aśoka by his royal proclamation prohibited slaughter and took positive measures for the welfare of all beings and consequently restricted the eating of meat in his kingdom. Tormented and moved by unprecedented death and misery he brought upon the people in the sanguinary Kalinga war, Aśoka found solace in the compassionate teachings of the Buddha and his mind being completely changed he prohibited the killing of animals in his kingdom out of compassion for all forms of beings. His acts must have had deep and far reaching impact on the monks and also on the course of development of altruistic ideals and acceptance of ultimate oneness of all beings in Mahāyāna. In Mahāyāna the abstinence from eating meat and fish was taken seriously and among its *sūtras*, the *Laṅkāvatara* is the more vehement in denouncing it as unsuitable for Bodhisattvas. Unlike the different versions of *Vinaya*, in the *Āgamas* (in Chinese) the total omission of references to meat and fish may account for an attempt to get atleast the *Sūtra* rid of such material by the compilers under growing support to prohibition or by the translators in China where they were turned into Chinese.

In China where the Mahāyānic forms of Buddhism found favour, the emperor Wu of Liang proclaimed (511 A.C.) the abolition of liquour and meat in his kingdom. As a result, the use of meat was completely stopped in the precincts of temples and monasteries and thereafter the tradition continued among the Buddhists of China and Japan, where Buddhism came from China.[26]

The practice of eating meat and fish again came back with the development of Tāntric Buddhism. Meat and fish form the two of the five *ma*'s that are popularly known as *pañcamakāra*. In Tibet the prevalence of this practice among lamas has its justification in the Tāntric form of Buddhism which they accepted. In 14th century Tsong-kha-pa purged the community of the Kadampa sect of the esoteric excesses and established once again the practice of celebacy and strict monastic rules, but he did not prohibit the practice of eating meat. The present Dalai Lama in his book, *My Land and My People* (New York, 1962), p. 16, has justified the practice due to the severe cold climate of his country.

Conclusion

Eating meat and fish was not a taboo in the time of the Buddha. The wide knowledge of Sīha's episode lends support to its authenticity and also why the rule was promulgated. The complete agreement regarding its meaning and scope in the scriptures of early Buddhist schools goes to show sincere and honest handling of the common practice by Lord Buddha in India. As regards China, some new elements were introduced to suit the local condition but the inclination to adhere to the tradition is revealed by the retention of the number three intact.

In its true spirit the rule does not obsess monks with the idea of blameless and blameworthy in food, but simply restrains them from being instrumental in killing animals for meat, refrains them from the idea of killing being which

is the first of the precepts for monks and laymen. The rules prohibiting the eating of meat of socially disapproved beings made up for the limitations. In spite of these rules, the support to prohibition grew and reached its climax in the Mahāyāna period but it staged a come back in the Tāntric Buddhism for different reasons.[27]

NOTES

1. Corresponding to Pali Vinaya, there are Sanskrit, Chinese and Tibetan versions of Mūla Sarvāstivāda, Sanskrit and Chinese versions of Mahāsānghika and Chinese versions of Sarvāstivāda, Mahīśāsaka and Dharmagupta. Corresponding to Nikāyas, there are four Āgamas in Chinese but these belong to different schools.
2. *Vinaya Piṭakaṃ*, R.ed., II, pp. 196 f.; III, pp. 171 f.; *Taishō Shinshū Daizōkyō*, ed. J. Takakusu and K. Watanabe (Tokyo, 1924-29), XXII, 164a, 594b; XXIII, 24c, 264b.
3. *Taishō* I,441c-442a.
4. *Sumangala Vilāsinī*, Siamese ed., II, p. 221.
5. Fa Chow, "Sukara-Maddava and the Buddha's Death", *ABORI*, 1942, pp. 127-33; A. Waley, "Did Buddha Die of Eating Pork ?", *Melages Chinois et Buddhiques*, I, 1932, pp. 343-54; I.F. Fleet, "The Tradition about the Corporal Relics of Buddha", *JRAS*, 1906, p.881 note; Thomas Watters,*On Yuan Chwang's Travels in India* 629-45 A.D. (London, 1904), II, p.28.
6. *Taishō* I, 18b; Fa Chow, *op. cit.*, pp. 129-30.
7. *Vinaya Piṭakaṃ* I, pp. 233-38.
8. *Mūla Sarvāstivāda Vinayavastu*, ed. S. Bagchi (Darbhanga, 1967), I, p. 142.
9. *Taishō* XXII, 149c, 872b; XXIII, 190b, 264c-65b.
10. *Anguttara Nikāya*, R. ed., IV, pp. 179-88.
11. *Taishō* I, 440a-426.
12. *Majjhima Nikāya*, R. ed., I, pp. 368-71.
13. *Vinaya Piṭakaṃ* I, pp. 218-20 : 'man, elephant, horse, dog, snake, lion, tiger, leopard, bear and hyena'.
14. Same as 7.
15. Same as 8.
16. *Samantapāsādikā*, ed. Birbal Sharma (Nalanda, 1964-67), II, p. 607.
17. Same as 7.
18. Same as 8.
19. *Taishō* XXII, 872b.
20. *Samantapāsādikā* II, pp. 697-8.
21. Watters, *op. cit.*, I, pp.53-56.
22. Same as 12.
23. *Samantapāsādikā* II, p. 608.
24. *Ibid.*, p. 609.
25. Same as 2.
26. Akira Hirakawa, "Ahimsa", *Encyclopaedia of Buddhism*, ed. G.P. Malalasekera (Ceylon).
27. Chandra Shekhar Prasad, "Logic behind Allowing Meat-eating and Prohibiting it in Buddhism", *Transactions of the International Conference of Orientalists in Japan*, XVI, 1971, pp. 104-5.

26

Recent Progress in Vinaya Studies

CHARLES S. PREBISH

Modern Buddhological studies have been enhanced in recent years by the fruitful research of the many scholars who have focused their attention on the primary literature of Buddhism. To be sure, one of the most promising endeavours in understanding the historical, religious, philosophical, and social dimensions of Buddhism has been the textual approach in which "the texts are allowed to speak for themselves." Nevertheless, with so many differing aspects to examine, in the various Buddhist countries and Buddhist languages, the organization of this overwhelming corpus of literature has proved to be the researcher's dilemma and the bibliographer's nightmare. Of course we have several *specific* collections of catalogues, such as *A Complete Catalogue of the Tibetan Buddhist Canons*, edited by Hakuju Ui *et. al.*, *Hōbōgirin Fascicule Annexe* (*Tables du Taishō Issaikyō*), edited by Lévi, Takakusu, and Demiéville, and the like. Equally, we have works outlining the various manuscript collections, such as Hoernle's *Manuscript Remains of Buddhist Literature* found in Eastern Turkestan. However, with few exceptions (most notably Edward Conze's *The Prajñāpāramitā Literature*), almost no scholars have presented us with organizationally sound, functionally manageable bibliographic research aids to specific areas of investigation in Buddhism. Most certainly, such aids would enormously reduce the veritable "search and seizure" that scholars must encounter in their work.

It is my contention that this form of enterprise in Buddhist Studies must necessarily begin with basics, and in this regard, no aspect of Buddhist literature is more basic than the Tripiṭaka. Now within the Tripiṭaka (in the Nikāya Buddhist tradition), the first basket of texts comprises the Vinaya or rules of training and discipline for the monks and nuns on the individual level and the guidelines for monastic regulation on the institutional level. To summarize all the problematics inherent in Vinaya

study, historically, comparatively, and with a view towards its position in the Indian Buddhist sectarian movement is not germane here, and has been clearly stated elsewhere.[1] It is my intention in the following pages to present a bibliographical survey, with commentary, of primary and secondary Vinaya literature that has appeared since 1950.

Although Buddhological research in the West is well into its second hundred years, study of the early Buddhist saṃgha, and the monastic code governing it, remains in its infancy. In pursuits of this nature, it is customary to begin with an exposition emphasizing the difficulty of securing any historical data concerning ancient India. Dr. Pachow expresses it succinctly :

> They appear to possess little sense of what is called "history" in the modern sense of the term. We presume, that it was the habit of sages in ancient India to attach hardly any importance to chronology of events as we do to-day. Hence, we find that India did not make much progress in the development of a historical sense as China did in her old days. Being deprived of the facilities of authentic history, the workers in this field have to labour extremely hard; they have to sift the facts from a heap of legends, study the archaeological data, and investigate the original literature preserved in Chinese, Tibetan, and other languages and also to get confirmation from early foreign travellers who came to India mainly from China and Greece, with the hope that a flood of light may be thrown on unsolved problems and fairly reliable conclusions drawn from them.[2]

Dr. Pachow's statement, however, contains more than a mere indictment of India's historical sense, as he presents a terse but functional statement of the methodology necessary for the Vinaya scholar. Preliminary to exercising even the finest methodology, one must gather all the available research materials, and in the case of Vinaya literature, this proves no easy task. To date, there are only two works in print which systematically review a substantial portion of Vinaya literature : Lamotte's *Histoire du bouddhisme Indien des origines a l' ère Śaka* (section on the Vinaya-piṭaka, pp. 181-197) and Akira Hirakawa's *A Study of the Vinaya-Piṭaka.*

In the second century following Buddha's parinirvāṇa, Buddhism was beset by an extensive sectarian movement. Since André Bareau has already presented a rather definitive and discerning study of the various early Buddhist nikāyas, *Les sectes bouddhiques du petit véhicule,* I shall not review this topic here, but simply remark that it is quite difficult to read Bareau without concluding that doctrinal matters solely were responsible for the sectarian movement. Such an interpretation also follows from Bareau's *Les premiers conciles bouddhiques.* Other scholars have taken the opposite approach, Dr. Ankul Chandra Banerjee, for example, states :

> We are told that there was little matter of dispute on Dharma between the different sects but it was Vinaya on which they differed and this ultimately led to the origin of so many schools in Buddhism. Thus we find that the texts of the Āgamas or the Piṭakas were accepted more or less by all the schools, while those of the Vinaya varied in the different schools. Even in Buddha's life-time Vinaya, *i.e.*, rules of

> discipline, sometimes formed the subject-matter of dispute but it subsided at the instance [sic] of the Great Teacher. It, however, produced a result of far-reaching importance. The difference in the interpretation of the Vinaya rules became very serious to the masters of Vinaya (Vinayadharas) and was the occasion for their separation. Thus arose the different schools with the different rules of Vinaya.[3]

It should be noted that Banerjee offers no support or evidence to substantiate his statement. Such evidence could, however, be found, and I argue for such a conclusion elsewhere.[4] Nevertheless, it is not unreasonable to suppose that one should expect to find Vinayas for all (or at least the majority of) the nikāyas. This is clearly not the case, as many of these nikāyas were indeed short-lived, disappearing before they could leave anything more than scanty evidence of their existence. We find fully developed Vinayas of only a few schools; Mahāsāṃghika, Theravāda, Mahīśāsaka, Dharmaguptaka, and Mūlasarvāstivāda. Even a casual perusal of the records of the travels of the Chinese pilgrims Fa-hien and Hsüan-tsang reveals the schools just mentioned to be the most forceful and persistent of the early Indian Buddhist nikāyas. It cannot be mere coincidence that the schools with the most developed Vinayas prospered while the others dissipated, and with this in mind, we can turn to an examination of the recent Vinaya research published since 1950. This shall be done in two categories : (1) material which is primarily textual (editing, translating, etc.), and (2) material which is primarily secondary and interpretive.

Textual Materials

The textual materials concern only four schools of early Indian Buddhism : Theravāda, Mahāsāṃghika (primarily its subsect, the Lokottaravādins), Sarvāstivāda, and Mūlasarvāstivāda. These we shall take in order, following the pattern of listing the Paracanonical texts first (Prātimokṣa and Karmavācanā), the Canonical texts next (Sūtravibhaṅga, Skandhaka, and Appendices), and the Commentarial texts last.[5] In the Theravāda nikāya, the only Paracanonical text of note is that by Ñāṇamoli entitled simply *Pātimokkha* (Bangkok : The Social Science Association of Thailand, 1966). This volume has much value, as it also presents an English translation to accompany the Pāli text, arranged on facing pages. Although the translation is sometimes hard to follow, it affords us an opportunity to examine the insights of a practicing Buddhist, occasionally yielding fruitful results. In addition, several texts recited before and/or after the Pātimokkha recitation are included. In the Canonical text category, we can note only the final volume of Miss I.B. Horner's translation : *The Book of the Discipline* (vol. 6, Parivāra; London: Luzac & Co., Ltd., 1966). I cannot praise Miss Horner's work highly enough, as her translations consistently remain the finest that the Pali Text Society has to offer. Although she is equally at home working in the Nikāyas (*e.g.*, refer to her translation of the Majjhima Nikāya), Vinaya seems to have been the significant passion in her investigation of Theravāda Buddhism. Her translations are always clear, to the point, and faithful to the Pāli. They are extensively footnoted, constantly calling attention to important and/or parallel passages in other texts, and offer a great deal of help in understanding particularly difficult or technical issues. Yet

there is more ! Each volume is graced by a lengthy introduction in which Miss Horner outlines many problems (and often their solutions) which she uses as a springboard to set forth her own conclusions about the Vinaya, gleaned from many years of careful study, both textual and otherwise. It is only fitting that her work remian unchallanged in this area. Three publications fall into the Commentary category : one text and two translations. The text is one of Buddhaghosa's two famous Vinaya commentaries. His major work, *Samantapāsādikā* was earlier edited in seven volumes by Junjirō Takakusu, Makoto Nagai, and Kogen Mizuno. His secondary work, *Kaṅkhāvitaraṇī*, a commentary on the Pātimokkha, was edited in 1956 by Dorothy Maskell for the Pali Text Society (London : Luzac & Co. Ltd.). Each of Buddhaghosa's works has been the basis for sub-commentaries. Our second citation is a partial translation of the historical introduction to the Samantapāsādikā, carried out by N.A. Jayawickrama and titled *Inception to Discipline* (London : Luzac & Co., Ltd., 1962). Finally, we have an interesting translation of a Chinese text, the *Vibhāṣāvinaya* (*Taishō* 1462), by Bapat and Hirakawa (Poona, 1970). This text is essentially a Chinese version of the Samantapāsādika, previously noted as early as 1896 by Takakusu [6]

In the Mahāsāṃghika category we have six entries, comprising four texts and two translations, all in the Lokottaravādin subsect, and resulting from the manuscripts found in Tibet by Rāhula Sāṅkṛtyāyana. The first of these is a Sanskrit text of the monks' Prātimokṣa-sūtra, edited by W. Pachow and Ramakanta Mishra as "The Prātimokṣa Sūtra of the Mahāsāṃghikas". It appears in the *Journal of the Gaṅgānāth Jhā Research Institute*, X, 1-4 (1952-1953), Appendix 1-48, but was published in book form later (Allahabad, 1956). The edition of this text has been widely criticized, particularly by Gustav Roth, Jan de Jong, and myself.[7] On account of the difficult character of the manuscript, and the unusual features of the language, a new edition is necessary, and has been announced by N. Tatia. Pachow attempted a partial translation of the text, titled "Translation of the Introductory Section of the Text," published in *Journal of the Gaṅgānāth Jhā Research Institute*, XI-XII, 1-4 (1953-1955), pp. 243-48. Unfortunately, his translation is wrought with errors, and I have sought to correct these, as well as present a translation of the entire text, in my *Buddhist Monastic Discipline*: *The Sanskrit Prātimokṣa Sūtras of the Mahāsāṃghikas and Mūlasarvāstivādins* (University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1975). In this latter work, we become increasingly aware that our one source of real information on Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit grammar and vocabulary, namely Franklin Edgerton's *Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit Grammar and Dictionary*, is woefully inadequate. The grammar is limited by his lack of exposure to a wide variety of texts and the editing of new texts in the twenty-odd years since its publication, and the dictionary is tinged by the lack of understanding of Buddhism that this great philologist perpetrated on his audience. While the editing of the Mahāvastu, also a Lokottaravādin text, drove the great French scholar Emile Senart into a frenzy with its most peculiar language, we now have sufficient data to begin to unscramble this devastating but important dialect. Steps in that direction are taken as we examine the Canonical texts of the school. Much recent progress can be claimed by Gustav Roth in his *Bhikṣuṇī-Vinaya* (Patna : Kashi Prasad Jayaswal Research Institute, 1970). Appearing as volume XII of the *Tibetan Sanskrit Works Series* Roth's edition may well be the most important text of this kind to appear since Waldschmidt's pioneering work on

nuns' Vinaya in 1926. Roth makes more sense out of the Lokottaravādin's dialect than anyone, and his work is praised by even the most severe critics.[8] Not so fortunate, however, is Dr. B. Jinananda, who edited the Skandhaka work as Volume IX of the *Tibetan Sanskrit Works Series.* This volume carries the title *Abhisamācārikā Bhikṣuprakīrṇaka*) and was published in Patna by the Kashi Prasad Jayaswal Research Institute in 1969. One critic, at least, feels that Dr. Jinananda has made a mess out of this important text.[9] Also appearing in the *Tibetan Sanskrit Works Series* (as Volume XI) is Dr. Sanghasena's edition of the *Sphuṭārthā Śrīghanācārasaṃgrahaṭīkā* (Patna : Kashi Prasad Jayaswal Research Institute, 1968), a text primarily devoted to the śrāmaṇera. The importance of these Mahāsāṃghika-Lokottaravādin texts cannot be stressed enough, as the more we study them, the more we become convinced that the Mahāsāṃghikas offer us the earliest stratum of Vinaya literature, and the ramifications of such a conclusion are quite profound regarding the earliest history of Indian Buddhism. Furthermore, they present the most interesting grammar in any of the Sanskrit texts of Buddhism.

In the Sarvāstivādin category we have only three entries. First, there is Herbert Hartel's *Karmavācanā* (Berlin : Deutsche Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin. Institut für Orientforschung, 1956). This edition and translation of a series of Paracanonical texts appeared as Volume III of *Sanskrittexte aus den Turfanfunden,* and offers a wealth of excellent explanatory materials on the nature and function of the karmavācanā procedure. The other two entries regard Canonical texts. There is Valentina Rosen's *Der Vinayavibhaṅga zum Bhikṣu Prātimokṣa der Sarvāstivādins* (Berlin. : Deutsche Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin. Institut für Orientforschung, 1959). This edition and translation appeared as Volume II of the *Sanskrittexte aus den Turfanfunden.* In addition to editing the Sanskrit text, which is fragmentary, Professor Rosen makes excellent use of the Chinese version to furnish a superb German translation. Her non-textual material is well organized and thoroughly footnoted. She has also prepared the most useful concordance table of Vinaya rules that has appeared in print. The last entry is Ernst Waldschmidt's "Reste von Devadatta-Episoden aus dem Vinaya der Sarvāstivādins," appearing in *Zeitschrift der deutschen morgenländischen Gesellschaft,* 113 (1963), pp. 552-58.

In the Mūlasarvāstivādin section we have six works which are worthy of note. The first three center around the Bhikṣu Prātimokṣa-sūtra of the school. Unearthed in the manuscript find at Gilgit were two Sanskrit texts, each containing a portion of the complete sūtra. The first (ms. no. 3) was edited and published by Ankul Chandra Banerjee as "Prātimokṣa Sūtram (Mūlasarvāstivāda)," in *Indian Historical Quarterly,* XXIX (1953), pp. 162-74, 266-75, and 363-77. It was later published in book form by Calcutta Oriental Press Ltd. in 1954, under the same title. Banerjee's edition was an altogether creditable job. His training and experience attest to his proficiency in working with Sanskrit materials. In addition, in 1949, he edited "Bhikṣukarmavākya," a manuscript also included in the Gilgit collection, affording him an opportunity to examine both the style of the Mūlasarvāstīvādin Vinaya texts and the general character of the Gilgit Sanskrit manuscripts. Banerjee's text, however, was somewhat fragmentary, and the gaps were filled by reconstructing from the Tibetan. Later, the gaps in the Sanskrit text were filled by another manuscript from Gilgit (no. 2), edited by Lokesh Chandra as "Unpublished Gilgit Fragment of the

Prātimokṣa-Sūtra, "*Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Süd-und Ostasiens*, IV (1960), pp. 1-13. Finally, the text was translated into English by Charles S. Prebish in *Buddhist Monastic Discipline : The Sanskrit Prātimokṣa Sūtras of the Mahāsāṃghikas and Mūlasarvāstivādins*. One other Paracanonical text, of the karmavācanā variety, is worthy of note here : the *Upasaṃpadājñaptiḥ*, edited by Dr. B. Jinananda as Volume VI of the *Tibetan Sanskrit Works Series* (Patna : Kashi Prasad Jayaswal Research Institute, 1961). The other two publications of the school are both canonical, one being a text and the other being a translation. The text is a re-edition of the *Mūlasarvāstivādavinayavastu* by S. Bagchi (Darbhanga : The Mithila Institute of Post-Graduate Studies and Research in Sanskrit Learning, 1967), issued as Volume 16 of the *Buddhist Sanskrit Text Series*. The translation is that of the Kaṭhinavastu, one of the chapters of the Skandhaka, published by Kun Chang as *A Comparative Study of the Kaṭhinavastu* ('S-Gravenhage : Mouton & Co., 1957). This latter text, published as Volume I of *Indo-Iranian Monographs*, offers, in addition to the translation, an introductory essay and a transliterated Tibetan text.

Secondary Materials

Between 1951 and 1955, Dr. W. Pachow published *A Comparative Study of the Prātimokṣa in Sino-Indian Studies*, Volumes IV, 1-4 and V, 1. This work was later issued in book form (Santiniketan : Sino-Indian Cultural Society, 1955). Although it did not receive an altogether favorable review,[19] perhaps because Pachow's key issues are often cloaked in what appears on the surface to be lax superficiality, much that Dr. Pachow discusses in the introductory portion of his text is both interesting and worthy of further development. In addition to the secondary material, Dr. Pachow offers a translation of the Sarvāstivādin Bhikṣu Prātimokṣa-sūtra. The translated text is compared, rule by rule, to those of the other nikāyas, and this is where Pachow encounters his most serious flaw. In presenting the comparative versions, he uniformly provides only a small phrase or insignificant reference; often overlooking entirely the main issue of a particular rule or an especially interesting bit of diversity between the various texts. Had Dr. Pachow explored more fully these main issues and disparate textual points, his work would have been of monumental importance for the Vinaya scholar. As presented, it is only conditionally useful. In 1952, Dr. Pachow, in conjunction with Ramakanta Mishra, published "The Prātimokṣa Sūtra of the Mahāsāṃghikas," in *Journal of the Gaṇgānāth Jhā Research Institute*, IX, 2-4 (1952), pp. 239-60, setting the stage for their Sanskrit edition of the same text (see above). Unfortunately, the article is only minimally successful, providing very limited results. Their remarks concerning the grammatical problems of the text are thoroughly unsatisfactory, and we are told nothing about the text itself. In 1952, we witness the beginnings of what later becomes a steady flow of research on the Vinaya from Japanese scholars. During that year, G. Nakano published "Indian Law as Found in the Vinayapiṭaka" in *Indogaku Bukkyōgaku Kenkyū* (i.e., *Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies*), I,1 (July, 1952), pp. 27-34. In 1953, Akira Hirakawa, perhaps the foremost Vinaya scholar in the world today, published "The Comparative Studies of the Prātimokṣasūtras," *Indogaku Bukkyōgoku Kenkyū*, I, 2 (March, 1953), pp. 394-95. This was followed in the next year by his "On the Formation of the Khandhaka of the Vinaya-piṭaka", in the same journal (II, 2, March,

1954, pp. 386-95). Later in 1954, Hirakawa also published "The Fundamental Truth from the Standpoint of Vinaya," again in *Indogaku Bukkyōgayu Kenkyū*, III, 1 (September, 1954), pp. 62-7. That issue of the journal also produced Tatsugen Satō's "A Study on Pārājika for Buddhist Monks," pp. 526-28. In 1955, Gokuldas De's *Democracy in Early Buddhist Saṃgha* (Calcutta : Calcutta University Press) again brought the Pāli Vinaya into the spotlight, presenting a series of translation from the Mahāvagga and offering some excellent explanatory materials (focussing primarily on the various historical stages of the ordination procedure, but also examining the requirements and disqualifications of candidates). Also in 1955, André Bareau published *Les premiers conciles bouddhiques* (Paris : Presses Universitaires) utilizing much Vinaya material to present the still definitive study of the various Buddhist councils. That same year witnessed two publications in *Indogaku Bukkyōgaku Kenkyū* : Akira Hirakawa's "On Translation of the Vinaya-piṭaka in China," III, 2 (March, 1955), pp. 398-405, and Mizumano Ishida's "On the Order Governing Nuns," III 2 (March, 1955), pp. 552-57. *The Earliest Vinaya and the Beginnings of Buddhist Literature* by Erich Frauwallner was published in 1956 as Volume VIII of *Serie Orientale Roma* (Rome : Instituto per il Medio ed Esteremo Oriente). This work presents much more and much less than it promises. Lamotte is correct in saying,

> The admirable work of Professor Frauwallner, comes to give one a brief résumé marking a considereble progress in our knowledge of Buddhist sources, but his conclusions cannot be accepted without restrictions,[11]

but Frauwallner's innovative genius and exhaustive presentation must be vigorously applauded. Frauwallner has shown us in his volume that comparative Vinaya study is an exciting dicipline, filled with all the snares and traps that make research in this area both challenging and exciting. Understandably so, his study will most probably remain the standard work on the Skandhaka texts for the immediate future. Also in 1956, Tatsugen Satō published "A Study of Saṅgha's Possessions in Vinayapiṭaka," *Indogaku Bukkyōgaku Kenkyū*, IV, 1 (Jaunary, 1956), pp. 110-11. The following year, this Japanese journal issued two articles of interest : Eishun Ikeda's "On the śīla and Vinaya doctrines by Unshō," V, 1 (January, 1957), pp. 122-23, and Masaya Kondō's "On the three Gāthās Preceding the Nidāna of Pātimokkha," V, 2 (March, 1957), pp. 492-93. In 1958, Akira Hirakawa published "The Construction of Bodhisattva-Saṃgha as seen from Vinayapiṭakas," *Indogaku Bukkyōgaku Kenkyū*, VI, 1 (January, 1958), pp. 34-43. The final article in the decade of the 1950s was Dev Raj Chanana's "The Vinaya Piṭaka and Ancient Indian Jurisprudence," published in *Journal of Bihar Research Society*, XLIV, 1-2 (March-June, 1958), pp. 22-36.

The decade of the 1960s was launched by Akira Hirakawa's *A Study of the Vinaya-Piṭaka* (Tokyo : Sankibo Busshorin, 1960). This masterful work is the most complete secondary volume on Vinaya yet written, utilizing all the Buddhist languages and literature, and will remain for some time the standard reference volume on Vinaya. Also in 1960, Shūko Tsuchihashi published "On the Vinaya text Shou-p'u-Sa-chieh-i from Tunhuang," in *Indogaku Bukkyōgaku Kenkyū*, VIII, 1 (January, 1960), pp. 33-42. In 1962 André Bareau published "La construction et le culte des stūpa d'aprés les Vinayapiṭaka," in *Bulletin de l 'Ecole Française d'Extréme-Orient*, L, 2

(1962), pp. 229-74. The following year "Zur Interpretation des Prātimokṣa-sūtra" by Dieter Schlingloff appeared in *Zeitschrift der deutschen morgenländischen Gesellschaft*, 113 (1963), pp. 536-51. In 1964, Hajime Sakurabe's "The Pravrajyā—and Upasampadā-karmavācanā as Found in Various Texts of the Mūlasarvāstivādin Vinaya" appeared in *Indogaku Bukkyōgaku Kenkyū* XII, 2 (March, 1964), pp, 496-504. *Indogaku Bukkyōgaku Kenkyū* also published two articles the following year : Shūko Tsuchihashi's "On a Fragment of Kamma-vāca from the Hsi-cheng K'ao-ku t'u-p'u," XIII. 1 (January, 1965), pp. 120-32, and "The Vinaya Text Ji-sei-ju-kai-sa-hō (Bodhisattva kammavāca) in the Moriya Collection" by the same author, XIV, 1 (December, 1965), pp. 42-7. By 1966, Gustav Roth had begun working on the Mahāsāṃghika-Lokottaravādin Vinaya texts brought down from Tibet by Rāhula Sāṅkṛtyāyana, and he published "Bhikṣuṇivinaya and Bhikṣu-Prakīrṇaka and Notes on the Language" in *Journal of the Bihar Research Society*, LII, 1-4 (1966), pp. 29-51. This important article proved to be a delightful discovery to me as I had no opportunity to examine it until after my Mahāsāṃghika Prātimokṣa-sūtra translation had been completed, and upon obtaining it, was pleased to learn that Roth, in working with the Bhikṣuṇī Vinaya of the same nikāya, had arrived at many of the same grammatical conclusions which I has already set forth in the notes to my translation. Also in 1966, Hideyo Nishino published "The Upasaṃpadājñaptiḥ of the Mūlasarvāstivādin Vinaya," *Indogaku Bukkyōgakū Kenkyū*, XV, 1 (December, 1966), pp. 188-89. 1967 witnessed one Vinaya publication, again in this important Japanese journal : Toshiyuki Ohtomo's "Some Problems in the Bodhisattva-prātimokṣa-sūtra," XV, 2 (March, 1967), pp. 616-17. In 1968, Gustav Roth continued his earlier Vinaya research with "Terminologisches aus dem Vinaya der Mahāsāṃghika-Lokottaravādin" in *Zeitschrift der deutschen morgenländischen Gesellschaft*, 118 (1968), pp. 334-48. During the same year, Oskar von Hinüber offered two items : "On the Interpretation of the Pāli Term Pavāraṇasaṃgha in the Vinaya Piṭaka," in *Journal of the Bihar Research Society*, LIV, 1-4 (1968), pp. 176-78, and *Studien zur Kasussyntax des Pāli besonders des Vinaya-piṭaka* (published in München). During the same period, Heins Bechert issued "Some Remarks on the Kaṭhina Rite" in *Journal of the Bihar Research Society*, LIV, 1-4 (1968), pp. 319-29. The final entry for the 1960s is Hideyo Nishino's "On Uposatha," *Indogaku Bukkyōgaku Kenkyū*, XVII (December, 1968), pp, 353-55.

The decade of the 1970s got underway with two publications by Shūko Tsuchihashi in *Indogaku Bukkyōgaku Kenkyū* : "A View on Vinaya," XIX (December, 1970), pp. 99-103, and "The Limitations of Vinaya," XXI (December, 1972), pp. 12-127. Also in 1972, G.S.P. Misra published *The Age of Vinaya* (New Delhi : Munshiram Manoharlal). In 1973, Charles Prebish published "Theories Concerning the Skandhaka : An Appraisal" in *The Journal of Asian Studies*, XXXII, 4 (August, 1973), pp. 669-78, and followed this in 1974 with "The Prātimokṣa Puzzle : Fact Versus Fantasy in *Journal of the American Oriental Society*, 94,2 (1974), pp. 168-76. Also in 1974, J.W. de Jong published "Notes on the Bhikṣuṇī-Vinaya of the Mahāsāṃghikas" in *Buddhist Studies in Honour of I.B. Horner* edited by L. Cousins, A, Kunst, and K.R. Norman (Dordrecht, Holland : D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1974), pp. 63-71.

Having now surveyed the recent research on Vinaya, several observations can be made regarding the field as a whole. The period up to 1900 seems to have been one

of preliminary preparation. Almost all of the publications furnished either editions or translations of text, or both, and roughly three-fourths of these dealt with the Theravādin tradition. As there was a great emphasis in Europe on the study of the Theravādin nikāya, primarily promoted by such scholars as Thomas W. Rhys Davids, Hermann Oldenberg, and Robert Childers, this focus was certainly not unexpected. During the period from 1900-25, nearly as many Vinaya works were published as in the preceding hundred years, but the emphasis was changing in two ways : first we find almost as many secondary studies (primarily articles) as textual editions and translation and second, interest began to shift away from the Theravādin tradition, which now merited only about one-third of the total publications. Largely through the research of scholars like Sylvain Lévi, Louis Finot, and Louis de la Vallée Poussin, study of the Sarvāstivādin tradition began to emerge as an independent discipline. Of course the added discovery of Sanskrit Vinaya fragments added momentum to this movement. The years 1926-1950 produced only slightly more Vinaya works than the preceding twenty-five years, again revealing about one-third of these studies devoted to the Theravādin nikāya and an equal emphasis on primary and secondary studies. Articles rather than books still occupied the overwhelming majority of the secondary studies. We might say that this period represented an interval of consolidation and further definition of the problems, foreshadowing the boom of the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s. The manuscript discoveries at Gilgit and in Tibet were a driving force in promoting new, active interest in Vinaya, and we are still experiencing it today. From 1950 to 1975, Vinaya study has exhibited a remarkable growth spurt. During this period, we find a fifty per cent increase, in terms of publication, over the preceding twenty-five years. Theravādin Vinaya study, once the giant, seems to have fallen out of vogue, perhaps coinciding with the general state of affairs in the Pali Text Society, and now finds itself receiving only about one-sixth of the market. In fact, the Mūlasarvāstivādin and Mahāsāṃghika nikāyas received as much attention during this period as the Theravādin nikāya. Full length Vinaya studies now compete with articles on equal footing, and the character of both forms of publication becomes general and interpretive rather than specific and simply informative, as before. It is only now that we can say with any assurance that Vinaya study has come of age.

NOTES

1. See my "Theories Concerning the Skandhaka ; An Appraisal" *The Journal of Asian Studies*, XXXII, 4 (August, 1973), 669-78, "The Prātimokṣa Puzzle : Fact Versus Fantasy," *Journal of the American Oriental Society*, 94, 2 (April-June, 1974), 168-76, and *Buddhist Monastic Discipline : The Sanskrit Prātimokṣa Sūtras of the Mahāsāṃghikas and Mūlasarvāstivādins* (University Park : The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1975).

2. W. Pachow, *A Comparative Study of the Prātimoksa* in *Sino-Indian Studies*, IV, I, p. 18.

3. Ankul Chandra Banerjee, *Sarvāstivāda Literature* (Calcutta : Calcutta Oriental Press Ltd., 1957), p. 30.

4. See my article (co-authored with Janice Nattier), "Mahāsāṃghika Origins :

The Beginnings of Buddhist Sectarianism," *History of Religions*, 16, 3 (February, 1977), pp. 237-272.

5. See the schemata in my book *Buddhist Monastic Discipline*, p. 10.

6. See Junjirō Takakusu, "Pāli Elements in Chinese Buddhism. A Translation of Buddhaghosa's Samantapāsādikā, a commentary, on the Vinaya, found in the Chinese Tripiṭaka," *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society*, New Series XXVIII (1896), pp. 415-39.

7. See Gustav Roth, "Bhikṣuṇīvinaya and Bhikṣu-Prakīrṇaka and Notes on the Language," *Journal of the Bihar Research Society*, LII, 1-4 (1966), pp. 29-51 or Roth, Terminologisches aus dem Vinaya der Mahāsāṃghika-Lokottaravādin, *Zeitschrift der deutschen morgenländischen Gesellschaft*, 118 (1968), pp. 334-48, as well as J.W. de Jong, "Notes on the Bhikṣuṇī-Vinaya of the Mahāsāṃghikas," in *Buddhist Studies in Honour of I.B. Horner*, edited by L. Cousins, A. Kunst, and K.R. Norman (Dordrecht, Holland : D. Reidal Publishing Company, 1974), pp. 63-71, and my *Buddhist Monastic Discipline*.

8. See de Jong, "Notes on the Bhikṣuṇī-Vinaya of the Mahāsāṃghikas," p. 64.

9. *Ibid.*

10. The Review, by Kun Chang, was published in *Journal of the American Oriental Society*, 80 (1960), pp. 71-7.

11. Étienne Lamotte, *Histoire du bouddhisme indien des origines à l' ére Śaka* (Louvain : Publications Universitaries, 1958), p. 195.

27

Zen and the Taming of the Bull
Brief Comparison of Theravāda and Zen

WALPOLA RĀHULA

Introductory books on Zen usually contain ten or six drawings called "Oxherding Pictures", depicting a story of taming an unruly, wild bull.[1] These pictures were drawn by some Zen masters of old, notably by Kaku-an and Jitoku of the 12th century. Here the bull represents the mind and the herdsman who tames the bull is the *yogi*, the person engaged in meditation.

It is significant that this simile of the taming of the bull goes back to very ancient times. Discussing the import of the expression *araññagato vā rukkhamūlagato vā suññāgāragato vā* "gone to a forest or gone to the root of a tree or gone to an empty (quiet) house (room)" occuring in the *Satipaṭṭhāna-sutta*, the Pali Commentaries elaborate :

"This bhikkhu's mind (*i.e.* the meditator's mind), which was for a long time scattered among such objects as visible forms (*rūpādisu ārammaṇesu*) does not like to enter into the path (street) of a subject of meditation (*kammaṭṭhāna-vīthi*), but runs only into a wrong path like a chariot yoked to an untamed (unruly) bull. Just as a herdsman, who desires to break in an untamed calf grown up with all the milk it has drunk from the untamed (mother) cow, would remove it from the cow, and having fixed a big post on a side would tie the calf to it with a rope; and then that calf of his, struggling this way and that way, being unable to run away, may sit down or lie down close to the post; in the same way, this bhikkhu (*i.e.* the meditator), who desires to tame the villainous mind grown up by drinking for a long time the pleasures of sense-objects such as visible forms, should remove it from such sense-objects as visible forms, and having gone to a forest or to the root of a tree or to an empty house, should tie it to the post of the object of the presence of mindfulness (*satipaṭṭhānārammaṇatthambha*) by the rope of mindfulness (*sati-yotta*). Then that mind of

his, even after it has struggled this way and that way, not finding the object previously indulged in, and being unable to break the rope of mindfulness and run away, sits down and lies down close to that same object (of mindfulness) by way of neighbourhood concentration and attainment concentration (*upacārappanāvasena*). Hence said the Ancients (*porāṇā*) :

"Just as a man would tie to a post
A calf that should be tamed,
Even so here should one tie one's own mind
Tight to the object of mindfulness."[2]

In this commentarial simile the herdsman fixes a post and ties the calf to it whereas the bull in the Zen pictures is tied to a tree.

The two Commentaries where this simile occurs are the Pali translations done by Buddhaghosa Thera in the 5th century A.C. of the original Sinhala Commentaries which go back to the 3rd century B.C.[3] The Ancients, (*porāṇā*), anonymous great masters, referred to in the passage quoted above (and in numerous other places in the Pali Commentaries), may be even earlier than the Sinhala Commentaries themselves, *i.e.* earlier than the 3rd century B.C. In this passage the last verse, attributed to these Ancients, contains in miniature the simile of the calf. Thus the story of the taming of the bull may perhaps be traced back to a period even earlier than the 3rd century B.C.

The Ancients, (*porāṇā*), had compared tersely and concisely in four short lines the training of the mind to the taming of the calf. The commentators enlarged it with more details and explanations. Zen masters developed and elaborated the same idea, depicting through the medium of beautiful drawings the fascinating story of the gradual training, purification and perfection of the mind. There seems to have been a common Buddhist tradition behind this development. Elsewhere I have indicated that both the Theravāda and the Mahāyāna seemed to have followed a common commentarial tradition.[4]

In the "Oxherding Pictures", the ox is black at the beginning, but in the course of its taming and training it gradually becomes white until finally it is completely white. The underlying idea is that the mind, which is naturally pure, is polluted by extraneous impurities and that it could and should be cleansed through discipline and meditation.

There are in the *Aṅguttara-nikāya*[5] two very important and essential *suttas* which may serve as index to the concept of the black ox gradually becoming white.

One *sutta* says : *Pabhassaram idaṃ bhikkhave cittaṃ, tañ ca kho āgantukehi upakkilesehi upakkiliṭṭhaṃ.* "Bhikkhus, this mind[6] is luminous and it is defiled by adventitious defilements." The other one says : *Pabhassaram idaṃ bhikkhave cittaṃ, tañ ca kho āgantukehi upakkilesehi vippamuttaṃ.* "Bhikkhus, this mind is luminous, and it is freed from adventitious defilements." Further, these two *suttas* state that there is no cultivation of the mind (*citta-bhāvanā*) for the uninstructed ordinary man who does not understand this exactly as it is, but that there is the cultivation of the mind for the instructed noble disciple who understands this exactly as it is.

It is interesting and instructive to note here that there is a striking agreement bet-

ween this concept of *cittu* in the two *suttas* above and the Mahāyāna doctrine of the *tathāgatagarbha. Citta* is qualified by the Pali word *pabhassara.* The *Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra,* (a Mahāyāna sūtra of a later date than the *Aṅguttara-nikāya* and which has greatly influenced Zen), qualifies *tathāgatagarbha* by the corresponding Sanskrit word *prabhāsvara* "luminous." It says that the *tathāgatagarbha* is *prakṛtiprabhāsvara* "luminous by nature" and *prakṛtipariśuddha* "pure by nature," but appears impure "because it is defiled by adventitious defilements" (*āgantukleśopakliṣṭatayā*).[7] (Cf. the Pali expession in the two *suttas* above: *āgantukehi upakkilesehi upakkiliṭṭhaṃ*). In the *Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra* the term *tathāgatagarbha* is used as a synonym for *ālayavijñāna.*[8] Now, *ālayavijñāna* is another term for *citta.*[9] So the *Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra* statement that the *tathāgatagarbha* is "luminous by nature" and "pure by nature" and that it is "defiled by adventitious defilements" is tantamount to saying that *citta* "mind" is "luminous by nature" and "pure by nature" and that it is "defiled by adventitious defilements." Thus, it is obvious that the concept of the "Oxherding Pictures" is derived from Pali and Sanskrit *sūtras* as well as from the ancient commentaries and that it was later elaborated into a set of graphic drawings.

The fundamental principle of Zen is evidently based on *Satipaṭṭhāna* (Skt. *Smṛtyupasthāna*) common to both Theravāda and Mahāyāna systems. The main purpose of *zazen* in Zen is the same as that of *ānāpānasati* in *Satipaṭṭhāna.* In *ānāpānasati* one sits cross-legged and concentrates one's mind on breathing in and out. At the first stage of its development in *jhāna* (Skt. *dhyāna*), passionate desires and some impure thoughts are dispelled and feelings of joy and happiness remain along with certain mental activities. In the second stage, all intellectual activities are suppressed, tranquility and one pointedness of mind developed, but the feelings of joy and happiness still remain. In the third stage, the feeling of joy, which is an active state of mind, also disappears while the disposition of happiness still remains in addition to mindful equanimity. In the fourth stage, all sensations such as happiness and unhappiness, joy and sorrow disappear, only pure equanimity and awareness remaining. Thus, at the end the mind becomes completely free from any kind of thought or sensation or sentiment.

Similarly, the principle of *zazen* is to sit cross-legged and concentrate one's mind and to empty it till it becomes completely free from any kind of thought or sensation or sentiment.

A very significant point always emphasized as characteristic in Zen discipline is that one should live in the act, live in the present moment, without worrying and disturbing oneself with thoughts of the past and the future. A distinguished Zen teacher, questioned as to how he disciplined himself in the truth, simply said :

"When I am hungry I eat ; when tired I sleep."

The questioner remarked that this was what everybody did and asked whether they could be considered as practising the discipline as he did. The teacher replied :

> "No; because when they eat they do not eat, but are thinking of various other things thereby allowing themselves to be disturbed; when they sleep they do not sleep, but dream of a thousand and one things. This is why they are not like myself."[10]

This is precisely what one section called *sampajāna-pabba* "mindfulness with clear

comprehension" of the *Satipaṭṭhāna-sutta* teaches. According to it, whether you walk, stand, sit, lie down or sleep, whether you stretch or bend your limbs, whether you look round, whether you put on your clothes, whether you talk or keep silence, whether you eat or drink, even whether you answer the calls of nature—in all these and other activities—you should be fully aware and mindful of the act you perform at that moment.[11] That is to say that you should live in the present moment, in the present action, and should not be disturbed uselessly by thoughts about the past and the future. (It should be remembered that in addition to this, the *Satipaṭṭhāna-sutta* deals with many other forms of meditation constituting a complete system based on mindfulness).

> Elsewhere, asked why his disciples were so radiant, the Buddha replied :
> "They do not repent the past, nor do they brood over the future. They live in the present. Therefore they are radiant. By brooding over the future and repenting the past, fools dry up like green reeds cut down (in the sun)."[12]

The origin of Zen is related in a delightful little story of apocryphal tradition. One day, while preaching to the assembly on the Vulture Peak (Gṛdhrakūṭa), the Buddha held up a golden lotus flower. None in the assembly understood the meaning of his act except Mahā-Kāśyapa, the great elder, who looked at the Buddha and smiled. Then the Buddha said : "I have the True Dharma Eye, marvellous mind of Nirvāṇa. This now I transmit to you, Mahā-Kāśyapa." Thus, Mahā-Kāśyapa is considered to be the first in the line of the Indian patriarchs of Zen. The whole episode is of doubtful origin.[13]

However it may be, the very idea that the realization of truth can be transmitted and handed down in a pupillary succession like an oral tradition of teaching and that a custodian of Truth in a line of hierarchy can be appointed is absolutely repugnant to the spirit of Buddha's teaching. A patriarch of a sect or a line or an order may certainly be appointed, but that belongs to the domain of institutional organized religion, and not to the realm of Truth. One should be extremely careful not to confuse the realm of Truth with the institutional side of a religion or a system.

It is popularly believed that Zen is different from all other systems of Buddhism. This erroneous impression is created probably by later developments that took place in China and Japan. The Japanese Zen is from the Chinese Ch'an which is derived from the Sanskrit *dhyāna* (Pali *Jhāna*), meaning "meditation." This was introduced from India to China about the 6th century A.C., probably by Bodhidharma. But in China, and later in Japan, its practice went through such tremendous transformations, almost beyond recognition, on account of the character and culture of those countries that it is now generally regarded as Chinese, or almost Japanese. Nevertheless, the spirit of the original Buddhism from India still remains as the life of Zen. Its fundamental tenents are all based on the teachings and ideas found in the original Canonical texts.

There are some important axioms considered particularly Zen, but these are quite in keeping with the original Theravāda teaching and tradition.

For instance, Zen maintains that the attainment of *satori* (enlightenment or awakening) is outside the scriptures and that it is impossible to attain the *satori* experience

by mere study of *sūtras*, on a scholastic level and that one should not be attached to the letter of the Law. This does not mean at all that one should not study *sūtras* or texts. Almost all Zen masters were, and are, well-versed in their texts. As Dr. D.T. Suzuki humorously observes : 'Zen claims to be "a specific transmission outside the scripture and to be altogether independent of verbalism," but it is Zen masters who are most talkative and most addicted to writings of all sorts.'[14]

That the realization of Truth, *Nirvāṇa*, cannot be attained by mere study of the *Dhamma* without practice, is a fundamental tenet of Theravāda. But a knowledge of the *Dhamma*, *pariyatti*, is a necessary help. However, this knowledge alone will not do. It should be put into practice in life (*paṭipatti*). As the *Dhammapada* (vv. 19, 20) says, a person who knows a great deal of the texts but does not put his knowledge into practice is like a man who counts others' cows. Another person knows only a little, but he practises this and enjoys the results. If a person studied the texts without applying his knowledge for spiritual attainments, it was, according to the Theravāda tradition, considered better for him to sleep than to waste his time in study.[15]

The *Dhamma*, the teaching, is compared by the Buddha to a raft (boat) (*kullūpama*),[16] for the purpose of crossing over to the other shore, and not to get hold of with attachment (*nittharaṇatthāya no gahaṇatthāya*). If you just sit on the raft holding fast to it without rowing it properly, you will never get to the other shore. Once you have crossed, you should not carry the raft, or the boat, on your back because it was helpful to you, but leave it there for the benefit of others. You should not, however, despise it and burn it after you have crossed. A scholarly Zen monk named Tokusan (782-865) a specialist of the Diamond Sūtra, is said to have burnt the *sūtra* and all his notes, apparently in contempt, after he had his "sudden awakening." But this is an extravagant, vehement and unnecessary exhibition of an enthusiast lacking in calm and balance rather than that of a man of "awakening." His long study of the *sūtra* was no doubt partly conducive to his so-called "sudden awakening."

Another point in Zen is that it aims at pointing to one's mind, in other words, it aims at direct experience. This is exactly what is conveyed by the Pali word *sacchikaroti* which means "to see with one's own eyes," "to experience directly." So also *Dhamma*, Truth, "should be realized by the wise individually, within themselves" (*paccattaṃ veditabbo viññūhi*).

The most important axiom in Zen is the attainment of Buddhahood by directly seeing into one's own Nature. This seeing into "one's own Nature" or "Reality" or "Truth" is denoted in Pali texts by such expressions as *ñāṇadassana* "seeing with wisdom," *cakkhuṃ udapādi* "eye was born (opened)", *paññā udapādi* "wisdom arose", *āloko udapādi* "light arose."

In Zen phraseology, one becomes Buddha by attaining *satori*. Here what is meant by Buddha, quite obviously, is not the same as the historical Buddha Gotama who was a *Sammāsambuddha* "Perfectly and Fully Enlightened One." It would be flattering to think that you can become as important as Gotama Buddha by attaining *satori*, whatever it may be. Here the term Buddha is used in its radical meaning of "awakened" or "enlightened" (from the root *budh* to awaken). Anybody who has realized Truth, *Nirvāṇa*, could be called Buddha in this sense, according to the Theravāda tradition too. The *Upāsakajanālaṅkāra*, a Pali treatise dealing with the ethics of the lay Buddhist, written in the 12th century by a *thera* named Ānanda in

the Theravāda tradition of the Mahāvihāra in Anurādhapura, states that when a disciple attains enlightenment (*sāvaka-bodhi*) he becomes a Sāvaka-Buddha "Disciple Buddha".[17] In the *Theragāthā* even the term *sambodhi* "full enlightenment" is employed with regard to the attainment of arahantship of a *thera*.[18] The Commentary says that the term *sambodhi* here means *arahatta* "arahantship".[19] Even a Sammāsambuddha is an arahant—*arahaṃ sammāsambuddho*. The Theravāda and the Mahāyāna both agree that as regards *vimutti* or *vimukti* "emancipation", "liberation", *i.e.* with reference to arahantship, liberation from defilements, there is no difference between a Sammāsambuddha (Skt. Samyaksambuddha), Paccekabuddha (Skt. Pratyekabuddha) and a sāvaka (Skt. śrāvaka), a disciple, who is liberated (*i.e.* arahant). A Sammāsambuddha is superior to a Paccekabuddha and a liberated disciple in the sphere of knowledge and with regard to innumerable other qualities, capacities and abilities.[20]

Although even a disciple who has realized *Nirvāṇa*, who has attained arahantship, can be called a Buddha, the Theravāda, perhaps out of modesty, does not usually do it so generously and liberally as Zen employs the term with regard to anybody who is supposed to have attained *satori*.

Zen puts much emphasis on the sudden attainment of *satori* as its particular distinction and relates stories to illustrate the point. For example, the Zen Master Reiun, after thirty years of hard discipline and training, had his *satori*, (awakening ore enlightenment) when he saw a common peach flower in bloom.

Master Kyogen, after a long and arduous search, had his *satori* when he heard the sound of a stone hitting a bamboo.

A Zen Master named Mumon spent six years of hard discipline and meditation with the famous *koan Mu* (nothingness) without any result. One day he heard the beating of the drum announcing meal-time, and all of a sudden he had *satori*.

Examples of this kind of "sudden" awakening or "sudden" attainment of arahantship are not lacking also in Pali Commentaries.

An acrobat named Uggasena attained arahantship standing, perilously balanced, on the top of a bamboo pole in the course of performing risky acrobatics when he heard from the Buddha an utterance almost like a Zen *koan* :

"Let go in front;
Let go behind;
Let go in the middle,
Gone beyond existence,
With a mind freed everywhere,
Thou comest not again to birth and decay."[21]

A *thera* named Usabha, who was living in a cave in a forest at the foot of a mountain, was one morning overwhelmed by the glorious beauty of the forest and the mountains (*vanarāmaṇeyyakaṃ pabbatarāmaṇeyyakaṃ*) and attained arahantship.[22]

Mahānāma Thera, living on a mountain, was thoroughly disgusted with his life because he was not successful in getting rid of such impure thoughts as lust, and at the moment when he was about to commit suicide by jumping from the top of a rock, he attained arahantship.[23]

Prince Vītāsoka, a younger brother of Emperor Asoka of India (3rd century B.C.), was a pupil of Giridatta Thera and was well-versed in the Dhamma. One day he took the mirror from his barber while the latter was trimming his beard and saw his face in it and attained the stage of *sotāpatti* (stream-entrance), seated in that very seat. Later he became a *bhikkhu* under his teacher Giridatta Thera and became an arahant in due course.[24]

Bhagu Thera, in order to overcome his drowsiness, went out of his room, and when he was getting in to his cloister for meditation (*caṅkama*, walk) he fell down, and then and there he became an arahant.[25]

Similarly, a *therī* (nun) of advanced age, named Dhammā, on her way back from alms-begging fell down on the ground. Suddenly and unexpectedly her mind was emancipated.[26]

Sīhā Therī, the sister of General Sīha, even after seven years of hard striving in meditation, did not achieve her peace of mind. Thoroughly disappointed and depressed with her inability to realize the liberation of mind from defilements, she decided to commit suicide by hanging herself. Tying a rope to the branch of a tree, she put the noose round her neck. Suddenly she was awakened to Truth and became an arahant.[27]

Paṭācārā Therī, who had already realized the stage of *sotāpatti*, was endeavouring to attain higher stages. One day she was washing her feet with water from a pot. The water flowed a little and sank and disappeared in the dry ground. Again she poured water on her feet, and this time it went a bit further and disappeared. The third time water flowed still further and vanished in the ground. Seeing this, she was utterly absorbed in the thought of impermanence, how aggregates appear and disappear. While she was lost in this thought, she saw the Buddha speaking to her : "One day's life of a person who perceives the rise and fall (of conditioned things) is better than that of a person who lives one hundred years without perceiving it." Then and there Paṭācārā attained arahantship.[28]

Although the attainment of awakening or enlightenment or emancipation, related in these Theravāda and Zen stories, seems to be "sudden", it is in fact not sudden. In these and many other examples, the so-called "sudden" awakening occurs after a long and hard discipline, training, striving and practice, if not in this life, perhaps in some previous lives according to Buddhist teaching and belief. It is "sudden" only in the sense that it can not be predicted or scheduled and decided that after so many weeks or months or years of discipline and meditation, enlightenment will occur on such and such a date at such and such a time. It occurs at a moment most unexpected, in a manner never anticipated, sometimes almost dramatically. But this moment is the result of a long and hard training and striving. Zen teachers themselves admit "that not everyone can be expected to have the training required for attainment of the exquisite moment of *satori*".[29]

This brief, cursory discussion might perhaps suggest that a comparative study of Theravāda and Zen methods of discipline and meditation could be a fascinating subject for research.

NOTES

1. E.g , *Manual of Zen Buddhism* by D.T. Suzuki, (Rider & Co., London), pp 127-44; *A Flower does not talk* by Abbot Zenkei Shibayama, (Charles E. Tuttle Co., Rutland, Vermont and Tokyo), pp. 156-203; *Zen Flesh, Zen Bones*, compiled by Paul Reps, (Doubleday & Co., New York), pp. 133-55.

2. *Sumaṅgalavilāsinī*, DA II, (Tripitaka Publications Press, Colombo 1925), p. 549 ; *Papañcasūdanī*, MA I, (Tripitaka Publication Press, Colombo 1933), pp. 222-23. Also *Visuddhimagga* (Tripitaka Publication Press, Colombo 1920), p. 198 or PTS Ed. (1975) p. 269.

3. See Buddhaghosa's introductory verses to these Commentaries and Walpola Rahula, *History of Buddhism in Ceylon*, (Gunasena & Co., Colombo 1966), 2nd ed., pp. xxiv ff.

4. See Walpola Rahula, *Vijñaptimātratā Philosophy in the Yogācāra System and Some Wrong Notions*, *The Maha Bodhi*, July, 1972, p. 324ff. or *The Middle Way*, November, 1972, p. 118ff.

5. A I (PTS), p. 10.

6. The commentary says that *citta* "mind" here refers to the *bhavaṅgacitta*. AA I, (Tripitaka Publication Press, Colombo 1923), pp. 35-36.

7. *Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra*, Ed. Najio, pp. 77, 222.

8. *Ibid.* p. 222.

9. *Ibid.* pp. 322-23 (*Sagāthakam* 459); *Sandhinirmocana-sūtra*, texte tibétain, édité et traduit par Etienne Lamotte, Louvain et Paris 1935, pp. 55, 185.

10. D.T. Suzuki's *Introduction to Zen Buddhism*, p. 86.

11. *abhikkante paṭikkante sampajānakārī hoti, ālokite vilokite. . . . . .sammiñjite pasārite. . . . . .saṅghāṭipattacīvaradhāraṇe. . . . . .asite pīte khāyite sāyite. . .uccārapas-sāvakamme. . .gate ṭhite nisinne sutte jāgarite bhāsite tuṇhībhāve sampajānakārī hoti.* D II (PTS), p. 292; M I (PTS), p. 57.

12. S I (PTS), p. 5.

13. See *Zen Dust* by Isshu Miura and Ruth Fuller Sasaki, (Harcourt, Brace and World, Inc., New York), pp. 152-53.

14. D.T. Suzuki in his Introduction to Zenkei Shibayama's *A Flower does not talk*, p. 9.

15. MA (Aluvihara edition, Colombo), p. 325.

16. M I (PTS), pp. 134-35; 260.

17. *Upāsakajanālaṅkāra* (PTS), p. 344.

18. *Theragāthā* (PTS), p. 38, (*gāthā* 335).

19. *sambodhin ti arahattaṃ*, Thag A (Tripitaka Publication Press, Colombo 1918), p. 414.

20. For details see Walpola Rahula, 'Bodhisattva Ideal in Theravāda and Mahāyāna, *The Maha Bodhi*, Vaishakha Number 1971, p.139, ff., or *The Middle Way*, August, 1971, p. 82ff.

21. Dhp. v.348. According to the Commentary, the meaning behind these words is as follows: Let go attachment to your five aggregates (*khandha*) past, present and future. Then you are gone beyond existence, and you are absolutely free, and you do not come again to birth, decay and death. DhpA II (Tripitaka Publication Press, Colombo, 1922), p. 607.

22. *Theragāthā-Aṭṭhakathā* (Tripitaka Publication Press, Colombo 1918), p. 218.
23. *Ibid.*, pp. 227-28.
24. *Ibid.*, p. 295.
25. *Ibid.*, p. 380.
26. *Therīgāthā-Aṭṭhakathā* (Tripitaka Publication Press, Colombo 1918), p.18.
27. *Ibid.*, p. 62
28. *Ibid.*, p. 89 and DhpA (T.P. Press, Colombo 1919), p. 338.

Unlike the DhpA, ThigA continues the story further and says that after this incident, Paṭācārā entered her cell with a lamp, and seated on her bed pulled down the wick of the lamp with the bolting pin and the light was extinguished. Instantly all her *āsavas* (defilements) were extinguished, *i.e.* she became an arahant. This seems to be incongruous. If she had already attained arahantship when she was washing her feet a little while before, all her *asavas* were extinguished (*khīṇāsava*) at that moment. It is irrelevant to say that again all her *āsavas* were extinguished in her cell when she extinguished the lamp. One becomes an arahant only once. There seems to be a confusion in the ThigA account. According to the verses in the *Therīgāthā* (PTS Ed. vv. 112-16; Colombo Ed. pp. 350-51) it seems that she attained arahantship in her cell when she extinguished the lamp, and not at the time when she saw how water flowed and disappeared in the ground. At that moment her mind was only absorbed in the thought of how conditioned things were subject to rise and fall.

29. Zenkei Shibayama, *op. cit.*, p. 48.

28

Notes on the Introduction of the Bhikṣu-Prātimokṣa-Sūtra of the Ārya-Mahāsāṃghika-Lokottaravādin

GUSTAV ROTH

"Purity be your command" had been the guide-line in the life of Venerable Mahāthero Jagadīsa Kassapo, who granted me a "darshan" first at Nava Nālandā Mahāvihāra in November 1954, when I was a student in the Department of Ancient Indian History and Culture of Patna University under the late Dr. A.S. Altekar. In the course of our conversation I noticed that the Venerable Bhikkhu embraced many walks of spiritual life and learning going beyond Theravāda-Buddhism. Soon we found ourselves engaged in a comparative discussion about the monastic discipline in Buddhism and Jainism[1], and Christianity.

In grateful memory of him let me offer notes on the Introduction of Prātim Mā-L, including a translation of its introductory verses where the principle is laid down in verse 5, *viśuddhaṃ śīlaṃ pratiṣṭhā*, "a pure virtuous conduct is the fundament" which was his.

This is in a little booklet[2] entitled Prātimokṣa-sūtram of the Lokottaravādimahāsāṅghika School, edited by Dr. Nathmal Tatia, Patna, 1976 (Tibetan Sanskrit Works Series, No. 16). It is a re-edition of a text formerly edited by Pachow-Mishra.[3] Compared to this one, Tatia presents a considerably improved edition with which we can work now. It is based on the photo-stat copy of a quasi-Sanskrit manuscript[4] (c. 12th cent. A.D.) which R. Sāṅkṛtyāyana photographed in Tibet in the year 1934.

1. The importance of Prātim Mā-L lies in the fact that it is the only complete Prātimokṣa manual outside the Pali Vinaya which is available in its Indian version. Besides, we possess the nearly complete Sk. version of Prātim Sa[5] preserved in a Turfan manuscript c. 4th cent. A.D.) of the Berlin collection, which is going to be edited as a whole by G. von Simson, Seminar fuer Indologie, Goettingen University. Then we have the fragmentary Sk. version of Prātim Mū edited by A.C. Banerjee,[6] which is

based on a Sk. manuscript from Gilgit (c. 6th cent. A.D.). All the three versions of Prātim, Mā-L, Sa, and Mū have an Introduction, preceding nine groups of disciplinary rules in Mā-L, eight groups in Sa and Mū, of which the Introductions of Mā-L, and Sa are complete, while the one of Mū is nearly complete. Only the last part of each of the three respective Introductions, containing stereotype stock-phrases in prose, leading to the Pārājika-group of offences, are common to the three, except for a few variants, while they considerably differ in the meter-and prose-portions preceding it. In this connection it is most instructive that only the last part common to the three above mentioned versions has its correspondence in the short Introduction of Fa-hsien's Chinese version (transl. 416-18 A.D.) of Prātim Mā, section 6 in the Mā-Vinaya proper, in Taisho Edition, Vol. 22, p. 549, lines 12ff.[7] When we take into account that this particular part has its correspondence[8] in Pali Mahāvagga 2.2.3, we may conclude that Chinese Mā, which has only this one for its Introduction without the meter and prose portions preceding it in Mā-L,Sa, and Mū, represents the oldest and original form of introducing a Prātimokṣa manual, while the portions before it have to be taken for later additions in Mā-L, Sa, and Mū.

The Introduction of Prātim Sa[9] consists (1) of a prose-portion lines, 1-26; (2) a meter portion of 6 stanzas only, lines 27-40; (3) the final prose portion, lines 41-63. This last portion is comparable with the ones of Mā-L (Tatia, p. 5. 10-19, p. 6. 5-14), or Mū (Banerjee, pp. 6-7), and of Chinese Mā mentioned above.

The Introduction of Prātim Mā-L is divided into two main portions, (1) meters : verses 1-25 (Tatia, pp.3-4); (2) prose (*ib.*, pp.5-6). Stanzas 1-5 are grouped under the title *upodghāta*, 6-25 under *vastu* at their ends. The prose portion is to be subdivided into three parts : (1) o.c., p. 5.1-19, (2) *ib.*, p. 5.20—p. 6.4, (3) p. 6.5-14. The whole is designated at the end as *nidānam*.

The Introduction of Prātim Mū begins with verses 1-13 (Banerjee, pp.4-5), (2) continues with prose (*ib.*, p. 5.15-p. 6.5), (3) again verses 14-18, (4) closes with the final prose portion (*ib.*, pp. 6-7), which is not complete at the end of the Gilgit Ms,[10] and has been restored by the editor.

This is the chronological line of order which I suggest regarding the Introduction of Prātim Mā (Chin.), Sa, Mā-L, and Mū. From the point of view of their composition, Mā-L and Mū seem to be of later origin than Sa.

2.1 The Introductions of the Prātimokṣa manuals of different Buddhist schools are of particular importance, as they reflect the stand of their respective redactors. So we note that the Introductions of Sa and Mū read Sanskrit in accordance with the language of their Sūtras, while the one of Mā-L reads quasi-Sanskrit containing Middle-Indic forms, as is to be noted from its main text.

2.2 Thus, we note from the metrical part of its Introduction : *yukto śramaṇo* for Sk. *yuktaḥ śramaṇas*, and *brāhmaṇo* for Sk. *brāhmaṇas* st. 4a, b; *gaṇottāmo* for Sk. *gaṇottamaḥ* st. (13)[11] 20b; *śikṣā uddeśo samvāso sambhogo śāstuno vacanaṃ/* Śloka, st. (13) 20c,d, no Sk. Sandhi; *poṣadho* for Sk. *poṣadhaḥ* st. (14) 22b. About the ending *-o*, used for *-as*, as in Middle-Indic dialects, see BHSG 8.18, s.v. Nom. sg. *-o*. However, *-o* for *-as* also occurs in the Abl. suffix *-tas* : *samudrato* for Sk. *samudratas* st. (9)12c, cf. BHSG 8.53.

2.3 *poṣadhena* st. (7) 8a,9a; (8) 10a,11a; (9) 12a,13a; (10) 14a,15a; (11) 16A,17a; (12) 18a,19a, see BHSD s.v. *poṣadha*. Its re-sanskritized *pauṣadha* was influenced by

Sk. *pauṣa*.

vitarkehi for Sk. *vitarkaiḥ* st. (7) 8d; *śīlehi* for Sk. *śīlaiḥ* (11) 16b,17b; *yehi* for Sk. *yaiḥ* st. (10) 14b,15b; (12) 18b,c, 19d; (13)21b.

vipattīyo for Sk. *vipattayaḥ*, *āpattīḥ* for Sk. *āpattayaḥ* st. (12)18d, see BHSG 10.149, 167, 172.

vidunā for Sk. *viduṣā* st. ld, see BHSD, s.v. *vidu*; *śāstuno* st. (13)20d, but Sk. *śāstur* (10)15c, *śāstu* (9)12d.

karonti for Sk. *kurvanti* st. 2d; *bhaviyā* for Sk. *bhūtva* st. (17)25b, about this gerund see BHSG 35.40.

bhavatha for Sk. *bhavata* st. 3d; *paricaratha* for Sk. *paricarata*, *adhigacchatha* for Sk. *adhigacchata* st. (17)25b,c; about second pl. imperative *tha*, see BHSG 26.12,13.

bheṣyati for Sk. *bhaviṣyati* st. (15)23b, about future tense *bheṣyati*, see BHSG 31.9, 12,13.

viya for Sk. *iva* st. (9)13c; See BHSD, s.v. *viya*, "only in Mv," and Index Bhi-Vin.

3.1 From the prose portion of the Introduction (Tatia, pp. 5-6) we note: the ending *-o*, used for *-as* in *śrāvaka-saṃgho so* 5.12; *bhante saṃgho imasmin* 5.14,17; *°anuttaro upa°* 5.25; *smaramāṇo santīm* 6.10-11; *mṛṣāvādo se . . . .mṛṣāvādo kho* 6.11; *āyuṣmanto āntarāyiko dharmo ukto bhagavatā* 6.12; *yo*[9] *puna bhikṣu* 6.9-10, which is the regularly employed stereotype introductory phrase of each rule in Prātim Mā-L. With it compare *yo pana bhikkhu* in the Pali Vinaya, but *yaḥ punar bhikṣuḥ* in Prātim Mū.

Inst. pl. ending *-ehi*, used for Sk. *-ais* in *āyuṣmantehi* 5.23, 25-26.

3.2 Oblique case-ending *-āye* of *ā*-stems, and *-īye* of *ī*-stems in *evam eva-m-evaṃrūpāye*[12] *bhikṣu-parṣāye*, Tatia, p.6.9, and *ib.*, p.6.10. Parallels : *evam eva eva-rūpāya parisāya* in Pali Mahāvagga 2.3 (Nālandā-Edition, p. 106.19); *evaṃ evaivaṃrūpāyāṃ bhikṣu-pariṣadi* in Intr. Sa, line 51, and *ib.*, line 52-53; Intr. Mū has the same except the reading *parṣadi*, Banerjee, p. 7.6,7 (Fasc. ed., p.16, leaf 21.5); *asantīye āpattīye*, Tatia, p.6.6-7. Parellels : *asantiyā āpattiyā* in Pali Mahāvagga 2.3, o.c., p.106.17; *asatyām āpattau* in Intr. Sa, line 48; *asatyā* [*m āpattau*] in Intr. Mū.[13]

3.3 Gen. sg. *-u-sya* of *u*-stems in *pṛcchitasya bhikṣusya*, Tatia, p. 6.8. Parallels : *-puṭṭhassa* in Pali Mahāvagga 2 3 oc., p. 106.18); *-pṛṣṭasya bhikṣor* in Intr. Sa, line 50; the same in Intr. Mū (Banerjee, p. 7.6—Facs. ed., p. 16, leaf 21, line 4). *bhikṣusya* is quite common in Prātim and Bhi-Vin Mā-L, also *ṛtusya*, Tatia p.5.11. Cf. BHSG 12.35.

3 4 *phāsu bhavati*, Tatia, p.6.13. Parallels: *phāsu hoti* in Pali Mahāvagga 2.3 oc., p. 106.22); *phāṣaṃ bhavati* in Intr. Sa, line 58 ; *phāsu bhavati* in Intr. Mū (tentatively restored by Banerjee, not confirmed by Ms, Facs. ed., loc. cit.). See BHSD, s.v. *phāsu*.[10]

3.5 *siyā* in *yasya vo*[14] *siyāpattiḥ*, Tatia, p. 6.6. Parallels: *yassa siyā āpatti* in Pali Mahāvagga (o.c., p. 106.17) ; *yasya vaḥ syāt saty āpattiḥ* in Intr. Sa, line 47 ; *yasya syāt āpattiḥ* in Intr. Mū, tentatively restored by Banerjee, p. 7.3-4, not confirmed by Ms. Facs. ed., p. 16, leaf 21, line 2-3. Cf. BHSG 29.40-41.

3.6 *kho* in *tūṣṇīm-bhāvena kho punar āyuṣmanto pariśuddhā iti vedayiṣyāmi, yathā kho punar āyuṣmanto . . .*, Tatia, p. 6.7-8. Parallels : *tuṇhī-bhāvena kho panāyussante parisuddhā ti vedissāmi yathā kho pana pacceka-puṭṭhassa*...in Pali Mahāvagga 2.3 (o.c., p.106.18); no *khalu-kho* in *tūṣṇīm-bhāvena vayam āyuṣmataḥ pariśuddhā iti vedayiṣyāma yathā ca pratyeka-pṛṣṭasya ...* in Intr. Sa, lines 49-50; *tūṣṇīm bhāvena ca* .... in Intr. Mū,

Banerjee, p. 7.5-6. not fully confirmed by Ms. Facs. ed., p. 16, leaf, 21, lines 3-4.

BHSD, s.v. *kho* "is rare in BHS." In Prātim Mā-L *kho* instead of *khalu* is frequently used, e.g. *uddiṣṭā kho* (Tatia, p. 8.11) ; *ime kho* (ib., p.8.18) ; *tasya kho puna bhikṣusya* (ib., p. 10.11) ; *bhikṣuḥ kho puna* (ib., p. 10.27) ; *saṃbahulā bhikṣū kho* (ib., p. 11.12), and many more examples. In Bhi-Vin Mā-L *khalu* is more frequent than *kho*, see Index.

3.7 The MIndic examples quoted from the last portion of the Introduction of Prātim Mā-L (3.2-6), common to Chin. Mā, Sk. Sa-Mū, in comparison with the Pali parallels demonstrably show how close to them the forms of the Prātim Mā-L version are. Thus, we can group the versions of Mā-L and Pali-Vinaya on one side, and those of Sa-Mū on the other one from the linguistic point of view.

3.8 However, *pṛcchita* of the above quoted *pṛcchitasya bhikṣusya* (3.3) in Intr. of Prātim Mā-L is near Śaurasenī-Prakrit *pucchida* (Pischel, § 565), while the regular Sk. *pṛṣṭa* of the above quoted (3.3) parallel *-pṛṣṭasya bhikṣor* in Intr. of Sa-Mū calls for Pali *puṭṭhassa*.

In the Prakrits, both P.p.p. *puṭṭha* and *pucchia*-Sk. *pṛṣṭa*-do occur outside Pali. So e.g. *puṭṭho* in Utt. 1.14,25 (by Pischel, § 565 called AMg.), and *pucchio* in Utt. 25.15, both in Śloka-metres. The form *pṛcchito* also occurs in Bhi-Vin Mā-L, see Index there s.v. *pṛcchati*.

A comparative review of the material collected in 3.1-6 makes it evident that the Prakritic forms of our Mā-L passages are close to the ones of Pali and possibly also of Śaurasenī, as I tried to show elsewhere.[15]

3.9 Towards Pali also point the verb forms *ārocetha . . . .prativedetha* at the beginning of the prose section (Tatia, p.5.3), not recorded in BHSG, which can also be traced in Bhi-Vin Mā-L § 96, where they stand in their original context. The same holds good for the adjective *ettakā* (*ib.*, p.5.2), and the adverb *yāvatakaṃ* (*ib.*, p.5. 14, 17), both of which are noted in BHSD.

Masc. nom. pl. *bhikṣū* (*ib.*, p.5.2), very common in all the Vinaya-texts of the Mā-L,[16] is connected with *bhikkhū*, recorded for Pali by Geiger § 82, for Ardhamāgadhī and Śaurasenī by Pischel § 72.

4. In the first part of the prose Introduction (Tatia, p. 5.2-19), the reader will find stock-phrases which were eclectically taken from the sections of the Mā-L Vinaya, which contain the Karmavācana mode of expressions. Thus, compare o.c., p.5.2-3 with Bhi-Vin §-96; o.c. ,p.5.4-8 with Bhi-Vin §§ 43, 44; o.c.,p.5.10-19 with Bhi-Vin §§ 95,96,98.

Here, the terms *sandhi-poṣadho* "sin-confessing ceremony at the transition from the 14th to the 15th of a lunar month at night", p.5.10, and *ovayikā eṣā ˌjnaptiḥ* "This is the following concluding motion,"[17] p. 5.19, particularly belong to the Mā-L Vinaya-terminology[18], which I could not trace elsewhere in this context. About these two terms see Index to my edition of Bhi-Vin Mā-L.

All these cases show how intimately our Introduction is connected with the corpus of the Mā-L Vinaya proper regarding the features of its composite language, its style and terminology.

5.1 In the second part of the prose section (Tatia, p. 5.20-p. 6.4), the group of the *daśārthavaśā* "ten purposes" (o.c., p. 5.26-6.4) is mentioned, for which the disciplinary rules of the Prātimokṣa are going to be recited.

This is how I would translate it : "From the point of view of the ten purposes,

the Tathāgatas, Arhats, and Samyaksambuddhas expound the command regarding the higher moral conduct to their disciples, and they point out the Prātimokṣa, the Sūtra. Which are the ten? They are as follows:

(1) For holding together the Order,
(2) for the surpassing merit of the Order,
(3) for the reprimand of (sinful) individuals who do not show regret,
(4) for the tranquil disposition of well-behaved monks,
(5) for faithful aid to unbelievers,
(6) for the progress of believers,
(7) for the removal of Sansaric influxes relating to this life,
(8) for the future state of non-flowing of Sansaric influxes relating to a life after death,[19]
(9) so that the Promulgation (of the Dharma) shall remain for long,
(10) that it shall be the property of many, disclosed, and well-explained, so far, among gods and men."

While the last portion of the Introduction in prose, immediately following the group of ten, treated in 3.1-8 of this article, shares a common tradition with Chin. Mā, Sa, and Mū, as already pointed out in § 1, the group of "the ten purposes" of Prātim Mā-L seems to be of unique occurrence in Vinaya literature as far as I can see, and so the sole property of the Mā-L.

5.2 Among them, the *arthavaśa*-points (7) and (8) are noteworthy. Both the terms *āśrava=āsrava*, and *an-anuśravaṇatā=an-anusravaṇatā*[20] are used in a sense which is near the one of Jinistic "influx" and "state of non-flowing of Karman". I have not seen *āsrava* expressly mentioned in connection with *dṛṣṭa-dharmika* and *samparāyika* elsewhere in Buddhist literature. The later one, however, occurs with reference to *āsrava* in Umāsvāti's Tattvārdhigama-Sūtra VI. 4: *sa-kaṣāyākaṣāyayoḥ sāmparayikêryā-pathayoḥ* "[Action (*yoga*)] is for him, who is infected with passions leading to the influx of Karma which extends transmigration, while it prevents or shortens it—when he is free from passions."[21] In this Jaina Sūtra, *īryā-patha* "path of wandering about as a religious mendicant," who is free from passions, for whom the momentary influx of Karma is limited to the present life, is in contrast with *sāmparāyika*, precisely as the Buddhist *dṛṣṭa-dhārmika*, "related to the influx of Karma in the present life", does in this context.[22]

6.1 Now let us turn to the introductory meter section, with which the Introduction of Prātim Mā-L (Tatia, pp. 3-4) begins.

The first five stanzas, which are designated as *upodghāta*, "commencement", are 11- and 12-syllabic meters in verses 1-2, and 11-syllabic in verses 3-5. They follow mainly the basic type (⏑—⏑ | — —⏑ | ⏑—⏑ | — — | (—⏑—), which H. Bechert noted in another context.[1] Among the remaining verses 6 25, stanzas 6-19, 21, 24 a, b are Āryās, stanzas 20, 22, 23, and 24 c, d Ślokas. The last verse, st. 25, scans 12 syllables in each pāda, where pāda *a* follows the rhythm of Indravaṃśa, and pāda *c* the one of Candravartma of the Jagatī meter.

Regarding verses 6-21, two always belong together and represent one unit from the point of view of their contents. In continued numbering from verse 5 onward, I

number such a unit, in parentheses, at the beginning of each of them. Within it, I supplement the number of the first stanza according to Tatia's numbering at the end of the second stanza of such a unit.

6.2 The following translation is only a report of a written document. It does not reflect the subtlety and stylistic refinement of this type of religious poetry.[2]

"Obeisance to the Lord, who is free from passions.

The Prātimokṣa has been well preached by the Buddha, who lives for the benefit of living beings, a Saint like that,[3] who is knowing, whose glory is resounding wide in the three worlds, who is worshipped well by Indra, and by earthly kings //1//.

On hearing this Prātimokṣa, the word of the Sugata, which is relief from the suffering of existence, the wise ones bring to an end birth and death, due to the state of restraint and control over the six faculties of sensual perception //2//.[4]

At last, after you have obtained the three gems, the coming into existence of the Buddha, and human faithfulness, be vigilant and of pure virtuous conduct, avoiding the fault of wickedness //3//.

Endowed with virtuous conduct he is either a Śramaṇa, or he, endowed with virtuous conduct, is a Brāhmaṇa; endowed with virtuous conduct he is to be honoured by men and gods, because the Prātimokṣa belongs to him, who is endowed with virtuous conduct //4//.

A pure virtuous conduct, as acknowledged by the many Buddhas, with its boundaries[5] (set by disciplinary rules), is the fundament like the earth (with its boundaries); I will expound it in the midst of the Order for the benefit of the people including gods //5//. Commencement.

(6) What is life to those, of whom the snare-like roots of sin cover the heart, like clouds above cover the sky //6//? But to those the highest form of life belongs, in whom the snare-like roots of sin quickly perish just as darkness is destroyed by the sun //7//.

(7) What is the use of the Sin-confessing Ceremony to those who are committed to blameworthy conduct? Entered into the cage of old age and death, they are consumed by reflections about immortality //8//.

The Sin-confessing Ceremony is of use to those who are committed to blameless conduct; who, being steadfast, set an end to old age and death, crushing the force of Māra //9//.

(8) What is the use of the Sin-confessing Ceremony to those, who without shame, lead a bad life and are of bad conduct, who take pleasure in the wrong way of getting a living, and who act as if for life-immortal[6] //10//?

The Sin-confessing Ceremony is of use to those, who, with shame, lead a good life and are of good conduct, who take pleasure in the right way of living, and are of pure virtuous conduct due to right inclinations //11//.

(9) What is the use of the Sin-confessing Ceremony to those who are of bad conduct and sinful activities? They are thrown aside the promulgation of the Teacher, like a corpse from the ocean //12//.

The Sin-confessing Ceremony is of use to those who are not clinging to the triple world, who are of the redeemed thoughts of the pure like water in the atmosphere //13//.

(10) What is the use of the Sin-confessing Ceremony to those by whom the group of the six faculties of sensual perception is continuously ill-protected,[7] who have fallen

into the region of Māra, and are abandoning their own sphere (of duties) //14//?

The Sin-confessing Ceremony is of use to those by whom the group of the six faculties of sense-perception is continuously well-protected, who are absorbed in the word of the Teacher, the word of the Jina, and take pleasure in Their instructions //15//.

(11) What is the use of the Sin-confessing Ceremony to those, by whom[8]—who are of selfish conduct—the Teacher, gods and men, including the Brahmacārins are blamed[9] to be of bad conduct //16//?

But the Sin-confessing Ceremony is of use to those in whom there is no vileness with regard to their virtuous conduct and who are not at all blameworthy for the sages, indeed in the world, with the gods included //17//.

(12) What is the use of the Sin-confessing Ceremony to those by whom the Teaching of the Teacher is disregarded, and by whom failures of conduct and the five offences[10] are committed //18//?

But the Sin-confessing Ceremony is of use to those who are devoted to the Teaching of Him who possesses the ten powers (Buddha), and those by whom the benevolent words of the Omniscient, the All-seeing-One are observed //19//.

(13) In the heart of whom the Teacher, the Doctrine, and the highly-esteemed chapter (of monks and nuns) dwell; furthermore teaching, instruction, co-residence, living-together, and the word of Teacher //20//.

For those who do not abandon these, the Sin-confessing Ceremony is to-day and they, who attended to the King of Righteousness (Buddha), reach the unconstituted state//21//.

(14) For the pure there is always auspicious spring season, for the pure there is always Sin-confessing Ceremony; for the pure whose deeds are pure, his observance always turns successful //22//.[11]

(15) As long as there will not be repudiation of the Sūtra in the midst of the Order, as long the true Dharma and unanimity will last in the highly esteemed chapter (of monks and nuns) //23//.

(16) As long as there are instructors and followers of the religious law[12], of the Jewel-like Dharma, as long the true Dharma will last for the benefit of the whole world //24//.

(17) Therefore, be in harmony, united, dignified, and turn the mind to each other. As indefatigable ones move towards the King of Righteousness, and reach Nirvāṇa, which is a permanent abode, without grief //25//.

This is the real object."

ABBREVIATIONS

Bhi-Vin Mā-L=Bhikṣuṇī-Vinaya Including Bhikṣuṇī-Prakīrṇaka and a Summary of the Bhikṣu-Prakīrṇaka of the Ārya-Mahāsāṃghika-Lokottaravādin, Ed. G. Roth, (Patna, 1970), K.P. Jayaswal Research Institute : Tibetan Sanskrit Works Series vol. XII. *BHSD*=Fr. Edgerton, Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit Grammar and Dictionary, volume II : Dictionary (New Haven, 1953). *BHSG*—Id., volume I : Grammar. *Facs.* Ed. =Gilgit Buddhist Manuscripts (Facsimile edition) by Raghu Vira and Lokesh Chandra, Śatapiṭaka vol. 10 (1) (New Dehli, 1959). *Mā*=Mahāsāṃghika. Mā-L=Māhāsāṃghika-

Lokottaravādin. *Mū*=Mūlasarvāstivādin. *Nālandā Edition*=The Mahāvagga, ed. by Bhikkhu J. Kashyap (1956), Nālandā Devanāgarī Pāli-Series. *Prātim Mā-L*=Bhikṣu Prātimokṣa-Sūtra of the Mahāsāṃghika-Lokottaravādin=Tatia. *Prātim Mū*=Prātimokṣa-Sūtra of the Mūlasarvāstivādin, see 1-5, n.6. *Prātim Sa*=Prātimokṣa-Sūtra of the Sarvāstivādin, see 1-5, n. 5, 8. *Sa*=Sarvāstivādin. *Sk.*=Sanskrit. *st.*=stanza. *Tatia*=Prātimokṣasūtram of The Lokottaravādimahāsāṃghika School, ed. by N. Tatia (Patna, 1976), K.P. Jayaswal Research Institute : Tibetan Sanskrit Works Series No. 16. *Utt.* =Uttarādhyayanasūtram, anuvādak : Śrī Śrī Śrī 1008 Upādhyāya Śrī Ātmarāmjī Mahārāj, bhāga 1-3 (Lahaur, 1939, 1941, 1942).

NOTES
1—5.2.

1. See J. Kashyap's remarks about "Jain Vinaya" in the Introduction of his Mahāvagga Pali edition, pp. XXII—XXIV, about "Jain Parallels" in the Introduction of his Cullavagga Pali edition, pp. XXVIII—XXX.

2. Prof. Anantalal Thakur very kindly presented it to me for the favour of review, when I visited K.P. Jayaswal Research Institute at Patna in July 27, 1976.

3. W. Pachow and R. Mishra (Editors), The Prātimokṣa -Sūtra of the Mahāsāṃghikas (Allahabad, 1956).

4. About it, R. Sāṅkṛtyāyana, "Sanskrit Palm-Leaf MSS. in Tibet," *JBORS* 21 (Patna, 1935), 42 : XXXIX, 1. 177, and n. 2.

I am very much indebted to Prof. S.H. Askari, and the Bihar Research Society, who made a photostat copy of it available to me.

5. About the manuscript, see the German Catalogue *Sanskrit-Handschriften aus den Turfanfunden*, Teil I, unter Mitarbeit von W. Clawiter und L. Holzmann, herausgegeben und mit einer Einleitung versehen von E. Waldschmidt (Wiesbaden, 1965), No. 88, 49-52. Place of discovery : Qizil in East—Turkestan.

6. A. Ch. Banerjee, *Prātimokṣa-Sūtram* (*Mūlasarvāstivāda*), (Calcutta, 1954). With it, the Facsimile edition of the Gilgit manuscript, on which this edition is based, should be consulted. See Abbreviations, s.v. *Facs. ed.*

7. In checking this passage, I enjoyed the help of Dr. Hiu Lie from Korea, at present in the State-and-University-Library of Goettingen.

8. This particular passage is in Nālanda Edition of Mahāvagga (cit. in *Abbreviations*) 106.14-22; PTS Edition of Oldenberg (1929), I 102.31 - 103.11; Burmese Edition (1954), 140.26—141.9. All the three editions offer the same text.

9. Hitherto available has been the edition of L. Finot, "Le Prātimokṣasūtra des Sarvāstivādins," *JA* 2 (1913), 465-558, which is based on an East Turkestan Sk. Ms. in the Ms. Collection of Bibliothèque Nationale at Paris, which contains many lacunae. Mrs. V. Rosen, *Der Vinayavibhaṅga zum Bhikṣuprātimokṣa der Sarvāstivādins* (Berlin, 1959), refers to Finot, and also quotes excerpts from the Berlin Qizil Ms. (s. n. 4 above) in her notes.

A copy of its complete Introduction in a preliminary draft of the whole, prepared by H. Haertel in Berlin, was kindly made accessible to me by my friend G. von Simson.

10. See Facs. ed. p. 16, leaf 21, line 6. The end of the Introduction is not continued on leaf 22. It includes instead of it, the end of Saṃghāvaśeṣa 10 (line 4), and the fragmentary beginning of Saṃghāvaśeṣa 11.

11. About the numbering of the verses, see my remarks at the end of 6.1.

12. So reads Prātim Mā-L Ms. fol. 5b.5, which is well attested by parallels. Tatia p.6.9 has *evam eva rūpāye . . .* in the text.

13. *Asatyā* only, can be read in the middle of line 3 of leaf 21 in Facs. ed., p. 16; *āpatyām* (Banerjee, p. 7.4) is nowhere in the fragmentary line of Ms.

14. Number 4 before *vo* in Tatia's text refers to preceding *yasya*, which is written *yaśya* in Ms., noted by Tatia.

15. G. Roth, "Particular Features of the Language of the Ārya-Mahāsāṃghika-Lokottaravādins and their importance for early Buddhist Tradition including Notes on the Patna Prakrit Dharmapada," a paper read before a conference about "Die Sprache der ältesten Überlieferung" on July 5, 1976, at Goettingen. Not yet published.

16. The Vinaya texts of the Mā-L available now are: Mahāvastu, Bhi-Vin, Prātim, and *Abhisamācārikā*, ed. by B. Jinananda (Patna, 1969).

17. This term always occurs with reference to the concluding motion of a formal act. See my remarks about it in § 25, n. 2 of Bhi-Vin Mā-L.

18. G. Roth, "Terminologisches aus dem Vinaya der Mahāsāṃghika-Lokottaravādin," *Z D M G* 118 (1968), 334-48.

19. About *āsava*, see L. Alsdorf, *Les Études Jaina: état présent et taches futures*, (Collège de France. Paris, 1965), 4-5. Here, he also mentions *phāsu(ya)*, treated in § 3.4 of this article, with reference to C. Caillat, "Deux Etudes de Moyen-Indien," *JA* 248 (1960), 41-64.

20. Cf. *āsavā nānusavanti* in Pali *S N* II.12.32.31 (*PTS* Ed., London, 1888) 54. See *CPD*, s.v. *anu-(s)savati*.

21. See H. Jacobi, "Eine Jaina-Dogmatik. Umāsvāti's Tattvārthādhigama Sūtra, Uebersetzt und erlaeutert," *Z D M G* 60 (1906), 287-325, 512-51; 518-19 in particular.

Cf. Pt. Phoolchandra S. Shastri (Editor), *Sarvārtha Siddhi of Pūjyapād* 5th cent. A.D.). *The Commentary on Āchārya Griddhapiccha's Tattwārtha Sūtra* (Kāshi, 1955), 318-21.

22. See BHSD, s.v. *dṛṣṭa-dharma*.

NOTES

6.1-2 (Translation)

1. H. Bechert *Bruchstücke buddhistischer Verssammlungen aus zentralasiatischen Sanskrithandschriften I Die Anavataptagāthā und die Sthaviragāthā* (Berlin, 1961) 27.14-15.

D. Schlingloff, *Chandoviciti—Texte zur Sanskritmetrik* (Berlin, 1958), 50 : 2.31 = P. S. 5,37 Ākhyānakī.

2. Pachow and Mishra translated the Introduction of Prātim Mā-L into English, o.c., 49-54 (see Notes on 1-5.2, n.2). The translation is based on misreadings in their edition. It would take me too far to discuss it here. For another translation,

see Ch. S. Prebish, *Buddhist Monastic Discipline—The Sanskrit Prātimokṣa Sūtras of the Mahāsāṃghikas and Mūlasarvāstivādins* (The Pennsylvania State University, 1975), 42, 44, 46. It is based on the same, but contains valuable references.

3. About *tāyin*, G. Roth, " 'A Saint like That' and 'A Saviour' in Prakrit, Pali, Sanskrit and Tibetan Literature," *Shri Mahavir Jaina Vidyalaya Golden Jubilee Volume*, part I (Bombay, 1968), 46-62.

4. About the six *indriyas*, see *AbhidhKBh* II.1=*Abhidharmakoṣabhāṣyam of Vasubandhu*, Edited by P. Pradhan, Revised second edition and Indices by Mrs. A. Haldar (Patna, 1975), 39.7.

5. *sāntaṃ* = *sa* + *antaṃ* in Ms fol. 1b. 5, not *sānuṃ*, as in Tatia's text.

6. *amaraṇam iva* in Ms. fol. 2a.4, not *asaraṇam iva*, as *ib*.

7. *kiṃ poṣadhena teṣāṃ ṣaḍ-indriyaṃ yehi arakṣitaṃ* (!) *nityaṃ*/in Ms. fol. 2b.2, not *yehi yehi surakṣitaṃ*, as in Tatia's text. Both the verses 14, 15 are in contrast to each other, as the other ones.

8. I suggest to read *yehy upa*^{0} instead of *ye hyupa*^{0} in (11)16b of the printed text.

9. Sic in Ms. I suggest reading *upavadyanti*, like *khādyanti* in verse (7)8d, reflecting a Prakrit 3 pl. present tense of the passive voice. This would better suit the metre of (11)16b in this Gīti-stanza.

10. This seems to refer to offences against the five rules of abstinence beginning with *yāvaj-jīvaṃ prāṇātipātāto prativiratā* in Bhi-Vin Mā-L, § 10.

11. For parallels see *MN* I.7, p.39 (PTS ed., 1888), and *Uv* XVI. 15 in : Fr. Bernhard (Editor), *Udānavarga* (Goettingen, 1965), 229.

12. So I translate *deśayitāraḥ pratipattāraś ca.* We meet the two words again in the prose section of the Introduction *nirvāyanti deśayitāraḥ parīttā bhavanti pratipattāraḥ* (Tatia, p.5.21). They are not recorded in lexicons in this context.

29

Pali Literature from Laos

H. SADDHATISSA

Compared to Burma and Ceylon (which have been adequately covered by Bode and Malalasekera), relatively few Pali compositions are known to have originated in the remaining countries belonging to the Theravāda persuasion. George Coedès, however, catalogued a surprisingly large number of manuscripts found in Laos by his predecessors and it is upon his pioneer, but little recognised, work, that the present paper is mainly based.

Apart from reproductions of canonical texts, the majority of Lao compositions are either *nissayas* (or word-for-word commentaries/translations) of existing Pali works, or indigenous, extra-canonical *jātakas*, which characterise the synthesis of Buddhism and folklore in South-East Asia. Let me begin my tabulated description of the non-canonical texts with an appropriate introduction to a commentary on the *Suttaniddesa*, a grammar of the Kaccāyana school by the Burmese monk, Chapaṭa : "Having paid respect to the Buddha, who has destroyed the obscurity of delusion, to the venerable Law, to the Community which destroys the stains, I am going to expound the *Niddesanyāsasaṅgaha*, based on the explanations of the masters, bringing light for the benefit of pupils."

The *Poraṇasaṅgaha* (literally, "Old Collection") is an anthology of *suttas* from the Nikāyas and was probably so named to distinguish it from the better known *Suttasaṅgaha* ("Collection of Suttas"), which originated in Ceylon.[1] It is composed of abridged versions, often simple outlines, of the following twenty-five canonical texts, with the use of the Commentaries to explain the circumstances of their exposition : *Subhasutta* or *Cūlakammavibhaṅga* (MN, III, 202-06), *Mahānāmasutta* (SN, V, 395), *Upāsakavagga* (AN, III, 203-04 and 206-08), *Visākhuposathasutta* (AN,I, 205-15), *Dhammahadayavibhaṅgasutta* (*Vibhaṅga*, 422-26), *Chattamānavakavimāna*

(*Vimānavatthu* 53, 229-43), *Revatī*—(*ibid.* 52, 220-29), *Guttila*—(*ibid.* 33, 137-48) *Anekavaṇṇa*—(*ibid.* 82, 318-22), *Mahādukkhakkhandhasutta* (MN, 1, 83-90), *Aṭṭhipuñjasutta* (SN, II, 185-86), *Mahārāhulovādasutta* (MN, I, 420-26), *Pāveyyaka-sutta* (SN, II, 187-89), *Sūkarapotikāvatthu* (*Dhammapadaṭṭhakathā*, IV, 46-51), *Jarāmaraṇasutta* (SN, I, 71), *Piyasutta* (SN, I, 71-72), *Appamādasutta* (SN, I, 86-87), *Aputtakasutta* (SN, I, 91-93), *Tamotamaparāyanasutta* (SN, I, 93-95), *Pabbatūpamasutta* (SN, I, 100-02), *Lokavicaraṇasutta* (AN, I, 142-43), *Supubbaṇhasutta* (AN, I, 294) and *Dhammavihārīsutta* (AN, III, 86-89).

In the majority of cases, its place in the Pali Canon is clearly indicated at the end of each section.

Another collection of *suttas*, entitled *Suttasaṅgaha*—which is not to be confused with the Sinhala version—is completely different from the above and comprises translations of five canonical *suttas* : *Sumana* (AN, III, 32-34), *Velāma* (AN, IV, 392-96), *Dakkhiṇāvibhaṅga* (AN, VI, 253-59), *Uposatha* (AN, I, 205-15) and *Kasī-bhāradvāja* (S-N 12). The anthology begins with a verse of invocation, thus : "I bow to the Saviour, with superior eloquence, who has attained to the other shore of the ocean of knowledge, and who reveals the abstruse Law, profound and wonderfully ornate".

The *Vāmadantadhātusutta* is the story of the relic of the Buddha's left tooth.[2] The work begins with the following verse : "The Saviour, having come to take refuge three times in the charming island of Laṅkā and desiring the lasting good of the Dispensation. . . ."

The *Buddhāpadāna*, although constituting an homogeneous unity, in fact comprises translations of the *Buddhāpadāna*[3] and *Metteyyasutta*, together with two Laotian texts, the *Mūlakammaṭṭhāna* and *Sappurisasutta*.

The *Metteyyasutta*, concerns the future Buddha, Metteyya[4]. This extra-canonical *sutta* shows itself as having been pronounced by the Buddha Gotama in the presence of Sāriputta and was subsequently related by the latter. It begins thus : "The Master was once dwelling at Kapilavatthu in the Nigrodhārāma, on the banks of the Rohinī. The Bodhisatta Metteyya took birth in the matrix of Kāncanā Devi, the queen of the King of Magadha". It further describes the progressive deterioration of the Dispensation of the Buddha and the scriptures, and the general recollection of the relics after 5,000 years. After describing this recollection in the form of a Buddha image, the text dilates on the misfortunes of the universe in general and of man in particular, and continues with the preliminaries of the birth of Metteyya at Ketumatī and describes his youth through to his renunciation of the world. After mentioning the ordination of those people surrounding Metteyya, and his own enlightenment, the text finishes with the praises of Metteyya and the exhortations of the Buddha Gotama to Sāriputta and other disciples.[5]

The *Sappurisasud* or *Sappurisadan* ("The Offering of Good People") enumerates the twenty-eight Buddhas from Taṇhaṅkara to Gotama and describes for each of them the time of preparation, the place of birth, the names of the parents, the duration of the lay life, the name of the tree under which each obtains enlightenment and the length of existence. For Gotama, the text relates his previous births and vows pronounced by him before the previous Buddhas, the fulfilling of the Ten Perfections, his conception in the matrix of Māya, the date of the enlightenment and the

Parinibbāna.

The second part, which begins like a *sutta*[6], is effectively an apocryphal *sutta* relating how, at the time of the Buddha Sikhi, a certain brahman called Saddeyya, in recompense for the offerings made to the Sangha, came to be reborn as a universal monarch owning the seven gems and subsequently took birth as a monk named Bāhula.

The *Mūlakammaṭṭhāna* is probably based on a lost Pali version and constitutes a manual of meditation for the use by *yogāvacaras.*[7] It begins with a description of preliminary practices and culminates in the traditional forty subjects of meditation (*samatha-kammaṭṭhāna*) which calm the mind. This manual finally treats of *vipassanā* or insight meditation.

The *Abhidhamma cet kambī* is a short work which describes some of the contents of the *Dhammasaṅgaṇī* (the first book of the Abhidhamma Piṭaka). The *Tilakkhaṇasuttasaṅgaha* is a text of which the complete title is *Dhammapadasuttasaṅgahatilakkhaṇaviniccayakathā.*[8] The translation is divided into five chapters : (i) unfortunate births; (ii) misfortunes in the world of men, the truth of suffering and its origin and the ten meritorious deeds; (iii) the cessation of suffering and the way to Nibbāna; (iv) the superior stages of the universe; and (v) the virtues of the Buddha, the three characteristics of *anicca, dukkha* and *anatta.* This work quotes several passages from the canonical texts, such as the *Dhammapada.*

The *Sudhanajātaka* is the second in the collection of fifty apocryphal *jātakas* (*Paññāsajātaka*).[9] The legend contained therein is famous in Laos and Thailand and was outlined by R. Nicolas under the title of "Histoire de Nang Manorā" in his study, "Le Lakhon Nora ou Lakhan Chatri, et les origines du théatre classique siamois."[10]

The *Dukammajātaka*[11] is an illustration of the common saying which dissuades a man from marrying a woman who has already had three husbands; from forming a friendship with a man who has taken and left three times the monastic robe ; and from entering a town where the king imprisons people without preliminary hearings. After having suffered several misfortunes for having ignored such advice given by his father, and having put to the test his wife (who is the future Ciñcamānavikā) and his friend (the future Devadatta), the hero (i.e. the Bodhisatta) becomes Dukamma, the King of Taxila. The text begins in the usual style of a *jātaka* Commentary[12] stating that it was pronounced by the Buddha dwelling at the Jetavana.

The *Nandakumāra*[13] is also known under the title of *Mālikā,* the name of one of the protagonists of this history that begins like a *sutta* but is, in reality, a *jātaka* designed to illustrate the benefits of meritorious deeds fulfilled in previous births.

The *Candagādhajātaka*[14] is yet another of the apocryphal *jātakas* popular in Laos, Thailand and Cambodia and relates the adventures of the Bodhisatta when he assumed the personality of Candagādha, the son of a poor man in the country of Campānagara. Following a famine, he leaves his native country accompanied by his elder brother, Suriyagādha. The latter, at Kāsinagara, resuscitates, by means of a medical plant furnished by Indra (the king of the gods), the daughter of the king and subsequently marries her. At Indapatta, Candagādha marries Princess Devatāsaṅkhā, the daughter of the king. During a pleasure trip, the man and the wife find themselves separated as a result of a tempest and the wife, having been able

to escape the unwelcome attentions of Prince Sudassanakumāra, becomes a nun. As for Candagādha, equipped with a jewel and a pair of magic sandals, he flies to Saṅkhanagara where he weds the daughters of three rich merchants. Thence he searches for his first wife and meets the young brahmacārī (Mālikā) whom he also marries. Having at last arrived to the kingdom of his parents-in-law, he is obliged to fight against them to secure the throne which he then occupies for the next 300 years.

Suriyagādha, Devatāsaṅkhā and Prince Sudassanakumāra are identified as Sāriputta,Yasodharā and Devadatta respectively. The work commences with a verse in poor Pali, in which the name Gambhīrapañña appears, and he could well be the author of this story, which illustrates the gratitude of the Buddha to his parents.[15]

The *Sambhamittajātaka* is also one of the fifty *jātakas* and appears more often under the title, *Subhamittajātaka*[16]. This text relates the story of the Bodhisatta as Subhamitta, King of Campaka. His brother, Asubhamitta, having plotted his overthrow and seized power, the Bodhisatta leaves the capital with his wife, Kesinī, and two sons so as to avoid bloodshed. In crossing a river, he is separated from his family but arrives in Taxila whose king dies soon after. He is proclaimed king in his place and receives, as a gift, two young slaves who are none other than his (unrecognised) sons. Later, he lets them guard a boat wherein their mother is living. She recognises them and displays her maternal affection. Denounced by the boatowner, who was vainly in love with her, they are accused and condemned to death by the king, but an investigation reveals the truth of the situation and the king is reunited with his family. He then abdicates in favour of Jayasena, whose younger brother, Māyādatta, becomes his viceroy. Subhamitta, Asubhamitta, Jayasena, Māyādatta and Kesinī are identified with the Buddha, Devadatta, Ananda, Rāhula and Yasodharā respectively.

The *Suvaṇṇahaṃsa* or *Dvesīsajātaka*[17] is the story of the golden swan with two heads. According to the beginning of the story, the incident occurred at the time of the Buddha Kassapa. An united couple, having aspired to be reborn in the form of a swan with golden feathers and two heads, is captured by order of the King of Benares.[18] The bird is put in a cage and, to satisfy the desire of the queen to divide the bird, a minister murmurs slanderous remarks into the ears of each head. Each head vainly endeavours to ascertain the nature of these remarks, to the extent that mistrust, discord and quarrels result in each half of the swan physically pulling itself separate from the other. The king makes enquiries of the stratagem employed for obtaining this result and realises the evil power of slander. The Buddha concludes the *jātaka* with moral exhortations supported by examples.

The *Arindamajātaka*, another post-canonical *jātaka*[19], was expounded by the Buddha, dwelling at the Jetavana, on the subject of the perfection of giving (*Dānapāramitā*). The Bodhisatta takes birth in the form of King Arindama, whilst Indra, disguised as a brahman, obtains from him all his wealth including his own person. Indra then makes him a doorkeeper with his wife as a slave. She gives birth to a child but the doorkeeper Arindama, adhering strictly to an order from Indra, refuses to open the door to let her into the house and thus allows the child to die of cold. At the cemetery, where the couple go to bury their child, the wife implores the gods to show their pity as a result of all the offerings made by her and her husband in the past (which she enumerates). As a consequence, the child revives, Indra returns the wealth to Arindama

and restores him to his throne.

The *Suvaṇṇajātaka*[20] is a story of the Bodhisatta in the form of Suvaṇṇa. Only a fragment has survived of this text which relates the garbled story of a child having a head without a body.

The *Lokavinaya*[21] is a work, in the form of a *jātaka*, expounded by the Buddha at the Jetavana concerning King Pasenadi (or Aṅgulimāla). Following the words of Ānanda, who praises the teachings of the Master regarding the mundane (*lokika*), as opposed to the supramundane (*lokuttara*), plane, the text relates the adventures of the Bodhisatta in the form of Dhanañjaya during the reign of King Dhanañjayakoravya of Indapatta. This long tale, which is impossible to summarise, describes Dhanañjaya's scientific accomplishments, which resolve the most complicated problems, how he saves the king from all sorts of difficulties, and ends with his becoming a king. His discourses form a compendium of lay discipline, which justifies the title of the work. It is divided into several chapters of which the headings give an idea of the variety of adventures and the diversity of subjects treated. The text begins with a passage in incorrect Pali forming, without doubt, two verses of which a single coherent translation is impossible and of which all that we can say is that they pay respect to the Buddha's intelligence.

Here are the colophons of these chapters: 1. Birth of Dhanañjayakumāra (*Uppattinidānakathā*); 2. The four mental distractions (*Vitakkapañhā*); 3. The questions of impurity (*Malataladhammapañhā*); 4. The questions of the doors (*Dvārapañhā*); 5.The questions of judgment (*Vinicchayapañhā*); 6. Characteristics of the scientist (*Purohitalakkhaṇavaṇṇanā*); 7. The teaching of the Doctrine (*Dhammovādakathā*); 8. The questions of anger (*Kodhapañhā*); 9. Chapter of doubts (*Saṅkitakaṇḍa*); 10. Chapter of ingratitude (*Akataññukathā*); 11. Chapter of conversation (*Sallāpakathā*); 12. The Bodhisatta leaves his parents (*Viyogakaṇḍa*); 13. Chapter of the residence (*Adhivatthakaṇḍa*) 14. Chapter of marriage (*Āvāhakaṇḍa*); 15. Chapter of the teaching of the Bodhisatta at Kappāsigāma (*Dhammadesanākaṇḍa*); 16. The Bodhisatta returns to his parents' country (*Pācīnagāmānupattavaṇṇanā*); 17. Dhanañjayapaṇḍita arrives at the capital (*Nagarapattakaṇḍa*); 18. Significance of the sound of the four drums (*Bherisaddatthavicāraṇakaṇḍa*); 19. The story of the young Ratanakalyāṇi (*Ratanakalyāṇikaṇḍa*); 20. The Bodhisatta arrives in the Aṅga country (*Aṅgaraṭṭhagamanakaṇḍa*); 21. The story of the four male factors (*Catupuggaladuccaritakaṇḍa*); 22. The Bodhisatta brings back King Damiḷa Abhaṅgiya (*Karaṇakaṇḍa*); 23. King Abhaṅgiya listens to the exposition of the Doctrine (*Abhaṃgiyadhamma(sa)vaṇakathā*); 24. Dhanañjayapaṇḍita, the Bodhisatta, becomes viceroy (*Uparājakaṇḍapāricchedakathā*); 25. The story of the competition according to the Doctrine (without weapons) (*Dhammayuddhakaṇḍa*).

The work finishes with the usual identification of the personages involved in the story.

The *Bālasaṅkhyājātaka*[22] relates the story of the conversion of a proud monarch, similar to King Jambupati. The monks are discussing the latter incident amongst themselves at the Bamboo Grove in Rājagaha when the Buddha arrives to relate the present story. The titles of the chapters from the colophons of each file are as follows : 1. The meeting of Bālasaṅkhya (*Paṭhamasamāgama*); 2. Bālasaṅkhya comes to find Varakithikā and demonstrates his virtues to his elder brother (*Bhātāriguna*); 3. End of the third file (*Bālasaṅkhya*); 4. End of the fourth file (*Sumittakaṇḍa*); 5. Fifth file

of the *Bālasaṅkhya*, going upto the fifth chapter, called *Sallapanta* (*Sallapantapāricchedo pañcama*); 6. Chapter on the victorious meeting (*Jayasamāgama*); 7. Entry to the capital (*Nagarapavesakaṇḍa*); 8. Chapter on Paduma (*Padumakaṇḍa*).

The *Suriyavaṃsahaṃsajātaka*[23] is also known as the *Pavaravanahaṃsajātaka* but is not included in any list of the apocryphal fifty *jātakas*. Whilst dwelling at the Jetavana, the Buddha mentions a previous existence of Devadatta.

The story of the prince with the golden tongue (*Suvaṇṇajivha*) forms the subject of one of the most famous and popular novels in Laos.[24] The present work is substantially the same story but in a simpler and more concise form and also in the frame of a *jātaka*—the Prince Lin Gāṃ being none other than the Bodhisatta in a previous existence.

Suvaṇṇameghajātaka (*Jātaka* of the Golden Cloud).[25] The incorrect Pali verse beginning this text cites the Buddha as having expounded this story at the Jetavana. In this supposed extract from the Saṃyutta Nikāya, the Bodhisatta comes to the world in the form of Prince Suvaṇṇamegha, the son of King Sudassana of Benares and of his first queen. From birth he was exposed to the jealousy of his half-brother, Jayarājakumāra, and of *his* mother, a wife of second rank. At three years old, when his mother died, he was thrown over a precipice but was saved by the virtue of his merits. Led by his dog with golden hair, which had been born on the same day as himself, Suvaṇṇamegha visited a hermit who offered him some magic weapons and a wife. Then, having defeated a *yakkha* who devoured girls, he obtained his victim's enchanted stick. Having heard that Suvaṇṇamegha and his dog were still alive, Jayarājakumāra and his mother advised the king to leave Benares for a new town near the sea, and, on his death, they persuaded the people to accept the succession of Jayarājakumāra's sister to the throne.

The dog with golden hair, having exhausted his bad *kamma*, was metamorphosed by Indra into a handsome young man with the name of Suvaṇṇa Hāṅ Gāṃ, who, after several changes, persuaded the King of Sāvatthi to give his daughter as wife. Meanwhile, Suvaṇṇamegha had ascended the throne of Benares but Jayarājakumāra organised a coalition of the neighbouring kings and surrounded the town. But Suvaṇṇa Hāṅ Gāṃ hastened to his friend's aid, the rival army was vanquished and the ground opened up and swallowed Jayarājakumāra and his mother, who descended to the Avīci hell.

The *Suvaṇṇahaṃsajātaka* is mentioned by Finot as being among the extra-canonical *jātakas* outside the collection of the apocryphal fifty.[26] It begins with the Pali text of the *Vijaya Sutta* of the *Sutta-Nipāta*.[27] It relates the story of the Bodhisatta as the son of King Brahmadatta of Benares and of his adventures in India, which include a trip in a flying machine in the form of a golden swan.

The *Nibbānasutta*, which begins like a canonical *sutta*,[28] consists of a discourse of the Buddha on the ineluctable nature of death and the necessity to accumulate meritorious deeds with a view to attaining Nibbāna. (*Vide* the story of Visākha *thera*[29] and the *Saṅkhāruppatti Sutta*).[30] The hearing of the *Nibbāna Sutta* delivers from the *Peta-loka* (the world of hungry spirits) and causes to ascend to a *devaloka*, a family of rich merchants guilty of adultery. Their two daughters, after having heard this *sutta* from the Buddha, made their parents profit from it and in later births became the nuns, Ummādanti and Uppalavaṇṇā.

The *Lohagoṇajātaka*, or the "Ox with Coppered Horns", bears a similarity with the above but is not to be found in any known list of the *Paññāsajātaka*. Finot quotes it for the first time under the title, "The Ox with Golden Horns"[31], and a second time[32] under the title, "The Ox with Coppered Horns", without any other explanation.

This *jātaka* which, as the preamble says, was told by the Buddha whilst dwelling at the Jetavana, relates the story of an ox with coppered horns (to become Anuruddha in a future birth) and of his younger brother (an early incarnation of the Bodhisatta). After all kinds of adventures, during which the younger ox manifests its inability to play and the elder his strength to fight buffaloes, the latter dies during a fight with a *nāga* and the Bodhisatta becomes a captive of the king of Kāsikanagara. At the death of the king, he is designated by lot as successor and takes his place on the throne under the name of Indacakkavaṃsarāja.[33]

The *Gandhaghātakajātaka*, which literally signifies the destroyer of the perfume, is the story of a frog. Again, this extra-canonical *jātaka* is not mentioned in the collection of fifty *jātakas*.[34]

From the preamble,conceived in the style of a canonical *jātaka*, the story is expounded by the Buddha whilst dwelling at the Jetavana. The Bodhisatta was born the son of Sudassana, King of Indapattanagara, under the aspect of a frog for which the brahmans had predicted a bright future. At the age of 20, he was metamorphosed by Indra into a charming prince to whom all the kings of the universe offered their daughters, and who himself became a powerful monarch. He had reigned fifty years when a great drought occurred which no ceremony could terminate. Having descended to the *nāga* kingdom, he learnt from their king that this drought had been provoked by the hunger of Indra. The king thereupon went to fight Indra, made him prisoner and did not free him until he promised to give each year an enormous amount of rice of which the grain would fall by itself into the baskets of the inhabitants. As soon as Indra was set free, the rain began to fall.

Next, the king had to deliver the earth from suffocation by an enormous liana which had been produced during a fight between Indra and the asura Vepacitti. Thereafter, the king ruled his people with justice and persuaded them to respect the Buddhist precepts. Meanwhile, Indra allowed the *nāga* to swim in a pond so that the rain fell and the population contented itself by making baskets for receiving the harvest of rice.

The *Mūlakittijātaka*[35] begins, after a short invocation to the Triple Gem, in the manner of a canonical *jātaka*, by indicating that it was told by the Buddha whilst dwelling at the Jetavana and concerned a monk devoted to his parents. The Bodhisatta, in the form of Prince Mūlakitti, sacrifices his life for his father, Yasakitti.

The *Sunandarājasutta*, also called *Nandasutta*, has no connection with the canonical *suttas* of this name. Opening in the form of a *sutta*, however, it tells of the visit of King Sunanda to the Buddha, whom he asks some questions on the future prospects of the Dhamma. The Buddha gives a reassurance by exhorting him to preserve it by making a copy of it which will certainly produce much merit.

The *Cakkhānavuttipāpasutta* is also known under the title of *Cakkhānavuttijātaka*,[36] but the exact title is uncertain. The preamble unskilfully combines the formulas of introduction of both a *sutta* and a *jātaka*. The text relates the story of the Bodhisatta at the time of the Buddha Padumuttara. Born as Prince Cakkhānavutti, the second son of Sararāja, King of Benares, and of Queen Vimaladevi, the story is used as a pre-

text for imparting moral exhortations.

Cundasūkarikasutta or *Dhammikapaṇḍitajātaka*.[37] In spite of its title, this text has no connection with the story contained in the *Dhammapadaṭṭhakathā*. The *Cundasūkarikasutta* comprises two parts : (i) the formula of *Iti pi so*, and (ii) an eulogy of the *sutta* in the form of a story. Under the Buddha Dīpaṅkara, four monks from the country of Suvaṇṇabhūmi arrive in the Siviraṭṭha, where King Surūpa reigns. He has a minister, reputed for his generosity, called Dhammikapaṇḍita, who asks the monks the purpose of their journey. They reply that they are going to the country of Tambapaṇṇeyadīpa (or Laṅkādīpa, *i.e.* Ceylon) to obtain from King Sudassana Cakkavatti the *Cundasūkarikasutta*. Thereupon they are allowed to continue on their journey and acquire a copy of this *sutta*, after making some offering to the latter king. They expound the text on their return to the Siviraṭṭha. Indra, desiring to hear it, sends his coachman Mātali, to obtain it from Dhammikapaṇḍita and thereafter preaches it to his fellow *devas*. After his death, the pious minister is reborn in a *devaloka* and, after a number of existences, eventually becomes the Buddha Gotama. Anyone who recites this *sutta* is supposed to acquire much merit and go to a heavenly world. The text begins with a verse of invocation in Pali to the previous Buddhas.

The *Lokavidū*[38] is derived from one of the words in the formula, *Iti pi so*, although in fact the major part of this text is taken up with a description of the universe as cognised by the Buddha. It ends with a eulogy of the Triple Gem.

The *Dasavarañāṇabuddhābhiseka*[39] is a compilation of verses in praise of the Buddha, designed to procure happiness and to invite the power of the Buddha to enter his image. Likewise, it is particularly recited at the time of the making of images of the Buddha.

The present manuscript begins with an invocation to the Triple Gem and continues with a word-for-word translation of a text which, after a very succinct outline of the Buddha's life from his coming down from the Tuṣita heaven to his victory over Māra, illustrates the essence of the knowledge acquired by the Buddha during the night of the Enlightenment[40]. In the form of litanies, the text then expresses the vow that each quality of the Buddha will come to reside in his image. After this, it briefly recalls the biography of the Buddha up to the teaching of the Abhidhamma in the world of the thirty-three gods.

The *Buddhābhiseka* enumerates, in the form of litanies, the several kinds of knowledge (*ñāṇa*) which are supposed to reside in the Buddha image. It continues in the same manner to relate examples taken from the ten great *jātakas* and other texts of the good fortunes or blessings (*jayamaṅgala*) which the reciter hopes to acquire. This text gives the impression of being a developed version of another manuscript with the same title[41] although both are incomplete.

The *Ākāravattasutta*[42] is the translation of the recollection of the Buddha beginning *Iti pi so*, following the verses in his honour which can be found in the analysis of the *Buddhābhiseka*.

The *Cetanabhedā* is the classification of psychological states[43]. It is a treatise on *kammavipāka* in the form of a dialogue between the Buddha and Anuruddha. This explains why, in the two colophons, it is presented as an extract from an *Anuruddhasutta* which corresponds to none of the canonical *suttas* bearing this name.[44]

The *Mahāvipāka* is an abridged version of a work on the resultants of *kamma*,

which has been amply described in canonical texts. It begins like a *jātaka*: "Thus, the Master dwelling at Sāvatthi told it about a rich banker named Putta. . . ."

The *Devadhitapañhā* is a short text which contains questions of a young goddess and the answers given by the Buddha. It explains the reasons for the racial and social differences amongst human beings.

The *Pabbajjānisaṃsa* is another short treatise on the fruit of entering the Sangha. It begins like a *sutta* : The Blessed one was once dwelling at Sāvatthi in the Jetavana monastery of Anāthapiṇḍika. . . ."

The *Caturārakkhā* is a fragmentary translation of the Pali text of the same name describing the familiar meditative recollections of the Buddha: *mettā*, impurity and death.

The *Yokappakko Ācāriya* presents a list of instructions from the Buddha to the *yogāvacara*. It is susceptible to several explanations from which it is not easy to make an accurate choice. Explanations are given of the practice of recalling the impurity of the body, meditation in general and the different kinds of knowledge.

The *Uṇhassavijayajātaka* is a poem[45] which recounts the story of a disciple of Sāriputta who predicts his death. He succeeds, however, in escaping its ill effects by means of several meritorious acts. Sāriputta goes to find the Buddha, who explains to him the effect of good deeds that generate such merit but that there is yet something superior in actually knowing the meaning of the verses in question.

The *Salākarivijasutta*[46] begins like a *sutta* : "Thus have I heard. The Blessed One was once dwelling at Rājagaha on the Gijjhakūṭa hill. At that time the Venerable Ānanda fell ill. . . ." However, this text is almost wholly taken up with describing the magical import of six words : *duṭṭhulā*, *uṭṭhulā*, *taṇḍulā*, *madhulā*, *pupphālā* and *kalalā*.

The *Paṭhamamūlamūli*[47] is a book dealing with cosmogony, known also in the Môn and Burmese languages from which its contents have been analysed in detail in two articles[48]. It begins with an incorrect Pali verse to the Buddha : "Having paid respect to the Blessed One, owning the triple omniscience, the ten powers and infinite virtue, the realisation of his vow for the perfection of his gifts, and integral purity, the characteristic marks of success, to the saviour of the three worlds, excellent, supreme, . . ."

The *Aruṇavatī*[49] is a kind of cosmological treatise which includes a description of the universe. It begins with the visit of the Buddha Sikhi and of his disciple, Abhibhū, to the realm of Brahmā and thus incorporates the same theme as the canonical *sutta*, which apparently explains the name chosen for this work. It deals with several subjects, *viz.* (i) the Buddha's characteristics, (ii) the thirty-three heavens, (iii) the ocean and the ranges of mountains, (iv) previous Buddhas, (v) the courses of the sun, moon and stars, (vi) men dwelling in the four continents, (vii) animals and *petas*, (viii) hells, (ix) *vimānas* or celestial palaces, (x) the creation and destruction of the universe at the beginning and end of each *kalpa* or cosmic period. (This work is cited in the introduction to the *Traibhūmikathā* as being among the sources of the Siamese cosmology composed in 1345 by king Lüdai of Sukhodaya. It is, therefore, anterior to this date and is largely made up of extracts from the canonical texts.)

The *Sodattakimahānidāna* is the translation of a Pali text widely known in the Indochinese peninsula, and which almost certainly originated in Ceylon.[50] It presents

some close affinities to the *Mahānidāna*[51] and the *Sampiṇḍitamahānidāna*[52] and probably served as a source book for the *Jinakālamālinī*[53], where one finds similar phrases and verses. All these texts, after general considerations on the successive *kalpas*, review the *nidānas* of the six divisions - *bāhira-,mahā-,atidūra-,dūra-,avidūra-, and santika-nidāna*— between which are classified the previous lives of the Buddha. They relate the circumstances in which the Bodhisatta made the resolution to become a Buddha. The text begins with a passage in Pali followed by its translation, in which appears the name of the author, Buddhaghosa (which is obviously incorrect.)

The *Kusaladhammavinicchayakathā* is based on the *mātikā* or contents of the *Dhammasaṅgaṇī*, the first book of the Abhidhamma Piṭaka. It begins with an invocation to the Triple Gem in incorrect Pali.

The *Timsāpāramī* is a work of which the title does not appear among those that Finot mentions as being treatises on the perfections (*pāramī*).[54] It gives illustrations of the thirty perfections[55] by describing those births during which the Bodhisatta practised them. It refers to the *Cariyāpiṭaka*, which contains fifteen of the stories reported here, but the true source is the *Jātakaṭṭhavaṇṇanā*.

The work begins with an exposition of the first desired manifestations for enlightenment conceived by the Bodhisatta, *e.g.* (i) the son who saves his mother from a wreck; and (ii) the king of Dhañňavatī; (iii) relates the meetings with the previous Buddhas from Taṇhaṅkara to Dīpaṅkara, whilst (iv) enumerates the Ten Perfections in three degrees—simple perfection (*pāramī*), secondary perfection (*upapāramī*) and supreme perfection (*paramatthapāramī*).

The *Paṭhamasambodhi* is quoted in the *Gandhavamsa*[56] and constitutes a life of the Buddha which formed the material for the biography penned by Alabaster.[57] The most ancient manuscripts, which go back to the 17th century, include about fifteen chapters and tell the life of the Buddha up to the *Parinibbāna*. They are composed in great part of extracts from the *Nidānakathā* (the introduction to the *Jātakaṭṭhavaṇṇanā*) but also include some original passages.[58]

The present text (dating from the 19th century) has been reconstituted in nine chapters : 1. Birth (*Gabbhābhinikkhamaṇa*), 2. Horoscope (*Lakkhaṇa*), 3. Coronation (*Rājābhiseka*), 4. The Great Renunciation (*Mahābhinikkhamāṇa*), 5. Ascetic Practices (*Dukkaracariya*), 6. Victory over Māra (*Māravijaya*), 7. The Enlightenment (*Sambodhi*), 8. The invitation of Brahmā (*Brahmajjhesana*), and 9. The First Sermon (*Dhammacakkappavattana*).[59]

A copy of the *Tilokadīpanī* (or *Lokadvipa*) is kept in the National Library in Bangkok. The theme of this work is similar to the beginning of the *Mūlasāsanā* (a Lao history of Buddhism up to the 16th. century) and of the *Jinakālamālinī*. It treats of the three categories of Bodhisatta, predominating in wisdom (*Paññādhika*), confidence (*Saddhādhika*), or energy (*Viriyādhika*), and relates the previous births of the Buddha from the most ancient time until the period of the Buddha Vessabhū.

The *Mahākassapattheraparinibbānakathā* is the account of the demise of the disciple, Mahākassapa. It begins : "The Venerable Mahākassapa was dwelling in the Veḷuvana Garden. . . ."

The *Mahāsāriputtaparinibbānasutta* is the account of the demise of the disciple, Sāriputta. The text begins like a *sutta* : "Thus have I heard. One day the Exalted One was dwelling at Sāvatthi in the Jetavana, the garden of Anāthapiṇḍika."

The *Mahāmoggallānaparinibbānavatthu* is the account of the demise of the disciple, Mahāmoggallāna. The text begins like a *jātaka* : "The exposition of the Law beginning by those words was pronounced by the Master at the Veḷuvana about the *thera*, Mahāmoggallāna."

The *Asokadhammarājanibbāna* is the account of the death of the Emperor Asoka and begins with a passage in incorrect Pali : "Kuṇḍalatissa and Byāghatthera had acquired meritorious deeds in the presence of previous Buddhas. After having been reborn in the world of gods and men, 218 years after the Nibbāna of the Exalted One they were born in the Jambudīpa (i.e. India) and Laṅkādīpa respectively, where they received the names of Mahā Dhammasoka and Devanāmpiyatissa, and accumulated further merit in the Dispensation of the Buddha."

The *Dasa-anāgatabuddhavaṃsa*[60] gives the translation of an account of the ten future Buddhas which does not correspond to any of the *Anāgatavaṃsa* texts enumerated by Minayeff. However the subject is the same—about a discourse of the Buddha to Sāriputta showing the progressive decline of the Dispensation, then the rebirth of humanity and the successive appearance of ten Buddhas, each separated by the periodic destruction of the universe. The last few pages of this work are devoted to an analysis of the terms *kappa* (*kalpa*) and *asaṅkheyya* in relation to the future Buddhas.

The *Caturāsītidhammakkhandhasahassasaṃvaṇṇanā*[61] is, as with the foregoing, a composite work in Pali and Lao. A fragment of it, the *Akkharagiṇṭhi*, constitutes a grammar, including a chapter on *sadda*. The bulk of the manuscript, however, is taken up with an explanation of the traditional division of the canonical texts into 84,000 sections.

NOTES

1. H. Oldenberg, "Pali MSS in the India Office Library" (*JPTS*, 1882, p. 80) and M.H. Bode, *Pali Literature of Burma* (pp. 5 and 73. RAS, London, 1909; reprinted, 1966).
2. L. Finot (*BEFEO*, XVII 5, p. 213, no. 1052; Hanoi, 1917).
3. The Laotian translation, which effectively follows the text, was composed at the request of the King of Khelaga (or Khelaṅga, the ancient Lāmpāṅ) at an unknown date.
4. Finot (*op. cit.*, p. 192, no. 408). Published in Bangkok by Dharmabhakti.
5. The *Sāriputtasutta*, which follows, is a text entirely in Laotian divided into two parts.
6. *Evaṃ me sutam* ("Thus have I heard").
7. "The Yogāvacara's Manual" (*JPTS*, 1896), translated by F. L. Woodward as *Manual of a Mystic* (PTS, 1916; reprinted 1970).
8. Under its abridged title, it is mentioned by Finot (*op. cit.*, p. 212, no. 1017).
9. Finot (*op. cit.*, pp. 44-50). His Pali text was published at Phnom Penh in 1944 in Vol. I of the *Paññāsajātaka* (=X of the *Ganthamālā* collection, edited by the Buddhist Institute). A Siamese version, of which Laotian texts bears a close resemblance to the Pali text, appeared in Vol. I of the *Paññāsajātaka* (Bangkok, 1924).

10. *The Journal of the Siam Society*, XVIII (pp. 106-10; Bangkok, 1924).

11. This is the 18th *jātaka* of the Luang Prabang recension of the *Paññāsajātaka*. *Vide* Finot (*op. cit.*, p. 45).

12. *Kudesañ cā ti idaṃ satthā jetavane vihāranto ekaṃ pitu orādāgahanaṃ purisaṃ ārabbha kathesi.*

13. Analysed by Finot (*op. cit.*, pp. 50. no. 1).

14. The 7th in the Lunag Prabang recension and the 49th. in the Cambodian and Siamese recensions. *Vide* Finot (*op. cit.*, pp. 45-6). The translation in Siamese with a reproduction of the verses in Pali, was published in Vol. 27 of the *Paññāsajātaka*, (Bangkok, 1930).

15. The Laotian version differs appreciably from the Siamese printed translation.

16. The 5th in the Laotian and Burmese recensions and 9th. in the Cambodian and Siamese (*BEFEO*, XVII 5. p. 45). A Siamese version was published in Vol. 4 of the *Paññāsajātaka* (Bangkok, 1933).

17. The 16th in the Luang Prabang recension and 32nd or 33rd in the Cambodian and Siamese recensions. Finot (*op. cit.*, p. 45) gives it the erroneous name of *Sorassa*. One translation in Siamese was published in Vol. IX of the *Paññāsajātaka* (Bangkok, 1925).

18. Hence the alternative title of this *jātaka*, *Bārāṇasīrājajātaka*.

19. The 41st in the Luang Prabang recension and the 46th. in the Cambodian and Siamese recensions. Its translations in Siamese was published in Vol. XIII of the *Paññāsajātaka* (Bangkok, 1927).

20. The 48th in the Cambodian and Siamese recensions. *Vide* Finot (*op. cit.*, p. 46). A Siamese translation of this latter *jātaka* (known as the *Suvaṇṇasirasājātaka*) was published in Vol. XIV of the *Paññāsajātaka* (Bangkok, 1927); and an outline in French from the Cambodian version, kept at the Bibliothèque Nationale in Paris, was quoted by Au Chhieng in his "Catalogue du fonds Khmer" (No. 196, pp. 162-4).

21. This is a literal translation, replete with Pali words, from the Pali text entitled *Dhanañjaya*, published by Dharmabhakti in Bangkok.

22. *Vide* Finot (*op. cit.*, pp. 49 and 178, no. 29).

23. *Vide* Finot (*op. cit.*, p. 209, no. 294). It was incorporated into the Siamese translation of this collection under the title of *Varavamsajātaka* (no. 45) and published in vol. XII (Bangkok, 1927). The story bears a close affinity to its counterpart in Cambodian literature, known under the name of *Vorvoṅ Sōrvoṅ*, translated by A. Pavie in *Mission Pavie. Études diverses* I (pp. 55-153).

24. Analysed by Finot (*op. cit.*. pp. 117-21).

25. Mentioned by M. Meillier in his *Catalogue de la Bibliothèque Royale de Luang Prabang* (Hanoi, 1918) as item nos. 340 and 419—and the 8th. in the local recension of the *Paññāsājātaka* (p. 24). In the same list, Finot (*op. cit.*, p. 45) refers to No. 8—the *Suvaṇṇamiga* which is almost identical to the canonical *jātaka* of that name (No. 359, ed. V. Fausböll, III,pp. 182-87; PTS, 1883, reprinted 1963) and quotes the *Suvaṇṇameghajātaka* as being among the extra-canonical *jātakas* not incorporated in the collection of the *Paññāsajātaka* (p. 50). The confusion between the two names, "golden stag" (*Suvaṇṇamiga*) and "golden cloud" (*Suvaṇṇamegha*) is understandable.

26. *Op. cit.* (pp. 50 and 210, no. 955). Only the name "golden swan", links it with the canonical *jātaka* (no, 136, Ed. Fausböll, I, pp. 474-77; PTS, 1877, reprinted 1962).

27. Ed. D. Andersen and H. Smith (p. 34; PTS, 1913, reprinted 1965).

28. *Evam me sutam ekam samayam bhagavā sāvatthiyam vihārati . . .*

29. *Visuddhimagga* (I, 312, *et seq.*; ed. C.A.F. Rhys Davids, PTS, 1920).

30. *Majjhima Nikāya* 120 (III, p. 99; ed. R. Chalmers, PTS, 1899-1902, reprinted 1960).

31. *Op. cit.* (p. 49).

32. *Ibid.*, (p. 195, no. 484).

33. There seems to be some confusion as to the status of the Bodhisatta as king, whether animal or man!

34. Under its Laotian title, *Bryā Gaṅgāk*, it is mentioned by Finot (*op. cit.*, pp. 49 and 199, np. 632).

35. Corresponding to the *Mullakūt* mentioned, without explanation, by Finot (*op. cit.*, p. 193, no. 425).

36. Mentioned by Finot (*op. cit.*, p. 180, no. 79) under the title of *Cakkhavutti-pāpasut*.

37. Analysed by Finot (*op. cit.*, p. 74).

38. The manuscript gives the translation of one text mentioned by Finot (*op. cit.*, p. 190, no. 330).

39. Mentioned by Finot (*op. cit.*, p.179. no. 59). One Pali manuscript of this work is kept at the National Library, Bangkok.

40. From the beginning of the *Mahāvagga* (Vinaya I, ed. H. Oldenberg, PTS, 1879, reprinted 1964); together with the two *Satipaṭṭhāna Suttas* (MN I, pp. 55-63; ed. V. Trenckner, PTS, 1887, reprinted 1964; and DN. II, pp. 291-315 ed. T.W. Rhys Davids. PTS, 1903, reprinted 1967).

41. It begins; *evaṃ kate buddhaṃ viya buddharūpaṃa pi mahātejaṃ mahānubhāvaṃ hotu yeva*—"having so done can the Buddha image be, like the Buddha, endowed with great splendour and great power".

42. Mentioned by Finot (*op. cit.*, p. 58, no. 2).

43. *Vide* Finot (*op. cit.*, pp. 72 and 181, no. 198).

44. One Cambodian version in fifteen files of a developed version of this treatise is kept at the Bibliothèque Nationale in Paris under the title, *Cetanābhedavaṇṇanā* (Khmer 223).

45. *Vide* Finot (*op. cit.*, pp. 74-6).

46. Finot mentions (*op. cit.*, p. 202), without explanation, a work with the same title but equates it with the *Sarākarivijāsutta* (no. 749). He also refers to the *Dibbamantasutta* or *Sut Tippamon* (p. 210, no. 236) from which the present work, in its colophon, is alleged to be extracted. But the *Tippamon*, described by Finot (p. 59) cannot be other than the *Khandhaparitta* with which the *Salākarivijāsutta* has nothing in common. (This text was published by Dharmabhakti in Bangkok.)

47. *Vide* Finot. (*op. cit.*, p. 77).

48. F. Mason, "Mūlamūli or the Buddhist Genesis of Eastern India from the Shan through the Talaing and Burman" (*JAOS*, IV, pp. 103-16, 1854). San Win and D. Win, "Mula Muloi, a Talaing account of the Creation" *Journal of the Burma Research Society*, 1912, pp. 218-24).

49. *Vide* the canonical *sutta* (SN, I, p. 155; ed. L. Feer, PTS, 1884, reprinted 1973) of the same name which Finot incorrectly identifies (*BEFEO*, XVII 5, p. 178,

note 21) as the translation of a Pali text, popular in Indochina, of which an extract, accompanied by his commentary, is kept at the National Library, Bangkok. A Cambodian version is to be found at the Bibliothèque Nationale in Paris (No. 342).

50. The National Library, Bangkok, in addition to some fragments in Cambodian characters, possesses a version in Sinhala script. A Cambodian translation is also kept at the Bibliothèque Nationale, Paris. This work is similar to the *Jātattaginidāna* attributed by the *Gandhavaṃsa* (*JPTS* 1886, p. 63) to Culla Buddhaghosa, a contemporary of the great commentator—*vide* G. P. Malalasekera, *Pali Literature of Ceylon*, p. 126, RAS, London, 1928; reprinted by M. D. Gunasena, Colombo, 1958).

51. R. Spence Hardy, *A Manual of Buddhism, in its Modern Development* (pp. 89-97, London, 1860; reprinted in Varanasi, 1967).

52. George Coedès, "Documents sur le laos Occidental" (*BEFEO*, XXV, p. 6, no. 1, Hanoi, 1925).

53. *Ibid.*

54. *BEFEO*, XVII 5 (pp. 72 and 196, nos. 536-44).

55. Hardy (*op. cit.*, pp. 101 *et seq.*).

56. *JPTS*, 1886 (pp. 65,75). Although it was supposed to have been composed in Ceylon, in fact it is known only in Thailand, Laos and Cambodia. Several manuscripts of the Pali text are kept in Paris, Bangkok, Phnom Penh and Luang Prabang, together with translations in Siamese, Laotian and Cambodian.

57. *The Wheel of the Law. Buddhism illustrated from Siamese sources* (London, 1871; reprinted in Taipei, 1971, and Varanasi, 1972).

58. *Mémoire concernant l'Asia orientale*, II, 1916 (pp. 107-22). The text has gradually grown with developments and new chapters, and the last recension—the Siamese translations of Prince Paramanujita Jinorasa (Bangkok, 1845)—contained thirty chapters.

59. The Cambodian and Siamese manuscripts of the 17th century already included about fifteen chapters, with the Laotian tradition represented by the present translation, corresponding to a much shorter recension, apparently ending at the ninth chapter.

60. *JPTS*, 1886 (pp. 33-40).

61. *Vide* Finot's description (*BEFEO*, XVII, 5, p. 76).

30

Buddha : The Teacher Extraordinary

N.H. SAMTANI

The Buddhist literature is replete with epithets of the Buddha.[1] Next to Dhamma (=Nibbāna), it is the word 'Buddha' that has received various qualitative appellations. These qualifications or epithets of the Buddha (e.g. *Tathāgata, Sugata, Samyaksambuddha, Tāyi, Amitābha*, etc.) are significant not only from the point of view of the growth of doctrinal exegesis but they reflect also traits in the personality of Gotama Buddha (e.g *purisadamma-sārathi, vijjācaraṇa-sampanna*, etc.).

The Buddha was also termed *dhammarājā* or *dhammasāmi*, which signified that he wielded spiritual and moral authority. However, he was mainly—rather, exclusively—a teacher and a teacher *par excellence*. It will be interesting to study the traits that made him the extraordinary teacher of men and gods (*satthā-devamanussānam*) and supreme guide of persons likely to go astray (*anuttra purisadammasārathi*). It will be worthwhile in present times to study the secret of his successful teaching career. Even if we dismiss his supernormal attainments, like omniscience, miraculous powers (*abhiññās*), 32 signs of a great man, ten powers (*dasa balas*), etc., as devotional or mythical outgrowth, there were surely some special distinguishing marks in his personality which made him really a supreme teacher (*anuttara satthā*).

These qualities, in the writer's view, were the following : self-confidence, fearlessness, fluency in speech, lucidity of expression, power of comprehension, brilliancy of intellect, charming physical appearance, cool temper, sympathy and understanding, perseverence, liberal attitude towards critics, knowing the inclinations of persons to be instructed, power to appeal to reason, strictness towards lax disciples, selflessness, faith in followers, alertness of mind, experience of hard life and facing evil forces, balanced judgement, knowledge of how to tame difficult persons, spotless conduct, etc. In all these accomplishments lay his secret of success. It is difficult to discuss all these

qualities in this paper, but I shall deal with some of them.

Under the famous formula which is often given under *Buddhānussati*,[2] we get the following description of the Buddha :

> "*Bhagavā araham sammāsambuddho vijjācaraṇasampanno sugato lokavidū anuttara-purisadammasārathi satthā devamanussānaṃ buddho bhagavā*".

This formula is one of the comprehensive characterisations of a Buddha and occurs frequently in Pali and Sanskrit Buddhist texts. The words occurring in this formula have been commented on in detail in Pali and Sanskrit texts.[3] Besides these, the Buddha is said to possess various mental and physical accomplishments, which are listed as ten *balas*, four *vessārajjas* (*vaiśāradyas*), four *paṭisambhidās* (*pratisaṃvids*), eighteen *āveṇikadhammas* (special characteristics), 32 *mahāpurisalakkhaṇas*, 80 *anubyañjanas* (32 signs of a great man and 80 minor signs—all physical). All these terms and lists present the Buddha as a paragon of all that is best in man.

There is no doubt that the biography of the Buddha as presented in Buddhist texts is inextricably mingled with myth and legend and it is difficult to get the exact picture of the Master from the literary sources, yet it is the personality of the Buddha which dominates the scriptures and that is especially pertinent in the Pali canon. Leaving aside some aberrations, we get more human touches of the personality of the Buddha and his missionary activities.

The Buddha is found in the Nikāyas as "teacher of wonderful energy even in extreme old age, continually impressing on the world certain truths which, though they might seem difficult, in as much as they were new, were not complicated; kind and in some ways liberal but in every thing that concerned his teaching most definite and tolerating no variation. Clearly such a character was likely to leave in the minds of disciples a clear recollection of what he taught."[4] In the *Mahāsīhanādasutta* of the *Majjhimanikāya*, we find the Master represented as a man of exceptional vigour and lucidity of wisdom even at the advanced age of eighty, still capable of answering tirelessly questions on dhamma even if he had to be carried about in a litter (*mañcaka*).[5] The commentary on the *Majjhimanikāya* says that this discourse was given in the year of his *parinibbāna*.[6]

It is difficult to state the exact period in the life of the Buddha when he entered into his teaching mission. According to Pali scriptures, the day he knew and proclaimed himself to be the Buddha, his career as a teacher began. After his enlightenment (*Bodhi*), the Buddha declares :

> "For me there is no teacher,
> One like me does not exist,
> In the world with its *devas*
> No one equals me".
>
> "For I am perfected in the world,
> A teacher supreme am I,
> I alone am all-awakened,
> Become cool am I, *nibbāna*-attained."[7]

However, according to Pali chronicles, the Buddha's teaching career lasted from after his enlightenment in his thirty-fifth[8] year up to the end of his earthly existence. It commenced at Sarnath, when he imparted his teachings to his five old companions asceties who had left him in disgust after the Buddha realised the futility of self mortifications. After the austerities and before his *bodhi*, Gotama had gone in search of teachers and met Āḷāra Kālāma and Uddaka Rāmaputta, but found them incompetent guides. It was only after full enlightenment (*sammāsambodhi*), when the noble truths were revealed to him, that he—after some initial hesitation—came forward as a teacher of mankind.

The Buddha, if he wanted, could have remained unconcerned about teaching his doctrine to others, enjoying alone the supreme nirvāṇic state which he had obtained after a great effort. But he remained most active in his missionary itineraries up to his *parinirvāṇa*. Though he is described as loving solitude and meditation (*pavivekārāma, jhānarata*), he is depicted in the Nikāyas as a busy instructor and helper of mankind, even at a very advanced age.[9]

The Buddha's enlightenment is marked off from that of other adepts, *śrāvakas* and *pratyekabuddhas*, in that it is insuperable (*anuttara*) and complete (*samyak-saṃbodhi*). It appears that the Buddha's stature grew steadily as years went by. The altruistic or public (*bahujana-sukhāya, bahujana-hitāya*) career of the Buddha marks him out even in early Buddhism from the two lesser ideals of *śrāvaka* and *pratyekabuddha*. *Pratyekabuddhas* had no compunction in declaring that they were interested in themselves—their personal enlightenment.

The Buddha's marvellous statues that have been found in India and abroad testify to his personal physical beauty also. Although the devotional sculptor's hand may have added much to the personal charm depicted in the Buddha's images, early texts also speak of him as handsome, pleasant to look at, inspiring trust, gifted with great beauty of complexion, fair in colour, fine in presence, stately to behold, etc. (*Samaṇo, khalu, bho, Gotamo abhirūpo dassanīyo pāsādiko paramāya vaṇṇapokkharatāya samannāgato brahmavaṇṇi brahmavaccasī akkhuddāvakāso dassanāya*).[10] In some of the later Buddhist texts, one of his 32 physical marks is *Mahānārāyaṇa-śarīra-samantaprāsādikatā* (having an all-round pleasing body, like that of *Mahānārāyana*).[11] In a teaching career, pleasing appearance also is an added factor, and the Buddha had inherited it in abundance from his very birth.

The Buddha is seen in the Pali texts carrying on discussion with an opponent, whether it be a brahmin or an adherent of another sect, in the same refined, skillful and ever polite and amiable manner. Sometimes he put himself entirely in the place of the opponent, setting out from the same point of view, making use of same expressions often also the same technical terms, and imperceptibly leading his opponent over to the opposite standpoint.[12] The dialogues of the Buddha, which were based on the recollections of the immediate disciples, give us a good idea of teaching methods of the Buddha. According to Rhys Davids, they are "probably a more exact reproduction of thoughts of the teacher than the dialogues of Plato".[13]

In his teaching method, the Buddha made abundant use of similes and parables. This enthralled and convinced his audience. A simile or a parable cannot be substituted for argument, but often it has more effect on the mind and even on the intellect of the hearer than a thousand arguments. "Thus, we find," writes Winternitz, "in th

suttas of all the four collections a veritable flood of similes, and they are foremost in investing these speeches with a literary character and artistic value".[14] The famous example of a convincing simile is given, in the *Cūla-Mālukyasutta* of a man hit by poisoned arrow who instead of having the arrow drawn from the wound is interested in unnecessary questions about the description of the arrow and its shooter.[15]

Now, let us discuss some technical lists of qualities associated with the Buddha exclusively. In the mental realm—leaving aside those in the physical realm, viz. 32 *lakṣaṇas* and 80 *anuvyañjanas*—we find of greater interest to us, the four *vaiśāradyas* and four *pratisaṃvids* (Pali *paṭisaṃbhidās*). The Buddha is supposed to possess four *vaiśāradyas* (four grounds of self-confidence). The word *śāradya* (Pali *sārajja*) means shyness or timidity.The Buddha has conquered timidity or shyness and cultivated fearlessness. As regards doctrine, he makes a lion's roar (*sīhanāda*). *Vaiśāradya* in Buddhist Sanskrit texts has been commented upon as absence of diffidence or timidity in assemblies (*sabhāsu āsāṃkucittyaṃ*).[16] The Buddha as a teacher had supreme confidence in himself and therefore he could speak in any assembly and boldly preach his doctrine. He was confident that the way he had taught for the cessation of misery was unchallengeable and definitely led to the goal (i.e. nirvāṇa). He is thus shown in the Buddhist texts as fearless, serene, self-confident, cultivating a noble and magnanimous spirit.[17]

The Buddha is also possessed of four *pratisaṃvids* (*paṭisambhidās*) for successful preaching. They are required to remove the doubts of persons to be trained. The word '*pratisaṃvid*' (*paṭisambhidā*) has been variously translated as 'analytic insight', 'power of comprehension and exegesis', 'logical analysis' etc.[18] There are four *pratisaṃvids*, viz. *dharma*, *artha*, *nirukti* and *pratibhāna*.[19] By *nirukti-pratisaṃvid* is understood 'knowledge of different languages that are spoken in different countries'. '*Pratibhāna-pratisaṃvid* is understood as 'readiness or confidence of speech' or 'brilliancy', etc.[20]

The faith that Buddha inspired was due not only to the fact that he was an ideal preacher but also to the fact that he was practitioner of virtues he preached. He was a seer, being endowed with *vijjā* (*-sammādiṭṭhi*) and he practised also *sīla* and *samādhi* (both are technically called *caraṇa*). Hence the Buddha is called *vijjācaraṇa-sampanna.* He was possessor of the power of expression (*vaktṛtva-sampat*) and the power of practice (*pratipattṛtva-sampat*).[21] We know also that he possessed (besides ten powers) two other powers, viz. *pratisaṃkhyāna* (Pali *paṭisaṃkhyāna-bala* -intellectual power) and *bhāvanā-bala* (power of practising *sīla* and *samādhi*).[22]

In spite of all these best qualities of a teacher, the Buddha did not ask his disciples to attach any importance to his person. He specifically instructed his Saṅgha to take the rules of *vinaya* and *dhamma* as their teacher.-[3]

Finally, this noblest among men and gods had no closed fist of a teacher (*ācariya-muṭṭhi*). He laid bare all that he had to say without any distinction. In the *Mahā-parinibbāna-sutta*, he says to Ānanda : "I have preached the truth without making any distinction between exoteric and esoteric doctrine, for in respect of truths, Ānanda, the Tathāgata has no such thing as the closed fist of a teacher who keeps some things back."[24]

Thus, this supreme teacher of the world of men and gods gave his disciples, just before he breathed his last, the ever-inspiring message of "striving vigilantly (in life),

for all the constituents are subject to decadence" (*vayadhammā saṃkhārā, appamādena sampādetha*).[25]

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NOTES

1. The following are some of the entries under the word 'Buddha' in the *Abhidānappadīpikā* : buddha, dasabala, satthā, sabaññū, bhagavā, muni, lokanātha, mahesi, vināyaka, samantacakkhu, sugata, māraji, dhammarājā, mahāmuni, dhammasāmi, tathāgata, sayaṃbhū, sammāsaṃbuddha, nāyaka, etc.
2. *Visuddhimagga*, Chap. VII. 1; also see under four *sotāpannassa aṅgāni*, *Dighanikāya*, III, p. 177.
3. See *Visuddhimagga*, loc cit.; *Arthaviniścaya-sūtra Comy.* pp. 241ff.
4. Eliot Charles : *Japanese Buddhism*, p. 26.
5. Cf. *Majjhima*, *N.* I, p. 115.
6. *Papañcasūdanī*, II, p. 51.
7. Cf. *Na me ācariyo atthi, sadiso me na vijjati /*
   sadevakasmiṃ lokasmim, natthi me paṭipuggalo //
   aham hi arahā loke, ahaṃ satthā anuttaro /
   ekomhi sammāsambuddho, sītibhūtosmi nibbuto // Majjhima. N. I. p. 221; For tr., see *Middle Length Sayings*, vol. I, p. 215.

8. *Mahāvaṃsa* II. 26-7; Dutt, N. : *Early Monastic Buddhism*, p. 95.
9. Cf. *Majjhima N.* I, p. 115; Eliot, Charles, *op. cit.* p. 42.
10. *Dīgha* N. I, p. 100.
11. *Arthaviniścaya-sūtra, Commy.* p. 305.
12. Cf. *Upāli-sutta, Majjhima. N.* vol. II, pp. 43ff.; Winternitz, M : *History of Indian Literature*, vol. II, p. 70.
13. Rhys Davids T. W. : *Dialogues of the Buddha.* Pt. I, p. 207.
14. Winternitz : *loc. cit.*
15. *Majjhima N.* II, p. 110-11.
16. *Arthaviniścaya-sūtra Commy.*, p. 271.
17. Cf. Har Dayal : *The Boddhisattva Doctrine*, p. 21.
18. For various translations of this term, see Har Dayal, *op. cit.* pp. 259ff.
19. Cf. *Paṭisambhidāmagga*, pp. 401-2; *Arthaviniścaya-sūtra*, pp. 51-2.
20. For various translations, cf. Har Dayal, *op. cit.* pp. 265-66.
21. Cf. *Arthaviniścaya-sūtra Commy.* p. 242.
22. *Paṭisambhidāmagga*, pp. 427-28; *Dhammasaṅgaṇi*, article 1353.
23. *Dīgha N.* II, p. 118.
24. *Ibid.*, p. 80.
25. *Ibid.*, p. 119.

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Religious Assimilation in Early Medieval Sinhalese Society

BARDWELL L. SMITH

Introduction

While the impact of Mahāyāna Buddhism in Ceylon (Śrī Laṅkā) has generally been underplayed, sufficient evidence exists (of a doctrinal, iconographic and cultic sort) to show that Sinhalese Buddhism has accommodated itself to a variety of religious influences, including those of Mahāyāna, over the centuries. If one takes literally the thrust of the chronicles, one has a picture of so-called orthodox Buddhism (*i.e.*, that of the Mahāvihāra in alliance with key monarchs) as "defensor fidei", staving off influences of a Mahayanist and Brahmanic nature, not to mention folk religious beliefs and practices.

The image created is that of a struggle to preserve some *Urbuddhismus* which existed in the mind of the chronicler, of orthodox Mahāvihāra bhikkhus generally. This image is deeply intertwined with that of Sinhalese nationalism and ethnic identity, and therefore it raises a research problem of considerable importance if one is to understand what actually happened during early medieval times (from the late Anurādhapura period through the Polonnaruva era, *i.e.*, early ninth to late thirteenth centuries), not to mention what Sinhalese Buddhism evolved into as a result of these influences. Was the Sāsana in actuality resistent to changes of an important sort? If not, how was it modified by newly emerging practices and beliefs as these came from abroad or arose within Ceylon ? Was it able to sustain significant continuity with its own past, at least its perceived past, and with that of early Buddhism in India?

Evidence of this sort, going back several centuries, is difficult to secure in any unambiguous sense, though there is no lack of testimony, however piecemeal, throughout the history of Ceylon as documented in the chronicles and the commentaries, the in-

scriptions, the ancient festivals and rites (many of which continue into the present), and the sculptural and architectural remains from both the Anurādhapura and Polonnaruva periods. Aside from these forms of evidence, in recent times valuable ethnographic and anthropological studies have enabled one at least to surmise that the forms existing within Sinhalese Buddhism today (in all its variety and richness) were in comparable ways existent in ancient times.

This essay is primarily theoretical in nature, using several methods and types of material as a way of suggesting that Buddhism throughout its history in Ceylon was more diverse than has often been assumed and of indicating that Sinhalese Buddhism became exceedingly skilled in adjusting to other religious traditions. In the process of discussing this, an attempt is made to develop a theoretical spectrum of stances taken by the Sāsana toward these other beliefs and practices, stemming from total rejection at one end to complete acceptance at the other, with a variety of intermediate positions which assimilated and sometimes transformed in various ways these elements, as contact continued over centuries. This brief essay is the first stage in a much longer study of religious assimilation within several traditions of Theravāda Buddhism from its emergence and development in India and Ceylon to its spread throughout large areas in Southeast Asia. The intent here is to advance the concept of a spectrum, to provide enough examples within the context of early medieval Ceylon (as well as those drawn from recent anthropological studies), and to raise a number of questions about what sorts of problems need to be explored (limited to Ceylon in this paper, though not in the projected study).

It was during the Polonnaruva period (ca. 993-1293 A.D.) that Ceylon began to relate to and influence strongly various Buddhist communities in Southeast Asia. It is ironic that the form of Theravāda which emerged after periods of intense exposure to Mahāyāna and Mantrayāna elements, with their rich and complex ingredients, was the form that was taken as the standard of orthodoxy in these other countries. If this is true, it attests to the resourcefulness of this tradition yet questions the image of abstract purity sometimes advanced, especially by apologists of the last hundred years, in relationship to "canonical" Buddhism in its earliest Indian components. The actual process of assimilating certain new forms while rejecting others reveals the tensions which arise in the encounters between a specific tradition and plural elements within and outside itself, and is in many ways analogous to the political problem of balancing centripetal and centrifugal forces which was characteristic of the Polonnaruva era.[1]

Part of analyzing the interrelationship between Buddhism and other religious beliefs and practices (whether at the folk level or in contexts where the intermingling receives some sort of imprimatur) is the need for clarity about terminology. Because the term "syncretism" is so commonly misunderstood, I would prefer at the outset to identify the process as one in which a tradition (in this case Sinhalese Buddhism) assimilates, subordinates, transforms, and is itself modified by elements of belief and practice from other religious traditions or communities. The process is subtle, complex, frequently reciprocal, dynamic, and found in the areas of ritual, symbol, cosmology and institutional structure (in doctrine too, though less acceded to here). A careful reading of the chronicles of Ceylon provides limitless raw material for study, but it is probably in cultic practices and archeological complexes as these may be observed in the present that

one can understand more deeply the process of assimilation and synthesis which has occurred in varied ways and at different rates throughout history.

Basically, religious assimilation is the process of incorporating, subordinating and transforming new or different elements into an on-going tradition of belief and practice. This process is a continuous one in which what is assimilated changes as does the matrix into which it is received. It is thus dynamic, dialectical and reciprocal. These new elements may emerge from within a tradition and do not necessarily impinge upon it from the outside. Reform movements within a particular religious community are the most obvious case in point, even though they are often influenced by outside forces to one degree or another. Analogous to the political process, in which the prevailing consensus recognizes its own survival depends partially upon its ability to incorporate or graft onto the main body dissenting or impinging elements, is the need for a dominant religious tradition to discover a comparable *modus vivendi*. One sees, therefore, in the basic process of religious assimilation an attempt to establish and maintain a viable balance between centripetal and centrifugal tendencies, or between so-called orthodoxy and so-called heterodoxy. The crux of the dilemma, from the standpoint of the dominant tradition, is how to be enriched by exposure and assimilation without losing a sense of self-identity, without in this case abandoning the tradition of the *ratanattaya* (the three treasures : Buddha, Dhamma, Sangha). Edward Shils has expressed very well both this notion of consensus and the inevitable tensions which arise within it : "The centre, or the central zone, is a phenomenon of the realm of values and beliefs. It is the centre of the order of symbols, of values and beliefs, which govern the society. It is the centre because it is the ultimate and irreducible; and it is felt to be such by many who cannot give explicit articulation to its irreducibility. The central zone partakes of the nature of the sacred. In this sense, every society has an 'official' religion, even when that society or its exponents and interpreters, conceive of it, more or less correctly, as a secular, pluralistic, and tolerant society."[2] Akin to this is what happens when there are, in fact, many subordinate centres, whatever their relationships might be to *the* center. Another issue is the nature and role of "civil religion" *vis-á-vis*, or as a part of, an historic religious tradition such as Theravāda Buddhism or, more specifically, Sinhalese Buddhism. At any rate, the other side of Shils' coin is that tensions within consensus are as vital to examine as consensus itself. "The central value system which legitimates the central institutional system is widely shared, but the consensus is never perfect . . . Active rejection of the central value system is, of course, not the sole alternative to its affirmation. Much more widespread, in the course of history and in any particular society, is an intermittent, partial and attentuated affirmation in the central value system."[3]

This point raises the question of a diversified response to central authority and its traditional ideological confirmations, on the one hand, and suggests a variety of stances in relationship to what is outside the traditional, however defined, on the other. These are opposite sides of the same phenomenon; the concern in this paper is with the latter, not the former. As a way of focussing upon the complexity of the phenomena with which we are dealing (before detailing the spectrum I believe to be present within Sinhalese Buddhism's approach to "extra-canonical" beliefs and practices), another theoretical approach to this issue is relevant. S. N. Eisenstadt, in a

discussion also of the center-periphery relationship, says that we may "distinguish between a generally positive as against a negative attitude to change." He refines this by sketching a more differentiated picture of "various concrete types of response to change." He underscores the following: "(a) a totally passive, negative attitude often resulting in the disappearance or weakening of such resisting groups; (b) an active resistance to change through an organized 'traditionalistic' response aiming to impose some, at least, of the older values on the new setting; (c) different types of adaptability to change; (d) the appearance of what may be called transformative capacity. This last is the capacity not only to adapt to new conditions but also to forge new general institutional frameworks and new centers. Transformative capacity may vary according to the extent of coercion which it involves."[4] Eisenstadt's typology could be used in examining many of the dynamics within Sinhalese Buddhism historically, but it does not allow sufficiently for elements characteristic to Buddhism which may not be found in other traditions. We may now proceed to describe what is essentially a very complex spectrum of positions within Sinhalese Buddhism, in its efforts to remain in continuity with what it perceived canonical Buddhism to be and as it responded to changes within itself and pressures from different sources over the centuries. By definition, a spectrum is a model, a portrayal of distinctive positions along a continuum. It is not definitive, only suggestive. In the process of outlining these positions, it will be necessary to consider important caveats.

Modes of Redefining Sinhalese Buddhism

The purpose of this section is to identify modes or nodal points along a continuum or shifting spectrum which may illustrate the infinitely varied, yet characteristically patterned ways in which Sinhalese Buddhists have reacted to changes of various sorts, as these have arisen within or come in contact with the Sāsana. One immediate question is what is meant by "Sinhalese Buddhism." While an essential issue, this question will have to be begged in a short paper. Only a much longer study could do justice to the tremendous variety implied in those words over more than two millenia. Suffice it to say here that we are talking primarily about the Mahāvihāra community as its varied positions can be discerned within the chronicles, though even this begs questions. (In each case, partially to avoid having to redefine terms constantly, I will let "x" stand for the dominant tradition and "y" for elements of a new or different sort. Examples should help to clarify this procedure).

The six positions outlined here are by no means mutually exclusive. They may overlap at various points in time. Their relationship may shift rapidly or evolve gradually, depending upon circumstances. But whatever qualifications can and must be made, the principal point is that these are definable and distinguishable positions and that considerable evidence for each exists in the history of Śrī Laṅkā. The present section will describe all six, providing evidence from a variety of sources. The last section will outline briefly ways in which one might explore the problems further.[5]

While examples will be drawn from many periods of Ceylonese history, the largest share will come from the early medieval period, *i.e.*, late Anurādhapura through the Polonnaruva, in part because these issues were exceptionally alive then. One wonders, indeed, whether there was a move during the Polonnaruva era both

toward renewed orthodoxy and, paradoxically, a developing *modus vivendi* with, even assimilation of, the many flourishing beliefs and practices of the day. These included forms of Mahāyāna and Mantrayāna, which were especially strong in the early centuries of this period; the vital bhakti movements as these spread from South Indian Śaivism; and the continuing elements of folk religious belief and practice. Was the result, in fact, a new orthodoxy ? Also, was Polonnaruva as a ceremonial complex more conducive to this than Anurādhapura in its earlier centuries had been? Or, was this process of "synthesis" not new at all, but simply a case of varied religious expression being allowed by, but kept distinct from canonical Buddhism? One central question almost goes without saying but should not, namely, what do we mean by "canonical Buddhism" ?[6] This ancient and honorable question will not be resolved in this paper.

1. The first two positions to be considered are, while opposites, often juxtaposed as reactions to each other. They are at antipodal ends of the same spectrum and do not represent historical modes of Sinhalese Buddhism in its typical forms. On the other hand, they cannot be dismissed as unrepresentative of Buddhism, for they have often characterized the dominant mode of the tradition at certain points in time. Of these two, the first may be portrayed as one which takes a resistant stance against what it perceives to be violations of the normative beliebs and practices of Buddhism, especially the former. Using the symbols mentioned above, this would be the stance of x against y. While there are obviously degrees of resistance against accommodation to extra-canonical styles of life and ways of perceiving reality, the basic posture here is that of rejection. But the other side of its protest is affirmation of traditional norms. In one sense, it is separatist in orientation, not spatially necessarily, but in terms of attitude. It perceives alterations in doctrine and regimen to be contaminations which, once sanctioned, will undermine the essence of the Dhamma. Though "false bhikkhus" are often singled out in the chronicles, there is a stock phrase usually reserved for kings who accept heretical views, namely, they are "as the grasshopper [who] leaps into the fire taking it for gold". A specific case in point is the monarch Silākāla (524-37) who, in his confusion, welcomed the arrival in Ceylon of a famous text entitled the *Dhammadhātu* which contained the heretical teachings of the Vaitulyavādins (the Vetulla School, a Mahāyāna sect), who were first mentioned in the reign of Vohārika Tissa (209-31) and who were affiliated with the Abhayagiri-vihāra in Anurādhapura. For his inadvertence, the king was portrayed as being "incapable of distinguishing truth from falsehood as the moth which flies to the lamp it takes for gold, when he saw it, believing it to be the true doctrine of the Buddha received it with ceremony." (*Cūlavaṃsa* 41: 38-39)

The various chronicles are replete with comparable evidence. While the *Mahāvamsa* and the *Cūlavamsa* are especially important documents, a late fourteenth century Sinhalese work entitled the *Nikāya Saṅgrahawa* is of value in cataloguing the various schisms within the Sangha over the centuries and the reasons for these.[7] When one juxtaposes this with an early thirteenth century non-canonical Pāli work, the *Saddhamma Saṁgaha*, which stresses the importance of compiling, writing down, and expositing the Pāli canon and its commentarial literature, the repeated emphasizing of orthodox teaching may be felt.[8]

Intrinsic to this position is the continuing attention given to reform of the Sangha.

Normally, what is at stake is purification of the life-style of the bhikkhus (to make behavior conform to the Vinaya or its accepted modifications according to time and place) and the unifying of dissenting elements within the monastic community. For the most part during the Anurādhapura period the emphasis was on purification, though there were many instances of immense strain between the four main sects in terms of doctrine as well. According to Gunawardhana in his introduction to the *Nikāya Saṇgrahawa*, it was not until Sena II (853-87) that the Mahāvihāra began to regain its dominance. Sena "now made the other three formulate their ritual, and enjoined their strict conformity to religion. This may be considered as the death-blow to the survival of the three new Nikāyas. It is true they thereby received a constitution, but it was a constitution which deprived them of their expansibility and the power to adapt themselves to the changeful fortunes of their struggle. From this time forth, therefore, they begin to decay, and they linger on till the time of Parākramabāhu the Great, when that mighty monarch bids them cease and they are heard of no more."[9] Following the example and admonitions of Asoka, Sinhalese monarchs involved themselves in monastic disputes from the beginning and in actual Sāsana reforms since the early sixth century A.D. It was during the Polonnaruva period, however, that the most noteworthy occasions of this involvement took place, as it was within the reigns of both Parākramabāhu I and Parākramabāhu II that Sāsana *katikāvatas* (codes of regulation) were promulgated—in 1165 and 1266/7 respectively. Aside from the standard stress on purification and on unity within the Sangha, which Parākramabāhu I enforced in an unprecedented manner, one also sees in these codes important developments toward organizational centralization within the monastic community, a trend stimulated by the confused nature of affairs social and political in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries.[10]

It is also clear that the stimulus for reforms within the Order frequently came from forest-dwelling sects (*Āraññika*). R. A. L. H. Gunawardana, in his doctoral dissertation mentioned in footnote 9, makes this point convincingly. Indeed, in general, one can say that the traditional distinction between the forest-dwelling monks (*Āraṇyavāsī*) and the town or village-dwelling monks (*Grāmavāsī*) separates those who are less accommodationist oriented (at least with respect to strictness of regimen) from those who are more so. It is likewise apparent in the modern period that groups among the laity can arise in protest against monastic slackness of discipline and impurity of doctrine. Among many examples of this one may point to the Sri Lanka Vinaya Vardena Society.[11] In all such cases one is dealing with a reform movement which is seeking both to reestablish doctrinal continuity with early Buddhism, in its Indian forms as perceived in the *Tipiṭaka* and in its Sinhalese forms as indicated through the chronicles, and to reaffirm impurity of discipline. Inevitably, therefore, this stance amounts to a rejection of so much that is historical Buddhism, Theravāda as well as Mahāyāna. It views accommodation with the ways of the world as essentially blindness to the causes of human suffering. While contact with the world cannot be avoided, it seeks forms of separation which make it a position few are willing to take. Paradoxically, though it may be perceived as closer to normative Buddhism and thus held in high esteem, it cannot be seen as typical of how most Buddhists (monks or laity) relate to the world. It is purist, not pragmatic, though its purism does not necessarily deny the validity of other positions.

2. The second position is literally opposite the one just discussed. In this instance *x* capitulates to *y*. The grasshopper leaps into the fire, undoubtedly with the best of intentions. Either the very identity of Buddhism is lost through accommodation to other forms of culture, or its basic essence is subverted by being used for purposes inconsistent with its identity. The ways in which either of these can happen are, of course, infinite. Whether the *x* factor is extinguished or simply rendered inert by being subsumed under *y* may or may not make a difference. In either case, it is inoperative. An example of the former would be what happened to Buddhism in India with the Muslim advance into Bihar and Bengal. Coupled with its own internal problems at this point, political misfortune effectively put an end to institutional Buddhism there (with some exceptions in East Bengal) until its partial revival in the past hundred years. For different reasons and in different ways we see a severe weakening of Buddhism in Ceylon during the long colonial period, especially under the British, until its various forms of revival beginning in the mid and late nineteenth century. A more recent example and a more dramatic one is the fate of Buddhism in Tibet since the 1950's, though it has in many ways thrived in exile. The several persecutions of Buddhism in China, especially in the fifth, sixth and ninth centuries, took their toll, even though the tradition survived in a less vigorous form. Again in Śrī Laṅkā one can track the fortunes of the Sāsana with respect to various of the Tamil invasions, in the early Anurādhapura period and later with the Cōḷas in the eleventh century and with Māgha in the thirteenth.

This sort of adversity is easier to understand than where the tradition is voluntarily seduced into becoming something other than it claims to be. Often, it is a matter of degree between extensive assimilation of non-Buddhist beliefs and practices and a virtual loss of fundamental Buddhist identity. There is clearly a continuum between these two positions; the drift toward the latter can be imperceptible but ultimately unmistakable. The most important kind of example, perhaps, is the appropriation of religious symbols, institutions, and personnel by social, political or economic forces to lend sanctity to what are basically non-Buddhist ends. Coercion need not be a factor at all, nor need the abductors, as it were, be maliciously disposed. We are referring here to what is now commonly called "civil religion", to the use of sacralizing powers for what are essentially worldly purposes. This is not to imply that Buddhism is disinterested in justice or the responsible use of power. The evidence throughout Buddhist history in various countries is otherwise. The point here is where the Sāsana becomes a virtual captive, often for good if naive reasons, of forces and powers which undermine its independence.

While it would be simple to supply evidence from the modern period (in Ceylon, Southeast Asia, and elsewhere), where the forces of so-called post-traditional society are threatening the very identity of all religious traditions and stimulating them to raise fundamental questions, the primary example used here is from the Polonnaruva period. Though the use of the Sangha by kings and other claimants for power for political purposes is common within Theravāda history, one may observe in the reign of Parākramabāhu I (1153-86) and in that of Parākramabāhu II (1236-70) very different forms of civil religion being employed. In the latter's case, the sources suggest that the Sangha was a willing participant. Indeed, here is almost a classic case of symbiosis between monarch and Order. Each retained a basic independence,

yet the relationship between the two added immeasurably to the strength of both. One gets primarily the impression of a pious king, anticipating the needs of both laity and bhikkhus alike. As one reads closely, it is clear that here is an exceptionally shrewd leader whose religious sincerity is matched by his political astuteness. The result, in my judgment, for both the Sāsana and the social order is as beneficial as it can be, considering the threatening nature of the times. In this case, we have an example of Buddhism's not being consumed or misused by civil religion.

The other example is not so clear. The more one tries to grasp the attitudes of the chronicler toward Parākramabāhu I, the more the possibility of ambiguity arises. Unquestionably, the 240-page account of this figure is told in the language of *kāvya*. His exploits are praised; his power, skill and courage are held in awe; all the obvious signs and portents are auspicious. He is a paradigm of paradigms. Had his kamma only fated him to be born in Jambudīpa (India), he would have rivalled Asoka. None but the Buddha outshines him, and the two are clearly associated throughout the tale. On the other hand, we are also presented with descriptions of a person whose ends are frequently made to justify his means and whose powers of artifice have no equal. He dispatches his foes with a touch of obvious cynicism. He rewards his followers, "to each according to his merit" (harking back to the *Cūlavaṃsa* 37 : 51 and the words "gato yathākammaṇ", or "he went according to his kamma", which was a common phrase), as though he were the dispenser of kammic destiny. Like the Buddha, he is the allayer of fear, striking the *abhaya* pose in one form or another; yet, unlike the Buddha, he uses fear to make cowards of his foes. The ironic tone is too evident to miss. Even his resolute purification of the Sangha, especially his determination to rid it of all divisions, makes cynics of careful readers, when one suspects that his motives are basically political and that his purpose in promoting organizational unity was to reduce the chances of factionalism. From the standpoint of political realism, this makes good sense. Again, Asoka provided a model. From the standpoint of the Sangha's independence, however, it did not bode well in the long run. The chronicler, at least, appears to be raising a flag of warning about an imbalance of power which was taking shape during this reign. The pitfalls as well as the advantages of civil religion are obvious from a reading of Sinhalese, Burmese and Thai history (ancient and modern). The issue at stake here is the danger of diminished freedom which results from too close association with the political order, despite the passing benefits which can be considerable.

3. The third position is where *x* assimilates *y* and the fusion creates a new entity, *xy*. This form of religious assimilation might be called "syncretism", though that term could be used for other forms as well. Or, it might be termed "synthesis", since this technically means a mixing together of different elements to form a new and different whole, not just in the sense of accretion, but of creating something that did not exist in the same fashion before. If the word is used loosely, any number of examples can be found, since the process of fusion and synthesis occurs regularly and is part of what one means by religious assimilation. But when used strictly, as is being suggested here, it becomes a distinct mode by itself and thus examples must be more selective. Two sorts of illustrations serve here : the first is broad in scope and suggests what was happening throughout the country over a period of several centuries; the other is very precise, namely, the process as it developed within one important

temple in the fourteenth century. Each of these entails the effect popular Hinduism (at the start, particularly Purāṇic Śaivism) was having upon the religious practice and world view of Sinhalese Buddhists. While Brahmanic influence in Ceylon is as old as Buddhism's and while India's impact upon Ceylon (intellectually, artistically, religiously, socio-politically) continued through the centuries, a different sort of influence gained momentum about the ninth century and continued for at least six hundred years. It was out of this movement that what we are calling a "synthesis" emerged.[12]

"With the increasing instances of Indian rule over Ceylon, Hinduism too began to influence Buddhist practices. Sinhalese kings like Mahinda II (787-807 A.D.) and Sena II (866-901 A.D.) put up temples for Hindu gods. During the Polonnaruva period influences of Saivism and Vaishnavism were felt strongly. Saiva and Vaishnava shrines were erected at Polonnaruva, and they possessed bronze images of Saivite and Vaishnavite gods . . . In a comparative study of the moonstones of the Anurādhapura and Polonnaruva periods, one sees a marked difference in design guided by Hindu ideals."[13] "From the 12th century onwards we find the influence of Hinduism on the faith of the masses of Ceylon and Hindu deities such as Visnu have since been absorbed into the popular religion of the Sinhalese people. Of the doctrines which the rivals of the orthodox monks had preached, some like the theory of perfections (*pāramitā*), the belief in Bodhisattvas and the emphasis on devotion (*bhakti*) had been accepted by the Mahavihara and incorporated into the Theravada. It should be noted that these doctrines are mostly Mahayanist in character."[14]

As general depictions, those two quotations are reasonably representative of what was happening from about 800 to 1500 A.D. A detailed history of religious assimilation during those centuries has not yet been written. The reasons for the increasing influence of Hinduism are several, though one would at least include among them the impact of growing numbers of Indians (mainly Tamil Hindus) who came to Ceylon as mercenaries, merchants and immigrants, roughly in that order during this period. Other factors would be the spread of Mahāyāna, especially during the Gupta age, which gave a strong impetus to the study of Sanskrit; the important revival of Hinduism occurring in South India in the seventh century; and the great literary activity which took place under Parākramabāhu I in the twelfth century, stimulating studies in Pāli, Sanskrit and Sinhalese in subjects both religious and secular.[15]

It was not in the area of scholarly activity, however, that the synthesis or fusion, with which we are concerned, occurred. It was rather in the growth of devotional expression, and not simply on the popular or folk level. While obviously manifested there, it became characteristic of the society generally, engaged in by king, monk, priest and layman alike. The origins of this devotional expression in Śrī Laṅkā are obscure. From the reverencing of the Buddha and his relics described in the *Dīpavamsa* (fourth century A.D.) and the *Mahāvamsa* (fifth century A.D.), it is clear that a cult of the Buddha existed then, even though those documents imply its beginnings with the Buddha's purported three visits to Ceylon during his lifetime, and its taking liturgical shape with Buddhism's establishment in the reign of Devānaṁpiya Tissa (250-210 B.C.). The arrival of the relics, the receiving of the Great Bodhi-tree, the construction of the Mahāthūpa and the enshrining of the relics during Buddhism's first hundred years are said to have been heralded with effusive devotion. We know also that in the fifth century A.D., when the Chinese pilgrim Fa Hsien visited Ceylon,

there was an active cult of the Tooth Relic, with large-scale festivals being promoted by the Abhayagirivihāra (which thrived during these years). We know that the Tooth Relic was brought to Ceylon in the first year of Sirimeghavaṇṇa's reign (301-28) and that the history of this relic was written in Eḷu (the ancient language of the Sinhalese), supposedly in the year 301. In line with our thesis about the strong emergence of devotional expression during the late Anurādhapura and its flourishing for centuries thereafter, it is not coincidental that a Pāli translation of this history, entitled the *Dāṭhāvaṁsa*,[16] was done about the year 1200 and that the cult of the Tooth Relic was of exceeding importance all through the medieval period of Sinhalese society, for both political and religious reasons. Nor is it coincidental that the *Thūpavamsa* was written during the reign of Parākramabāhu II (1236-70), for as an account of the construction of the Mahāthūpa in Anurādhapura during the reign of the hero-king Duṭṭhagāmaṇī (161-137 B.C.) it associates the mid-thirteenth century (an era witnessing the decline of Sinhalese greatness) with an age of emerging Sinhalese national and religious identity. As such, the *Thūpavamsa* was not simply a remembrance of greatness, but a recalling of a people to their destiny.[17]

The essence, therefore, of the synthesis which was strongly characteristic of this period was its fashioning of a form of *bhakti* or pious devotion which typically had elements from more than one religious tradition. In a footnote to his translation of the *Cūlavamsa* Wilhelm Geiger mentions the use of the term *bhakti* (Pāli, *bhatti*) in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, ascribing its influence to Hinduism but showing how it was applied to forms of reverencing the Tooth Relic, the Bowl Relic and the sacred foot-print.[18] One example of this was the promoting of pilgrimages to Sumanakūṭa (Adam's Peak) by various kings within the Polonnaruva era (including Vijayabāhu I, Parākramabāhu II and Vijayabāhu IV) so that Buddhists could honor the sacred foot-print (*Śrī Pāda*) and also pay respect to Sumana (Saman), the god of this mountain and one of Ceylon's traditional protectors. As Paranavitana says :

> "The acceptance of Buddhism by a people is not necessarily followed by the disappearance of the gods whom they were wont to worship. The conversion of a people to Buddhism generally results in the conversion of the gods of that people also to the same faith. The Buddha is the teacher, not only of men, but also of gods. The gods thus continue to exist, but not the same as before...But the cults of these gods, as well as the worship of the Footprint on Adam's Peak, though not encouraged by the orthodox religious leaders in Anurādhapura, were probably prevailing in places away from the main centres of Theravāda Buddhism ; it is, in fact, after a prince belonging to a branch of the royal family that had been in Rohaṇa for several centuries, established himself at Anurādhapura in the eleventh century, after repelling the Chola invaders, that we have a record, for the first time, of a royal benefaction to Adam's Peak. Similarly, it was after the centre of political gravity shifted away from the ancient capitals in the thirteenth century, that there is mention in the chronicles of a king of Ceylon concerning himself with the worship of Saman."[19]

The second example of synthesis can only be mentioned in passing. It is the interesting development in the mid-fourteenth century, apparently occurring for the first

time with the construction of the Laṅkātilaka Temple (the state temple of the Gampola period), of locating Hindu dēvālēs *inside* Buddhist monasteries. While it was becoming increasingly common for dēvālēs to be attached to vihāras, the instance of Laṅkātilaka is considered to be the first of its kind. Since this has been described at length by Hans-Dieter Evers, it is merely cited here as a particularly graphic case of synthesis.[20] In saying this, it does not imply that either Buddhism or Hinduism loses its identity by this sort of functional and symbolic fusing. This position along the spectrum is unlike the second where that danger is very real one, although, as Evers indicates, both monk and priest here are at the behest of the palace system, with all the implications of civil religion again. The most interesting feature of this relationship between vihāra and dēvālē is that, while the former nominally retained supremacy, the more insecure the times became, the more people resorted to what the priest had to offer, namely, protection against a threatening world. The shifting relationship within this fusion was based upon the circumstance and the need, but its unique feature lay in its encouragement of a roughly equal and mutually advantageous co-existence.

4. The fourth position is one in which a definite hierarchical arrangement exists between the related elements. Symbolically, it is x over y. This essentially pyramidal relationship has been described in a number of ways by anthropologists in recent years, especially by Gananath Obeyesekere, Michael Ames and Nur Yalman. Similar studies have been made by others in Burma and Thailand. While one cannot automatically project these perceived structures back into past eras of history, sufficient material of a mythological, ritualistic, and artistic nature remains from these earlier periods both to indicate how relationships have evolved and how basically sound the hierarchical theory is, as far as it goes. In a sense, the concept of hierarchy is endemic to Buddhism. By definition, the Brahmanic deities and later the Hindu gods (as well as the entire Mahāyāna pantheon) are subordinate to the Buddha. It is he who has extinguished his *kamma*, as comparable Buddhas before him. All others remain on the wheel of suffering, however high or low their status. The question of differential status and authority, nevertheless, is intrinsic to a pyramidal structure. Equality is an illusion, as the differences between beings derive from merit earned or lost in former existences. Built into the fundamental distinction between the Buddha and all others is a division of labor separating those persons, institutions, rites, and supernatural beings who are oriented toward *nibbāṇa* (the extinction of kammic existence) from those who seek further pleasure and/or less pain. In a hierarchical schema, there are necessarily gradations of merit accrual, but there remains a difference in kind between the most meritorious and the Buddha. The very concept of a hierarchy suggests the infinity of distance between enlightenment (freedom from attachment) and non-enlightenment. In order to tolerate that fact, religious traditions create universes of differentiated beings, a multiplicity of forces whose help man seeks or whose malevolent intent he avoids.

The pantheon, with its various levels and numerous ways of being approached or protected against, has been portrayed most clearly by Obeyesekere.[21] Under the Buddha there is first Śakra (Sakka), king of the gods, to whom the Buddha entrusted the welfare both of the Sāsana and of Laṅkā. The latter's care was then delegated to Uppalavaṇṇa (Upulvan) or Varuṇa (later seen as Viṣṇu). The other pan-Sinhalese deities, essentially lokapālas or guardian figures of the Sinhalese world, are Saman

(Sumana), Skanda (Muruga), Vibhīsaṇa, Pattini, and Nātha (Avalokiteśvara). These figures are "gods in a conventional sense, for they grant favors, intercede on behalf of humans, help them in worldly affairs, and cause weal or woe in the human world."[22] Beneath them, in feudal fashion, are area or district deities, who in the modern period have tended to fade in importance as people move more easily from one locale to another. On levels four and five, at the pyramid's base, are first "a host of very powerful demons who are completely malevolent and 'irrationally punitive' . . . Below them are spirits of dead relatives (*preṭas*), goblins, and ghosts, who are all spiteful, causing fear in men's heart".[23]

The Sinhalese pantheon and its ritualistic aspects have been ably described by others. Only a few additional comments are called for here. *First*, when observers have noted that a complementary division of labor exists, for example, between "pure belief" and "syncretistic practice" and between "other world" and "this world", one must be careful not to read *modern* distinctions back into the medieval period. The effects of modernism and the quite natural desire of bhikkhus (most laity also) to present normative Buddhism as distinct from what might be interpreted as magic are products of a "scientific age" but may have presented less of a problem in previous centuries. At least, this issue needs further discussion. The evidence would include this as one of many possibilities but not as the sole one.

Second, one of the more promising topics for further exploration is "the process by which a 'foreign' god or demon is incorporated into the pantheon".[24] If one uses the model of superiority/inferiority, then the new member accepts the suzerainty inherent within the pantheon. The most interesting feature, however, is in fact the *process* which occurs (sometimes gradually, sometimes quickly) between various deities and bodhisattvas, for instance, a process in which shifting relationships may be observed and in which the notion of hierarchy may or may not be appropriate. At any rate, the process is exceedingly complex and suggests the need for more fluid models, arising out of historical and comparative research which focuses quite literally upon the process itself whereby religious assimilation takes place.[25]

5. The fifth position is one which poses the central dilemma within Buddhism as an historical tradition, and within Theravāda especially, namely, the task of helping monk and laity alike to live within a world of suffering without compromising the basic principles of the Dhamma. This dilemma creates an inevitable tension between x (the dominant tradition with its normative belief and codes of behavior) and y (in this context, all those elements of mundane existence which arise inside and outside the Sangha), making the relationship one of continuing paradox, essentially irresolvable. In a real sense, this position is the most difficult of all, for it acknowledges both sides of the tension with equal force. It refuses to collapse the tension in the manner of accommodationism, but it recognizes that Buddhists live within a world of compromise and that they do so in a less than enlightened fashion. It neither rejects this world, nor can it live easily within it. And, part of the latter is that, while it sees and may even value certain forms of religious assimilation, it lives uneasily with these and perceives more clearly their threat to the Dhamma than do positions three and four. While this dilemma may be more sharply felt by those bhikkhus who have left village or city life, choosing instead to live either in a hermitage or in a community of forest-dwelling monks, it

is in fact a current that is widely felt within Buddhist societies from Śrī Laṅkā throughout Southeast Asia. This tension is unquestionably a severe one in the modern world, experienced and expressed by laity as much as bhikkhus, but it is clearly not a modern phenomenon *per se*. The historic documents give repeated evidence; rituals, mythology and symbols attest to it in all ages. It is, indeed, intrinsic to the Buddhist world view and may be traced in its earliest Indian forms.

It is true, on the other hand, that the more disturbed the times and the more threatened the Sangha, the greater the dilemma becomes, for it is precisely at such times that men and women are inclined toward non-canonical means of release. Obviously, individuals and communities under serious stress resort to these means even in relatively stable times, but the more the forces of *adhamma* appear in the ascendency, the greater the inclination. It has been the thesis of this essay from the start that early medieval Sinhalese society increasingly experienced this sensation and that this was inevitably a major factor, though not the sole one, why religious assimilation of varied sorts was accelerated during this period. If this thesis has sufficient validity, then one would also expect a heightened sense of dilemma at the same time. A combination of paying close attention to the tremendously increased liturgical and ritualistic emphasis which evolved in the Polonnaruva era, and the very interesting historical studies done by Gananath Obeyesekere on the relationship between myth and history (see footnote 25) create the decided impression of a correlation between cultural anxiety and religious syncretism. This correlation points to the inherent dilemma or tension we are discussing.

In an analysis of changing status relationships between gods in modern Ceylon, Obeyesekere states that "wherever uncertainty prevails, astrology flourishes.".[26] While he limits that observation to South and Southeast Asia in recent times in that context, its implications pertain to any period of history, especially if one sees astrology as simply one means of seeking to resolve the tension. In an earlier essay entitled "Theodicy, Sin and Salvation in a Sociology of Buddhism", Obeyesekere examined the dilemma which exists between orthodox, classical Buddhism and "practical secular Buddhism" and pointed to the two most prominent ways in which this dilemma has been resolved—*i.e.*, by the Bodhisattva (saviour) cult in Mahāyāna and by the concepts of counter-karma, transfer of merit, and the importance of one's last thoughts before dying in Theravāda.[27] As ways of not resolving this dilemma but of facing it, at least for monks, he mentions how normal monastic life can be viewed as an obstacle to enlightenment (hence the decision of some to become forest monks) and how laity regard the purity of the Sangha (hence its need for regular reform) as a social necessity, *i.e.*, as a vehicle of transferring merit. In an important article entitled "Magical-animism and Buddhism: A Structural Analysis of the Sinhalese Religious System", Michael Ames states the problem concisely: "The fundamental paradox facing the Sinhalese is that they have such a high and noble ideal they can never fully realize it in this life. Not only are they unhappily bound to endless rebirth, they *need* rebirth. Then they must somehow learn to escape from it."[28]

Sinhalese Buddhists have, however, developed ways of reinforcing the dilemma as well as trying to resolve it. In a discussion of the *pataha* ritual (see footnote 25, item 2), Obeyesekere shows how this ritual becomes over time a means of inverting or challenging misuses of the theory of divine kingship. "What is at issue is not so much the

theory of divine kingship per se but the form it took in an era of troubles...[This] neither implies a rejection of notions of divine kingship nor the authority of the king. Similar rituals of humiliation are directed against gods and demons: yet they are respected, venerated or feared." [9] The ritual acts, as it were, to redress an imbalance. Functionally, it is similar to the ongoing tension between the monarchy and the Sangha, between the two wheels of the Dhamma. In general, perhaps, one may see this balancing occurring more within a ritualistic context than any other. The elemental function of liturgy is precisely *not* to collapse the tension between levels or dimensions of reality, but to register their actual separation and to reinact their essential oneness. One may refer to this separation as this-worldly and other-worldly, but this distinction is more confusing than edifying. The dilemma of separation, of division, between reality as it is commonly experienced and reality as seen upon awakening is a continuing Buddhist dilemma. The difficulty of sustaining this tension, even of recognizing its deeper implications, is clear. While Sinhalese Buddhists have had no less difficulty with this than any other community, they have also experienced the dilemma profoundly and attempted to live within it as a way of discovering how to transcend it. In a recent article Frank Reynolds makes a case for how the Mahāvihāra community in Ceylon reacted over centuries to the stimulus of Mahāyāna and Mantrayāna forms of Buddhism on the one hand and to varieties of Hinduism on the other, not by a "grudging acceptance of the newer views and practices" but by a "persistence and resilience" which enabled Sinhalese Buddhism to sustain a balance between significant continuity with its historic tradition and significant change in the face of major threats and challenges. The result was a perceptively altered form of Buddhism which became the model for the forms the Sāsana took in Burma, Thailand and Cambodia.[30]

6. The sixth and final position on the spectrum is peculiarly important in that it may be closer to the essence of what the Dhamma means to reflective and sensitive Buddhists, yet it may also be the furthest from the manner in which Buddhism is typically conceived as well as practiced. It might be stated as x transforming y, but even more as an ongoing process in which x (the normative dimensions of the dominant tradition) relates to y (again in this context, those elements of mundane existence which arise inside and outside the Sangha) in a manner transformative of both x and y. The first neither rejects nor succumbs to the second. The two are not simply combined into a 'higher' or 'lower' synthesis, nor does the notion of hierarchy fit the relationship. While the position of tension or paradox or dialectic approaches it more closely, it falls short for the obvious reason that the notion of transformation includes but goes beyond tension, makes room for but is not defined by paradox, and engages in but does not settle for dialectic.

To some, the position in question is a goal or ideal; to others, it is the fundmeantal nature of reality, whether realized by men and women in history or not. In some respects, therefore, it is an impossible ideal, but it is also one which tradition believes was realized in the Buddha and, in fact, in all awakened persons. However liberally or conservatively tradition acknowledges its realization (the range running from not uncommon arahantship in the early history of Buddhism to few, if any, examples in recent times), the affirmation goes beyond that of an abstract ideal to that of a genuine but unlikely possibility. In Buddhism, as in other traditions, concrete historical models (however idealized) and abstract ideals (even if stemming from actual

experience) exist side by side. While the former may appear more accessible, they are, in fact, as far removed from ordinary experience as the latter.

At this point, the distinctions between Theravāda and Mahāyāna portrayals of enlightened beings overlap and begin to blur. The ideal is inevitably an abstraction until it is realized. The sixth position, therefore, is not descriptive of historical reality as experienced by those on the path, but only of the possibility of its realization. This possibility serves as a transforming influence, since other positions along the path are perceived to be finally incommensurate with the Dhamma, however efficacious or even necessary they may appear to be It is being suggested here that part of what emerged within early medieval Sinhalese Buddhism was a blending of positions, not into a stable synthesis but into an interrelationship between very diverse ingredients which had a transforming effect upon each other. For perhaps the first time in Sinhalese history the role of Mahāyāna changed from being essentially external to mainstream Buddhism in Ceylon to one which subtly exercised a transforming, however brief, impact. The effects of the impact, however, were more enduring. As one observer put it :

> For Parākramabāhu I, in the historical mythology of Lankā, is regarded as the Sinhalese ecumenicist *par excellence* whose greatest kingly act was the reconciliation of Ceylon's Buddhist sectaries and the restoration to ecclesiastical supremacy of the followers of the Theravāda. Still, the Mahāyānist character of the Wata-dā-ge at Polonnaruva, and of its model, does not reflect a cultural abnormality. The role of the Mahāyāna in the cultural development of Ceylon has been grossly underrated, both in the traditional histories and in modern commentary. (It may be said also that the special character of ecclesiastical reform in ancient Ceylon has not been understood.) The archeological remains alone suggest a widespread Mahāyāna cult flourishing from the seventh century until the devastation of Anurādhapura in the tenth. And there is considerable evidence for the survival of Mahāyāna institutions well into the fifteenth century.[31]

While this transformative capacity may be present anywhere along the spectrum, it is perhaps more clearly portrayed through artistic means than elsewhere in Sinhalese Buddhism. An interesting article by S. Paranavitana on "The Significance of Sinhalese 'Moonstones' " suggests how a specific Buddhist symbolic complex assimilates and transforms, in this case, Brahmanic and folk elements for its own purposes and how this symbolic gestalt or synthesis is then used in ritualistic fashion.[32] Moonstones first appeared around the fourth century A.D. in Anurādhapura (with Indian counterparts earlier) and continued through the Polonnaruva period. These symbols, representing the plane of suffering (*bhava-cakra* or *saṁsāra*), were stepping stones, as it were, to the image shrine or mount upon which the Buddha sits (*pabbata*). The pilgrimage symbolically is from the world of psychic suffering (*samkhāra loka*) to the Abode of Pure Beings (*Brahmā-loka*), where *taṇhā* has been extinguished. Discussing the iconographic and floral detail, Paranavitana relates this to Brahmanic and Buddhist mythology, elaborating upon its spiritual implications as well as pointing to evidence of religious assimilation. His discussion deals with the basic process of symbolization, *i.e.*, the attempt to make intelligible through the use of symbols or ritual or cosmology that which is essentially unknowable, *i.e.*, to interpret the unknown by analogy with

what is known in some sense, however relatively. Thus, by recognizing the pluralistic nature of all symbolic interpretation and by experiencing the inadequacy of symbolization itself, one is led liturgically and psychically to the non-symbolic beyond infinite symbolization.[33]

The transformation that can occur is essentially within the imagination of the participant. Concrete reality is viewed symbolically; by stages the imagination opens doors to the non-symbolic, finally integrating this with the perception of concrete reality. In the words of Paul Mus, "Here we see why the ancient Buddhist kings undertook 'cosmic' architecture . . . it is simply for the Buddhists a theatre in which the Law is unfolded and all things awake in all their radiance. In a word, it is not descriptive architecture but normative, a catharsis. It isolates itself from the world that is nothing but confusion and it points to the way out. The order of its parts and the imagery that meets the pilgrim coming there emphasizes what leads from evil to good. This indicative value, which one must listen to as one does an injunction, makes of the stūpas . . . by the force of their example, a 'replication' of the life, or rather the lives, of the Tathāgata".[34] The ritualistic reenactment is part of the transformative process, though transformation by definition can be captured by no form. The formlessness to which this process points inevitably partakes of forms, freeing them to become vehicles of the Dhamma. The sixth position is finally, therefore, not a point along a line within a spectrum, but the qualitative fulfillment of any point. It is both no point and every point. While it would be false to claim this characterized Buddhism in early medieval Ceylon, one can say that in the midst of social and political confusion distinctly new insights emerged, largely through the process of religious assimilation of a varied sort, which enriched an entire culture.

Conclusion

The depiction of a spectrum of positions is simply one way of looking at evidence. It is not descriptive of reality but a means of examining material of a varied sort. The examples used cannot do justice to any entire context. The variety itself precludes this. Furthermore, new moments of time bring new images into focus and create new realities. H.A.L. Fisher advocated as the "one safe rule for the historian: that he should recognize in the development of human destinies the play of the contingent and the unforeseen."[35] This applies to religious assimilation in early medieval Ceylon as to any subject. Other attempts at analyzing this and further evidence would discover alternate ways of interpreting the picture. I have considerable doubts about the adequacy of the examples used in this essay, though I have some confidence that the positions spelled out exist in one form or another and that better examples can be found by further looking. Endless caveats could be made, beyond those already hinted at about the difficulty of defining canonical Buddhism or of depicting Sinhalese Buddhism, but a more appropriate way of ending this discussion is to suggest areas for future research which would illuminate both the wider topic of religious assimilation and the more specific historical period of Polonnaruva Ceylon.

One area entails the study of South India and Ceylon as an interrelated microcosm (during this period of history) within a larger developing orbit, including the remainder of India and large parts of Southeast Asia. This is obviously a series of projects,

utilizing specialists in many fields. To begin with, one would settle for a more integrated study of South Indian history and culture with those of Ceylon from the ninth through the thirteenth or fourteenth centuries. Too often, these areas are studied in relative isolation from each other, touching primarily at the obvious points and then only as far as the competence of the particular scholar allows. This also calls for a series of projects, involving many scholars in careful and extensive research.

A *second* area of importance would be the comparative study of Buddhism's relationship to Hindu culture and specifically to forms of Hinduism within Theravāda contexts of Ceylon and Southeast Asia. This would necessarily entail examining Mahāyāna and Mantrayāna forms of Buddhism. Indigenous folk religion would likewise be important to such a study. Many individual studies have been done, but nothing of a genuinely comparative nature which tried to see the different modes of religious assimilation occurring in various cultures at several points in time.

A *third* area would be a comparative study of the organization of the Sangha and of various factions and interest groups within it during this period in both Ceylon and Southeast Asia. Part of this would be the relationship of these groups to the political sector (examining the nature of civil religion itself) and to broader aspects of the socio-economic order. It would also include a comparative study of stratification within the Sangha and the process whereby elites emerge within the Order.

A *fourth* area in which further work needs to be done is relating the symbolic and cosmological implications of religious architecture, sculpture and painting to ritual, festivals, pilgrimage and other forms of religious devotion. Attention should be paid to the socio-political aspects of this area as well. A comparative study on religious assimilation or synthesis would analyze the process by which different ingredients become related to each other. A basic feature would be the variegated uses of assimilated beliefs and practices among and between laity and members of the Order. Intrinsic to this is the frequently mentioned distinction between doctrine and praxis (in terms of religious assimilation), which may be a valid distinction in some contexts but a confusing and even inaccurate one in others. It is, at any rate, an important distinction to question and explore.

NOTES

1. This essay is in many ways complementary to two others recently completed by the author: (1) "The Polonnaruva Period (ca. 993-1293 A.D.) : A Thematic Bibliographical Essay", in Bardwell L. Smith, ed., *Religion and Legitimation of Power in Sri Lanka* (Chambersburg, Pa. : Anima Books, 1971); and (2) "Polonnaruva as a Ceremonial Complex : Sinhalese Cultural Identity and the Dilemmas of Pluralism", in A.K. Narain, ed. *Comparative Studies in Buddhist Historiography*, forthcoming.

2. Edward Shils, "Centre and Periphery", in *The Logic of Personal Knowledge : Essays Presented to Michael Polanyi on his Seventieth Birthday* (Glencoe, Ill. : The Free Press, 1961), p. 117.

3. *Ibid.*, pp. 123-24. His entire essay is germane to this particular issue.

4. S.N. Eisenstadt, "Some Observations on the Dynamic of Traditions", *Comparative Studies in Society and History : An International Quarterly*, Vol. 11 (1969), p. 458.

This essay is reprinted in Bardwell L. Smith, ed., *Religion and Legitimation of Power in Thailand, Burma and Laos* (Chambersburg, Pa.: Anima Books, 1978).

5. To anyone familiar with H. Richard Niebuhr's typological study entitled *Christ and Culture* (Harper & Brothers, 1951), in which he develops brilliantly a spectrum involving five primary positions, my indebtedness to his approach will be clear. For many reasons, however, the same kind of approach would not work with Sinhalese Buddhism, but I have deliberately used his categories, adding one more, to see if they help to illuminate the diversity of stances within a completely different sort of tradition. I must likewise acknowledge my continuing appreciation for the two-volume work by Ernst Troeltsch, *The Social Teaching of the Christian Churches* (New York: MacMillan Co., 1950), which could also serve as a model for getting at similar phenomena in other religious traditions. Of more modest scope but very suggestive is the essay by Thomas F. O'Dea, "Five Dilemmas in the Institutionalization of Religion", *Journal of the Scientific Study of Religion*, Vol. 1, No. 1 (October 1961), 30-41. See also a recent volume, edited by Heinz Bechert, *Buddhism in Ceylon, and Studies on Religious Syncretism in Buddhist Countries: Report on a Symposium in Goettingen* (Goettingen : Abhandlungen der Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1978), especially the chapters by Bechert, Gombrich and Ruelius.

6. See Sukumar Dutt, *The Buddha and the Five After-Centuries* (Luzac & Company, Ltd., 1957) for a stimulating but inconclusive approach to this subject.

7. See the *Nikāya Saṇgrahawa, being A History of Buddhism in India and Ceylon*, tr. by C.M. Fernando, rev. and ed. by W.F. Gunawardhana (Colombo : H.C. Cottle, 1908). Also, *A Manual of Buddhist Historical Literature* (*Saddhamma-Saṁgaha*), tr. by Bimala Churn Law (Calcutta : University of Calcutta, 1941).

8. For fuller discussion of this one may consult the following : E.W. Adikaram, *Early History of Buddhism in Ceylon* (*or "State of Buddhism in Ceylon as Revealed by the Pali Commentaries of the 5th Century A.D."* (Colombo : M.D. Gunasena & Co., Ltd., 1953); Walpola Rahula, *History of Buddhism in Ceylon* (*The Anuradhapura Period, 3rd Century B.C.—10th Century A.D.*) (Colombo : M.D. Gunasena & Co. Ltd., second edition, 1966); G.P. Malalasekere, *The Pāli Literature of Ceylon* (Colombo : M.D. Gunasena & Co. Ltd., 1958); C.E. Godakumbura, *Sinhalese Literature* (Colombo : The Colombo Apothecaries' Co., Ltd., 1955).

9. *Nikāya Saṇgrahawa, op. cit.*, pp. xxx-xxxi. For a more sophisticated and extended explanation of what happened to the structure of the Sangha and its sectarian nature, see the doctoral dissertation (London, 1965) of R.A.L.H. Gunawardana, "The History of the Buddhist 'Saṅgha' in Ceylon from the Reign of Sena I (833-53) to the Invasion of Māgha (1215)", which is due to be published in 1978.

10. See Nandasena Ratnapala, ed. and tr. *The Katikāvatas: Laws of the Buddhist Order of Ceylon from the 12th to the 18th Century* (München : R. Kitzinger, 1971). An important distinction exists between Sāsana katikāvatas and vihāra katikāvatas, in that the latter apply only to local or sectarian branches of the Sangha.

11. For an analysis of this interesting movement, see Steven E.G. Kemper, "Buddhism without *Bhikkhus* : The Sri Lanka Vinaya Vardena Society", in Bardwell L. Smith. ed., *Religion and Legitimation of Power in Sri Lanka* (Chambersburg, Pa. : Anima Books, 1978). See also Kemper's doctoral dissertation entitled "The Social Order of the Sinhalese Buddhist *Sangha*" (University of Chicago, 1973).

12. For a good survey of the "evolution of Sinhalese sculpture", which sheds light on the repeated Indian artistic influences, see Nandadeva Wijesekera, *Early Sinhalese Sculpture* (Colombo : M.D. Gunasena & Co., Ltd., 1962), pp. 121-74.

13. Vincent Panditha, "Buddhism during the Polonnaruva Period", *The Ceylon Historical Journal* (Special Number on the Polonnaruva Period), Vol. IV, Nos. 1-4 (July 1954-April, 1955), p. 125. See also S. Paranavitana's article entitled "The Art and Architecture of the Polonnaruva Period", pages 69-90 (plus numerous plates), in the same issue. For bronze images especially, see P. Sarvesvara Iyer, "Puranic Saivism in Ceylon during the Polonnaruva Period", *Proceedings of the 1st Conference-Seminar of Tamil Studies*, University of Malaya, Kuala Lumpur (International Association of Tamil Research, 1968), Vol. 1, 462-74; and Sir P. Arunachalam, "Polonnaruva Bronzes and Siva Worship and Symbolism", *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society (Ceylon Branch)*, Vol. XXVI, No. 68 (1915-16), 189-222 (plus numerous plates).

14. Nandasena Mudiyanse, *Mahayana Monuments in Ceylon* (Colombo : M.D. Gunasena & Co. Ltd., 1967), p. 11. See also P.E.E. Fernando, "Tantric Influence on the Sculptures at Gal Vihara, Polonnaruva," *University of Ceylon Review*, Vol. 18 (1960), 50-66 ; and S. Paranavitana, "Mahāyānism in Ceylon", *Ceylon Journal of Science (Section G. Anthropology)*, Vol. 2, Pt. 1 (1928), 35-71, in which he first gives an historical sketch of Mahāyāna in Ceylon (noting its particular strength in the 3rd, 6th and 9th centuries because of Indian influences) and then focusses on the Bodhisattva cults (especially those of Nātha or Avalokiteśvara and of Sumana or Samantabhadra) which emerged in the Polonnaruva period, or slightly before, and thrived through the fifteenth century.

15. O.H. de A. Wijesekera, "Sanskrit Civilization among the Ancient Sinhalese", *The Ceylon Historical Journal*, Vol. I, No. 1 (1951), 23-29.

16. Bimala Charan Law, ed. and tr. into English, *The Dāṭhāvaṁsa : A History of the Tooth-relic of the Buddha* (Lahore : Moti Lal Banarsi Das, 1925).

17. N.A. Jayawickrama, tr. and ed., *The Chronicle of the Thūpa and the Thūpavaṁsa* (London : Luzac and Co., Ltd., 1971). In a similar way, another chronicle written during this same reign, the *Hatthavanagallavihāravaṁsa* (Colombo, 1866, tr. by James d'Alwis), serves to associate the saint-king Sirisaṁghabodhi (247-49 A.D.), the account of whose short reign comprises two-thirds of the text, with Parākramabāhu II, the high point of whose pious career is the miracle of the Tooth Relic described in the final chapter of this chronicle (as well as in Chapter 82 of the *Cūlavaṁsa*).

18. See *Cūlavaṁsa* 74 : 243 and footnote; 85 : 33 and 121.

19. S. Paranavitana, *The God of Adam's Peak* (Ascona, Switzerland : Artibus Asiae Publishers, 1958). pp. 71-73. Other important treatments of the fusing of Buddhist belief and practice with both indigenous and Brahmanic or Hindu traditions are the following : (1) S. Paranavitana, *The Shrine of Upulvan at Devundara*, Memoirs of the Archaeological Survey of Ceylon, Vol. VI (Colombo : The Ceylon Government, Archaeological Department, 1953); (2) Ananda K. Coomaraswamy, *Yakṣas* (New Delhi : Munshiram Manoharlal, 1971); (3) Richard F. Gombrich, *Precept and Practice: Traditional Buddhism in the Rural Highlands of Ceylon* (Oxford : Clarendon Press, 1971), especially his chapters on "The Buddha", pages 80-143, and "A Sketch of the Universe as Seen from Mīgala", pages 144-213, in which he depicts the enormously

rich composite of traditional Buddhist practices and beliefs alongside the coexistence of folk religion, Hindu ingredients, and diverse forms of Buddhist ritual and belief which constitute the Sinhalese tradition; (4) M.B. Ariyapala, *Society in Medieval Ceylon* (Colombo: Department of Cultural Affairs, 1968), pp. 179-249; and (5) S. Paranavitana, "Pre-Buddhist Religious Beliefs in Ceylon", *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society (Ceylon Branch)*, Vol. 31, No. 82, (1929), pp. 302-27.

20. Hans-Dieter Evers, *Monks, Priests and Peasants: A Study of Buddhism and Social Structure in Central Ceylon* (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1972).

21. Gananath Obeyesekere, "The Buddhist Pantheon in Ceylon and Its Extensions," in *Anthropological Studies in Theravada Buddhism*, Cultural Report Series No. 13, Southeast Asia Studies (New Haven: Yale University, 1966), 1-26.

22. Gananath Obeyesekere, "The Great Tradition and the Little in the Perspective of Sinhalese Buddhism", *Journal of Asian Studies*, Vol. XXII, No. 2 (February 1963), p. 144.

23. *Ibid.* See also Michael M. Ames, "Ritual Prestations and the Structure of the Sinhalese Pantheon", in *Anthropological Studies in Theravada Buddhism*, 27-50; Edmund R. Leach, "Pulleyar and the Lord Buddha: An Aspect of Religious Syncretism in Ceylon", *Psychoanalysis and the Psychoanalytical Review*, Vol. 49 (1962), 80-102, which shows how the Hindu god Ganesha (son of Śiva and brother of Skanda) becomes Pulleyar, a feudal dependent of the Lord Buddha among Buddhists in North Ceylon; Nur Yalman, "The Structure of Sinhalese Healing Rituals", *Journal of Asian Studies*, Vol. XXIII (June 1964), Special Issue on *Aspects of Religion in South Asia*, edited by Edward B. Harper, 115-50; Michael M. Ames, "Buddha and the Dancing Goblins : A Theory of Magic and Religion", *American Anthropologist*, Vol. 66 (1964), 75-82; and Richard Gombrich, "The Consecration of a Buddhist Image", *Journal of Asian Studies*, Vol. XXVI, No. 1 (November 1966), 23-36.

24. Obeyesekere, "The Great Tradition and the Little in the Perspective of Sinhalese Buddhism", *op. cit.*, pp. 145-6. Another interesting paper by Obeyesekere, "Social Change and the Deities: The Rise and Fall of Deities in the Sinhalese Buddhist Pantheon", unpublished manuscript, read at a symposium held at Swarthmore College (April 1972) traces, among other things, the dramatic rise in the influence of Skanda (the god of Kataragama) in recent times and analyzes some of the factors behind this.

25. Aside from the Bechert volume mentioned in footnote 13, see the following: (1) Heinz Bechert, "Eine alte Gottheit in Ceylon und Süd-indien", *Beiträge zur Geistesgeschichte Indiens, Festschrift für Erich Frauwallner, Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Süd- und Ostasiens*, Vols. 12/13 (1968-69), 33-42, which examines with great care the evolving identification of the North Indian god Skandakumāra with South Indian and Ceylonese gods of a similar nature from the fourteenth century on; (2) Gananath Obeyesekere, "The Pataha Ritual: Genesis and Function", *Spolia Zeylanica*, Vol. 30, Part II (1965), 279-296, spells out the nature of the ceremony of first fruits after the harvest or "in times of crisis like pestilence, famine and drought" (with the goddess Pattini presiding) in which a major theme is the tension between kingship as traditionally legitimated and kingship gone astray, a theme fitting into the *daṇḍadhamma* tension but also showing how ritual often inverts the meaning of myth, exposes its nonconformance with reality, and acts as an assimilating agency of new ingredients

over time; (3) Gananath Obeyesekere, "Gajabāhu and the Gajabāhu Synchronism: An Inquiry into the Relationship between Myth and History", *Ceylon Journal of the Humanities*, Vol. I, No. 1 (January 1970), 25-56, to be reprinted in Bardwell L. Smith, ed., *Religion and Legitimation of Power in Sri Lanka* (see footnote 1), which shows the evolution of the Gajaābhu story from a matter of fact account within the chronicles to an elaborate myth in the *Pūjāvaliya* in the reign of Parākramabāhu II (1236-70) and especially in the *Rājāvaliya* four centuries later, an evolution providing major evidence of a dynamic ritualistic process at work in which South Indian and Sinhalese elements on the one hand and diverse religious and mythic ingredients on the other were gradually amalgamated; (4) H.L. Seneviratne, "The Āsala Perahāra in Kandy", *Ceylon Journal of Historical and Social Studies*, Vol. 6, No. 2 (July-December 1963), 169-80, and also his doctoral dissertation entitled *The Natural History of Buddhist Liturgy* (*Being a Study in the Nature and Transformation of Kandyan Sinhalese Metropolitan Ritual*), Ph.D., University of Rochester, 1972 (forthcoming as *Rituals of the Kandyan State*, Cambridge University Press, 1978), both of which depict the subsuming of Hindu gods and the provincial chiefs to the centralizing process at work in Kandyan Buddhism and Kandyan political administration; and (5) Paul Wirz, *Kataragama: The Holiest Place in Ceylon* (Colombo: Lake House Investments Ltd., second edition, 1972) examines briefly what has become the most popular pilgrimage place for Buddhists, Hindus and Muslims in Ceylon, resulting in a fusing of pietistic beliefs and practices on the folk level (alongside deliberate attempts at retaining distinctions) centered around the god Kataragama (Kārttikeya, Subrahmanya, Skanda, Murukaṉ).

26. Obeyesekere, "Social Change and the Deities: The Rise and Fall of Deities in the Sinhalese Buddhist Pantheon", *op. cit.*, p. 41. See also Kitsiri Malalgoda, "Millennialism in Relation to Buddhism", *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, Vol. 12, No. 4 (October 1970), 424-41, which examines the way millennial expectations emerge with the rise of frustrations when a community's image of its identity clashes with the actual reality it faces in periods of self-confusion and rapidly increasing pluralism. The relevance of this phenomenon to Sinhalese Buddhism's long-term stress upon its Guardian Deities is of great importance. The essay by Obeyesekere on the Gajabāhu synchronism, mentioned in footnote 33, is very much to the point here.

27. Gananath Obeyesekere, "Theodicy, Sin and Salvation in a Sociology of Buddhism", in E.R. Leach, ed., *Dialectic in Practical Religion* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1968), 7-40.

28. Michael M. Ames, "Magical-animism and Buddhism: A Structural Analysis of the Sinhalese Religious System", *Journal of Asian Studies*, Vol. XXIII (1964), Special Issue on *Aspects of Religion in South Asia*, edited by Edward B. Harper, p. 47.

29. Obeyesekere, "The Pataha Ritual: Genesis and Function", *op. cit.*, p. 294. See also John Halverson, "Dynamics of Exorcism: The Sinhalese Sanniyakuma", *History of Religions*, Vol. 10, No. 4 (May 1971), 334-59, which describes at length how the demonic (specifically here the *sanniyaku* or demons of ill health) is assimilated in ritualistic fashion and is thereby domesticated. The process is one which combines the need for both integration and individuation, a process having psychic, communal and cosmic dimensions.

30. Frank E. Reynolds, "Dhammadipa: A Study of Indianization and Buddhism in Śri Lanka", *Ohio Journal of Religion*, Vol. II, No. 1 (April 1974), 63-78. See also Lowell W. Bloss, "The Buddha and the Nāga: A Study in Buddhist Folk Religiosity", *History of Religions*, Vol. 13, No. 1 (August 1973), 36-53, which shows how Buddhism relates to other religious phenomena not simply by a process of accretion or assimilation but often by a kind of dialectic or tension whereby it accepts and at the same time rejects elements of popular belief and practice, in different ways at different times.

31. Diran K. Dohanian, "The Wata-dā-ge in Ceylon: The Circular-Relic-House of Polonnaruva and Its Antecedents", *Archives of Asian Art*, Vol. 23 (1969-70), p. 37. For an extensive treatment of this subject, see his unpublished doctoral dissertation (Harvard University, 1964) entitled "The Mahāyāna Buddhist Sculpture of Ceylon". See footnote 22, above, for a similar judgment on Mahāyāna's impact.

32. S. Paranavitana, "The Significance of Sinhalese 'Moonstones' ", *Artibus Asiae*, Vol. 17 (1954), 197-231.

33. I am indebted to Eric Voegelin's important discussion of the relationship between the symbolic and the non-symbolic. See his book *Order and History* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1956), pp. 1-11.

34. Paul Mus, "Bouddhisme et monde occidental: pour une nouvelle méthode", in René Berval, ed., *Présence du Bouddhisme* (Saigon : France-Asie, 1959), 187-200. (Unpublished translation by George O. Totten.) Without question, the most comprehensive and perceptive study of this entire subject is Mus' *Barabuḍur: Esquisse d'une histoire du Bouddhisme fondée sur la critique archeologique des textes*, 2 volumes (Hanoi: Imprimerie d' Extrême-Orient, 1935).

35. H.A.L. Fisher, *A History of Europe* (London: Edward Arnold and Company, 1936), p. v.

32

The Role of Uruvela Kassapa in the Spread of Early Buddhism

Dr. C.S. UPASAK,

The role of the early disciples of the Buddha was great in converting people of other persuasions to the Dhamma by making a radical departure from the traditional line. After preaching his First Sermon at Isipatana Migadāya (Sarnath, Vāraṇasī), the Buddha asked his disciples to 'go around all alone and preach his doctrine to the people at large for their welfare and happiness'. This instruction of the Buddha was faithfully followed by his disciples. We do not know the whereabouts of the first five disciples, except Assaji. who chose to come to Rājagaha, where at his instance, Sāriputta and then Moggallāna, the two 'Chief Disciples', were initiated into the Dhamma.[1] The Buddha himself remained active in making his doctrine and path of practice known to the 'deserving persons'. After the first five disciples were initiated, Yasa, the son of a wealthy merchant of Vārāṇasī, was admitted into his Order.

The Buddha spent three months of rainy season (*Vassāvāsa*) at Sarnath and then decided to travel to Bodha-Gayā, the place where he had got his Enlightenment. It appears that while he was practising his penances at Uruvela (Bodh-Gayā), he met the mendicants living round about in the hills on the bank of the river Neraṇjarā. The Jaṭila mendicants, whose leader was Uruvela Kassapa, were then living there. It is a point worth mentioning here that the early disciples of the Buddha were mostly mendicants, the *tāpasas* and *paribbājakas*. The Buddha was aware of the fact that as his doctrine was 'glorious' in the beginning, in the middle and in the end, and also 'deep and profound, understood only by those beings whose mental eyes were scarcely covered by any dust'. He was also conscious that if the doctrine was not preached to them, they could not attain salvation. He, therefore, decided to preach the doctrine to them and declared to his disciples at Sarnath, "I will go also, O Bhikkhus,

to Uruvela Senānigama in order to preach the doctrine."[2]

The *tāpasas* and *paribbājakas* as well as numerous other contemporary religious orders offered a very fruitful field for Buddhist convertion. It is a remarkable feature of the time that the members of other religious sects attached more importance to reasoning than to blind belief or aimless practice. Conversion to another faith or religion was immediate if the believer of a faith was rationally convinced in a debate. The personality of the Buddha, his spiritual attainments, his supernormal powers, and, above all, his method of teachings were unique in many respects. All those who came into contact with this great personality were unable to make their self-defence. It was for this reason that we find a number of instances where even the persons who with crooked intention came to argue and took to crooked ways of disputation were defeated by the Buddha. (Cf. Ambaṭṭhasutta of the *Dīghanikāya*; Kasibhāradvājasutta of the *Suttanipāta* etc.).

Who were The Jaṭilas?

We do not find any definite historical background of the Jaṭilas as a religious sect prior to the time of the Buddha. However, they are mentioned in the *Mahābhārata*[3] and in the *Mahābhāṣya*.[4] They are referred to as individual ascetics practising penances in the forests and performing fire-worship. But the Buddhist accounts show that the Jaṭilas were prominent Brāhaminical sects having large followings all over the country. They are said to have had matted hair and believed in fire-worship.[5] A number of Buddhist converts were Jaṭila ascetics who wielded influence in Magadha, Kosala, and even in the south. Keṇiya Jaṭila of Aṅguttarāpa became the disciple of the Buddha.[6] In the *Suttanipāta* we get reference to an ascetic, Bāvarī by name, who lived on the slopes of the Godāvarī with a large number of disciples. These disciples had matted hair (*Jaṭājinadharā sabbe*) before they joined the Buddhist Order.[7]

The hermitages of the Jaṭilas were situated far from the villages, generally on the banks of the rivers which flowed by forests or hills from which they could get sufficient wood for their fire-worship. In their hermitages. they had a special room for fire-worship, known as *Agyāgāra.* Jaṭila Uruvela Kassapa was living in a hermitage on the bank of the river where there was a jungle (*vanasaṇḍa*) nearby.[8] In the *Apadāna*, we find that Kosiya Jaṭila and Nārada Jaṭila were living in *āśramas* or hermitages situated near the forest and were practising austere penances (*uggatapano*).

About their philosophical views we do not know much. They are said to be believers in the 'doctrine of action' (*Kammavādin* or *Kiriyavādin*) as mentioned in in the *Mahāvagga*.[9] They, as mentioned above, always worshipped fire and paid oblation to it. They were certainly not naked ascetics, but since they always tended the fire in their *Agyāgāra*, naturally they required few clothes to cover their bodies. They did not cut off the hair of the body or pare their nails. They also carried with them a few articles necessary for fire-worship.[10] That they performed *yajña* ceremony on a large scale is also mentioned in the *Mahāvagga*.[11] The people of Aṅga and Magadha are said to have brought with them ample food and eatables as their offerings.[12] Fire- worship is connected with the god, Agni of the Vedic age and these ascetics certainly belonged to one of the Brāhamanic schools. They also held the view that purification might be achieved by performing *yajña* (*Yaññena suddhi hoti*) and

believed in taking a holy bath in the river as a means to attain purification. In the *Udāna*, it is mentioned that on a certain occasion the Buddha was staying at Gayāsīsa. At that time, there was a large congregation of ascetics with matted hair, who in chilly winter nights and in early cold mornings were found to be emerging from their huts and plunging into water near Gayā, anointing one another and sacrificing with fire thinking to obtain purification by such a means.[13] It is also remarkable to note that the first *sutta* that the Buddha preached to the first Jaṭila converts is called '*Ādittapariyāya*' (fire sermon)[14] probably because fire-worship was most common among the Jaṭilas. In the *Udāna Aṭṭhakathā*, Buddhaghosa says that the Jaṭilas also worshipped the sun and the moon while standing in the water and some recited the Gāyatri mantras (Savitri mantra) many thousand times and some invoked Indra with the mantras.[15]

Uruvela Kassapa

Among the Jaṭila ascetics, the name of Uruvela Kassapa stands prominent, both as a practitioner and also as one having a large following. As mentioned above, there were three brothers, living at Uruvela on the bank of the Nerañjarā. The two brothers of Uruvela Kassapa were Nadī Kassapa and Gayā Kassapa. It is mentioned that Uruvela Kassapa was living with 500 disciples, Nadī Kassapa with 300 disciples and Gayā Kassapa with 200 disciples. It appears that the Buddha, while practising his penances in this area of Uruvela (near Bodh-Gayā), had had occasion to meet Uruvela Kassapa, and probably was aware of his spiritual attainments. He, therefore, after spending his *Vassāvāsa* (rainy-season-resort) at Isipatana Migadāya and after having despatched his first converts, the five Bhikkhus, to propagate his Dhamma came straight to the hermitage of Uruvela Kassapa to meet him. When the Buddha visited Uruvela Kassapa, he was not welcomed by the latter. Uruvela Kassapa, however, allowed him to have a seat in the *Agyāgāra* (fire-place), but he warned him that the spot was inhabited by a fierce *Nāga* (serpent). It is mentioned in the *Mahāvagga* that the Buddha subdued the *Nāga* by his supernormal power (*iddhi*). Uruvela Kassapa, pleased with this demonstration of *iddhi*, undertook to provide the Buddha with the daily food. It is also mentioned there that the Buddha stayed in a grove nearby. He was then visited by Mahārājika Devatās, Śakra, Brahmā etc.; and the Buddha while staying there is said to have performed 3000 miracles of various types which included, among others, the reading of the thoughts of Uruvela Kassapa, splitting of the fire-wood for sacrifices, heating stoves for the ascetics to be used by them after they had bathed in cold water.[16] Uruvela Kassapa was undoubtedly much impressed with the personal qualities he saw in the Buddha. He persisted in his thought that the 'great ascetic' had great magic power, but that he was not an *arahata* like him. Finally, the Buddha told him that he was not an *arahata*, nor did the way he followed lead to the arahataship. Ultimately Uruvela Kassapa was reconciled to his defeat and reverently asked for ordination, whereupon the Buddha asked him to consult his pupils. Uruvela Kassapa and with his 500 disciples cut off their hair, threw their sacrificial utensils into the river and were all ordained by the Buddha himself. When his two brothers, Nadī Kassapa and Gayā Kassapa, saw their hair and other things floating on the river, they made

anxious enquiries and learnt about the conversion of their elder brother. Then they were also ordained by the Buddha along with their pupils.[17]

The initiation of Uruvela Kassapa, his two brothers and their 1000 mendicant disciples is a remarkable event in so far as the proselytising power of early Buddhism was concerned. It was not the number of the new converts into the Dhamma but the conversion of Uruvela Kassapa, a renowned and influential ascetic of Aṅga and Magadha, which is to be regarded as a great event. This immensely contributed to the propagation of the new religion of the Buddha in Aṅga and Magadha, the eastern region of India. Uruvela Kassapa commanded very high reverence from and influence among the people of this area. As recorded in the *Mahāvagga*, Uruvela Kassapa had once organised a great sacrifice (*mahāyañña*) in which all the people of Aṅga and Magadha assembled and brought food and eatables in abundance (*Bahulena khādnīyena bhojanīyena ādāya Aṅga-Māgadhā*).[18]

Uruvela Kassapa himself had no doubt attained some proficiency in spiritual life. The discussion that followed between the Buddha and Uruvela Kassapa when the former was staying with the latter, clearly points to the fact that although Uruvela Kassapa had not attained perfection, he had certainly achieved some sort of higher knowledge. The Buddha (the Perfect Being) found him endowed with spiritual achievements and also found him to be one who could understand the 'deep and profound' Dhamma and attain higher knowledge.[19]

From Gayāsīsa (in Gayā), the Buddha went to Rājagaha with Uruvela Kassapa and his brothers and pupils. The Buddha is said to have stayed at the Laṭṭhivanuyyāna, a grove near Rājagaha (modern Jeṭhiyana, near Rajgir). While Uruvela Kassapa was a very well-known ascetic of the area, the Buddha was quite unknown to the people. King Bimbisāra of Magadha must have known this famous Jaṭila ascetic or might have had personal contact with him. We have referred to above the gathering of a large number of the people from Aṅga and Magadha on the occasion of the great sacrifice organised earlier by Uruvela Kassapa. Uruvela Kassapa undoubtedly commanded unparalleled reverence in the society. When the people and the king of Aṅga and Magadha heard of his arrival at the Laṭṭhivanuyyāna along with his pupils, they flocked to meet him.[20] They certainly did not come to meet the Buddha, as he was not at all known to them. The king, Bimbisāra, might have known the Buddha, as the latter was the son of a king. In the *Mahāvagga*, of course, it is recorded that king Bimbisāra, along with a large gathering came to do obeisance to the Buddha, [1] but no doubt the public came in such a large number to pay homage to Uruvela Kassapa, and not to the Buddha. It is evident from the account we find there. It is mentioned that in the beginning people could not make out whether Uruvela Kassapa was the teacher of the Buddha or the Buddha was the teacher of Uruvela Kassapa. To dispel this confusion, Uruvela Kassapa thereupon very reverently saluted the Buddha declaring himself as the disciple of the Buddha. [2] Obviously, Uruvela Kassapa as the disciple of the Buddha created a very great impact upon the public. Naturally, the followers and admirers of Uruvela Kassapa became the devotees of the Buddha, the person who was the teacher of their teacher. In the *Mahāvagga*, the number of those who announced that they were the *upāsakas* (lay-devotees) of the Buddha were in '*nahutas*' (myriads).[23]

The conversion of Uruvela Kassapa created a stir in the society and it is easily con-

ceivable that all those people who once were the followers of Uruvela Kassapa naturally became the followers of their teacher's teacher. Although we do not know the exact number of people who were the followers of Uruvela Kassapa when he was a Jaṭila ascetic, there is no doubt that a large section of society in Aṅga and Magadha belonged to the faith preached by him. In the *Mahāvagga* and elsewhere, the tenets of philosophy preached by Uruvela Kassapa as a Jaṭila are said to have been based on '*Kammavāda*', the principle of action.[24] The Buddha's philosophical ideals are also based on *Kammavāda*. His *Paṭiccasamuppāda* (Law of Dependent Origination) and his social philosophy of equality are primarily based on the theory of *Kammavāda*. If one does good deeds, he will achieve good results, and conversely, the results will be according to actions. The social philosophy of the Buddha is well-known. It decries the theory which holds that a person is high or low because of his birth. In the *Suttanipāta*[25], the *Dhammapada*[26] and elsewhere the Buddha has said : "*Kammunā hoti abrāhmaṇo' kammunā hoti brāhmaṇo*" (By action one becomes non-brāhmaṇa and by action one becomes a brāhmaṇa).

The general philosophical ideal which Uruvela Kassapa held and preached had a great affinity to the Buddha's ideal as well. This ideological affinity certainly gave impetus to the mass conversion of the people who once adhered to a similar view preached earlier by Uruvela Kassapa. The people could not find any difficulty in associating themselves with a similar faith, preached by the Buddha, which was both superior and perfect.[27]

The propagation of Buddhism in Magadha in the beginning was certainly due to the mass conversion of the people who once belonged to the Jaṭilas. The conversion of king Bimbisāra, who was the king of Aṅga and Magadha, must have created a favourable atmosphere in the society, but not to the same extent as that of Uruvela Kassapa.

As a Buddhist monk, Uruvela Kassapa held a very high position in the assembly of the monks. It is recorded in the *Aṅguttaranikāya* that Uruvela Kassapa was once declared by the Buddha as the foremost among those who had large followings.[28] In the *Theragāthā* great homage is paid to him because of his unparalleled achievements.[29] That Uruvela Kassapa had a large following even in the Saṅgha (*Aggam mahāparisānaṃ*) also proves that he had great following in the past. With regard to the rules of ordination contained in the *Vinayapiṭaka*, the Buddha gave concession to the Jaṭila converts on the ground that they 'affirm deeds, they affirm what ought to be done', So the *Upasampadā* (higher ordination) was granted to the Jaṭila ascetics without asking them to undergo the *Parivāsa*, or probationary period of four months.[30] It seems probable that because of Uruvela Kassapa's joining the Buddhist Order, a large number of the Jaṭila ascetics living in the country also adopted the religion of 'Great Samaṇa' (the Buddha). And Buddha, finding a large number of Jaṭilas joining his Order, probably gave this concession to them. There is no doubt that the role that Uruvela Kassapa played in the spread of early Buddhism was very great.[31]

NOTES

1. *Mahāvagga* (Nalanda Ed.), p. 38.
2. *Ibid.*, p. 23.
3. *Mahābhārata*, VII, 43, 47.
4. *Mahābhāṣya*, 1.2.32; 1.2.48; 6.1.5.
5. *Udāna Aṭṭhakathā*, p.68 : '*Jaṭilāti tāpasā'te hi jaṭādharitāya idha jaṭilā ti vuttā*'; '*Ibid.*, p. 300, '*Jaṭilā jaṭāvanto tāpasavesadhārino*'.
6. *Majjhima Nikāya*, (Nalanda Ed.) II, p. 369.
7. *Suttanipāta*, Parāyaṇavagga.
8. *Mahāvagga* (Nalanda Ed.), p. 26.
9. *Ibid.*, p. 76
10. *Ibid.*, p. 33.
11. *Ibid.*, p. 29.
12. *Ibid.*, p. 29.
13. *Udāna*, (Nalanda Ed.) p. 69.
14. *Mahāvagga* (Nalanda Ed.), p. 34.
15. *Udāna Aṭṭhakathā*, p. 67.
16. *Mahāvagga* (Nalanda Ed.), pp. 25-34.
17. *Ibid.*, pp. 33-34.
18. *Ibid.*, p. 29.
19. *Ibid.*, p. 33.
20. *Ibid.*, pp. 35-37.
21. *Ibid.*, p. 35.
22. *Ibid.*, p. 37.
23. *Ibid.*, 36.
24. *Ibid.* p. 76.
25. *Suttanipāta* Ambaṭṭhasutta.
26. *Dhammapada* Brāhamaṇavagga.
27. Compare the movement of the Late Dr. Ambedkar as neo-Buddhist in India.
28. *Aṅguttaranikāya*, (Nalanda Ed.), vol. I, p. 25.
29. *Theragāthā*, Khaddaka Nikāya (Nalanda Ed.), vol. II, p. 3000.
30. *Mahāvagga* (Nalanda Ed.), p. 76.
31. Uruvela Kassapa as a Jaṭila is also found in sculptures. A schist bas relief of Buddha being worshipped by the Kassapa brothers found from Shotork (Afghanistan) of 2nd century A.D. is now preserved in the National Museum of Afghanistan, Kabul.

33

The Twenty Reifying Views (sakkāyadiṭṭhi)

ALEX WAYMAN

There is a valuable article on *sakkāyadiṭṭhi* by J. Rahder[1], but it seems possible to make a modest advance by considering the various bits of evidence. In the following, 'P' will stand for Pāli, 'S' for Sanskrit, e.g. (S. *satkāyadṛṣṭi*, P. *sakkāyadiṭṭhi*).

The portion S. *satkāya* or P. *sakkāya* is variously defined, but the '*kāya*' is frequently explained and provisionally accepted in this paper as referring to the five personality aggregates (S. *skandha*, P. *khandha*).[2] In this acceptance, the full term could be rendered 'view that the aggregates are real', but this is an unwieldy translation and I prefer to employ the rendition 'reifying view'. Translators from Pāli sometimes render it 'theory of individuality'.[3]

The twenty views (S. *dṛṣṭi*, P. *diṭṭhi*) are variously referred to, in the *Diṭṭhikathā* of the *Paṭisambhidāmagga* part of the *Khuddaka-Nikāya* as an 'aspect' (P. *ākāra*), in the *Abhidharmakośa* (Chap. IX) as an 'alternative' (S. *koṭika*), in Candrakīrti's *Madhyamakāvatāra* as a 'piece' (S. *aṁśa*), in the *Mahāvyutpatti* as a 'peak' (*śikhara*).

Those views are applied in four ways to each of the five aggregates to give a total of twenty. Since the listing of the twenty aspects shows in each case an observing of self (*ātman*) in a wrong manner, it amounts to a commentary on the waywardness (S. *viparyāsa*) in the traditional statement, taking as self what is non-self. Asaṅga explicitly states this:[4] "Among those, the reifying view is the waywardness that takes non-self to be self." Furthermore it is a 'view' kind of waywardness.[5]

At the scriptural stage, we may consult the Indian edition edited by Jagdish Kasyap of the *Samyutta-Nikāya*, sect. 41, '*Cittasamyutta*', 3. *Dutiya-Isidatta-sutta*, Vol. III, p. 256, for the passage beginning, "Well, then, your honor, how is there the reifying view?" ("katham puna, bhante, sakkāyadiṭṭhi hotī" ti?). The passage continues with the reply, in my translation:

> "In that, householder, the ordinary person (P. *puthujjana*) who does not listen (to the Buddha's teaching), who does not observe the nobles, who is not skilled in the doctrine of the nobles, who is not trained in the doctrine of the nobles, who does not observe illustrious persons, who is not skilled in the doctrine of illustrious persons, who is not trained in the doctrine of illustrious persons, regards form (*rūpa*, or body) as a self, or the self as having a form, or the self as in form, or form as in the self; regards feeling as a self . . . or feeling as in the self; ideation as a self . . . or ideation as in the self; motivation as a self . . . or motivation as in the self; perception as a self . . . or perception as in the self. Thus, you should know, householder, there is the reifying view."

The scripture continues, "Well, then, your honor, how is there no reifying view?" And the reply: "In that, householder, the noble disciple, who listens (to the Buddha's teaching) . . . (and so on, with the opposite of the foregoing statement, down to). Thus, you should know, householder, there is no reifying view." One may find approximately the same statement in *Majjhima-Nikāya*, III, 17-18.

The scriptural style continues in the *Diṭṭhikathā* which classifies the views under 'nihilistic views' (P. *uccheda-diṭṭhi*) or under 'eternalistic views (P. *sassata-diṭṭhi*).[6] The views, 'observes form as a self', observes feeling, ideation, motivation, perception, as a self, constitute 'nihilistic views'. The views, 'observes self as having form', 'form as in self', 'self as in form', with analogous views for the other aggregates, namely, feeling, ideation, motivation, and perception, constitute 'eternalistic views'. The point of the classification seems to be that since form (or, body) in time perishes, the identification of self with form (*rūpa*), likewise with the other aggregates, is the nihilistic view. On the other hand, if self is other than form, by reason of having it, form being in self, or self being in form, likewise self vis-a-vis the other aggregates, then the fact that form perishes, likewise the other aggregates, still leaves self to continue; and so this is the eternalistic view of self. Thus, five of the aspects are nihilistic views, and fifteen are eternalistic views.

The twenty are listed in the *Dhammasangani*.[7] Buddhaghosa's commentary on that work, the *Atthasālinī*, has the remark:[8] "All of them are to be considered as blocking the way to the Path, as not blocking the way to happy rebirth, and as that which is to be slain by the First Path." By 'First Path' is meant 'Entering the Stream'.

For the tradition of Sanskrit Buddhism, we first notice Nāgārjuna's *Madhyamaka-kārikā*, Chap. XXII, especially verse 1, which on first sight one would think to translate this way:[9]

> The Tathāgata is not the aggregates (S. *skandha*); not other than the skandhas; the skandhas are not in him; nor he in them; he does not possess the skandhas. What, then, is the Tathāgata?

But in the context of Candrakīrti's *Madhyamakāvatāra*, citing this very verse under VI, 144,[10] Candrakīrti points out that when one takes this verse as having five terms, when applied to each of the five aggregates it would yield a total of twenty-five rather than the traditional twenty. He denies that there are more than four terms, and so

We are forced to translate Nāgārjuna's verse differently:

> The Tathāgata is not the aggregates; also not other than the aggregates (*skandha*), to wit, the aggregates are not in him, nor he in them, nor does he possess the aggregates. What, then, is the Tathāgata?

Candrakīrti's verses VI, 144-145 are especially devoted to the topic, and are among the few verses of his *Madhyamakāvatāra* cited in the *Subhāṣitasaṃgraha*:[11]

> The *ātman* is not the *rūpa*, nor does *ātman* have a *rūpa*, *ātman* is not in *rūpa*, the *rūpa* is not in *ātman*. Likewise, know all the skandhas in four ways. These are held to be the twenty pieces of the self-view.
> These are the high peaks located on the large mountain of reifying views. With the thunderbolt of enlightenment to non-self, the self is rent asunder, and along with them (the high peaks) the mountain of views collapses.

La Vallée Poussin points out in the note what is the first modification of position in comparison with the Pāli Buddhism tradition set forth above. That is to say, there are here two kinds of reifying view; the first, the imagined (S. *parikalpita*), no longer exists among those who have entered the stream, the First Path; but the second kind, the 'co-natal' (S. *sahajā*) remains.[12] Tsoṅ-kha-pa, in his native Tibetan commentary on the *Madhyamakāvatara*, Photo edition, PTT, Vol. 154, p. 89-4, explains that the one who has entered the stream has given up the bad doctrinal systems, and so no longer has the 'imagined' kind of reifying view. The more subtle form of 'reifying view, is still there.

Now we move to the *Mahāvyutpatti* dictionary, where in the Sakaki edition, item No. 4684 is the title, S. *vimśati-śikhara-samudgataḥ satkāyadṛṣti-śailaḥ* (the mountain of reifying views, high with twenty peaks). The twenty follow:

1. Form (S. *rūpa*) is a self like a prince (*svāmī*).
2. The self has a form like an adornment (*alaṅkāra*).
3. Form belongs to self like a servant (*bhṛtya*).
4. The self is in form like a pot (*bhājana*).
5. Feeling (S. *vedanā*) is a self.
6. The self has feeling.
7. Feeling belongs to the self.
8. The self is in feeling.
9. Ideation (S. *saṃjnā*) is a self.
10. The self has ideation.
11. Ideation belongs to the self.
12. The self is in ideation.
13. Motivation (S. *saṃskāra*) is a self.
14. The self has motivation.
15. Motivation belongs to self.
16. Motivation is in self.
17. Perception (S. *vijñāna*) is a self.

18. The self has perception.
19. Perception belongs to the self.
20. The self is in perception.

Vinītadeva, in his *Vinaya-vibhaṅga-pada-vyākhyāna*, part of his commentary on the 'Fourth Defeat', PTT, Vol. 122, p. 310-1,2, gives the list of twenty as in the *Mahāvyutpatti*, and, moreover, repeats for each of the aggregates the similes, 'like a prince', 'like an adornment', 'like a servant', and 'like a pot'. Since his is a commentary on the words of the *Vinayavibhaṅga* (of the Mūlasarvāstivādin Vinaya), it follows that in all likelihood the *Mahāvyutpatti* list stems from this Vinaya, which was the only Vinaya accepted in Tibet. Vinītadeva, p. 310-1-4, explains that the reifying views are said to be like a mountain because they are difficult to shatter. Candrakīrti's expression 'thunderbolt of enlightenment' (*bodhakuliśa*) also occurs in Vinītadeva's account by the same Tibetan translation, and with the explanation, "because the defilements that are simultaneously destroyed are eliminated by the path of vision (*darśana-mārga*)."

Notice the difference from the Pāli formulation of the four terms, which obey a pattern of quasi-inflections, 'nominative', 'genitive', 'locative', 'locative', as follows:

X is a self,
or the self has X,
or the self is in X,
or X is in the self.

The *Mahāvyutpatti* in common with the Mūlasarvāstivādin Vinaya has a list with a pattern of quasi-inflections, 'nominative', 'genitive', 'genitive', 'locative', as follows:

X is a self,
or the self has X,
or X belongs to the self,
or the self is in X.

In short, the *Mahāvyutpatti* reverses the third and fourth aspects, and substitutes 'X belongs to the self' for 'X is in the self'. While this is a definitely formal departure from the old Pāli Buddhist formulation, still in terms of the division into 'nihilistic views' and 'eternalistic views' it would make no difference. This is because in the *Mahāvyutpatti* account, the first one would also be 'nihilistic view' and the next three, all involving the self as 'other', would be 'eternalistic' just as in the *Paṭisambhidāmagga*, n.b., if indeed the *Mahāvyutpatti* list belongs to a tradition which is classifying the twenty views, as 'nihilistic' or 'eternalistic'; but this is not borne out.

Rahder's article shows that the *Vibhāṣā* cites the Abhidharma work *Jñānaprasthāna* which takes five of the views to be 'view of self' (*ātmadṛṣṭi*), and the remaining fifteen to be 'view of what belongs to self' (*ātmīyadṛṣṭi*); that this work mentions that the Buddha expressed the list of twenty views, and that Śāriputra when explaining them did not divide them into *ātmadṛṣṭi* and *ātmīyadṛṣṭi*.[13] It then appears that Śāriputra's explanation is the one found in the *Paṭisambhidāmagga*, with the division

into 'nihilistic views' and 'eternalistic views'. The *Jñānaprasthāna* classification also furnishes a reason for the difference between the *Mahāvyutpatti* list and the Pāli literary tradition, which is that the interpretation of the second, third, and fourth aspects as *ātmīyadṛṣṭi* favors the reinterpretation that substitutes 'X belongs to the self' for 'X is in the self'. Hence, the *Jñānaprasthāna* is here consistent with the Mūlasarvastivādin Vinaya tradition preserved in Vinītadeva's commentary and with the *Mahāvyutpatti* list.[14]

We may now conclude that Nāgārjuna in his *Madhyamaka-kārikā*, Chap. XXII, is faithful to the old Buddhist scripture—he was probably using the canon known as the four Āgamas, including the *Saṃyuktāgama*—in that he uses the four terms, 'X is a self', or 'the self has X', or 'the self is in X' or 'X is in the self', but of course denies each of them. Furthermore, in my retranslation of his verse XXII, 1, deciding that 'not other' is a covering expression for denying the next three terms, we should note that Nāgārjuna has no implication of 'not belonging to'. Passing to Candrakīrti, he is presumably familiar with the alternate tradition and affected by it sufficiently to employ the terminology of a mountain with twenty peaks that is shattered by the 'thunderbolt of enlightenment' (*bodhakuliśa*); but since he is following Nāgārjuna's school, the Mādhyamika, he does not depart from this in favor of the list which made its way into the *Mahāvyutpatti*.

One may appreciate further this distinction by noticing Nāgārjuna's treatment of the topic in *Madhyamaka-kārikā*, XVIII, 1-2. Thus, verse 1: "If the self were the aggregates (S. *skandha*), it would be subject to arising and passing away. If it were other than the aggregates, it would exclude the characteristic of aggregates."[15] And verse 2: "When there is no self, how will there be what belongs to self! By cessation of self and what belongs to self, there is neither 'I' or 'mine'." Nāgārjuna expresses in these verses two quite different problems. Cessation of self automatically ends what belongs to self, but cessation of self *per se* does not end what is other than self.[16] Therefore, for him, the interpretation of the twenty aspects of the reifying view as a matter of self and other than self is incompatible with interpreting them as a matter of self and what belongs to self.[17] For Nāgārjuna, apparently in agreement with Śāriputra, if indeed he is responsible for what was recorded in the *Paṭisambhidāmagga*, the reifying view is not restricted to self and what belongs to self, but applies to self and what is other than self. Therefore, for him the *'kāyā'* of the *satkāyadṛṣṭi* is not only the personality aggregates (S. *skandha*), but also anything that is other than those personality aggregates that could be understood as *kāya* (accumulation). This is consistent with classifying the 4X5 views as 'nihilistic' or 'eternalistic', since 'nihilistic views' are *other than* 'eternalistic views', and the ending of one set does not entail the ending of the other set, as would be the case when ending the view of self, the view of what belongs to self also ends.

The present writer hopes the foregoing can be considered the modest advance promised at the outset.

NOTES

1. J. Rahder, "La satkāyadṛṣṭi d'après Vibhāṣā, 8," *Melanges chinois et bouddhique*, I, 1931-32, p. 227-239.

2. See *Abhidharmakośa*, Chap. V, La Vallée Poussin tr., p. 15-17.

3. So Bhikkhu Ñāṇamoli, *The Path of Purification* (*Visuddhimagga*) *by Bhadantācariya Buddhaghosa* (Colombo, Ceylon, 1956).

4. V. Bhattacharya, ed., *The Yogācārabhūmi of Ācārya Asaṅga* (University of Calcutta, 1957), text, p. 166.19: tatra satkāyadṛṣṭir anātmany ātmeti viparyāsaḥ.

5. For the three stages of waywardness, including the 'view' stage, cf. Alex and Hideko Wayman, *The Lion's Roar of Queen Śrīmālā* (Columbia University Press, 1974), p. 102, note.

6. The only edition available to me is Arnold C. Taylor, Pāli Text Society, *Paṭisambhidāmagga*; Vol. I, 1905, p. 150.

7. Tr. by Caroline A.F. Rhys Davids under title *A Buddhist Manual of Psychological Ethics* (London, 1900), p. 259.

8. Tr. by Pe Maung Tin under title *The Expositor*, ed. and rev. by Mrs. Rhys Davids (London, 1958 reprint), Vol. II, p. 457.

9. Louis de La Vallée Poussin, *Mūlamadhyamakakārikās avec la Prasannapadā*, p. 432 : skandhā na nānyaḥ skandhebhyo nāsmin skandhā na teṣu saḥ/tathāgataḥ skandhavān na katamo 'tra tathāgataḥ.

10. Louis de La Vallée Poussin, *Le Muséon*, 1911, p. 311-312.

11. *Ibid.*, p. 312-313.

12. See *Abhidharmakośa*, Chap. V, tr., p. 41, for an old Abhidharma theory of the two kinds. Furthermore, Rahder, "La satkāyadṛṣṭi," p. 239, points out that the *Brahmajāla-sūtra* says that the *satkāyadṛṣṭi* is the root of all the sixty-two false views.

13. Rahder, "La satkāyadṛṣṭi," pp. 228-229.

14. In agreement with this conclusion, notice that the *Vibhāṣā*, per Rahder, "La satkāyadṛṣṭi," p. 231, uses the terminology, (1) rūpa is the ātman, and so on, including, (2) vedanā is the ornament of ātman, (3) vedanā is the servant of ātman, (4) vedanā is the receptacle of ātman.

15. For the last part of the verse: *bhaved askandhalakṣaṇaḥ*. Candrakīrti's *Prasannapadā* commentary, text, p. 343.2,3 explains:/*yathā hi gor anyo 'śvo na golakṣaṇo bhavati*/"Just as a horse, being other than a cow, excludes the cow characteristic."

16. As in Candrakīrti's illustration, when a cow characteristic passes away, this provides no information on what happens to a horse characteristic.

17. In short, Nāgārjuna's verse XXII, 1, cited above (note 9) shows a rejection of the Abhidharma position espoused by Vasubandhu, *Abhidharmakośa*, Chap. V. tr., p. 17, who, restricting the *satkāyadṛṣṭi* to belief in 'I' and 'mine' shows an agreement with the Abhidharma tradition of the *Jñānaprasthāna*, and so on, as was discussed above.

34

The Etymology of Pali Gotrabhū

O.H. de A. WIJESEKERA

The doctrinally important word *gotrabhū* (*v.* 1, *gottabhū*) occurs in several contexts in the Canon in a technical sense. In the P.T.S. Dictionary, which cites most of them, it is analysed as *gotra*+*bhū*, and is taken to mean "become of the lineage", as designating "one, whether layman or bhikkhu, who, as converted, was no longer of the worldlings (*puthujjana*), but of the Āryas, having Nibbāna as his aim." Accordingly, '*gotra*' here would refer to the 'lineage' of the Āryas. Such an implication, however, does not appear to be supported by linguistic considerations. It may be pointed out that the grammatical analysis of the term into '*gotra*+*bhū*' is itself questionable. For, syntactically, it can hardly give the sense "become of the lineage", but must mean "becoming lineage", just as '*brahma-bhūta*' signifies "become Brahma." In view of this difficulty an attempt to find a more satisfactory explanation seems warranted.

A morphological parallel to the above word occurs in the Jātaka (Fausböll edn., V. 153, verse 93), namely, *vatrabhū*, as epithet of Sakka, Vedic Indra. That this could be the Pali derivative from Vedic *vṛtrahan* was long ago suspected by Fausböll who suggested emending the reading to *vatrahū* or *vatrahā* (*Ibid*, f.n. 3). Here (*vatra*)-*vā* may justifiably be traced to the Vedic root *han*, on the analogy of Vedic *san*/*sā* *van*/*sā* etc. (Whitney, *Roots*, s.v.). But the relevance of Fausböll's alternative suggestion of *-hū* is not *prima facie* apparent. Yet it is not altogether an implausible assumption, if we consider the vowel lengthening as secondary, the original form being *-hu* with a short vowel. The problem then is to derive the form **vatra-hu* from Vedic *vṛtra-han*. Students of Indo-European philology are familiar with the hypothetical root **gwhen* to which Vedic *han* is traceable. with its weak form *gwhṇ* which occurs in the Rgveda itself in *vṛtra-ha* (VI. 48.21), where the final *-a* stands for the I.E. sonant ṇ. It is a well attested phenomenon in Pali (and Prakrit) that a final *-a* in such terminal syllables

tends to get weakened and result in *-u-*. Geiger has shown how even in the body of a word *-a-* becomes *-u-* in Pali (*Pali Language and Literatured* § 19). We can straightaway compare the similar Pali form *bhūṇahu* from earlier *bhrūṇahan*, 'killer of the embryo' as attested to in the *Brāhmaṇas* (see Monier-William's Dictionary, s.v.). What remains now is to explain the change of *-h-* to *-bh-* in **vatrahu*. This can be accounted for as a case of 'false restoration', no doubt, prompted by analogy, euphony and other factors of linguistic change as is observed in Middle Indian languages. The analogy of parallel forms like *hoti/bhavati* and *-hi/- bhi* (instr. pl. suffix) etc. in Pali makes it quite possible for the *-bh-* to appear for *-h-* by way of 'false restoration.' Thus the form *vatrabhū* is legitimately derivable from Vedic *vṛtrahan*.

In view of the above considerations, it is perfectly feasible to regard *gotrabhū* as a development from earlier *gotrahan*, in which case the meaning of the term would be 'killer (i.e. destroyer) of the *gotra*', just as *vattabhū* means the 'killer of Vṛtra', and *bhūnahu* 'the killer or destroyer of the embryo'. The evidence of the Pali exegetical literature appears to justify such an interpretation. Explaining the term *gotrabhū* at Puggalapaññatti p. 13, the Commentary says : ". . . *puthujjana-paññattim atikkamitvā ariyasaṅkham ariyagottam . . . . okkamanato gotrabhū-puggalo nāma vuccati*" (*J.P.T.S*, 1915-14, p. 184). Similarly, in the Visuddhimagga we have the explanation ". . . *paritta-gottābhibhavanato mahaggatagottabhavanato ca gotrabhū ti pi vuccati*" (p.138). In both these glosses what is important is the inclusion of the idea of the need to discard or transcend (*atikkamitva abhibhavanato*) the worldling status before one can aspire to the higher spiritual stages by which final freedom is won. Hence the meaning of *gotrabhū* can reasonably be established as 'one who discards his worldly (*lit.* clan) status'. Textual references to *gotrabhū* as at Aṅguttara IV. 373 and V. 23 also seem consistent with such an interpretation.

35

The Buddhistic Cosmos and Tibetan Tradition

A.N. ZELINSKY

Buddhism established itself in Tibet in the 7th century A.D. when the process of its crystallization had already been fully completed on the Indian sub-continent. The specificity of Tibetan tradition is therefore not due to any supplementary elements, new in principle, but rather to the consolidation on Tibetan soil of all that had been achieved during the many centuries of the previous development of Buddhism in India. This also applies to the idea of the "Buddhistic Cosmos."

The "Buddhistic Cosmos" is not identical to the "Cosmos" in ancient Greek thought because it lacks its natural philosophical basis. In Buddhism the central point of attention is removed from the phenomenal world to the inner world of the individual, where the external world is first of all regarded as the function of its psychic processes ("microcosmos") acting in turn as the reflection of some macropsychical phenomena ("macrocosmos") that cannot be submitted to rational investigation. The "dharmas", *i.e.* biopsychical quants or elements of the "being-consciousness", are at the basis of the mentioned processes. Their manifold combinations create a variegated "carpet of being" named as "the current of consciousness in Buddhism."

In its final aspect, the conception of the "Buddhistic Cosmos" was formulated at the end of the Kushan era by the Mahāyāna school of Yogācāra which later on had a great influence on Buddhistic tradition in Tibet. The essence of this conception did not exceed the main scope of Mahāyāna and reduced itself to the idea of metalogical unity of the micro- and macrocosmos, *i.e.* of "*Saṅsāra*" and of "*Nirvāṇa*" forming the "psycho-cosmical" system of Buddhism, called only conventionally "Buddhistic Cosmos."

Thus, the suggested model of the "Buddhistic Cosmos" is derived from the regularities following logically the fundamental axioms of Buddhism, accepted as self-evident

by the supporters of this tradition. The model is built up according to the principle of "Mandala" or of a "Psychocosmogram" representing the graphical and symbolic expression of cosmic forces as psychical processes. Two cardinal principles of Buddhism are placed at the basis of the model : the notion of the "Wheel of Life" and that of the "Wheel of Law" (respectively the "Bhava-cakra" and the "Dharma-cakra"). The former revolves in the eternal succession of births and deaths whereas in following the latter it becomes possible to find the way out of the endless circle of reincarnations. Compared to their expression and description in Buddhistic tradition, the originality of our application of these notions in our model lies in the representation of the two mentioned "Wheels" as complete graphical schemes of the Buddhistic micro- and macrocosmos with their strictly consistent inner hierarchy. Thus, the ' Wheel of Life" gives not only the idea of the "Twelve Divisioned Cycle of Causations and Becomings", but also that of all the "Three worlds" (Trailokya) with their basic subsections corresponding to the degrees or steps of contemplation, whereas the "Wheel of Law" organically includes the main theses of Buddhistic dogmatics and mythology besides giving also the idea of the "Eightfold Way". The principle of junction of the micro- and macrocosmos in the moment of "Consciousness" (Vijñāna) is the central point of the model. It is represented in the third "*nidāna*" of the "Twelve Divisioned Cycle" expressing thus the fundamental thesis, shared by all schools of Buddhism, which may be called the "Law of conservation of psychic energy" or the principle of "non-variability" of the consciousness forming the basis of the Buddhistic theory of "metapsychosis."

The development of this idea by the school of Yogācāra led to the conception of "Consciousness-Universum" (*ālaya-vijñāna*) that we regard as facing by one of its sides the temporary world of illusion and by the other the eternal and all-embracing principle identified in Mahāyāna with Nirvāṇa or with "Buddha's Cosmic Body" (Dharmakāya).[1]

In the aspect of the creative Word, expressed by the universal symbol OM, "Buddha's Cosmic Body" acts as a certain "Logos" in Buddhism while the "Consciousness-Universum" (*ālaya-vijñāna*) reminds the position of "Sophia" in a series of gnostic systems in as much as being beyond time it nevertheless accomplishes the functions of a creative chronogenic factor as a certain kind of "lens of consciousness" relating the two planes of the Buddhistic Cosmos. In correlation with the given model, the "Consciousness-Universum" lies at the crossing of two sectors formed by the mental section through the Buddhistic micro- and macro worlds.[2] The rhombus, thus formed, comprises "two cones of consciousness" related to one another as mirror reflections. Each sector of the mentioned figure is divided into four small sub-sectors which together with the former symbolize the five integral parts of the individual (5 *Skandhas*) and of the cosmic consciousness (5 Dhyāni-Buddhas). The above statement permits to represent the processes of evolution and of involution of the Buddhistic Cosmos as the emanation of five rays of the cosmic spectrum (as each Dhyāni-Buddha possesses his own colour) which are dispersed onto the five *Skandhas* or aggregates of profane existence after passing through the "Lens of consciousness" and then again focussed (or sublimized in the soteriological process) and retransformed into five Dhyāni-Buddhas as in their mirror reflection. The dialectic essence of this process is expressed by the universal syllable "HŪṂ",—symbol of the "indestructable body" (*Vajrakāya*) as the integral of five wisdoms of the Buddhistic microcosmos four of which are placed

crosswise (in the succession of time of the corresponding Dhyāni-Buddhas) emanating from the fifth central source personified, in our model (according to the most ancient Tibetan school Rnin-ma-pa), in the image of Dhyāni-Buddha Vairocana.[2]

In the course of the development of this process, the consciousness of the individual passes along all the imaginary degrees of the "Three worlds", *i.e.* of the steps of the ladder of its consciousness, reaching up to the culminating point in the center of the "Wheel of Life" corresponding to the summit of the "World Tree", regarded as the "Axis of the World" (Axis mundi) transpiercing all the layers of the being directly up to the mount "Meru" inclusively. According to the principle of Tibetan Yoga, this movement is realized on account of the fusion of the active vital energy of consciousness, as the manifestation of the solar, male principle, with the secret vital energy of the subconsciousness expressing the lunar, female aspect of the being. In their sublimated plane, the fusion of these principles symbolizes the unity of compassion (*karuṇā*) and of wisdom (*prajñā*) as of the eternal principles of being. On the "macropsychical" level, the dynamical polarity of these principles is expressed in the idea that each of the five "Dhyāni-Buddhas" has a female hypostasis acting as personified wisdom. Thus, in Buddhism the psychocosmical processes may be represented as the divergence and convergence of the male and female principles in the "right-left aspect" of the Buddhistic micro- and macrocosmos. The realization of the unity of the mentioned principles corresponds to the complete issue from all the spheres of the "Wheel of Life" and to the transition to another "dimension" symbolized in the left "cone" of our model. One of the Sanskritic terms characterizing such a state as the sum of the traversed path is "*Buddha-bhūmi*" corresponding to the Tibetan "sans-rgyas-kyi-sa". The detailed analysis of psychical states accompanying the "ladder of contemplation" (*dhyāna*), leading to the mentioned aim, is given in the well known treatise Abhisamayālaṃkāra belonging to the Yogācāra school and enjoying special popularity in Tibet and Mongolia. In correspondence with this work, the ten *bhūmi* and ten *pāramitā* may be distinctly distributed in our model at the corresponding levels of the "Three worlds."

Thus, in Buddhism the problem of the arrangement of the Cosmos comes down to the problem of the arrangement of the consciousness related to the aim of diminishing the chaotic state of the latter toward its higher organization. With the full victory of the centripetal tendencies over the centrifugal ones, the entropy in the "dharma field of consciousness" will become equal to zero, symbolizing "emptiness" (*śūnya*) of all its corresponding dharmas as their transition into a qualitatively new state. Attempting to formulate the mechanism of such a process, the Yogācāra introduced the conception of the "absolute element" (*gotra*, Tib. rigs) whose secret energy realizes the "catarcis" as the transformation of the "Eightfold consciousness" (*Ālayavijñāna*) into "Three bodies" and "Five wisdoms" of the Buddhistic macrocosmos.[3]

The particularity of our model lies in the rigid links between almost all its components organically joined as parts of a system reflecting the dynamica aspect of the described process. In the scope of this system, the Hīnayāna represents a particular case of the Mahāyānic doctrine. To the author's knowledge, the present work is one of the first attempts to represent the Buddhist conception of the world as a model expressed graphically on a plane in the two dimension space.[4]

NOTES

1. Th. Stcherbatsky, *The Conception of Buddhist Nirvāṇa*, Leningrad, 1927.
2. Lama Anagarika Govinda, *Foundations of Tibetan Mysticism*, New York, 1960, p. 189.
3. E. E. Obermiller, The Sublime Science of the Great Vehicle to Salvation Being, a Manual of Buddhist Monism, "*Acta Orientali*", Vol. IX, 1933.


«КОЛЕСО УЧЕНИЯ»
(dharma-сакра)
«КОЛЕСО БЫТИЯ»
(bhava-сакра)
Ratnapāṇi
samyag dṛṣṭi
samyag saṃkalpa
samyag vāk
samyag karmānta
samyag ājīva
samyag vyāyāma
samyag smṛti
samyag samādhi
Vajrapāṇi
Viśvapāṇi
ИСТИНА ПУТИ
ИСТИНА СТРАДАНИЯ
ИСТИНА ПРИЧИНЫ
ИСТИНА ОСВОБОЖДЕНИЯ
ТЕЛО
ЯВЛЕННОЕ
БЛАЖЕННОЕ
АЛМАЗНОЕ
jarāmaraṇa
jāti
bhava
upādāna
tṛṣṇā
vedanā
sparśa
ṣaḍāyatana
nāmarūpa
vijñāna
saṃskāra
avidyā
СТАРОСТЬ И СМЕРТЬ
РОЖДЕНИЕ
СТАНОВЛЕНИЕ
ПРИВЯЗАННОСТЬ
ЖАЖДА
ОЩУЩЕНИЕ
СОПРИКОСНОВЕНИЕ
ОХРАНЫ ЧУВСТВ
ИМЯ И ФОРМА
СОЗНАНИЕ
НЕВЕДЕНИЕ
ā-ryaṣṭāṅganamāni
«ВОСЬМИРИЧНЫЙ СВЯТОЙ ПУТЬ»
МОДЕЛЬ БУДДИЙСКОГО «КОСМОСА»
dvādaçāṃgapratītyasamutpāda
«ДВЕНАДЦАТИЧЛЕННЫЙ ЗАКОН ПРИЧИННОСТИ»

36

The Indian Rediscovery of Buddhism, 1855-1956

ELEANOR ZELLIOT

In the 19th and 20th centuries, India, like Europe, "discovered" Buddhism—in history, in archaeology, in texts and in its living presence. The European scholarly interest in Buddhism was supplemented by a relatively small but still astonishing number of Europeans who became Buddhists, even Buddhist bhikkhus. It was also accompanied by popular writing, the most influential of which was Edwin Arnold's *The Light of Asia*, a poem on the Buddha's life (1879). These three strands : scholarship, active participation in Buddhism, and popular writing, also mark the Indian revival. India, however, possessed two additional fields of interest: there were remnants of Buddhist communities surviving into the modern age in the original homeland of Buddhism, and there was a movement among India's lowest castes to convert out of Hinduism and into the once-more-honored religion of the Buddha. In 1956, the year of India's widespread observance of the 2500th anniversary of the Buddha's *nirvāṇā*, outside the realm of official attention and unnoted by most scholars, a conversion movement to Buddhism which now totals nearly four million people began in India.

India's renewed interest in Buddhism began approximately a hundred years before the mass conversion led by Dr. B.R. Ambedkar in 1956. It was that renewed interest, and especially the living example of four scholars who became active Buddhists—Dharmanand Kosambi, Rahul Sankrityayan, Anand Kausalyayan and Jagdish Kashyap—which helped make possible the later low-caste conversion. Through their efforts, as well as through the presence of Buddhist nations bordering India, the idea of Buddhism as a *living force* was added to the increasing consciousness of the glory of the Buddhist past. No one man converted Dr. Ambedkar, although he called upon the oldest bhikkhu in India, Chandramani Maha Thera, to officiate at the 1956 conversion services in Nagpur; as Rahul Sankrityayan put it, "he was converted by books." But

this is not the story of that conversion; rather it is an account of the linking of all these forces—scholarship, participation, popularization, revival among the Buddhist remnants—which produced India's current many-faceted attitude towards Buddhism.

The First Generation of Scholars

The first modern scholar of Buddhism in India was Rajendralal Mitra (1824-91), who published nineteen articles and books between 1855 and 1889[1], at a time when Buddhist literature was "more explored in the West than in the East."[2] Mitra published archeological and textual studies in the *Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal* and, as in the case of many of the early scholars, his prime interest was the living Buddhism to the north of India, with its neglected Sanskrit texts. Mitra collaborated with a younger Bengali scholar, Hara Prasad Shastri, in bringing out *Sanskrit Buddhist Literature of Nepal* in 1882. Shastri was not only one of the most prolific early scholars, with some sixty books and articles to his credit, but also the first to be aware of the survival of Buddhism in India. His *Discovery of Living Buddhism in Bengal* appeared in 1897, at the very time that the Buddhist community in Chittagong was discovering itself as a connecting link between the past and the present, and between India and the Buddhist countries. A third Bengali pioneer was the scholar-explorer Sarat Chandra Das, whose *Contributions on the Religion and History of Tibet*, published in 1881, proved valuable enough to be reprinted in 1970. Das published over fifty articles and books, including an edition of the *Dhammapada*; he also founded a *Journal* for the Buddhist Text Society established in 1882. Das was closely associated with Anagarika Dharmapala, who founded the Maha Bodhi Society first in Ceylon, and then in Calcutta in 1891, and it was Das who was entrusted with the *Maha Bodhi Journal* in 1893 when Anagarika Dharmapala went to the historic Parliament of World Religions in Chicago to bring Buddhism before the American public.[3]

The early work of the Indian scholars was in Sanskrit texts, but even before the turn of the century there was a realization that Pali should be taught in the universities of India if Buddhist scholarship was to be complete. Asutosh Mookerjee, a member of the Maha Bodhi Society and "at heart almost a Buddhist,"[4] instituted Pali at the University of Calcutta; Satish Chandra Vidyabushan, who had been involved in the Buddhist Text Society, received a Pali M.A. in 1901. In the same year he published Kaccayana's Pali Grammar, editing the text in Devanagari script and translating it into English.

The instituting of Pali studies on the Western side of India at the University of Bombay came about in 1909. Its proponent, the renowned scholar Sir R.G. Bhandarkar, had included Buddhism among his Indological interests from 1878 on, and his associate, K.B. Pathak began a lengthy period of work in 1894. Even before this, Bhagavanlal Indraji had worked with the European scholars James Burgess and Johann Georg Bühler on Western cave temple and Nepalese inscriptions, but full-fledged studies based on Pali had to wait for a second generation of scholars trained not at Bombay but at Poona by one of the most remarkable figures of the modern rediscovery, Dharmanand Kosambi.

Popular Writing

There was some popular writing on Buddhism in Western India before the turn of the century, and it was this rather than scholarship that led to participation in Buddhism. A school teacher at Wilson High School in Bombay, Krishnarao Arjun Keluskar, published a *Life of Gautama Buddha* in Marathi in 1898 (and it was this book, presented by the author to the schoolboy Ambedkar, which introduced Ambedkar to Buddhism). Vinayak Kondadev Oka also pubilshed a serialized life of the Buddha in the Marathi children's magazine, *Bālbodh*, in the 1890's. This publication came to the attention of Dharmanand Kosambi, the first Indian scholar-Buddhist in the modern period.

Popular or creative writing on Buddhism on the Eastern side of India is far better known, although it produced no such yearning for direct experience. Rabindranath Tagore began to use Buddhist legends and stories in his work in the 1890's. The play *Mālini* of this period stressed one of the themes Tagore often used—"the forces of Brahmanism . . . ranged against the challenge of compassion, of universal love—in this case as specifically taught by the Buddha."[5] An early biographer of Tagore, Edward Thompson, commented, "In [this play] what I venture to call [Tagore's] Buddhism finds utterance. He is drawn by the Indian ascetic-prince, as by no other figure in the world's history."[6] But although Tagore was drawn to the compassion of Buddhism, he questioned its practicality in political life both in *Mālini* and, even more strongly, in *Natir Pūjā*, performed first in 1925. Here the Queen Mother heroine is torn between devotion to the Lord Buddha, whom she has seen face to face, and resentment of her husband's and son's abandoning home and throne to become monks, "wrecking the basic order of Hindu society."[7]

Most of Tagore's work involving Buddhism, such as the brief legends of Upagupta and Shrimati, some of the essays in *Sādhanā*, the well-known and still performed play *Chandālikā*, and the dance-drama *Śyāmā* written during the last year of Tagore's long life, stress social justice, compassion, devotion, universal love. Tagore read Charu Chandra Bose's Bengali translation of the *Dhammapada* and wrote a critical appreciation of it,[8] but he was not much involved in the scholarly renaissance of Buddhism or in the direct experience of it. More than anyone else, however, he placed the themes and legends of early Buddhism before the modern Indian public.

The Experience of Buddhism : Mahavira and Dharmanand Kosambi

The last decade of the 19th century saw not only much scholarship but also a Hindu becoming a Buddhist bhikku for the first time in the modern age. Mahavira, or Mahavir Swami, was ordained in Ceylon in 1890, came to the Buddha's place of *nirvāṇa*, Kushinara in northern Uttar Pradesh, and established a *vihāra* or *dharmshāla* in 1902. According to Valisinha, Mahavira was a close relative of Kunwar Singh, one of the Bihari leaders in the Indian Revolt of 1857. After the defeat, Mahavira fled to Ceylon, disguised as a wrestler. There he studied Pali and the Buddhist Dhamma and, inspired by Indrasabha Nayaka Thera, became a bhikkhu. A devout Burmese layman, Khee Zarhee, gave him funds to build the Dharmshala in Kushinara.[9] Another Burmese, the Venerable Chandramani Maha Thera, joined Mahavira in Kushinara. and after his death took over the Dharmshala work. Little more is known about the romantic

figure of Mahavira, but there is an interesting direct connection between this fugitive from the Revolt of 1857 and the contemporary period. Mahavira's associate, Chandramani Maha Thera, by then the oldest Bhikkhu living in India, was asked by Dr. B.R. Ambedkar to give him *dīkshā* at the first great conversion ceremony in 1956 in Nagpur.

The second modern Indian to become a Buddhist monk, at least for a time, was the scholar Dharmanand Kosambi, one of the most colorful figures in the Indian revival of Buddhism.[10] Born in Goa in 1876, Kosambi became interested in Buddhism through the popular writing in the children's magazine *Bālbodh*, which ran a series on great Indian historical figures, including the Buddha. In the last year of the 19th century, at the age of 23, Kosambi left home and family to begin his pursuit of Buddhism. To learn Sanskrit he went to Poona, Gwalior and finally Banaras, where he spent a year and a half. His study seems clearly for personal reasons, since he then went to Nepal to trace the marks of the Buddha's birthplace and to experience the living remnants of Buddhism. Disappointed in what he found, he went to Bodhgaya, the place of the Buddha's enlightenment, and there met a bhikkhu who said he could find knowledge of the Theravāda Buddhist books in Ceylon. Kosambi immediately set off to spend a year at Vidhyoday Vidhyalaya Vihar, where he studied Pali books under the guidance of Mahastavir Sumagalacharya, living as a Śrāmaṇera, if not a Bhikkhu. His ordination was in 1902, and he wore Buddhist robes much of his life, although he did return to his family; his equally famous son, not a Buddhist, D.D. Kosambi, was born in 1906.

Often plagued by foreign food and his own health, and undoubtedly endowed with *wanderlust*, Kosambi then lived for periods of a year or so in Ceylon, in Madras, in Burma, in Poona again, and on tour in the Buddhist holy places of Northern India. In 1906 he was asked to teach the newly developed Pali program at Calcutta University, and he also taught at the National College of Calcutta which was founded in the wake of the Swadeshi movement following the partition of Bengal. Kosambi was a nationalist all his life, but his chief dream was to teach Buddhism to his own countrymen in the Marathi-speaking region. Sayajirao, the Gaikwad of the Maratha princely state of Baroda in Gujarat and a magnificent patron of many revival and reform movements, brought Kosambi back to western India with the stipulation that he produce a book a year for three years. Kosambi worked with Professor Bhandarkar to establish the Pali Language Department at the University of Bombay, and from 1912 to 1918 taught Pali at Fergusson College in Poona, firmly establishing a generation of Pali scholars. Shortly before this period, Kosambi had taught Pali to James H. Woods of Harvard in Bombay, and Woods invited Kosambi to Harvard to work on the text of the *Visuddhimagga*. In all, Kosambi spent four periods in the United States, getting his Ph.D. from Harvard in 1929. The American publication of the edited *Visuddhimagga* was delayed until 1950,[11] in part because of disputes with Charles Lanman, editor of the Harvard Oriental Series. Kosambi also published various inscriptions, a Pali Reader in 1914-16 with his student C.V. Rajwade, several other texts, and some very influential interpretations of Buddhism in Marathi. The most important of his books to current-day Buddhists in Maharashtra is *Bhāgwan Buddha*, published in 1940, which profoundly influenced Ambedkar's rational interpretation of the Buddha's life.

Kosambi's scholarly life was combined with activity in the cause of Indian indepen-

dence, with socialism, and with the preaching of Buddhism. He was an early Gandhian, participating in the Non-Cooperation Movement of 1921, undergoing imprisonment for his leadership in the salt Satyagrahas of 1930, and finally spending his last days at Gandhi's ashram in Sevagram, where he died in 1948. Kosambi's interest in socialism took him to Russia in 1929, but his abhorrence of violence made Gandhi's way more appealing than Marxism. His concern for the common people was probably behind one of his most interesting experiments in the actual revival of Buddhism. In 1936 he founded an ashram in Parel, a mill-workers' area of Bombay City, with the avowed intention of destroying untouchability through Buddhist philosophy. The Hindu philanthropist and Gandhian, Seth Jugal Kishore Birla, financed a building which Kosambi called the Bahujan Vihara, which might be roughly translated as "the Buddhist temple for the masses." The contemporary scholar of Buddhism B.G. Gokhale says that he worked there on Pali with Kosambi, who at that time wore his Buddhist robes. The year of this effort coincides with a conference of Mahars in Bombay which declared, under Ambedkar's leadership, that a conversion out of Hinduism and into a new religion was a necessity. But Buddhism had not yet become a viable religion of conversion for such a mass in India, and in any case, conversion through a Brahman, albeit a Buddhist monk, would have been a denial of the independent stance of Ambedkar and the Mahar caste. The Parel Vihara did not function as Kosambi felt it should, and it was handed over to the Maha Bodhi Society, to be used in a somewhat less ambitious encouragement of Buddhist ideas.

Kosambi's commitment to Buddhism remained constant, however, and although he left the Vihara in Bombay for Sarnath and eventually Sevagram, he continued writing on Buddhism, and he secured from Gandhi an agreement that some students should be sent to Ceylon to study Buddhist literature and the Buddhist religion.[12]

Kosambi's Bahujan Vihara in the slums of Bombay failed in its immediate purpose, but his influence persists through his students, although they became scholars, not Buddhists, and through his scholarly and popular writing. All the later Indian intellectuals who converted to Buddhism knew of him and his work. A true Maharashtrian eccentric, he wandered restlessly through India and the Buddhist countries and the United States all his life, never staying in one place more than a few years, but leaving behind him inspiration both for scholarship and for living Buddhism.

The Bengali Buddhist revival

A revival movement had begun in the old Buddhist community of Chittagong long before Anagarika Dharmapala came to Calcutta in 1891. A Burmese Bhikkhu, the Venerable Sangharāja Saramedha, stopped in Chittagong on his way to Bodh Gaya in 1856.[13] Distressed by the "corruption" of Buddhism he saw among Buddhists there, he stayed two years at Pahārtali, preaching Theravada Buddhism. He also converted Queen Kalindi of the small Cakma kingdom to Theravada Buddhism, and it was the Queen who financed the first modern Buddhist publications in Eastern Bengal.[14]

Even before Sangharaja's arrival in Chittagong, a young Bengali Buddhist discovered Theravada Buddhism in Calcutta through a Singhalese. He then went to Sangharaja Saramedha's monastery in Akyab, Burma, to be ordained. As Bhikkhu Acariya Punnasara, this first Theravāda monk from the old Bengali Buddhist community tra-

velled back and forth between Ceylon and Chittagong, ordained a new generation of Bengali bhikkhus, established schools and a Pāli Tol, and set in motion a wide range of religious reforms which affected a large part of the Buddhist community. Another Bengali Bhikkhu, Kripasaran Maha Thera, joined with the Maha Bodhi Society to urge the study of Pāli at Calcutta University, and with these two bhikkhus as leaders, the old Buddhist community began to participate in the modern Buddhist revival.

The best known scholar from the Bengali Buddhist society and one of the most important modern scholars of Buddhism, B.M. Barua, took his degree in Pāli at Calcutta in 1913, went on to London to work in London with the Rhys Davids and F.W. Thomas, received a D. Litt. from the University of London, and returned to Calcutta as University Professor of Pali. He published *A History of Pre-Buddhistic Indian Philosophy* in 1921, bec. me co-editor of *Buddhist India* (London) in 1927, and in 1935 established the Nalanda Vidyabhavan in Calcutta for the teaching of Pali and Buddhology. Before his death in 1948, he also worked on much inscriptional and archeological material.

Buddhism in South India

The rediscovery of Buddhism in South India seems to follow a different pattern from that in the North, where one can discern a first generation of scholars in the 19th century, and a second generation in the 1920's and '30's, each generation with its concomitant, but not necessarily, affiliated popularizers and participants. The revival of Buddhism in the South seems more oriented to conversion than scholarship. There were religiously disinterested scholars of Buddhism in the South, but not in the numbers that Bombay and Bengal produced. S Krishnaswami Aiyangar published Buddhist material from 1904. on, and collaborated with Vincent Smith on the first edition of *Ancient India* in 1911. In the second generation, V.R. Ramchandra Dikshitar wrote on ancient Buddhism in Andhra Pradesh and in Tamil literature; H.R. Rangaswamy Iyengar translated Tibetan material; T. N. Ramchandran published articles on Buddhist sites; N. Aiyaswami Sastri worked on Buddhist texts; and K. R. Subramanian published *Buddhist Remains in Andhra and the History of Andhra*, 225-610, for the Andhra University series in 1932.

Even before the scholars were at work, the popularizers and participants began to appear. A.S. Mudaliyar published a brief pamphlet on Buddism in 1903. The most conspicuous figure in the revival, however, is P. Lakshmi Narasu, a Buddhist and a writer and missionary in the cause of Buddhism. Narasu opened a branch of the Maha Bodhi Society in Madras in 1900 together with M. Singaravelu. He knew Anagarika Dharmapala, and for a time worked with the Maha Bodhi Society in managing a School Hall at Perambur for the elementary education of "Dravidian Buddhist children"[15] and also maintained a residence for Buddhist bhikkhus. Some sort of dispute with the Maha Bodhi Society over management seems to have ended his connection with them; it may have been an uncomfortable relationship since Narasu was far more interested in conversion and in the lower classes than was the main Maha Bodhi Society.

Narasu was Professor of Physics and Chemistry at Madras Christian College, and it was out of his personal interest rather than his profession that he wrote. Narasu

claimed no original Pali or Sanskrit based scholarship, but did publish both in India and Europe. His best known book, *The Essence of Buddhism*, appeared in 1907 with an introduction by Anagarika Dharmapala, was reprinted in 1912, and was published again in 1948 with a preface by Dr. B.R. Ambedkar. It is a straight forward explication of Buddhist principles, with a clear emphasis on the social aspects of Buddhism, and was well enough known to be used as a source by Kenneth Saunders in his popular life of the Buddha in 1922. Narasu's later work is less objective and seems to grow out of a passion for propagating Buddhism.

Early in the 20th century, Lakshmi Narasu and Pandit Ayoti Das, who was from an Untouchable community and had become a Buddhist in 1897, founded the Madras (or South Indian) Buddhist Association.[16] Narasu published a pamphlet in 1916 in the name of the Madras Buddhist Association, announcing that it was open to Buddhists and sympathizers, and that its first objective was "to promote a knowledge of Buddhism among Indians with a view to securing adherents." Anagarika Dharmapala was listed as Patron of the association. The pamphlet's espousal of Buddhism, however, was of a different sort from the Maha Bodhi Society's approach. Narasu clearly saw Buddhism as a religion in competition with others. He wrote that dogma and miracles were wisdom to the Christian, Kismet and fanaticism wisdom to the Muslim, caste and ceremonialism wisdom to the Brahman, asceticism and nakedness wisdom to the Jain, mysticism and magic wisdom to the Taoist, formalism and outward piety wisdom to the Confucian, ancestor worship and loyalty to the Mikado wisdom to the Shintoist, but "love and purity are the first wisdom to the Buddhist."[17]

At a meeting of the Indian Buddhists of Madras Presidency in 1920 at the Perambur Vihara, it was announced that in the last twenty years there had been 3000 converts to Buddhism.[18] But the number recording themselves as Buddhists in Tamilnadu in the 1971 Census was only 1,148, so in spite of Narasu's efforts, the Buddhist conversion he envisioned was never widespread. His promulgation of an Indian religion that was egalitarian and without caste, however, may have had some long-lasting effect. He was associated with Appadorai, one of the many Tamil Untouchables who found work in the Kolar Gold Fields in present day Karnataka and who was instrumental in starting a Buddhist movement there. The sympathy which the non-Brahman leaders E.V. Ramaswamy Naicker and C.N. Annadurai felt toward Buddhism may have had some roots in Narasu's presentation of that religion's rationality and egalitarianism. And Narasu was one of the earliest proponents of the theory that at least some Untouchables had been Buddhists in an earlier age, a theory that Dr. B R. Ambedkar developed in a meaningful way for his followers.[19]

Buddhism in Kerala was also primarily a lower caste phenomenon. Organized Buddhism had been re-established in 1924 in Calicut at the instance of the Maha Bodhi Society, but it was dominated by members of the Izhava caste, a Depressed Class group. C. Krishnan, an Izhava, became a Buddhist in the 1920's, opened the Maha Bodhi Society's temple in 1927, conducted a "strenuous campaign" for Buddhism in the 1930's and provided for the building of another Maha Bodhi Vihara in Calicut in 1937. He was joined there by the first Malayali to become a Bhikshu, Dharmaskhanda.[20] The Census for Cochin in 1931 noted 96 Buddhists, most of them educated Malayali Izhavas "disgusted with the social disabilities to which their caste is subjected within the Hindu fold." There was considerable interest among the Izhava group in

Dr. Ambedkar's conversion announcement in 1935, but the Bombay movement never connected with the Malayali movement in any joint work. Some Izhavas maintained a myth of Buddhist origin, but the reformed Hinduism of the chief Izhava leader, Shri Narayana Guru, seems to have kept the main interest of the group in that religion.

The only scholarly work which seems to have come directly out of Kerala is *Buddhism in Kerala* by P.C. Alexander of Shri Narayan College in Quilon. Published in 1949, the book shows that Buddhism flourished in Kerala until the 9th century.

The second generation of scholars

The work in Pali at Bombay, Fergusson College in Poona, Baroda, Shantiniketan, Patna and Calcutta, as well as the continuing interest in Sanskrit sources, yielded a great flowering of Buddhist scholarship in India in the late 1920's and 1930's.[21] Kosambi's work at Fergusson College produced four well-known Pali scholars, two of whom lived long enough to participate in the Indian Government's 1956 volume on *2500 Years of Buddhism*. The editor of the volume, P.V. Bapat, went on to get his Ph D., as had Kosambi, from Harvard. He served for many years as Professor of Pali at Fergusson College and Poona University. Another Kosambi student and contributor to the anniversary volume, C.V. Joshi brought out a manual of Pali in 1916, and served as Professor of Pali at Baroda University. N.K. Bhagwat was Professor of Pali at St. Xavier College in Bombay, and seems to have had a more personal interest in Buddhism than Kosambi's other students. He taught the *Dhammapada* in private classes for the Buddha Society in Bombay, an organization founded by Dr. A.L. Nair in 1922. The fourth of Kosambi's brilliant students, Cintaman Vaijanath Rajwade edited a Pali reader with Kosambi (Poona, 1914-1916) but died at the age of thirty.

There are at least four other noteworthy Buddhist scholars from the Mahārārshtra area : G.R. Nandargikar translated the *Buddha-charitam* of Aśvaghosha for the Arya Bhushan Press in Poona in 1911. V.V. Gokhale secured a doctorate from Bonn, published Tibetan studies, and taught at Fergusson College. P.L. Vaidya, who was Director of the Mithila Research Institute, Darbhanga, at the time of the 1956 anniversary volume on Buddhism, received his M.A. from Calcutta and D. Litt. from Paris. He edited, together with R.D. Shrikhande, an edition of the *Dhammapada*, which was published in Poona in 1923. and wrote a book on the rise and spread of Buddhism in Marathi which was published by Willingdon College in 1929. Finally, J.K. Nariman, a Parsi, did some comparative studies in Zoroastrianism and Buddhism and also wrote "Buddha's Message to the Lowly" for an issue of the *Maha Bodhi Journal*.[22]

Scholarship from Bengal during this same period indicates that university Buddhism studies had come into full flower. Among the names any student of Buddhism will recognize are P.C. Bagchi (D. Litt., Paris) whose final work was done as Vice-Chancellor of Visva-Bharati University at Tagore's Santiniketan ; Benoytosh Bhattacharyya, who headed the Gaikwad's Institute at Baroda and whose *Indian Buddhist Iconography* (1924) and *Introduction to Buddhist Esoterism* (1932) are still in print; Vidhushekar Bhattacharya (or Vidhushekhar Sastri) who published *Basic Conception of Buddhism* in 1934 and was connected with both Santiniketan and Calcutta University;

Nalinaksha Dutt, who succeeded B.M. Barua as head of Pali at Calcutta University and published *Aspects of Mahayana Buddhism and its Relation to Hinayana* in 1930 with an introduction by the great French scholar, Louis de la Valee Poussin; Sukumar Dutt, whose *Early Buddhist Monachism* (1924), *The Buddha and Five After Centuries* (1957) and *Buddhist Monks and Monasteries* (1962) are standard works; U.N. Ghoshal, who added knowledge of early Buddhism in Afghanistan to the history of Buddhism, among many other contributions; and B.C. Law, whose enormous output included *Life and Work of Buddhaghosha* (1923), *Women in Buddhist Literature* (1927), and *The History of Pali Literature* (1933.) In 1931 B.C. Law edited *Buddhistic Studies*, in which eleven of the twenty-seven contributors were Indian scholars.

Popularizers and Participants

Those who called themselves Buddhists or who wrote for the general public on Buddhism during this period are, by and large, far removed from the Indian centers of learning. The three most important figures, Rahul Sankrityayan, Anand Kausalyayan and Jagdish Kashyap, all received their education in Buddhism and became Buddhists in Ceylon. There are a number of other interesting figures, none of whom achieved the level of scholarship or of commitment of these three men, but who seem to indicate a spreading of Buddhist ideology in many parts of India.

Dr. A.L. Nair, a medical doctor in Bombay, organized a Buddha Society there in 1922, built Ananda Vihara on the grounds of his hospital in 1931, and published a jo. rnal called *Buddha Prabhā* from 1933 on. He celebrated Vaiśākha in which N.K. Bhagwat and other Buddhist scholars took part, and it was for this Buddha Society that N.K. Bhagwat taught classes in the *Dhammapada*. K.A. Padhye continued the publication of *Buddha Prabhā* after Nair's death in 1934, and the Maha Bodhi Society took over the Buddhist temple that Nair had built.

Although little is known about Dr. A.L. Nair, it would seem that he and K.A. Padhye are representatives of a view found among many of the popularizers, the view of Buddhism as a sort of higher Hinduism. A corollary of this view was the search for Buddhist links to Hindu practice. K.A. Padhye wrote an article in 1942 entitled "Warkari Sect of the Deccan—an Offshoot of the Mahayana Buddhism"[23] in which he attempted to show that the important and highly respected bhakti movement in Maharashtra was related to later Buddhism. Another Maharashtrian who held this view was A.R. Kulkarni, an advocate in Nagpur. Kulkarni became interested in Buddhism in the 1930's largely because he found the behavior of some Hindus involved in a temple court case more intolerant than he felt was right. His interest in Buddhism seems to have come entirely from reading. He began to observe Buddha Jayanti (the Buddha's birth observance) in 1944 and in 1946 gave up his profession to be an advocate for Buddha for a number of years. He did not preach conversion, but taught that Buddha was an avatāra of Vishṇu and "as long as Buddha was respected, India was happy and cultured."[24]

A similar interest in the figure of the Buddha drew Viththal Ramji Shinde, one of the most active social reformers in the Marathi-speaking area in the first part of the 20th century, towards an individualistic commitment to Buddhism. A member of the Hindu reform society, the Prārthanā Samāj, he called for an extensive system of

education for the Depressed Classes. The Samāj was not prepared to support him in this, so he joined the more distant Brahmo Samāj and created his own educational system. In his autobiography[25] he tells of studying the *Dhammapada* with C.V. Joshi and coming to the conclusion that he did "take refuge in the Buddha," although not in the Dhamma or the Sangha. The serenity of mind of the Buddha; the equal place of women in Burma, which he visited; and the general egalitarianism of Buddhism impressed this active reformer. In 1927 he informed a Brahmo Samāj meeting in Calcutta that he was a Buddhist, and according to him, this "caused an uproar." Although Shinde's educational work for the Depressed Classes is well known, his Buddhism was not particularly influential. He and the others who were drawn toward Buddhism, however, illustrate that the re-discovery of Buddhism in India involved not only scholars but a number of reform-minded laymen who drew inspiration from Buddhism although they did not formally become Buddhists.

An important figure in the field of popular literature was Hari Singh Gour, a lawyer, a member of the Central Legislative Assembly for fourteen years, and the Vice chancellor of Nagpur University. He wrote a number of light articles and in 1928 published *The Spirit of Buddhism*, which Mahatma Gandhi thought the greatest work on the subject and for which Rabindranath Tagore wrote the foreword[26]. Sir Hari was by no means a convert; his work shares with others an interest in Buddhism as a high point in Indian civilization, as a religion akin to Hinduism but purer and more compassionate.

The period of what I have called the second generation of Buddhist scholars and activists was also the high point of the activity of the Maha Bodhi Society. Founded to re-establish in all their former glory the Buddhist holy places and to present Buddhist ideas, the Maha Bodhi society was not so much interested in converts as in raising the consciousness of Buddhism in India and providing connections between India and Buddhist countries. Much of its building during the 1930's was financed by the industrialist Seth Jugal Kishore Birla, who saw little distinction between Hinduism and Buddhism.[27] Although it undoubtedly did much to further the knowledge of Buddhism in India, the Maha Bodhi Society did not attract for more than a brief period those who were actually Buddhists, and in its chief area of work, Calcutta, there seem to be no converts.

Three Northern Indians must be added to this account of popularization and participation in the second generation. Pandit Sheo Narain of Lahore did much work in the 1920's to propagate the idea that Buddhism represented the highest stage of Indian culture. His articles in the *Maha Bodhi Journal* in 1923 and 1927 encourage the publication of Buddhist texts in translation as the best way to revive the religion, but he saw no need for Hindus "to shelve their great Indian Heroes. To avow Buddhism means that all human beings on the globe are members of a brotherhood, that His perfect code of morals is to be your guide and that in His name you can collect all your scattered fragments and mould them into one harmonious whole."[28] For Narain, the age of reason had come, and "Buddhism will be the only religion for the whole world to fall back on." Narain was not a published scholar, but he gave his scholarly library on Buddhism to the International Buddhist Institute at Sarnath shortly before his death in the mid-30's.

Kashi Prasad Jayaswal, whose home in Patna served as a center for Rahul Sankrit-

yayan, wrote a number of articles on Buddhism from 1918 on. His most important service was to provide a place for the large collection of Tibetan materials brought back from the north by Rahul Sankrityayan, now housed in the Jayaswal Research Institute of Patna.

Har Dayal, the flamboyant Punjabi revolutionary, was drawn to Buddhism at various points in his checkered career. He arrived in the United States to study Buddism at Harvard in 1911, but within three months left to work with Sikh and Punjabi laborers in California and eventually to plan the Ghadr (mutiny) revolt of 1915. When he repented his revolutionary activities in 1927, he was allowed by the British Government to study at the School of Oriental and African Studies in London, where he produced a book on the Boddhisattva doctrine in Buddhist Sanskrit literature which is still a standard work in its field. Dayal at times called himself a Buddhist, and his writing contains many statements such as "India achieved her greatest triumphs in science, ethics, education, art and international prestige [during the Buddhist period],"[29] but his mercurial temperament prevented any sustained organizational work.

The great trio : Sankrityayan, Kausalyayan, Kashyap

The three most important scholar-converts of this period all came out of the Arya Samaj reform atmosphere of the North rather than the Buddhist centers of learning in Eastern and Western India. Their interest in religious reform and in faith chosen without adherence to tradition seems to be more important in their conversion than any of the other factors present in India—Buddhist scholarship, the work of the Maha Bodhi Society, the revival among Buddhist survivals, contact with Buddhist countries, popular writing on Buddhism. For Jagdish Kashyap, Rahul Sankrityayan and Anand Kausalyayan, the egalitarianism and rationality of Buddhism itself were the drawing powers. Although the Arya Samaj stressed reform, it seems not to have satisfied these inquiring minds. Eventually the greater intellectual breadth and the less doctrinaire scriptures of Buddhism brought all three men to a lifetime commitment. The life of Jagdish Kashyap will be touched upon in this essay only as it interacted with the work of Rahul Sankrityayan and Anand Kausalyayan, since a separate essay in this volume will be devoted to his work.

Rahul Sankrityayan was as colorful a figure as Kosambi, and like Kosambi was a staunch Buddhist all his adult life, but a bhikkhu or sramanera only a part of his mature years. Born Kedar Nath Pandey in 1893 in a Brahman family in the United Provinces, he died in 1963 not as a bhikkhu but as Maha Pandit Rahul Sankrityayan. In his seventy years, he travelled widely and in unusual places, wrote prodigiously, wore the Buddhist robes some years and the mantle of Marxism even longer, and achieved a reputation not only as a scholar but also as a master of Hindi literature.

As a child, Sankrityayan ran away from home a number of times and seems to have gone only through Urdu Middle School in formal education. In late adolescence he spent six months in the Himalayas, and there learned something about the Tantric form of Devi worship. Then in Banares he studied Sanskrit and became a disciple of a Vaishnava sadhu, Baba Ram Udar Das, but soon was on his way to Lahore to

study Vedic literature in an Arya Samaj circle.[30] He joined Gandhi's nationalist movement, and then became interested in the peasant movement, and in a period of imprisonment for this activity in 1925-26 began to read Buddhist literature. He went to Ceylon in 1928 and joined the Vidyalankara Parivena, where he taught Sanskrit and studied Pali. His next adventure was in Tibet, where he stayed fifteen months in the early 1930's, learning Tibetan and, according to Agrawala, receiving his initiation as a monk "telegraphically from Maha Pandita Dharmanand Kausambi"[31] He returned with 22 mules laden with Sanskrit manuscripts, and this rich discovery of Tibetan Buddhist culture became one of the dominant interests of his life.

In 1932 Sankrityayan and another Indian bhikkhu, Anand Kausalyayan, went to England under the aegis of the Maha Bodhi Society to teach Buddhism to Europeans. But a trip to the Soviet Union at the invitation of Professor Stcherbatsky was more important to his scholarship, since Stcherbatsky was interested in Central Asian Buddhism, and to his social activities; it led to his joining the All India Communist Party in 1938. The years following are marked by travel, including a third trip to Tibet and a second one to the Soviet Union in 1944 which lasted three years; by writing; and by such activities as a leadership role in the Bihar peasant movement and then the All-India Hindi Sahitya Sammelan. Sankrityayan was expelled from the Communist Party in 1948 in a disagreement over the language policy of the party. Sankrityayan's Marxism, however, remained firm. He made no easy linkages between Marxism and Buddhism, but stated that "an understanding of marxist philosophy is easier for students of Buddhist philosophy."[32] In 1959 he returned to his old alma mater, Vidyalankara Parivena University in Ceylon, and served as University Professor the rest of his life. Somewhere in these rich years he took off his Buddhist robes, married a Russian and then a Nepali woman He kept his Buddhist name, and evidently his reputation in Ceylon was not harmed by his departure from the Sangha.

Sankrityayan's genius led to the writing of many books, some not yet published. He compiled a Russian-Sanskrit dictionary, a Tibetan-Sanskrit dictionary and a dictionary of Hindi administrative terms; he wrote a life of the Buddha, books on Buddhism in Tibet and the history of Central Asia; he published archeological works; he delved into the early literature of the Hindi tradition; he wrote novels and travel literature and biographies of Lenin, Stalin and Mao tse-tung; he mastered many schools of Indian philosophy, wrote on several and translated many Buddhist texts into Hindi. He is considered an important literary figure as a Hindi writer. All in all, there are some 150 books to his credit, on almost every subject under the sun.

Rahul Sankrityayan also had a profound influence on the two younger members of the Buddhist trio, Jagdish Kashyap and Anand Kausalyayan. The late Venerable Kashyap in an article called "Rahulji, My Gurubhai"[33] makes it clear that he and Sankrityayan were both disciples of the same guru and intellectual brothers. They met in 1933, after Kashyap had written a letter in Sanskrit to Vidyalankar to inquire if he could study the Pali Tripitika there in preparation for his Ph. D. work. The letter was answered by Bhikshu Rahul Sankrityayan, then in Germany, suggesting that they meet when he came to Patna. After spending some time with Rahulji, Kashyap's interest in Buddhism as a Ph. D. subject became much more personal. "Don't accept scripture or tradition. What you learn with your own mind and agree with, accept that," said Sankrityayan, and it was in accord with that principle that Kashyap's commitment to

Buddhism grew. Sankrityayan sent Kashyap to Mahastavir Dharmananda, head of Vidyalankar, and it seems that Kashyap not only quickly learned Pali but at the same time received *diksha* into Buddhism.

For the next few years, Sankrityayan guided Kashyap's work: first a translation of the *Digha Nikāya* into Hindi, then a trip to Penang, where Kashyap spent much time with Chinese Bhikshus, came to have a sense of the international fellowship of the Sangha, and translated the *Milinda Pañha*, the *Udāna*, and the *Samyutta Nikāya* into Hindi. Here, however, he began to be interested in meditation, and Sankrityayan wrote him it was not proper for a young man to study yoga and meditation, lest it cut down on his activeness in spreading the religion. Kashyap, however, retured to Ceylon for a year's study of meditation and yoga, and then met Sankrityayan again in 1936, receiving his blessing and forgiveness. Kashyap, Sankrityayan and Anand Kausalyayan then worked together in Allahabad, and came to an understanding about their future direction. Rahulji was chiefly interested in writing. Anandji wanted most to travel, to lecture, to write pamphlets, and to contribute to some one else's institution rather than found one of his own. Kashyap wished to found an institution and to sit there "like the head of a temple" and study.

This distribution of duties seems to have been what each pursued for the following years. The resurrection of the ancient Buddhist University of Nalanda was Rahul Sankrityayan's dream, but it was Jagdish Kashyap who gave Nalanda new life. His travel-filled life, his other interests, and his volumes of writing prevented Rahulji from building any sort of on-going institution, but his output was enormous. Kausalyayan indeed travelled, wrote pamphlets, and since 1956 has been profoundly involved in the Buddhist conversion movement begun by Dr. Ambedkar.

Sankrityayan's work in bringing Tibetan Buddhist manuscripts to light, editing many, writing commentary on and translating some, was certainly one of the most long-lasting of his contributions to world Buddhism.[34] However, he also had a vision of the resurrection of Buddhism in India and its linkage to other Buddhist cultures which not only influenced a handful of men to become Buddhists but also helped create the atmosphere which made a mass Buddhist conversion a viable possibility. He welcomed the conversion of 1956 with open arms. In an article reprinted in 1976 in a Maharashtrian Buddhist periodical[35] but evidently written in the year after the conversion, he considered the good that this conversion would do the country in reviving "the glory of the old historic places," linking India with other Buddhist countries and "saving India [since] we cannot be saved until the lowest stratum is uplifted." Sankrityayan's tone in this article is sympathetic without being at all patronizing. He compared the conversion of Ambedkar to the conversion of Kubla Khan to Buddhism, after "all religions came to convert him." He said that it would not have been difficult for Ambedkar to rise to the highest place in the Buddhist Sangha in the Buddhist age. He noted that Ambedkar converted to Buddhism rather than to a foreign religion because of his love for the culture of India. "No one can doubt the foresight of Ambedkar. He threw away the unwanted things in Hindu culture but did not led the original form and spirit [of Indian culture] slip from his hands." Rarely has an Indian not in the Ambedkar movement written so approvingly of the conversion of the Untouchables to Buddhism.

The third of the great trio, Anand Kausalyayan, originally from the Punjab, met

Rahul Sankrityayan in Lahore.[36] Kausalyayan was first a Vaisnavite, then an Arya Samajist. Restless, he moved from place to place, reaching Ceylon where Sankrityayan was teaching Sanskrit in 1928. Kausalyayan spent eighteen months in Ceylon, "reading the Tripitika eighteen hours a day." He was ordained a bhikkhu in 1928. Kausalyayan then felt his study of Buddhism was incomplete and went to Tibet. He went to England in 1932 with Rahul Sankrityayan at the behest of the Maha Bodhi Society and stayed in Europe nearly twenty months.

Although Kausalyayan has remained an active bhikkhu since 1928, he has been supported not by a Buddhist organization for much of that period but by his own teaching of Hindi. He has been a Professor of Hindi at the University of Ceylon and more recently Secretary of the All India Hindi Prachar Samiti. A prolific writer, Kausalyayan has some sixty books and pamphlets to his credit, including many intended for the Buddhist community in Mahārashtra, a book on Rahul Sankrityayan, and a translation of the Jātaka tales into Hindi. Like Sankrityayan, he is well known as a creative writer in Hindi.

Kausalyayan has been more involved in the contemporary Buddhist conversion than any other of the high caste Indian intellectual converts. He initiated perhaps a hundred thousand people in Bombay into Buddhism ten days after the death ceremonies of Dr. B.R. Ambedkar in 1956. He now lives in Nagpur, on the grounds where the Nagpur conversion took place, in a house designed with architectural motifs from classical Indian Buddhist structures. His home, very near Dr. Ambedkar College, is a center for the training of bhikkhus and lay leaders in Buddhism. Over forty young men have studied Buddhism seriously under Bhadant Kausalyayan's guidance. Half of these have become, or intend to become, bhikkhus. Almost all do university work as well as Buddhist studies, and about two-thirds of the young men now studying with Kausalyayan at Nagpur are also engaged in Ph.D. work.

This intellectual commitment seems to be a key factor in the interest of Kausalyayan and his generation in Buddhism. He states that the fact that Buddhism was not a revealed religion was appealing to him, and he found solace in the idea that Buddhist texts were not to be believed unquestioningly. The intellectual freedom of Buddhism and the depth of its social commitment impressed him. Kausalyayan comments that he read Har Dayal on choosing an occupation: "Take the least, give the most to society," and this influenced his decision to become a Buddhist Bhikkhu. He also was influenced by Dharmanand Kosambi, lived with him for a brief period in Sarnath, and is acquainted with all of Kosambi's work.

Many of those involved in the Buddhist revival in India did not see Buddhism as a religion separate from Hinduism. In the foreword to the official government publication of 1956, *2500 Years of Buddhism*, S. Radhakrishnan wrote, "The Buddha did not feel that he was announcing a new religion. He was born, grew up and died a Hindu. He was restating with a new emphasis the ancient ideals of the Indo-Aryan civilization."[37] The distinguished art historian Ananda Kentish Coomaraswamy stated this position in an early book, *Buddha and the Gospel of Buddhism* (1916) and repeated it toward the end of his life in *Hinduism and Buddhism* (1943): "The more superficially one studies Buddhism, the more it seems to differ from the Brahamanism in which it originated; the more profound our study, the more difficult it becomes to distinguish Buddhism from Brahmanism."[38]

Those who actually became Buddhists in the pre-1956 era obviously had somewhat differing beliefs. Bhikkhu Jagdish Kashyap, the only Indian contributor to Kenneth Morgan's *The Path of the Buddha : Buddhism Interpreted by Buddhists*, stated the issues gently but firmly in his chapter on "The Origin and Expansion of Buddhism."[39] He noted differences: the discarding of blind acceptance of the authority of the Vedas, the non-acceptance of the idea of God or First Cause; not holding rite or ritual to be spiritually efficacious; rejecting caste and untouchability; opposing self mortification. He also noted similarities : belief in rebirth, the law of kamma and the idea that suffering is due to attachment, and held that there was never a distinctly separate Buddhist society isolated from the rest of the community.

Those involved in the current conversion movement hold more radical ideas ; they chose Buddhism in the belief that it was a distinctly separate religion from Hinduism."[40] But the attraction of Buddhism for the new converts was not purely its negation of Hinduism. The image of Buddhism as a rational, ethical, creative, egalitarian religion, full of compassion for all mankind, had been spread through India by scholars, popular writers and participant alike. The very symbols of the new India, the Asokan pillar and the wheel of law, spoke of the reclaimed glory of the age of Buddhism. A hundred years of scholarship, of writing for the general public on Buddhism and the Buddha, of participation on the part of a few in the institutions of Buddhism out of profound personal conviction, of developing the idea that those who were Buddhists once could be Buddhists again—in those hundred years the ground was prepared for an actual as well as an intellectual rediscovery of Buddhism.

NOTES

1. Information on the publications of Indian scholars was gleaned from Shinsho Hanayama, *Bibliography on Buddhism* (Tokyo : Hokuseido Press, 1961) ; *Bibliographie Bouddhique*, Vols. I-XXIII (Paris : Librairie Orientalists and Librairie d'Amerique et d'Orient, 1930-1955); Padmanabh Jaini, "Some Eminent Buddhist Scholars : In India and Europe" (pp.380-94) and P.V. Bapat, "Progress of Buddhist Studies: India" (pp.411-22) in P.V. Bapat, ed., *2500 Years of Buddhism* (Delhi: The Publications Division, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Government of India, 1956.)

2. The President of the Buddhist Text Society, Calcutta, 1882, quoted in Jaini, *2500 Years of Buddhism* (P.V. Bapat, ed.), p. 387.

3. Since there are full accounts of the Maha Bodhi Society in Bhikshu Sangharakshita, "Anagarika Dharmapala: A Biographical Sketch," (pp. 9-65) and Nalinaksha Dutt, "The Maha Bodhi Society, Its History and Influence," (pp. 66-132) in *Maha Bodhi Society of India: Diamond Jubilee Souvenir, 1891-1951* (Calcutta : Maha Bodhi Society, 1952) and an analysis of the Society's work in Robert J. Miller, "Background to Buddhist Resurgence: India and Ceylon" in Robert K. Sakai, ed., *Studies on Asia 1966* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1966, pp. 39-48,) I have noted the work of the Society here only as it related to the other facets of the Indian rediscovery of Buddhism.

4. Nalinaksha Dutt, *Maha Bodhi Society Souvenir*, p.104.

5. Krishna Kripalani, *Rabindranath Tagore: A Biography* (London: Oxford Uni-

versity Press, 1962), p. 171.

6. Edward Thompson, *Rabindranath Tagore* (London : Oxford University Press, 1926), p.137.

7. Kripalani, *Tagore*, p. 325.

8. Suniti Kumar Chatterji, "Dharmapala and the Cultural Renaissance in India and Ceylon," *Maha Bodhi Society Souvenir*, p.165.

9. Devapriya Valisinha, *Buddhist Shrines in India* (Colombo: Maha Bodhi Society of Ceylon, 1948), p.118. See also D.C. Ahir, "Eighty Years of Buddhism in India (1891-1971)" in *The Maha Bodhi* 79 (1971) pp. 219-21.

10. The best source in English on the life of Kosambi is P.V. Bapat, "Professor Dharmanand Kosambi, a Profound Pali Scholar and a Sincere Nationalist Worker," in *Modern Review* 83 (1948), pp.134-37. I have also used the introduction to *Bhagwān Buddha* (Nagpur and Pune: Suvicar Prakashan Mandal, 1974) written by the editor, S.S. Banhatti (translated from the Marathi with the assistance of Jayant-Karve.)

11. Buddhaghosa, *Visuddhimagga of Buddhaghosacariya*, edited by Henry Clarke Warren and revised by Dharmananda Kosambi, Vol. 41 in the Harvard Oriental Series (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1950.) This work appeared under the same title, edited by Dharmanand Kosambi in 1940 (Bombay: Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan.)

12. The scholar Padmanabh S. Jaini was a Dharmanand Kosambi Memorial Fellow in Ceylon.

13. This account of the Bengali Buddhist revival is largely from Sukomal Chowdhury, "Renaissance of Buddhism in Bengal in the Modern Period," *The Maha Bodhi* 79 (1971) pp. 410-19.

14. Heinz Bechert gives the Queen an important role in the Buddhist revival in "Contemporary Buddhism in Bengal and Tripura," *Educational Miscellany* IV: 3 & 4 (December 1967—March 1968) pp. 1-25.

15. Nalinaksha Dutt, *Maha Bodhi Society Souvenir*, pp. 85 and 114.

16. Adele Fiske, "Scheduled Caste Buddhist Organizations," in J. Michael Mahar, ed. *The Untouchables in Contemporary India* (Tucson: University of Arizona Press ,1972) p. 116.

17. P. Lakshmi Narasu, *What Is Buddhism* ? (Madras: author, 1916).

18. Fiske, *The Untouchables* (Mahar, ed.), p. 116.

19. See B.R. Ambedkar, *The Untouchables* (New Delhi: Amrit Book Co., 1948. Ambedkar probably developed his theory that Untouchables had been Buddhist Nagas before the resurgence of Brahmanism independently of Narasu, but the earlier Tamil writer was certainly an influence on Ambedkar and an example to him. Ambedkar's introduction to the third edition of *The Essence of Buddhism* (Bombay : Thacker, 1948) gives as many facts about Narasu's life as were available to Ambedkar. P. Lakshmi Narasu's *A Study of Caste* (Madras: K.V. Raghavulu, 1922) contains much information about low caste Buddhist survivals among the Doms in Bengal and a history of a 19th century revival movement in Orissa.

20. For brief notes on Kerala Buddhism, see Nalinaksha Dutt, *Maha Bodhi Society Souvenir*, pp. 103, 114-15.

21. Many of the second generation scholars are represented in the 1956 anniversary volume, *2500 Years of Buddhism* (P.V. Bapat, ed.) Special issues at that time of

the Indian Historical Quarterly [XXXII: 2-3 (1956)] and the *Journal of the Bihar Research Society* (1956: 1, Buddha Jayanti Special Issue) also contain the work of Indian scholars on Buddhism. See also the bibliographies listed in Footnote 1.

22. *The Maha Bodhi* XXXIII (1925), pp. 243-7.

23. *The Maha Bodhi* L (1942), pp. 28-31.

24. Interview with A.L. Kulkarni, Nagpur, 1964.

25. Viththal Ramji Shinde, *Mājhyā Āthvanī va Anubhav* (My Memories and Experiences) (Pune: Shri Lekhan Wachan Bhandar, 1958).

26. See the entry for Hari Singh Gour in the *Dictionary of National Biography*, S.P. Sen, Ed. (Calcutta: Institute of Historical Studies, 1972-74.)

27. Nalinaksha Dutta, *Maha Bodhi Society Souvenir*, pp.109-10. Among Birla's contributions were the Sarnath Dharmsala, the land for the Maha Bodhi Vidyalaya, the rest house at Kusinara, the Vihara at New Delhi, the Bahujan Vihara in Bombay and the Vidyodaya School in Manoor, Malabar.

28. Sheo Narain, "Revival of Buddhism, "*The Maha Bodhi* XXXI: (1923), pp. 254-62. See also Sheo Narain, "Prospects of Buddhism in India,"*The Maha Bodhi* XXXV : 4 (1927) pp. 204-06.

29. Emily C. Brown, *Har Dayal : Hindu Revolutionary and Rationalist* (Tucson : The University of Arizona Press, 1975), p. 235.

30. In writing about his relationship with the Arya Samaj, Sankrityayan mentions another early figure in Buddhism. Pandit Shivanarayan Shamin, an advocate in Lahore, told Sankrityayan that he saw Swami Dayanand, but his heart and mind had been conquered by Buddha so he didn't join the Arya Samaj. Rahulji stated that he had given his heart and mind to the Arya Samaj, but had to take them back when he discovered Buddha. Rahul Sankrityayan, "Navadīkshit Bauddh" in *Dhammachakra* (Poona), 14 October, 1976, pp.1-12.

31. V.S. Agrawala, "Mahā-Paṇḍita Rāhula Saṇkṛityāyana," *The Journal of the Bihar Research Society* XLVII: 1-4 (1961) pp. 1-6. This and the *Dictionary of National Biography* are my main sources for the life of Sankrityayan.

32. Rahula Sankrityayana, "Buddhist Dialectics" in Rahula Sankrityayana, ed., *Buddhism: The Marxist Approach*, (Delhi : People's Publishing House, 1970) pp. 1-8.

33. Bhikshu Jagdish Kashyap, "Rāhuljī: Mere Gurubhāī" *Journal of the Bihar Research Society* 47 (1961), pp.7-10, Translated for me by Jayant Karve.

34. Agrawala wrote: "The pinnacle of his glory rests on the Sanskrit Buddhist literature that he brought from the Tibetan monasteries, Sa-mye and others. By his learning, tact and profession of Buddhism he found favour with the monks and examined the manuscripts collection under their care, persuading them for permission to prepare photographs and hand copies." *Journal of the Bihar Research Society*, p. 4.

35. Rahul Sankrityayan, *Dhammachakra*, 14 October, 1976, pp. 1-12. *Dhammachakra* is a journal published by Buddhists in Poona.

36. Information about Anand Kausalyayan comes from several interviews, conducted in 1964 and 1976. He is not eager to talk about himself, and I have little information on his early life.

37. P.V. Bapat, ed., *2500 Years of Buddhism*, p. xiii.

38. Ananda Kentish Coomaraswamy, *Hinduism and Buddhism*, (New York: Philosophical Library, 1943), p. 45.

39. Jagdish Kashyap, "The Origin and Expansion of Buddhism," in Kenneth W. Morgan, ed., *The Path of Buddhism* (New York: Ronald, 1956), pp. 44-47.

40. See Eleanor Zelliot, "Background of the Mahar Buddhist Conversion" in Robert Sakai, ed., *Studies on Asia 1966* (Lincoln : Universiy of Nebraska, 1966) and "The Revival of Buddhism in India," *Asia* (New York) X (1968), pp.33-45, for more information on the contemporary conversion movement to Buddhism led by Dr. B.R. Ambedkar.

37

The Viśeṣastava of Udbhaṭṭasiddhasvāmin[1]

LEONARD ZWILLING

Among the Buddhist stotras preserved in Tibetan translation the *Viśeṣastava*, in seventy-six stanzas, occupies a special place, in that it was chosen by the editors of the bstan 'gyur to stand at the head of the entire collection. This should draw our attention to it, since an examination of the divisions of the bstan 'gyur reveals that the editors reserved that position for those works which tradition regarded as either especially important or particularly old. In the case of the *Viśeṣastava*, the choice was apparently made on the basis of a belief in its antiquity for, as Prof. Bailey has pointed out, "in the Bstan ḥgyur...(the) stotras seem on the whole to be arranged in chronological order..."[2] The *Viśeṣastava*, then, claims our attention in having been regarded as the oldest Buddhist stotra extent.

In addition to its place in the canon, the work is of interest for the way in which the eulogy of the Buddha is pursued. Drawing upon well known episodes from the epics and making reference to the philosophical theories and religious practices of the non-Buddhists, the author contrasts the Buddha's conduct and his ethical and philosophical teaching with that of t.e Hindu deities and sages in a manner that is inimical to the latter. The work thus takes on the character of a sustained anti-Hindu polemic. This combination of eulogy and polemic is in marked contrast to the rather limited content of the usual Buddhist stotra whose authors "for the most part adhere to the mass of traditions about the Buddha, his deeds, his powers, his character, (and) his well known epithets..."[3]

As is the case with most Indian Buddhist authors, we can know nothing of Udbhaṭṭasiddhasvāmin's life apart from what he chooses to tell us of himself in his works. Upon examination, we find only a single autobiographical reference in the *Viśeṣastava*; "Having forsaken other teachers I go to You, O Lord, for refuge." (Verse

1) On the basis of this explicit statement, we can safely assume that our author was a convert to Buddhism, most probably as an adult.

As for the external evidence, his commentator, Prajñāvarman (8th. cent. A.D.)[4] tells us that our author (along with his brother Śaṃkarasvāmin, the author of the *Devātiśayastotra*[5], a work which greatly resembles the *Viśeṣastava* in content although not in style) was born into a family of orthodox Brahmans who were devotees of Maheśvara. He goes on to tell of the brothers' doubts of Maheśvara's superiority over the Buddha, their journey to Mt. Kailāśa where they see Maheśvara himself honoring and giving alms to arhats, their conversion to the Buddhadharma and the composition of their eulogies.[6]

Prajñāvarman's identification of our author as a convert from Śaivism is supported by the single other work attributed to him in the bstan 'gyur, the *Sarvajñāmaheśvarastotra*.[7] This work is a eulogy of the Buddha in the guise of Śiva in which the attributes of the latter are given a Buddhist interpretation; for example :

> I bow down to Maheśvara who always carries the skull of friendship (byams pa; Skt. maitrī), who is smeared with the ashes of compassion (sñing rje; Skt. karuṇā), and whose head is adorned with the moon of moral discipline (tshul khrims; Skt. śīla). 4
>
> O Maheśvara, who travels mounted on the bull of the Mahāyāna (theg chen khyu mchog; Skt. mahāyānavṛṣa) whose great horns are friendship and compassion, and whose eyes are joy (dga'; Skt. prīti) and equanimity (btang sñoms; Skt. upekṣā). 5
>
> I bow down before Maheśvara who travels with his queens and friends (? mchog; Skt. vara) giving (sbyin; Skt. dāna), moral discipline, patience (bzod pa; Skt. kṣānti), effort (brtson 'grus; Skt. vīrya), meditation (bsam gtan; Skt. samādhi), and the rest. 6

The suggestion in verse 5 above that our author was a follower of the Mahāyāna is partly confirmed by the *Viśeṣastava* itself. In the last two verses of that work the author dedicates the merit accrued through its composition to all living beings that they might enter the path to enlightenment (byang chub lam; Skt. bodhimarga) and become Buddhas, a common sentiment of Mahāyāna authors.[8]

Turning to the Tibetan material, Tāranātha places our author before Nāgārjuna and after the death of Kaṇiṣka in the period which he calls "The Beginning of the Extensive Propogation of the Mahāyāna." He associates our author directly with the Mahāyāna depicting him as a supporter of its followers and a donor of its scriptures.[9]

As for the *Viśeṣastava*, Tāranātha testifies to its great popularity; "from the market place up to the king's palace—most of the people recited (it) as (a) song."[10]

From the point of view of style, the work is simple and direct, apparently lacking in long compounds, and without elaborate ornamentation. Its vocabulary is free of specifically Buddhist terminology and although philosophical matters are raised they are discussed without employing technical terms other than those which would have been well known to anyone taking an interest in such questions. Allusions to well known Hindu legends are made throughout; Viṣṇu. Śiva, Skanda, Rāma, Indra, Rāhu

and others are mentioned by name[11] while no reference is made to such figures as Devadatta, Angulimāla, Nanda, or Maudgalyāyana which one would expect in a work directed towards Buddhists. In addition, the work lacks any reference to such basic Buddhist teachings as the Four Noble Truths, Eightfold Path, Pāramitās, etc. and emphasizes Buddha's perfection of the traditionally Brahman virtues of compassion and non-violence, chastity and renunciation, charity and wisdom. On the basis of its style and content we may well suppose that Tāranātha's belief in the *Viśeṣastava's* popularity is not to be ascribed to pious sentiment alone, and that it was indeed successful as a propagandistic work directed towards a non-Buddhist audience.

Turning to the work itself, compassion is predominant among the virtues for which Buddha is praised. His compassion is contrasted with the violence of the gods and sages, the heroic ethic of the epic is criticized and the practice of animal sacrifice is condemned :

> The bearers of the discus and the javelin were unable to subdue the demon host; yet You, without discus or javelin, subdued them with the weapon of your friendship. 8
>
> Skanda, Indra, Upendra, Rudra and others always carry weapons out of fear and in order to threaten (others); You are fearless and threaten no one. 55
>
> Because no one fears you and you threaten no one, You alone do not carry weapons and are, therefore, superior to such beings. 56
>
> The fame that Rāma acquired by destroying the world's kṣatriyas with his deadly arrow[12] is infamous in Your Teaching. 36 .
>
> Kapila with a single glance incinerated the sixty thousand sons of Sagara;[13] You would have acted compassionately towards them. 47
>
> The sages are known to be ascetics by the efficacy of their curses; You, O Lord, are known to be an ascetic by the efficacy of your compassion. 20
>
> The glory for which the Kauravas and Pāṇḍavas went to war You shunned like a tree surrounded by poisonous snakes. 37
>
> Vyāsa says that an angry man slain in battle will go to paradise;[14] You have taught that such a mind warrents a bad rebirth. 53
>
> Those learned in the Vedānta teach that in battle one should slay the enemy; You, the Teacher of the World, have taught that one should be compassionate even towards enemies. 66
>
> It is well known that the sages teach that animals should be slain in sacrifice while You, O Sinless One, would not harm even an ant. 17

Some teach that a burnt offering should be made with the lives of others in a sacrifice for one's own benefit; You alone, for the sake of others, would make a burnt offering of Your own life. 18

The world accepts as righteousness the murder of living being before images of the gods and in sacrifices; that is condemned in Your Teaching. 63

How can one who always injures living beings be righteous? You, O Lord, well protect living beings with your very own life. 64

After compassion, the Buddha's dominant virtues according to the *Viśeṣastava* are his chastity and asceticism. Udbhaṭṭasiddhasvāmin would seem to have been addressing an audience whose normative ethic was anti-sexual and abstinent for he misses no opportunity to point out the discrepancy between the Brahman ideal of brahmacārya and restrained conduct and the lusty antics of the gods and sages. On the other hand, the Buddha and his disciples are portrayed as being totally unmoved by the passions and thus perfectly exemplifying the ideal ethic postulated by the Brahmans themselves :

Lustful Mahādeva's penis fell (to the ground) through the sages curse; [15] but You destroyed lust itself, the root of all evil. 21

Mahādeva became four-faced out of desire for Tillotamā;[16] yet the wiles of Māra's daughters could not shake the hairs on Your body. 6

Because Mahādeva did not completely destroy Kāma he was brought under his power again;[17] while You totally destroyed lust with the fire of Your wisdom. 5

It is well known that Indra became defiled by lust when he saw Āhalyā;[18] You, O Hero, renounced Your wife in order not to be deluded by passion. 14

Although the Sāṃkhya Bharadvaja had seen reality he was still attached to Vāsantā (? dpyid ldan ma)[19] but not even Your disciples, O Lord, have lust for women. 24

Tradition has it that Prajāpati coupled with his own daughter;[20] but the chastity of Your disciples, O Sage, is stainless. 41

It is well known that Rāma crossed over the sea for the sake of his wife; but You renounced eighty thousand women and went to the forest. 33

The kings Rāma, Vararuci (?gos sred) and others returned from the forest; yet You, O Sugata, did not return, being satisfied with the nectar of solitude. 16

Moreover, the Buddha is an exemplar of honesty :

Viṣṇu changed into a dwarf and deceived Balī with a stratagem.[21] Although You

know the means of deceit You are never false to others. 10

And unlike Viṣṇu and Śiva, the Buddha is truly able to save and protect his devotees, and is invincible :

Viṣṇu was unable to protect his own while You, O Lord, strive to protect all creatures. 68

Because of a curse Viṣṇu destroyed his clan while You liberate all clans from cyclic existence. 70

Jarā slew Viṣṇu with an arrow,[22] Māhadeva's neck turned blue;[23] injury came to these two gods but You, O Lord, are exempt from injury. 9

The personal virtues of the Buddha aside, the merits of his Teaching are prominently extolled; the Buddhadharma is original, openly taught and internally consistent, in contrast to the derivitive, caste-restricted, and contradictory teaching of the non-Buddhists :

Dvaipāyana and others mostly repeat what others have said; You teach a unique Teaching based upon Your own insight. 22

The words of the non-Buddhist's Vedas are to be spoken only in private; You teach the Teaching loudly, proclaiming it with a lion's roar. 23

Those who are accepted as reighteous say that knowledge should not be given to śūdras, while You, out of compassion, have taught the Teaching even to untouchables. 59

The words of sinful teachers and the words of the Vedas, etc. are for the most part contradictory while Yours is the Teaching of an omniscient being. 57

The philosophical concerns of the *Viśeṣastava* provide little clue to the date of its composition, although they do not rule out an early one. Among the doctrines attacked in the poem which are identified with a particular school we find Sāṃkhya, Vaiśeṣika and Jaina conceptions of self (ātman, jīva, puruṣa) and substance (pradhāna) which are refuted with stereotyped arguments common to both Hīnayāna and Mahāyāna writings :[24]

Kapila determined that the mark of the self is consciousness, You showed that if such were the case the self would be impermanent. 43[25]

Kaṇāda has said that the self is separate from consciousness and pervasive. You have said that if it is unconscious it would be similar to wood .23[26]

The Jainas teach that the soul is the size of the body and expands and contracts. You have said that it would then be impermanent because it has parts. 45[27]

The Brahmans teach that the cause of living beings is a permanent self. You have said that a permanent cause does not exist. 49[28]

Kapila, the knower of reality, explained that living beings are born from a fundamental substance. You have proclaimed that the birth of living beings results from actions and aflictions. 48

Tradition has it that a subtle self migrates from one body to another.[29] You taught that there does not exist a self which goes from one body to another. 52

The *Viśeṣastava* then is of interest as a rare example of Buddhist polemical verse which mirrors the ideology and concerns of the upper-class intelligentsia among which it was composed and to which it was at least partially addressed. Udbhaṭṭasiddhasvāmin and Śaṃkarasvāmin must have had numerous contemporaries who shared their outlook; rationalist and puritan intellectuals, Brahman in caste but attracted to Buddhism because of its moral purity, social compassion and universalism, and the logical consistency of its teachings. It should be noted that the pretensions of the Brahmans as a caste are not attacked, as in the possibly contemporaneous *Vajrasūci*,[30] but it is merely the specific evils perpetrated by the Brahmans as Hindu hierophants, such as animal sacrifice and caste monopoly on religious teaching which are condemned. Udbhaṭṭasiddhasvāmin seems to share the view found in much earlier Pāli writings on this same subject; *e,g.* the Vasalaka and Brahmanadhammika suttas, that the original ideals of the Brahmans, *i.e.* purity, asceticism, non-violence, etc. were entirely congruent with the Buddhist ethic but that the Brahmans as a caste group became corrupted by greed using false teachings to justify their profitable but sinful practices. At present, according to this view, the true Brahman ideals of old are represented by the Buddha and his Teaching rather than by degenerate Brahman priests and their lascivious gods. In its Buddhist guise true Brahmanhood is accessibe to all who have the necessary intellectual and moral qualities, since members of any social class can be admitted to the Saṇgha and receive the Teachings. This view suggests that Udbhaṭṭasiddhasvāmin, who (along with his brother) remained a layman,[31] was seeking a *modus vivendi* between his Brahmanic origins and social position and his Buddhist beliefs, and was attempting to justify those beliefs to his peers in terms of values which they held in common as Brahmans by presenting Buddhism as offering a more perfect realization of those values than that provided by their ostensible representatives.

NOTES

1. The first modern edition of the *Viśeṣastava* (Toh. 2001) appeared in 1966 edited by Ācārya L. Jamspal and published by A. K. Bose, Vārānasī. I should like to take this opportunity to express my thanks to the Rev. Ācārya for resolving a

number of difficulties relating to that work in conversations we had in January, 1977. I should also like to express my thanks to Dr. Michael Sweet for his many helpful comments and suggestions.

2. D. R. Shackleton Bailey, *The Śatapañcāśatka of Mātṛceṭa*, Cambridge, At the University Press, 1951, p. 9.

3. A. K. Warder, *Indian Kavya Literature*, Vol. 2, Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi, 1974, p. 228.

4. According to Tāranātha (*Tāranātha's History of Buddhism in India*, translated by Lama Chimpa and Alaka Chattopadhyaya, Indian Institute of Advanced Study, Simla, 1970, p. 259.) Prajñāvarman was a contemporary of Gopāla. On the date of Gopāla see, Romila Thapar, *A History of India*, Vol. I, Penguin Books, Baltimore Maryland, 1969, p. 222.

5. *Devātiśayastotra* of Śaṃkarasvāmin; Toh. 2004.

6. This story is given by Prajñāvarman in slightly different forms in his *Viśeṣastava-ṭīkā*, Toh. 2002 (Peking Reprint Vol. 46, page 4, plate 3, line 4 to plate 5 line 7) and *Devātiśayastotraṭīkā*, Toh. 2005 (Peking Reprint Vol. 46, page 22, plate 4, line 7 to plate 5 line 4.)

7. *Sarvajñāmaheśvarastotra* of Udbhaṭṭasiddhasvāmin, Toh. 2003.

8. Har Dayal, *The Bodhisattva Doctrine In Buddhist Sanskrit Literature*, Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi, 1970, p.192.

9. Tāranātha, op. cit.; p.101.

10. Tāranātha, loc. cit.

11. On Viṣṇu see verses 9, 10, 30, 34, 40, 60; Śiva, verses 4, 5, 6, 7, 9, 21; Skanda, verses 12, 67; Indra, verses 14, 39; Rāma. verses 16, 33; Bhārgava Rāma, verse 36; Vyāsa, verses 22, 31, 32: Śuka, verses 28, 29; Janaka, verse 29; Prajāpati, verse 41; Kapila/Bharadvaja, verses 43, 48, 49; Kanada, verse 44.

12. On Bhārgava Rāma see, E. Washburn Hopkins, *Epic Mythology*, Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi, 1974. p.184.

13. Hopkins, ibid., pp. 216-217.

14. Mahābhārata (Poona Edition) 12.99.43.

15. On the castration of Śiva by the sages of the Pine Forest see, Wendy O' Flaherty, *Hindu Myths*, Penguin Books, Baltimore, Maryland, 1975, pp. 325-326.

16. Hopkins, ibid., pp. 162, 220.

17. O' Flaherty, op. cit, p. 326.

18. Rāmāyana (Baroda Edition, 1960-) 1.47.15-32; 1.48.1-10 cited in O' Flaherty, op. cit., p. 305.

19. I have been unable to trace this reference.

20. On Prajāpati's incest with his daughter in the Vedas and Brāhmaṇas see O' Flaherty, op. cit., p. 313.

21. O' Flaherty, op. cit., 328-329.

22. On this and the previous two verses see, Mahābhārata (Poona Edition) 16.2.4-10.

23. Hopkins, op. cit., p.219.

24. For a survey of the arguments contained in the Pāli material see, A.K. Warder, *Indian Buddhism*, Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi, 1970, pp.118-126. On the Mahāyāna arguements see Prajñākaramati's commentary on Śantideva's Bodhicaryāvatāra IX. 60

in *Bodhicaryāvatāra of Śantideva*, edited by Dr. P.L. Vaidya, Mithila Institute, Darbhanga, 1960. pp. 213-215. It should be noted that the *Viśeṣastava* is also to be found in the Madhyamaka section of the Peking bstan 'gyur (Peking =||= 5476); having been placed there most likely on the basis of the arguments found in verses 43-46, and 52.

25. See the commentary to *Bodhicaryāvatara* IX. 66ab.

26. See M. Gangopadhyaya's *Nyāya Philosophy*, Vol. I., Calcutta, 1967, pp. 3-46, 121-179.

27. See Erich Frauwallner, *History of Indian Philosophy*, Vol. II., Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi, 1973, pp. 38-39 on the relation between the Vaiśeṣika and Jaina conceptions of the soul.

28. See note 25.

29. Bhagavadgīta, II. 22.

30. Contained in B.H. Hodgson's *Essays On The Languages, Literatures, and Religions of Nepal and Tibet*, (first printed in the transactions of the Royal Asiatic Society, vol. III., 1829) Bharat-Bharati, Varanasi, 1971, pp. 127-133.

31. Tāranātha, op. cit., pp. 100-101.

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